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AAnnaallyyssiiss ooff DDeetteerrrreennccee CDR (s) Harrison Schramm NNaavvaall PPoossttggrraadduuaattee SScchhooooll Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED JAN 2011 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Analysis of Deterrence 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School,Monterey,CA,93943 REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 2011 Force Structure Workshop, TASC Heritage Conference Center, Chantilly, VA, 24-27 January 2011 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 19 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Agenda • WWhhaatt iiss ddeetteerrrreennccee?? • A review of Analytic Methods • CCase SStuddiies • Implications and prospects for deterrence 2 Motivation “(I want) to take the lessons of the ppaasstt iinn nnuucclleeaarr ddeetteerrrreennccee aanndd apply them moving forward” – ADM Mike Mullen ”the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace. And yet this truth must coexist with another ‐ that no matter how justified, war promises human tragedy.” ‐‐ President Obama’s Nobel Peace speech 3 Deterrence: Is.. Is challenging to study because… • A coercive strategy which aims • We only gain partial to maintain the status quo by information about fforciing an addversary tto re‐ effffecttiiveness. consider the costs and – When we (or others are benefits of their actions attacked) we can conclude that our deterrence was insufficient • RReeqquuiirreess:: – When attacks to not happen, it – The ability to inflict harm to may be because of our something the adversary values deterrent, or another effect. – The Will to inflict this harm • WWee nneevveerr ttrruullyy kknnooww tthhee – Effective communication of motivations / utilities of our the ability and will adversaries. • Can sum these up in one – Their private utilities are wwoorrdd:: CCRREEDDIIBBIILLIITTYY probbabblly ‘‘unkknowabblle’’ NNoo oonnee wwaannttss ttoo bbee iinn tthhee ppoossiittiioonn ooff ffiinnddiinngg aa pprroobblleemm bbootthh iimmppoorrttaanntt for study and without good analytic methods to tackle it. ‐ Jervis 4 Analytic Methods • Critical Thinking / Systems Analysis – Kent’s First Strike Stability • Statistical Analysis: fitting models to datasets – DDiiffffiiccuullttiieess:: CCooddiinngg ddaattaa, mmooddeell ssppeecciiffiiccaattiioonn, ddeessccrriippttiivvee statistics. Presupposes model format. – Huth, Signoriono • GGame TThheory – Difficulties: presupposes an ability to compute utilities – Schellingg, Zaggare and Kilggour • History – Difficulties: May not be applicable to future campaigns – MMeeeerrsshhiimmeerr, KKeeeeggaann, ootthheerrss 5 General Conclusions • Deterrence requires all the levers of national power – it is not simpplyy a militaryy pproblem – ((all methods)) • Deterrence is most likely to fail when: – At least one side perceives the campaign will be ‘quick’ and ‘easy’ (History, Strike Stability) – At least one side perceives the campaign feels that they aarree iinn aa ‘uussee oorr lloossee’ ssiittuuaattiioonn ((HHiissttoorryy, GGaammee TThheeoorryy)) – Deterrence postures irrelevant if not effectively communicated (History, Statistics) – Communication Fails (History) • The objective of deterrence cannot be ‘Everything – EEvveerryywwhheerree’’ – wwee sshhoouulldd pprriioorriittiizzee wwhhaatt wwee wwiisshh ttoo ddeetteerr. 6 Who is deterrable? Deterrable Not deterrable • Nations that seek to • Groups who do not seek to minimize costs minimize costs – Because they don’t count them – Because they have ideological imperatives to act – Because theyy seek conflict • Nations that feel secure in • Nations who feel they are in their nuclear (and other) a use // lloose siittuattiion. deterrents 7 Nuclear Deterrence: The Gold Standard? • Sources of Stability: •Kent’s model of Nuclear – CClleeaarr CCoommmmuunniiccaattiioonnss DDeetteerrrreennccee – Assured Retaliation •Advantages: tractable, • Sources of Instability: simpple,, eleggant – “Splendid First Strike” •Disadvantages: Measures the – Deterrence capability made ‘costs’ of attacking first versus irrelevant: tthhe ‘‘costts’’ off attttackkiing secondd • Communication lapses i.e. •The closer this ratio is to Saddam Hussein unityy,, the more stable the – “Mandates” – Political or personal motives that force a system is. solution • Germany WWII? 8 Kent’s Model of deterrence FFiirrsstt ssttrriikkee SSttaabbiilliittyy IInnddeexx:: CC CC AA,11 BB,11 FFSSSSII   C C A,2 B,2 Where: C represents costs; several definitions have been used RRaattiiooss ddoonn’tt tteellll tthhee wwhhoollee ssttoorryy;; mmaaggnniittuuddee ooff ppootteennttiiaall ccoossttss kkeeyy aass well. 9