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Transforming Aerospace Power Frank Finelli* Our Vision can be characterized in one word: Transformation. —Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen THE UNITED STATES is pursuing a defense strategy developed during the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), stated in terms of “shape, re spond, and prepare now.” The latter tenet of this strategy implies change in defense ca pabilities to leverage advances in techno-l ogy and address operational challenges en- visioned for the early twenty-first century. Certainly, aerospace power will have a key role in our future. But the real question to consider is whether this nation will develop the bureaucratic and political resolve to make the necessary investments and key decisions to truly transform aerospace power as Secretary Cohen indicates, or whether we will merely evolve the current state of aerospace affairs. To put the bottom line up front, the United States is destined merely to evolve aerospace power unless we demonstrate, in a joint setting, the capa bility to overcome vulnerabilities associated with technical shortfalls and operational challenges in areas such as anti-access, target identification, and force protection. Before discussing the future of aerospace power, we need to define transformation in general and differentiate it from a mere evo *This article is adapted from a speech presented at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Conference—“The United States as a Twenty-First-Century Aerospace Power”––in Boston on 19 November 1998. 4 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1999 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1999 to 00-00-1999 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Transforming Aerospace Power 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Air and Space Power Journal,155 N. Twining Street,Maxwell REPORT NUMBER AFB,AL,36112-6026 9. 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Some people as long-range, precision strike; and distributed, sociate this notion of discontinuous change survivable, and redundant satellite systems1. with a revolution in military affairs. The pro- Others postulate that this transformation in posed transformation of aerospace power cludes the increased migration of capabil-i involves not only the pursuit of new tech ties to space and unmanned platforms and nologies but also the adoption of new orga the adoption of a decisive halt-and-contain nizational structures and new operational ment paradigm. concepts. The National Defense Panel Yet, we must address several key issues (NDP) described some attributes of this before increased aerospace investments will transformation as it relates to aerospace gain consensus support within the Pentagon 6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1999 or on Capitol Hill. First, aerospace power that the technical and operational potential must demonstrate the technical perfor for space-based capabilities is so com mance to be decisive. Second, the end-to- pelling that space should play a bigger role end operational architecture for the employ in aerospace power: “I do see an opportunity ment of aerospace power must address an for us to exploit this period of unchallenged adversary’s asymmetric exploitation of its conventional superiority on Earth to shift vulnerabilities. And third, these decision substantial resources to space.” 2 This article makers must be comfortable that increased complements Senator Smith’s views and pr-i aerospace investment, as opposed to a re- marily assesses technical and operational allocation of resources across capabilities, is aspects of the air side of aerospace power. required. Correspond-ingly, it provides some back- With respect to this latter point, Sen. Bob ground on the case for transformation, de- Smith (R-N.H.), chairman of the Strategic scribes challenges for the aerospace para Subcommittee of the Senate Armed digm, and assesses Congress’s perspective Services Committee (SASC), has articulated on several aspects of an aerospace trans- a view that the US Air Force is shortchang formation. ing space power. In short, his assessment is The Case for Transformation Previously in US history, we have found ourselves unprepared for threats we faced at the outset of war. Our nation rallied to overcome these threats eventually, but at a cost—not only in fiscal terms but also in lives cut short. Today, the United States stands as the sole global superpower in an era when no nation truly threatens our vital interests. But in the near future, technology will enable a different range of capabilities and threats Too many, too few, or just the wrong kinds of aircraft? Are there too many options and pro ponents for too little money? What risks are acceptable in fielding tomorrow’s weapons while fighting today’s wars? TRANSFORMING AEROSPACE POWER 7 that we must dominate to sustain this global key investments in pursuit of transforming position. So the challenge for us is to trans- defense for the future. For example, the ser form defense through leveraging technology, vices are planning to replace many of their changing organizations, and developing legacy strike systems on nearly a one-for- new operational concepts to combat these one basis, without recognizing the capabil-i future threats successfully. ties that other services bring to the joint war However, the United States has yet to fight. The defense plan supports the pro gain a consensus about the future path of curement of nearly four thousand advanced our military capabilities and the defense po-l tactical fighters, reported to be two to six icy required to achieve it. The QDR con times more effective than the aircraft they cluded that “our future force will be different replace; over two thousand advanced at- in character. . . . New operational concepts tack and armed reconnaissance heli and organizational arrangements will enable copters; and thousands upon thousands of our joint forces to achieve new levels of ef new, long-range, precision-guided mun-i fectiveness.”3 tions as well as cannon and missile sys Unfortunately, the QDR did not touch the tems. But what is the aggregate joint re sticky issue of prioritizing capability initia quirement that justifies all this strike tives to articulate how and when our future capability? Furthermore, even if we require force would be different in character. the capabilities that each of these systems Although Gen John Shalikashvili, former brings, what is the coherent, crosscutting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), assessment process that determines how crafted Joint Vision 2010 to guide such a many of each of these systems we should quest, to date, this vision has failed to effec procure to support the national security tively focus the Pentagon’s development ef strategy? forts, largely because it is being vaguely in- In short, one of the primary reasons the terpreted to mean all things to all people4. JCS testified before the SASC in Consequently, Congress is confronted September 1998 about an approximate $25 with numerous, competing approaches to fu billion per year shortfall in the defense bud- ture warfare. Some advocate aerospace get is that we have a crisis in joint require power’s precision strike; others argue for ments. Despite the Clinton administration’s land power’s positional advantage; still oth claims to have added over $110 billion to ers argue for a new, rapid dominance that the defense program from fiscal year 2000 destroys an enemy’s will to resist; and the through fiscal year 2005, the joint chiefs list goes on. These disparate views bring continue to testify of double-digit annual several problems for Congress. First, these shortfalls in the defense budget. In short, approaches require radically different invest this requirements crisis fosters an environ ment policies, organizational structures, and ment wherein each of the services inde doctrine. Second, these approaches, taken pendently pursues a force structure and in- together, are unaffordable and unrequired. vestment strategy that fields a far more Third, we have today no unbiased way to effective conventional military. But we are test the effectiveness of these competing doing so at a time when the conventional approaches. And fourth, all these ap military capability of our adversaries is proaches may not even address the real largely in decline. As it is, we estimate that threats to our twenty-first-century national US defense spending exceeds that of the security. next 10 nations in the world combined— The military services have already sub and many of those nations are our allies.5 mitted a fiscal program for the years all the The demographics of international de way out to 2005. The concern is that this fense expenditures simply do not support a program focuses too heavily on the here and conclusion that our potential adversaries are now and imprudently chooses to postpone investing their scarce defense resources to 8 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1999 buy advanced tactical fighters and tanks by abilities across the spectrum of our joint- the thousands. Rather, they are pursuing force capabilities and invest in areas that will asymmetric capabilities in areas such as minimize them or counter an adversary’s re anti-access, distributed surface-to-surface sponse to them—either conventionally or strike, space degradation, information war- asymmetrically. fare, and what Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig calls weapons of mass dis The Aerospace Paradigm ruption. So the real growth in defense re quirements most probably deals with com Aerospace advocates propose that the bating asymmetric, as opposed to employment of an increased array of air and conventional, capabilities. But that is not space capabilities can leverage technology where we are placing our effort, and this is a to address many operational vulnerabilities mistake. and ensure our national security with far From this perspective the NDP made a less risk to forces and at less cost than a-l compelling argument that fundamental, not ternative approaches. This paradigm as incremental, change is essential. Panel serts that the United States can rely primar members concluded that we face greater ily on aerospace assets to control an risk in the future than we face today due to adversary through information superiority, the nature, magnitude, and trend of envi global reach, and precision strike. At the sioned operational challenges. high end of the operational spectrum, it ar Furthermore, they assessed that these cha-l gues that we can decisively halt and contain lenges, when juxtaposed with opportunities massive land assaults primarily with driven largely by the revolution in informa bombers, tactical aviation, and missiles. tion technology, may be so extraordinary Furthermore, the aerospace approach con- that they could literally drive discontinuous tends that we can reduce an enemy so sig change in the way antagonists will fight us— nificantly that a large ground counteroffen and the way we choose to fight them. sive is never required. At the mid and lower Consequently, the NDP questioned the ends, this paradigm advocates that we can course of existing policy and recommended employ aerospace power to coerce adver instead that we pursue with priority a policy saries to adjust policy or deter them from to transform today’s post-cold-war force to tomorrow’s information-age force. The taking actions in opposition to US and allied panel’s recommendation is direct and un interests. This approach has huge implica mistakable: “The Department of Defense tions: increased airpower investment; down- should accord the highest priority to execut sized land forces; and new, joint concepts in ing a transformation strategy. . . . In the ab which land forces support decisive air oper sence of additional defense funding, the ations by herding targets, securing the front, transformation could be funded by infra and mopping up the battlefield. structure and acquisition reform, reducing As supporters of aerospace power, we the operational tempo associated with non should challenge our thinking about the fu warfighting activities, canceling acquisition ture viability of such an approach. We programs, or reducing force structure and should also consider the tactics that our ad end strength.”6 versaries may employ to mitigate the effec The panel’s recommendation implies that tiveness of aerospace power. we should reconsider decisions that commit Correspondingly, before we pursue invest enormous resources to forces and platforms ing in an aerospace transformation, we have which may be less relevant in the future. We to demonstrate the performance of this ap do not need to focus on known and familiar proach and understand its associated vu-l threats we can already effectively deal with. nerabilities. Critics have been suspicious of Rather, we need to identify potential vulner aerospace’s claimed performance before TRANSFORMING AEROSPACE POWER 9 and since Operation Desert Storm, and they issue. The issue is ensuring that a viable tar- continue to doubt whether airpower can de get is at that location when the effects are cisively engage the broad range of targets delivered. Aircraft and ordnance are only a we may face in the future. subset of the operational, end-to-end arch-i Congress certainly heard the Department tecture associated with the employment of of Defense’s (DOD) and manufacturers’ aerospace power. In short, until we demon claims of weapon system performance dur strate in a joint venue the technical capabi-l ing the Gulf War. Nonetheless, Capitol Hill ity to fuse information from the strategic, op focused on the General Accounting Office’s erational, and tactical sensors of all services (GAO) assessment of airpower in the Gulf, and agencies; automatically recognize tar- which concluded that these claims “were gets; and dynamically plan missions, we will overstated, misleading, inconsistent with never be able to defeat a theater-level set of best available data, or unverifiable. ”7 But fixed, fleeting, and moving targets with aero GAO’s comments on the limitation of air- space power. power drew the significant attention: “Air If an adversary chooses to mass his mil-i power was inhibited by the limited ability of tary formations deep in the battle space and aircraft sensors to identify and acquire tar- segregate them from his populace, then gets, the failure to gather intelligence on crit aerospace power may work wonders. ical targets, and the inability to collect and However, an adversary is likely to disperse disseminate [bomb damage assessment] in his force to make us employ our aircraft and a timely manner. Similarly, the contributions precision munitions at uneconomic rates. of guided weaponry incorporating advanced Further-more, adversaries may mix combat- technologies and their delivery platforms ants and noncombatants within the effective were limited because the cooperative oper radius of our weapons, thereby placing the ating conditions they require were not con- United States in a position of causing unac sistently encountered.”8 ceptable collateral damage. Military writings Critics acknowledge the finite availability in nations that are our potential adversaries of precision munitions during the Gulf War already emphasize similar tactics to exploit and the advances that have been made in vulnerabilities associated with an aerospace munitions, sensors, and command and con approach.9 trol processes since that time. Regardless, Yet, these current operational challenges they still contend that employing aerospace do not even address a wide range of asym power effectively on the open desert of metric tactics that limit the effectiveness of Southwest Asia may be a far more elemen an aerospace approach, some of which tary undertaking than destroying and con taining disjointed, infiltrating forces in the ter have already been employed by Saddam rain of Korea or Yugoslavia. More generally, Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic. These tac they argue that aerospace power will never tics include placing civilians within fixed tar- be decisive because our command, control, gets, hiding high-value military assets in communications, and computers (C4) and in urban areas, employing multispectral coun telligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance termeasures to disrupt terminal seekers, (ISR) capabilities will remain unable to dif and attacking our in-theater air basing. In ferentiate between friend, foe, noncombat- addition, within the last year, we have wit ant, and decoy in real time. This is the heart nessed in Operation Desert Fox the anti-ac of the target-identification challenge. cess problems described by the NDP that The United States either has in its pos limit the employment of short-range, land- session or will soon possess the airpower based tactical air (TACAIR). Interestingly, platforms and munitions to hit any given this access limitation originated with our a-l point on the ground, virtually anytime and lies and coalition partners—not our ene anywhere on this planet. But that is not the mies. 10 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1999 that we have 40 percent too much TACAIR.1 0 Further-more, our experience in operations Desert Fox and Allied Force raises scrutiny on the premise that aero space power, when employed without land power, can adequately influence the policy of our adversaries. This is not to argue that aerospace power is anything other than an absolutely essential element of US joint warfighting capability. However, it does recog nize that an aerospace paradigm has yet to demonstrate a comparative advantage over alternative joint war-fighting approaches in leveraging the opportunity of technology or Above: The extended-range variant of the US Navy’s addressing operational challenges envi standoff land attack missile (SLAM ER) and (below) a sioned for the early twenty-first century. conventional air-launched cruise missile (CALCM). Do differences over guided-weapon design and employ This concern over demonstrated perfor ment result from reasonable, even prudent, interpreta mance and operational vulnerabilities, when tions of the services’ expertise and experience or un coupled with an impression by many sena necessary concessions to service parochialism? tors and representatives that Congress has already allocated sufficient funding to this broader mission area, results in slim pros pects for asymmetric increases in invest ment to transform aerospace power. Therefore, it is appropriate to comment on investment balance across three pillars of aerospace power: TACAIR, global attack, and space capabilities. Tactical Air DOD is planning to invest well over $300 bi-l lion across the three tactical aircraft pro grams—the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, F-22 Assessment Raptor, and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)—de spite concerns over the operational cha-l To date, we have demonstrated neither lenges addressed earlier. The consensus in the required technologies nor the opera Congress appears to be that the Pentagon’s tional processes required to overcome vu-l planned investment in nearly four thousand nerabilities in the end-to-end architecture for short-range aircraft exceeds the level re the application of aerospace power. quired. But that is where the consensus Therefore, it is imprudent to conclude that ends because no simple prescription exists claims of decisive halt and containment are for cutting it back. valid and that we should invest additional re- Simply put, the air forces of the US Air sources to pursue this approach. This is one Force, Navy, and Marine Corps dominate of the reasons that the NDP concluded we the skies. Nonetheless, we are planning to should move toward fewer numbers of replace our existing inventory with far more short-range aircraft and that Adm Bill capable and far more expensive platforms Owens, US Navy, Retired, former vice chair- on largely a one-for-one basis. Yet, our ad man of the JCS, testified before the SASC versaries already hide their aircraft when TRANSFORMING AEROSPACE POWER 11 facing a confrontation with US airpower solutely requires the timely fielding of a rather than fight and risk them all. Although STOVL JSF. Gen Chuck Krulak, comman we see isolated news of foreign TACAIR-de dant of the Marine Corps, testified that velopment efforts—the Eurofighter, the “STOVL capability is critical to the Corps and Gripen, and the Russian Fighter 2000—we critical to the way we think we are going to have no competitor with the defense re- be fighting in the 21st Century.”12 sources to invest in an integrated aerospace Consequently, before proposing to push JSF system with advanced C4 and ISR. to the right, the Pentagon and Congress Correspondingly, the valid assessment for should prudently address the very thorny military planners to make is not their aircraft question of whether the Marine Corps’s pur against our aircraft but their aerospace sys suit of transformation concepts in ship-to-ob tem-of-systems against ours. jective maneuver should also be slowed and More fundamentally, however, it is exactly whether the ser-vice should retain a fixed- the combination of international defense re- wing TACAIR capability. source shortfalls and US development ofthe three TACAIR programs, particularly theF- Global Attack 22, that will lock potential adversaries out Despite claims of power projection based in from even pursuing an air-to-air or air-to- the continental United States (CONUS), ground capability. Instead, US TACAIR in- global attack is still largely a one-punch phe vestments could very well accelerate the de nomenon. Nonetheless, long-range capabi-l velopment of surface-to-air or ities could become a more relevant piece of surface-to-surface regimes of missiles and lasers, as well as other asymmetric capabi-l aerospace power because they mitigate vu-l ities on the part of our potential adversaries. nerabilities in access and leverage an in Therefore, the mere notion of air dominance creasingly capable suite of precision mun-i could fundamentally change to decrease tions. Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, executive emphasis on air-to-air capabilities, while in- director of the Center for Strategic and creasing capabilities against ground- Budgetary Assessment, testified on 10 launched effects. How do we even achieve March 1999 before SASC’s Airland air dominance against an enemy missile Subcommittee that even countries with aus force? tere military budgets could invest in missile Given this background on TACAIR, capabilities that would hold US forward air Congress had largely capped the cost of the bases at risk and jeopardize the employ- Super Hornet and the Raptor to keep JSF ment of tactical aircraft.1 3 There-fore, we development on schedule, particularly the must develop a balanced set of strike capa short takeoff, vertical landing (STOVL) var-i bilities that can sustain the required volume ant. But that intent is now challenged be- and character of effects without relying on cause the F-22 is experiencing cost over- tactical aircraft from fixed, in-theater land runs of approximately $700 million, which bases. will break the statutory developmental-cost Operations Desert Fox and Allied Force cap.1 1 These overruns are in addition to the demonstrate that we do not presently have approximately $2 billion in cost overruns a-l the capability to instantaneously conduct ready absorbed by the F-22 program. Since and sustain global attack. Simply put, long- the Super Hornet and the Raptor compete range precision strike is limited by the ca fiscally against the JSF for resources in the pacity of our bomber force and naval fleet near term, the Navy, Air Force, and tactical- and the time associated with positioning aircraft industrial base desire either to add naval forces. We can air-refuel critical as- funding for TACAIR programs or delay the sets projected from CONUS but have yet to JSF to cover these overruns. But the trans- develop concepts regarding aerial rearming formation of Marine Corps TACAIR ab- or refitting of bombers and replenishing of 12 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1999 at-sea missiles. Such concepts are central space. However, numerous members be to addressing the extensive turnaround lieve that DOD has the fiscal and require times associated with the potential lack of ments flexibility to take more risk in TACAIR fixed, in-theater basing due to the anti-ac and place a bigger emphasis and invest cess problem. ment in space. Consequently, we should not Congress has undoubtedly enjoyed the anticipate that Congress will add much in respite from B-2 bomber debates since the the way of funding for space capabilities defense authorization cycle of fiscal year when shifting funds may be a more prudent 1998. However, many people remain con approach. Far more likely, key congres cerned about the absence of a follow-on de sional leaders will continue to push for the velopment program for long-range strike ca establishment of a Space Corps to enhance pabilities besides conventional upgrades to the bureaucratic position for space capabil-i bombers. In fact, we hear that the Air Force ties in the Pentagon’s fight for resources. plans to wait 35 years before replacing its Second, many members of Congress are long-range bombers.14 However, it may be uncertain what the mix of DOD versus com prudent, given advances in weapon techno-l mercial space investment should be. ogy and the rapid development of anti-ac Industry projects the investment of a half-tri-l cess capabilities by our potential adver lion dollars and the launch of between saries, for US defense planners to take an twelve hundred and seventeen hundred entirely different approach that accelerates satellites over the next 10 years.16 This level development of new, long-range, precision- dwarfs military space activity and presents engagement capabilities in terms of a B-3 an opportunity for dual use or outsourcing. bomber, an unmanned combat aerial veh-i Hence, Congress may await insights on how cle, or some completely different means of successfully the military can use commercial strategic strike. space capabilities before dedicating a larger share of public-sector funding to military space activity. Space Third, Congress remains concerned During the Air Force posture hearing on 12 about our ability to protect and control as- February 1998, Sen. Strom Thurmond (R- sets in space. We need to learn more about S.C.), SASC chairman, commented that with asymmetric vulnerabilities to space and Global Engagement’s vision of a Space and ways of mitigating an adversary’s attempts Air Force, we expected to see a noticeable to exploit them. Furthermore, we need to un shift in Air Force resource allocation toward derstand these vulnerabilities across the op space capabilities. But no such shift has oc erational architecture for space capabil-i curred. The senator asked the chief of staff ties—the space-based assets themselves, of the Air Force whether this emphasis on as well as launch facilities, ground control, space was rhetoric or whether we would see downlinks, and so forth. For example, what money put behind it. Gen Mike Ryan’s re are we doing to investigate the relative mer sponse that Global Engagement is “a very its of hardened assets, rapid constellation long term vision of where the Air Force is reconstitution, and high-altitude-endurance going” speaks volumes of near-term com- unmanned aerial vehicles as satellite surro mitment to space transformation.1 5 gates? Some people criticize Congress for not Global Engagement and New World doing more in terms of funding space capa Vistas clearly provide a vision for space’s bilities, but several reasons exist for this playing a key role in a revolution in military state of relative legislative inaction. First, the affairs, both as the home of joint enablers revealed preference of the Pentagon—as and a base of operations.17 But now the assessed from the white side of the defense rhetoric appears to have changed from an budget—is that air is more important than objective Space and Air Force to an objec-