DTIC ADA528818: Principles for Coalition Warfare

15 Pages·0.34 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

0901 RisCassi 10/14/97 10:26 AM Page 58
Summary
Past experience and military potentialities destine the United States to lead a disproportionate share of future
multilateral coalitions, a challenge that is compounded by the need for doctrine to conduct joint operations
in a combined environment. Four tenets go far toward achieving success in a coalition war: agility which calls
for maintaining balance and force in shifting situations while striking in fleeting windows of opportunity,
initiative which means dominating the terms of battle and thus depriving the enemy of that same option,
depth which considers every dimension of war and envelops the entire spectrum of events across time and
space, and synchronization which applies combat power both at the optimum moment and in the right place
while controlling a myriad of simultaneous actions. But no commonly accepted doctrine for coalition war-
fare exists today. Any multinational operation will require planning by all the participants, interoperability,
shared risks and burdens, emphasis on commonalties, and diffused credit for success.
This article is being published simultaneously in Military Review, vol. 73, no. 6 (June 1993).
PRINCIPLES
FOR COALITION
WARFARE
global interests and responsibilities of our
Nation inevitably dictate that far more often
than not our forces will be engaged in al-
liance and coalition activities. This article ad-
dresses fundamental tenets that underpin
By R O B E R T W. R I S C A S S I
our efforts to create a doctrine for joint oper-
ations in a combined environment.
When we say we no longer intend to be
Since the beginning of this century, the world’s policeman, it does not mean we
there has been a strong common are going to disengage. It means we want
thread in the involvement of Ameri- more policemen to share in the responsibili-
can forces in combat. Almost every ties, risks, and costs of settling the world’s
time military forces have deployed from the most vexing problems—intrinsically, we are
United States it has been as a member of— articulating a condition for wider and more
most often to lead—coalition operations. active participation in coalition operations.
Rarely have we committed, nor do we intend Even though we consider this a responsible
to commit forces unilaterally. Our remaining proposition on its merits alone, the redistri-
forward positioned forces are routinely en- bution of global wealth and economic power
gaged in coalition operations during peace makes it also essential. In 1945, the American
and are committed to do so in war. The
58 JFQ / Summer 1993
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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
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Principles for Coalition Warfare
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National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,Fort REPORT NUMBER
Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319
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RisCassi
economy produced around half of the world’s the leaders who led victorious coalitions, as
Gross National Product. Today, it comprises if the secrets of success lay in personalities
less than a quarter. In any event, coalition op- more than methods. A doctrinal founda-
erations are generally key to legitimizing the tion must be based on methods.
use of force. Yet, both as a function of our his- Interestingly, and as a testament to their
torical experience as a leader of coalition op- value, we have yet to experience an inci-
erations and the continuing fact that America dence where a prepared military coalition in
brings the most military power to the table, which we are engaged has been attacked. In
we should also recognize that American mili- those cases—Western Europe and South
tary leaders will almost always be called upon Korea—where the coalition had the will,
to lead multilateral coalitions in which we are time, and resources to prepare for alliance
participants. The fundamental question warfare, the effects were never tested in bat-
becomes one of tle. Thus, we cannot be certain their prepara-
“how?” tions were sound. It may have been that the
Notwithstand- tranquility they imposed undercut their abil-
ing our reoccurring ity to achieve essential concessions from na-
historical experi- tions whose priorities were more nationalis-
ence, we have at tic than threat-oriented. Every other case we
times been remark- scrutinize involved ad hoc coalitions merged
ably ill-prepared for hurriedly in crisis or conflict. For obvious
coalition opera- reasons, they also may not represent the
tions. In truth, we model upon which we should create a doc-
have not had, nor trine. Between the two, however, there is
do we yet possess, a ample experience to build a doctrine.
commonly agreed We know that joint operations, in and of
doctrine for forming themselves, represent significantly greater
or fighting as part of complexity than single-service operations.
military coalitions. Some may argue it is not The Joint Staff is trying to create the doctrinal
necessary to have such a foundation; but, architecture to glue joint forces together in
under its absence, we will have to address warfare. In a coalition, the difficulties of joint
each new coalition on an ad hoc basis. Also operations are still prevalent, but with the
in its absence, we have no comprehensive added dimensions and complexity of two or
doctrinal base to create the means
or tools to improve our ability to notwithstanding historical experience,
participate in, or lead, coalition op-
we have been remarkably ill-prepared for
erations. There is a clear and om-
coalition operations
nipresent reason to create such a
doctrinal consensus. Five of our re-
gional commanders in chief (CINCs) are more national armed forces, all of which
coalition or alliance commanders, as is one bring their separate orientations and proclivi-
of our specified CINCs. ties to the practice of warfare. Often the ap-
There is no cookbook approach to parent intractability of problems has been so
coalition warfare. Every coalition will be awesome that any attempts at achieving
different in purpose, character, composi- unity have been limited to the strategic and
tion, and scope. But there are some basic operational levels. Battlefield responsibilities
commonalities that confront any coalition have been divided nationally based on the ca-
commander. Obviously, the most valid pabilities each nation brings to the coalition.
basis we have to form a doctrine is our own Each national force is given discrete sectors
historical experience. Yet, for the most part, and missions. A single leader is appointed to
our historic perspectives tend to analyze unify coalition efforts and—based on the
numbers of national forces involved—decen-
tralizes operations through national chains of
General Robert W. RisCassi, USA, is currently the Commander
command, which become multi-hatted. This
in Chief of the United Nations and the ROK–U.S. Combined
is a patchwork approach. Seams are recog-
Forces Command; the Commander of U.S. Forces, Korea; and
nized but stitched together by strategic and
the Commanding General, Eighth Army.
Summer 1993 / JFQ 59
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COALITION WARFARE
operational agreement. Sometimes the seams of joint combat power, the warfighting doc-
are tight; sometimes they are loose. trine must be common to all arms. In the ab-
If we look back at World War I, World sence of a commonly understood doctrine, it
War II, Vietnam, or even the Gulf War, we becomes extraordinarily difficult to plan or
see variations on this structure and also the execute military operations.
problems that resulted. In multiple cases, Yet, approaching a commonly agreed
campaigns were disjointed by ruptures in doctrine can be politically frustrating. Past
timing, unity of purpose, or tactical disagree- U.S. attempts in Europe and Korea to enjoin
ment. Often commanders found themselves allies to embrace AirLand battle were met
in positions where mutual support was es- with arguments that it is a distinctly Ameri-
sential. Yet, procedures can doctrine whose execution is technology-
were nonexistent or inad- dependent—therefore suspected as a Trojan
equate and had to be Horse for “buy American” campaigns—or
man jury-rigged on the spot. that it is terrain-dependent and suitable only
Den Cross use of assets—com- in Europe. Notwithstanding suspicions, hav-
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S. compatibility. In some most firm basis for organizing and conduct-
U.
cases, vast technological ing coalition operations. They are not char-
The U.S. Coast Guard
differences between forces caused either acteristically American attributes, nor are
cutter Chaseand
the Russian Maritime multiple tiering of the battlefield or over-re- they limited to any single service. They are
Border Guard frigate liance on the most capable units continu- cross-national intellectual tenets which,
Orelin the port of ously to perform the most difficult missions. when physically applied, cause success in
Vladivostok.
Differences in national doctrines, languages, modern war. Their application may be im-
and cultures often meant breaches in under- pacted by the technology available, but the
standing, inability to communicate on the tenets are essentially mental, rather than
battlefield, fratricide, and disorga-
nization. In short, effective opera- a coalition must share a common doctrine to
tions were hindered by multiple
take advantage of commonalties
sources of friction.
What are the elements essen-
tial to conducting joint operations in a physical. They are a reflection of how tech-
combined environment? In other words, nology has evolved modern battle, and may
what have we learned and how do we in- grow obsolete over time as the nature of war
tend to apply it the next time American continues to mutate. As both mental states
forces are asked to lead a multinational of mind and emphasized characteristics in
coalition in combat? battle, they allow us to bridge the intellec-
tual gap between “principles of war” and
Doctrine
practical execution. More particularly, when
The first point is that a coalition must
closely examined, these tenets strike at the
share a common doctrine to take advantage
heart of the most difficult, yet crucial aspects
of commonalties. Doctrine is more than sim-
of joint and coalition operations.
ply how we intend to fight. It is also the tech-
Agility is compared to that quality found
nical language with which we communicate
in great boxers who sustain an intuitive grasp
commander’s intent, battlefield missions,
of their position and motion in the ring—as
control measures, combined arms and joint
well as their opponent’s—and maintain the
procedures, and command relationships.
balance and force to move and strike as op-
Doctrine is not contained simply at one level
portunity permits. In an environment that is
of war—strategic, operational, or tactical—it
constantly shifting, where the unexpected is
embodies all. Campaign execution demands
to be expected, agility is essential. Battle is a
that these levels of war become inextricably
contest where vulnerabilities and opportuni-
linked. To achieve the full synergistic effects
ties open and close continuously; victory
goes most often to the commander and force
60 JFQ / Summer 1993
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RisCassi
with the balance and insight to strike or shift effect of limiting or restraining initiative. It
within these windows. Agility derives from a was the quality exuded by Admiral Chester
keen sense of what is happening in battle, Nimitz and his commanders at Midway as
the poise to transition rapidly from one situ- they turned the tide of Japanese offensives
ation to the next, and a physical and mental through tactical and operational initiative.
ability to always have more options than the As Nimitz’s forces closed with the more
enemy. It was powerfully displayed by Gen- powerful Japanese fleets, they continuously
eral Walker and his coalition command in sought to induce vulnerabilities in their op-
the battle for the Pusan perimeter. Relying on ponent, until they were able to execute a
interior lines, Republic of Korea (ROK)/U.S. decisive thrust that caught the Japanese
forces continuously repo- fleets off-balance. Tactically, the decisive air
sitioned and reconfigured attacks that won the battle were not a pre-
reserves to parry enemy planned operation; they were a timely re-
thrusts, shifted forces sponse applied when the enemy fleet was
along the outer perimeter located and deemed vulnerable to and
Chang to reduce or accept vul- within reach of an air attack. At the opera-
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S. Ar more rapidly than North understood the higher intent and was able
U.
Korean commanders. It to link both the risks and benefits of his ac-
Soldiers of the 25th
was a liquid defense that succeeded because tions to the larger campaign design. The im-
Infantry Division
(Light) train for de- it retained its balance to address the unex- pact was a strategic turning point in the Pa-
ployment to the Middle pected. Often, North Korean thrusts were re- cific campaign. Had Nimitz adhered to the
East to take part in pelled within a hair’s breadth of a decisive letter of his instructions, it is unlikely he
Operation Desert
breakthrough. Eliminating any seams be- would have delivered this blow and the
Storm.
tween American and South Korean forces was course of the Pacific campaign would have
vital to sustaining agility. All sources of com- been different.
bat power were pooled, boundaries and com- Depth requires both mental conceptual-
mand relations were shifted as the situation ization and physical reach. It is applied as a
required, and there was an absolute merging reference to time, space, and resources. It rec-
of joint and binational efforts. The agility of ognizes that modern battle has eliminated
a multinational force proved superior to that linearity—and linear thought. War is a con-
of a homogenous enemy force. tinuum of events and activities in space and
Initiative, again, is a state of mind as time. Both the increased tempo of battle—
well as an action-reaction cycle. At its core, whether through faster, more mobile ground
it is dictating the terms of battle to an oppo- forces, higher sortie generation rates for air-
nent, thus obviating the opponent’s ability craft, or the evolution of fleets no longer tied
to exercise initiative. Thus, it is a highly to homeports—and the increased ranges, ac-
contested quality whose balance swings on curacies, and lethalities of weapons systems
surprise, deception, speed of action, ingenu- have compressed time and space. In all di-
ity, and asymmetric comprehension. Initia- mensions of war, the current and future bat-
tive requires flexibility in thought and ac- tles must be interrelated. Like a chess player
tion, an ability to act and react faster than who views the board as a single, interrelated
an opponent, and a derived priority among plane of action—and each move as a prelude
subordinates at all levels regarding the link- to a series of further moves—the modern
age of their actions to the ultimate intent, commander must extend his hand in time
more so than the scheme of higher com- and space to create future vulnerabilities and
manders. It has been made all the more crit- opportunities, and reduce future enemy op-
ical by the rampant pace or tempo of mod- tions. Coalition commanders at Normandy
ern battle. No plan, no matter how detailed, applied this tenet decisively. Recognizing the
can foresee every contingency, develop- vulnerability of Allied landing forces to Field
ment, vulnerability, or opportunity that will
arise in battle. In fact, the more detailed and
inhibiting the plan, it may have the reverse
Summer 1993 / JFQ 61
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COALITION WARFARE
Marshal Erwin Rommel’s ability to counter- two operations as coordinated hammerblows
concentrate heavy armor forces on the Co- to crumble the North Korean offensive and
tentin peninsula, they forged and executed a turn what appeared to be a risky operation
deep interdiction campaign to slow the into one of history’s most memorable routs.
movement of German armored columns and The full series of operations—air, sea, ground,
prevent them from arriving at the battlefield and amphibious—were carefully synchro-
before the coalition was able to establish de- nized to achieve maximum shock and sur-
fensible beachheads. Simultaneous with the prise. Because of the risks, the timing had to
initiation of the air campaign, French resis- be precise, with each operation intended to
tance and Allied special operations units create conditions for the success of the next
executed a daring operation, operation. Coordination between services
targeting the concentration ap- and national forces was exacting and thor-
paratus of German forces and ough. Once the series of operations began,
further inhibiting the flow of they operated in tandem to crush the North
Holmes German reinforcements from Korean offensive. The landing forces at In-
W. reaching the beachhead in chon moved deftly inland, cutting the North
D.
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U.S. tions, and the interdiction tions for an audaciously executed breakout,
British troops and umbrella covered all of the na- which then converged northward. Air opera-
units from other coali- tional ground forces participating in the in- tions were executed to harass and interdict
tion countries gather
vasion. The invasion succeeded because the withdrawal of North Korean columns. It
for review by King
coalition commanders applied nonlinear was a tightly synchronized series of opera-
Fahd of Saudi Arabia
during Operation thought to their operations, striking in depth tions, involving the forces of several nations
Desert Storm. in both the air and ground dimensions with in a series of the most difficult, yet success-
the full palette of Allied capabilities. ful, joint operations in the history of warfare.
Synchronization is perhaps the most dif- The principles of war also offer a way to
ficult tenet to apply in coalition operations. intellectually massage the elements of an
It is a term often related to the inner work- operation to understand its risks and
ings of a watch. In that context, it is the cali- strengths. Almost every nation’s military re-
brated movement of hundreds or thousands lies on a list of principles; for the most part
of different pieces moving in tandem and op- they are derivatives of one another. As a
erating cooperatively to produce the desired whole, the principles focus commanders
effect. In war, the desired effect is simply and staffs in their effort to decide whether a
combat power at the time and place of the course of action is prudent and to under-
commander’s choosing. It is key to achieving stand its risks. When viewed in context with
unity and efficiency in action. Yet, in a coali- the tenets, combined commanders have a
tion there are great inhibitors to effecting solid intellectual foundation for action. Just
synchronization. Differences in language, as important, commonly accepted military
technology, doctrine, and training act to principles serve as a point of reference when
deter efficiency and increase the potential for organizing the coalition and establishing
friction. These problems are not overcome command relations.
simply through planning, although thor- The tenets and principles are vital means
ough planning is a key factor. Synchroniza- to think about war, but these thoughts must
tion must also be fluidly applied as condi- be structured. The layering of military art
tions change and the unexpected occurs. It into strategic, operational, and tactical levels
relies on common procedures, a shared un- is valid and for the most part universal. Al-
derstanding of the language of battle, and though the layers are difficult to separate,
smooth linkages between the disparate na- they provide the intellectual linkage between
tional entities in a coalition, at all levels. The campaigns, operations, battles, and engage-
success of General Douglas MacArthur’s mas- ments in a manner that ensures continuity of
terful Inchon landing and breakout of the effort, as well as to describe the contributions
Pusan pocket in the Korean War was an ex-
ample of synchronization. He planned these
62 JFQ / Summer 1993
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RisCassi
of various echelons to the overall effort. gent edge of international relations and
Moreover, as a coalition winds its way diplomacy and must seek congruency with
through these levels in planning, it forces the these forms. It addresses issues as weighty as
coalition’s leaders to confer on every aspect the endstate to be achieved and as mundane
of military efforts. as the rules of engagement to be applied at
each stage of operations. In coalition opera-
Campaign
tions, strategy is the level of war where inter-
Agreement on strategy is the foundation
national politics and bodies are coalesced
for coalition action. It is derived from policy
into a unified approach.
agreements between participating nations
The ability to design an effective military
and must be sharp enough to
campaign will be a calculus of the military
shape the direction of an im-
strategy. At the operational level, disagree-
plementing campaign, yet
ments that occur generally are among mili-
broad enough to capture the ef-
tary professionals. But, there are of course
forts of the various national
political ramifications and considerations.
forces. The development of an
The campaign must be paced or phased by
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Ar tion is unilateral; it is far more
S. campaign plan also provides the base for
U. trying in a coalition. Strategy is
defining and recommending national contri-
An M–1 Abrams main designed to accomplish politi-
battle tank moves butions. Unless this is done and provided to
cal objectives. Because of its proximity to
across the Egyptian the various national authorities, the com-
policy, it will be the point of reference for
desert during Exercise bined commander will end up with a force
Bright Star ’89. gaining consensus between military and po-
composition that is not rationalized toward
litical leaders. Consequently, it is also most
operational requirements. The campaign
likely to be the center of controversy in both
plan has the integrating effect of serving as
political and military spheres. Rarely do na-
both the driver for force requirements and
tions enter a coalition with identical views
the timeclock for generating those assets.
on ends to be achieved. As a coalition in-
The campaign plan is the tableau for
creases in numbers of member nations, con-
synchronizing all elements of combat power.
flicting objectives and additional political
It provides combined commanders with the
constraints are added to the pot. The coali-
vital understanding to link operations, bat-
tion commander must walk a taut line be-
tles, and engagements to the coalition’s
tween accommodating and compro-
strategic objectives. It is the orchestral ar-
mising, yet preserve the ability to
the campaign must rangement of these various activities in a
achieve military decision. At the
be paced or phased rational path to achieve the endstate envi-
same time, it is important to remem-
sioned in the strategy. It must address a vari-
by the availability ber the old dictum that in coalitions
ety of choices concerning the approach to
the will is strongest when the per-
of combat power warfare—offensive or defensive, terrain- or
ception of threat is greatest. Over
as it is generated force-oriented, direct or indirect approach—
time, as conditions change, so may
and in so doing, becomes the enabling pro-
from multiple the will and objectives of participat-
cess for actually applying force.
ing nations.
national sources Tactical operations should be designed
Coalition strategic formulation
to create a seamless battlefield where fric-
is difficult also because of the sheer
tion is minimized and the four tenets can be
mass involved in the effort. Strategy involves
applied freely. This requires cooperation
the melding and coordination of nearly
from all participating nations. It is at this
every element of multinational power to ac-
level of war where the combined inhibitors
complish military objectives. It may require
to efficient operations could have their
insights into different national industrial
most degrading impact. At higher levels of
capabilities, mobilization processes, trans-
war, success is mostly a function of plan-
portation capabilities, and interagency con-
ning and apportioning forces and resources
tributions, in addition to military capabili-
to various missions. At the tactical level of
ties. It must bind all these together with
precision and care. It operates on the tan-
Summer 1993 / JFQ 63
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COALITION WARFARE
war, forces must actually engage together in lack of support by any coalition force. When
battle and function synergistically to defeat it failed, Eisenhower returned to the broad
an enemy. All of the differences in training, front approach and it succeeded. The cross-
equipment, language, and culture congeal channel invasion was later than initially an-
to hinder the application of combat power. ticipated, but did occur and was decisive.
Events move rapidly and have a cascading Germany was defeated first and Japan sec-
effect. It is for these reasons that many ond. In short, neither nation got exactly
coalitions have sought to conduct tactical what it wanted and the agreed strategy was
operations, battles, and engagements within not executed with any sense of discipline,
national boundaries. However, this ap- but the objectives were obtained.
proach cedes an advantage to The use of centers of gravity, phasing or
enemy commanders who may sequencing, main and supporting efforts,
target precarious seams. It ac- culminating points, setting conditions, and
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D
Australian troops ar- hower’s experience as Euro- tools, the commander merges the theory
rive at a makeshift pean Theater of Operations commander in and practical application of the military art.
landing zone on a Ma-
World War II amplified the difficulties that Each of these mental tools is a critical point
rine CH–53 Sea Stallion
can arise at all three levels of war. Although for creating broader understanding of the
to provide security for
relief supplies being the Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff met and underpinnings of how force is to be applied,
lifted into Somalia. agreed early in the war to pursue a strategy and for what purpose. When used for men-
to defeat Germany first and Japan second, tal reference, they enable subordinate com-
and to apply a direct approach against Ger- mands to move beyond robotic execution.
many through an early cross-Channel inva- They liberate subordinates to apply ingenu-
sion into Europe, this is not what occurred. ity, innovation, or situational adaptability to
By late 1943, the United States had more sol- each event because they understand “true
diers, ships, airplanes, and landing craft in north” rather than simply the compass vec-
the Pacific than in the Atlantic. The British tor provided in the scheme of maneuver.
pressured for an indirect approach against
Planning
Germany and convinced the American Presi-
A common planning process is essential.
dent to attempt an invasion up the boot of
The degree to which allied commanders and
Italy before a cross-channel invasion into
staffs understand and are able to participate
France could be launched. This further de-
in planning impacts on the time required to
layed the eventual date of the cross-channel
plan and the sharing of knowledge of every
invasion to the summer of 1944. Once the
component of operations. We rely on the In-
invasion occurred, Eisenhower faced contin-
telligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
uing disagreements between his American
as the underlying process to gain commonly
and British commanders over whether the
understood perceptions of the threat and its
campaign should be on a broad front or con-
organizations and capabilities, terrain, and
centrated on a single axis. He maintained his
other environmental factors that may im-
broad front approach, but acquiesced on one
pact on operations and courses of action
occasion to Field Marshal Sir Bernard Mont-
available to enemy commanders. Without
gomery’s insistence on concentration of re-
this foundation, applied as a collective and
sources in an attempt to achieve decision
trickle down process that occurs from the
along the Flanders avenue into Germany.
strategic through tactical levels, it is difficult
The result, Operation Market Garden, led to
if not impossible to shape uniform percep-
tactical quarrels between American com-
tions of the threat or agree upon the coali-
manders, who viewed the operation as too
tion’s courses of action.
ambitious for the terrain, and Montgomery,
who argued that temerity needed to be put
aside. Market Garden failed, but not due to
64 JFQ / Summer 1993
0901 RisCassi 10/14/97 10:26 AM Page 65
RisCassi
A key distinction is that the IPB must be Integration
a joint process. It must analyze every Implementing a common planning pro-
medium of the battle—air, sea, and ground cess is only a small, albeit important, part of
—over time. In fact, every service has its bringing unity to coalition operations. The
own variation of the IPB process. Naval com- execution of these plans involves far more
manders look to sea lines of communica- complex problems. Each nation will bring its
tions and enemy bases as the terrain or mo- own forces and capabilities to the coalition.
bility routes pertinent to combat operations. Integrating these forces for action depends
They consider the enemy fleet’s organiza- upon many variables. There may be, and usu-
tion, capabilities, doctrine, and objectives ally are, vast differences in the organizations,
and then design operations to deny these capabilities, and cul-
objectives. Air commanders analyze enemy tures of military
air capabilities, bases, and courses of action forces. As a general
before forming a vision of their own opera- rule, differences are
tisio an ajlo rineqt uairnedm ecnotms.b Winheadt IhPaBs pbreoence lsasc kthinagt mfoorcset ss.e vAeirre ainnd g rnoauvnadl Chang
Al
vsthiioeenwaatsel rto hipnee vreaontlievominnysg acjsoo iamnntm efanonrtcidteyes.r, ’ Issn um cah uc lotaimnd ibimninteeenld-- fmnoaurtcsiteo son,p abelre acmtaeu eisdne i iutnhmteesry-, Army photo by
lectual template is the only holistic means to are equipped with U.S.
design joint operations. communications gear U.S. Army infantrymen
There is an additional value to the IPB and common proto- cross the Bug Han Gang
process. We emphasize the importance of cols and procedures River during Exercise
Team Spirit, a combined
getting inside the decision cycle of the to provide for orga-
South Korean/U.S. train-
enemy commander. Unless we do so, we nized space manage-
ing exercise.
cede the initiative of battle; a recipe for de- ment. All of the “ves-
feat. Instinctively, this means that all our sels” that operate in
processes—planning and execution—must the air or sea can be readily classified for their
be swifter than the enemy’s. The cycle of de- strengths and weaknesses to perform the vari-
tect, decide, target, and execute becomes all ous missions of air and naval warfare. Ground
the more difficult when multinational forces forces come in all shapes and sizes, and their
are entered in the equation. As a general equipment may be entirely dissimilar and in-
rule, the more organizations, joint and coali- compatible. Technological differentials, par-
tion, that must be integrated in an opera- ticularly in this era of revolutionary change,
tion, the longer it takes to integrate or syn- can be vast. Therefore, fundamental com-
chronize actions. The IPB process, which is monalties become even more important.
continuous, is the best means to accomplish At the theater level, integration results
this. It creates a degree of predictability from functional design. There can be only
which is essential to get and stay ahead of one Air Component Commander (ACC),
enemy decision cycles. Ground Component Commander, Naval
From this point of departure, the coali- Component Commander, Special Operations
tion moves through the remainder of the Forces (SOF), and/or operational Marine
planning process—statement of comman- Headquarters. Having two or more of any of
der’s intent, estimate of the situation, these functional headquarters invites
wargaming and formulation of the concept calamity. Yet, imposing functional integra-
of maneuver, and the remaining sections tion requires more than creating headquar-
and annexes of the coalition operation plan ters. The interrelationships and synergies be-
(OPLAN). The American structures for the tween functional commands stumble in the
OPLAN, operations orders, and fragmentary face of many of the same delicate issues that
orders are the templates for order formula- our own joint forces find difficult to resolve.
tion and communication because they are The command relationship between ground-
reasonably complementary with most na- based air defenses and air forces, the appor-
tional systems and incorporate all the ele- tionment of responsibilities and roles in
ments of the planning process itself. deep operations and the relationship of mul-
tidimensional forces such as marines or
Summer 1993 / JFQ 65
0901 RisCassi 10/14/97 10:26 AM Page 66
COALITION WARFARE
naval air or attack helicopters to various is a function of flexibility. Fleeting targets of
component commanders must be addressed. opportunity must be struck, however, by
But the magnitude and complexity escalate whoever is available to exploit the opportu-
because each national force has its own con- nity. Moreover, enemy dispositions and op-
victions on these issues. Moreover, coalitions erations in his rear will be interchangeable
may confront the obstacle of nations main- across the front of operations; deep opera-
taining strings on various forces, or insisting tions must always be viewed as an opera-
upon stovepipe management of various ele- tional requirement because of the enemy’s
ments. Concessions to any nation on any of flexibility to shift and move forces not in
these issues create precedents that others contact. Just as there can be no blank spaces
may insist upon. It may not in linear operations, there can be none
be possible to derail all these throughout the depth of the battlefield. But,
Martin inhibitors, but proliferation deep operations beyond the control of ma-
E. invites unmanageability. neuver commanders must be under control
wight It is helpful to analyze of a single coordinating headquarters. This is
D
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U.S. and the dynamics of close, On the other hand, close operations
F/A–18C Hornets and deep, and rear operations. may be divided into national sectors. But
Mirage 2000s flying These provide the bases to organize efforts, there are risks and inefficiencies in this ap-
together during Exer-
find the critical nodes where multinational proach. It could critically hinder the ability
cise Dasix Lafayette, a
integration must occur and ensure balance to mass combat power across national
combined U.S./French
exercise in the and mutual support in battle. But, for the boundaries. Even if this approach is applied,
Mediterranean Sea. purposes of joint warfare, the Army’s defini- it must be recognized that it does not allevi-
tion of these areas is too narrow. For naval ate the coalition’s need to instill the agility
power, an additional point of analysis is sur- to integrate forces in the close battle. Reserve
face, subsurface, special operations, and air. formations, air power, and other sources of
For air power, the various abilities of na- combat power must have the capability to
tional forces to perform tradi-
tional air missions must be ana-
relinquishing national command and
lyzed. These include close air
support (CAS), battlefield air inter- control of forces is an act of trust and
diction (BAI), strategic bombing, confidence unequalled in relations
long-range interdiction, special
between nations
operations, and counterair. For
SOF, it is the means to perform the
various functions of reconnais-
sance, military strikes, and integrating with be applied across the front of operations.
the other combat arms. Rear operations must be intermixed but
As national force strengths and vulnera- tightly centralized. National lines of com-
bilities across each of these functions are as- munication, main supply, and mobility
sessed, achieving balance will require a shar- routes will be in a disorganized competition
ing and mixing of assets to increase synergy. for priority unless strong central control is
Deep operations cannot be inhibited by na- imposed. It is unwise to decentralize rear
tional boundaries. Nor should any force be area responsibilities. To do so undermines
left without the ability to apply the tenet of the need for integrated air defenses, orga-
depth. Because of international differentials nized responses to rear ground threats, and
in the ability to see and strike deep, the the organized security of the host popula-
coalition must arrange its capabilities and tion and nation.
command structures to extend this capabil-
Command and Control
ity across the entire front of operations. The
The ability to integrate rests largely on
ability to see and strike deep to desired effect
one principle. Unity of command is the
most fundamental principle of warfare, the
66 JFQ / Summer 1993