Table Of Content

Dr.AndrewRoss,moderator,isaprofessorintheStrate- gicResearchDepartmentoftheNavalWarCollege’sCen- terforNavalWarfareStudies.Acoeditorofthe1995, 1997, and 2000 editions of Strategy and Force Planning,Dr.RosscurrentlydirectstheCollege’spro- jecton“MilitaryTransformationandtheDefenseIn- dustry after Next.” MichèleFlournoyissenioradviserintheInternational SecurityProgramoftheCenterforStrategicandInter- nationalStudies.Shewasadistinguishedresearchpro- fessorattheInstituteforNationalStrategicStudiesat theNationalDefenseUniversity;PrincipalDeputyAs- sistantSecretaryofDefenseforStrategyandThreatRe- duction;andDeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefensefor Strategy.Inadditiontothreeeditedvolumes,Professor Flournoyhas published more than fifty articles. Dr.WilliamsisaprincipalresearchscientistintheSe- curityStudiesProgramattheMassachusettsInstituteof Technology.Shehaspreviouslyservedasassistantdirec- torfornationalsecurityattheCongressionalBudget Office;attheMITRECorporation;intheDefenseDe- partmentdirectorateofProgramAnalysisandEvalua- tion; and as a mathematician at RAND. DavidMosherisanuclearpolicyanalystatRANDand istodirectastudybytheAmericanPhysicalSocietyon boost-phasedefenses.HespenttenyearsintheNational Security Division at the Congressional Budget Office analyzing nuclear, missile defense, and arms control policyandbudgetissues.Previouslyheworkedatthe Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Labora- tory,whereheconductedresearchonoceanphysicsand remote sensing. © (Prof.Flournoy’ssections only) 2001 byMichèleA.Flournoy Naval War College Review, Winter 2002, Vol. LV, No. 1 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2002 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2002 to 00-00-2002 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER What Do We Mean by ’Transformation’? An Exchange 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval War College,686 Cushing Road,Newport,RI,02841-1207 REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 17 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 WHAT DO WE MEAN BY “TRANSFORMATION”? An Exchange Andrew L.Ross,MichèleA.Flournoy,Cindy Williams,and DavidMosher W hatexactlydowemeanby“defensetransformation”?Howmightitaffect the nation’s strategy and the military forces that it deploys? How long mightaprocessoftransformationtake,andwhatmightitcost?TheSecretaryofthe Navy’sCurrentStrategyForumheldattheNavalWarCollegeon12–13June2001 askedoneofitsfourdiscussionpanelstoaddresstheseissues.Itsmembershadlong grappledwithsuchquestionsfromdifferentvantagepoints. MICHÈLE FLOURNOY Ithinktransformationisoneofthemostimportanttopicsthatthedefensecom- munity needs to grapple with today. Accelerating transformation of the U.S. militaryandoftheDepartmentofDefensemorebroadlywillbeamajortheme of the new administration’s defense strategy when that is unveiled.To be suc- cessful,however,thesecretaryofdefense,DonaldRumsfeld,willhavetobemore clearintheguidancehegivesontransformation,intermsof theobjectiveswe are striving for, the desired capabilities we want the process to yield, and the trade-offswearewillingtomaketoacceleratetransformation. Iwantfirsttoask,whytransform?Whyisitsoimportant?Second,Iwishto articulate what I think are the primary objectives of transformation. Third, I wanttogiveanassessmentofwhereweareintheprocesstoday.Fourth,Iwillfo- cusonsomeofthe“longpolesinthetent”—thethingsthatarehardesttodoand takethelongest—beforeconcludingwithsomerecommendations.Thismate- rialisdrawnprimarilyfrommyownexperienceinthetrenchesoftheOfficeof theSecretaryofDefensebutalsofromanopportunityIhadtoserveontheDe- fenseScienceBoardtaskforceontransformation. 28 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW ComingSoontoaTheaterNearYou:ReasonsandObjectives Iseemanyreasonswhyweshouldbetreatingtransformationof theU.S.mili- taryasapriority.Oneisthattomorrow’swarswillnotbeliketoday’s.Thepri- marylessonforanypotentialadversaryoftheGulfWarwasnottobesostupid astoconfronttheUnitedStateshead-on,militarily.Lookforweaknessestoex- ploit;lookforstrengthstoundermine;lookforasymmetricmeansofattacking theUnitedStates.Aprincipalasymmetricmeanswillbetodenyanddelayour accesstotheirregions,touseanti-accessstrategiesagainstus.Thescenariosfor which we are currently planning do not adequately reflect those challenges. Theydonotrepresentsomeofthemostlikelyfuturechallengeswewillface. Another reason is that the future is coming sooner than we think.The real challengestoourabilitytoprojectpowerinthefaceofanti-accesschallengesdo notlietwentyortwenty-fiveyearsoff.Wedonothavetowaitfortheriseof a near-peercompetitorin2025.Theproliferationof keytechnologiesandcapa- bilitiesmeansthatlessercountries,regionalpowers,willbeabletoposesignifi- cant anti-access challenges to us within the next decade. As I like to say, this threatis“comingsoontoatheaternearyou.”CurrentU.S.capabilitiesandcon- ceptsofoperationswillbeseverelychallenged,absenttransformation. WeshouldalsotransformtheU.S.armedforcesbecauseoftheopportunities thisallows.Newtechnologiesoffernewopportunitiestobemoreeffectiveinfu- ture warfare.Examples include information technologies,biotechnologies,di- rected energy—the list goes on. Of course, fiscal pressures will continue, and they will continue to require the Defense Department to do things in smarter ways,togetmoreefficient.Transformationshouldsupportthat. Finally,transformationtakestime.Ifwewanttobereadytenyearsdownthe road—twentyyears,forsomenewchallenges—weneedtostarttheprocessnow. Theremustbetimefortheinevitablemissteps,failures,andblindalleys,andfor learningfromthem. Letmeturntotheobjectivesoftransformation.Ithinktheprimaryobjective isensuringcontinuedU.S.militarysuperiorityand,withthat,ourabilitytoad- vance and to protect our national interests in the face of emerging and future threats.Thismeansseveralspecificthings,suchasanabilitytoprojectrapidly andthensustaincombatpowerinthefaceofstrategiesdesignedtothwartour ability to do that. It entails an ability to operate across the spectrum of con- flict—notonlyhigh-endwarfarebutsmallerscalecontingencies,presence,and soforth.Itmeansunderwritingdeterrenceand“shaping”withaforcethatre- mainscombatcredibleinachangingenvironment.Thatinvolvesthetransfor- mation of forward presence. In sum, it requires maximizing the effectiveness andefficiencyofU.S.forces.Thosearetheobjectivesoftransformation,atavery broadlevel. ROSSETAL. 29 TheGoodNewsandtheBadNews Howarewedoing?Hereisthegoodnews.The“transformation”sectionofthe QuadrennialDefenseReviewof1997,notsolongago,wasvirtuallyblankforat least one service. There was not much happening in transformation in 1997—buttodaythereisagreatdeal.Transformationbecamearecognizedde- fensepriorityofthepreviousadministration,andcertainlyitwillbeforthisone. The military has articulated an ambitious joint vision for 2020.That vision is verybroad,withlittlespecificguidance,butitiscompelling.Eachoftheservices individuallyhasestablishedtransformation“roadmaps”and“battlelabs”;they areconductingtransformationactivities,wargames,conceptdevelopment,and experimentation.Wehavecomealongwaytowardtranslatingrhetoricintoreal activityandaction.TheestablishmentofJointForcesCommandhasincreased the importance, and improved the resourcing, of transformation in the joint arena. But there are still barriers to transformation,and that is the bad news.The Bush administration will have to address these barriers if it is serious about transformation.Perhapsthelargestobstacleiscomplacency,theabsenceofthe pervasive sense of urgency that has existed in the past when transformations haveoccurred.“Of coursewewilltransform,”theservicesseemtosay,“butat our own evolutionary pace and without making any hard trade-offs.This will naturallyhappen,overtime;thatishowwedobusiness.”Anotherbarrierarises fromthefactthat,historically,periodsoflowoperatingtempohavebeenmost conducivetourgentmilitaryinnovation;today,wearetryingtotransformeven aswearerespondingtomajorinternationalchallenges. Nottheleastoftheproblemsisageneralunderestimationofwhatittakes actuallytochangethestatusquoinalargeorganizationliketheDepartmentof Defense.Thereisnodepartment-widestrategyorroadmaplayingoutortrans- lating the very broad Joint Vision 2020 into more concrete mission objectives and priorities.There are no clear metrics for measuring progress.There is no lens through which we can judge investment priorities and trade-offs, no Defensevisionlinkingthetransformationofthemilitarytothetransformation of the department and of its business practices more broadly. We have stated that the linkage exists,but we have not fleshed it out in specific terms.In any case,transformationhasnotbeengiven“teeth,”hasnotbeenmadeapriorityby the department in the services’ planning, programming, and budgeting processes. WhileIwouldapplaudmanyof ourexperimentationefforts,someof them havebeentooconstrained,infectedwitha“zerodefect”culturethatpromotes showcasingasopposedtotrueexperimentation.Therehasbeenaninadequate emphasisinsomecasesonrealdiscovery,whichrequiresatoleranceoffailure. 30 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW Sometimesthemostproductiveexperimentisonethatfails;wehavenotseen much of that. Further, many of the models and measures of effectiveness by which we evaluate results do not adequately reflect how a transformed force wouldoperate.Finally,jointexperimentationhastendedtofocustoonarrowly ontheseamsbetweentheservicesratherthanonnew“conceptsatlarge”foruti- lizingthejointforce. Relatedly,thereisaninadequateprocessfortranslatingtheresultsofexperi- mentationintorealprograms.Supposetheexperimentationprocessdiscovers somethingpromising.Dowehaveanadequatewayof makingsurethatitgets into the defense program? The answer is yes, theoretically; but there are not manysuccessstoriesyet.Whatwelearnfromexperimentsshouldleadustore- assessourprioritiesandresourceallocations,withrespectnotonlytomatériel buttodoctrine,concepts,andorganizations. Afurtherbarrieristheshortageofinstitutionaladvocates;thereisasyetno full-time staff in the Pentagon dedicated exclusively to transformation. There are no adequate mechanisms for consistently focusing high-level attention on thisissue.Ifwearegoingtogettransformation,itwillrequireimpetusfromthe top.Ontheotherhand,shorttoursofduty—thatis,rapidrotationofkeyper- sonnel—limittheimpactofmanymilitaryprofessionalswhoareatonetimeor another responsible for transformation activities.They stay only two or three yearsinthejob,andthattendstolimittheirefficacyinthoseroles. Wemustalsoacknowledgethespecterofinterservicerivalry,aPandora’sbox thatseniorleadersaresoafraidtoopenthattheydonotcreateforawhereideas andconceptsofoperationscanreallycompete.Relatedly,evenaverypromising conceptdevelopedandexperimentedwithbyaparticularservicemaybeviewed withsuspicionbytheothersifitisbroughtintothejointarena—asiftheservice inquestionwerebentonusingtheinnovationtoincreaseitsownbudgetshare anddecreaseothers’. Finally,asIhavehinted,wefacetherealityof near-termdemands.Anynew strategy,evenonethatwouldgenuinelyincreasetheemphasisontransforma- tion,mustdealwiththedemandsoftherealworld,thehereandnow.Transfor- mation often gets crowded out by more immediate concerns.Those concerns include the effects, which are still with us, of the procurement holiday of the 1990s.Anumberofrecapitalizationneedsareindirectcompetitionwithtrans- formationpriorities. TheLongPolesintheTent,andRecommendations Letmeturnnowtothetwomostimportantareasuponwhichweshouldfocus. Thefirstisdevelopmentofnewconceptsofoperationsforprioritymissionar- eas. Concept development has not been given high enough priority; too few ROSSETAL. 31 “racehorses”arededicatedtothetask.Theservicestypicallygivethetaskeither tocontractorsortosmall“futuresgroups,”notcoreelementsoftheirownstaffs. Inthejointrealmaswell,therearetoofewavenuesforvettingandtestingnew concepts.JointForcesCommandisatremendousaddition,butitcannotdoit all,certainlynotatitscurrentsizeandlevelofstaffing. Withintheheadquarters,therehasbeenagenerallackofincentivestobreak withcurrentdoctrineorcurrentapproaches;thereisageneralsensethatifyou aretooinnovative,youmaydashyourpromotionopportunities.Now,contrast thatwithhowtheGermans,beforeWorldWarII,cameupwiththeconceptthat eventuallyyieldedtheblitzkrieg.TheGermanarmytoldagroupof lieutenant colonels and colonels that, in effect, they could not be promoted unless they cameupwithsomethingthatbrokecurrentdoctrine. WhatIamreallyarguingforisafundamentalchangeinculturefromoneof consensus—whichwouldpursueatransformationthatcausesnoonetobeun- comfortable—to a productive and open forum where ideas and concepts for solvingprioritymissionproblemsortaskscantrulycompete. Theother“longpoleinthetent”isorganizationalchange—thetransforma- tion,ormorebroadlytherationalization,oftheDepartmentofDefenseitself.If transformationfocusesonlyonthefighting“tooth”andignoresthesupporting “tail,”itwillultimatelyfail.Wehavetoreduceunnecessaryduplicationbetween theservicesinkeysupportareaslikelogistics,C4ISR*,possiblyevensomeas- pectsof training.Weneedacquisitionreform.Wehavetoeliminateunneeded infrastructure, to outsource and commercialize functions like accounting, healthcare,long-haulcommunications,andsoon.If theDefenseDepartment does not transform the way it does business, it will not have the resources to transformtheU.S.military.Norwoulditbeabletosupporteffectivelyatrans- formed force.There are huge political and bureaucratic barriers to surmount here, but this issue has to be put on the table if transformation is going to succeed. TherecommendationsIwouldofferarelargelydrawnfromtheDefenseSci- enceBoardtaskforceontransformation.Thenumber-onerecommendationis toestablishasenseofurgencyatthetop.Suchasensemaybegrowinginsidethe officeofthesecretaryofdefense,butnotinalloftheservices.Itislargelyabsent onCapitolHill,amongthepeoplewhocontrolthepursestrings.Next,weneed animplementationroadmaptoenergizeandfocustransformationefforts.The broadvisionofJointVision2020hastobeconvertedintomuchmorespecificar- ticulations:whatarethekeyoperationalchallenges?Onwhatmissionareaswill we focus? What capabilities do we want the transformation process to yield? *Command,control,communications,computers,intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance. 32 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW Thenweneedtoestablishanduseappropriatemetricstoassessprogress.Also, weshouldstrengthenthevoiceofjointforcecommanders;theywillbethepeo- pleinthefielduponwhomwewillrelyinthefuture,andtheyshouldbeengaged todaytohelparticulateneeds. Iamurgingustochangeorganizationculturesandincentivestructures,soas toallowandrewardrealexperimentation,opencompetitionbetweenconcepts andideas,andinnovation.Iamalsocallingforanoverarchingvisionthatlinks militarytransformationwiththedepartment’sowntransformationandthatul- timatelycreatesacadreofprofessionalswhoarecommittedtoand,veryimpor- tantly,accountableforprogressintransformation. CINDY WILLIAMS LetmebeginbyagreeingwholeheartedlywithMichèle—theDepartmentofDe- fenseandtheU.S.militaryhavebeenstuckforadecadeinaColdWarmindset. Theyneedtochange,andchangequickly,bothtoovercomethechallengesofthe futureandtotakeadvantageofnewtechnologies.Insteadoftheterm“transformation,”however,Iprefertheold-fashionedwords“innovation”and“change.” “Transformation”hascometoevokespecificsolutions,likeprecisionweapons ortheArmy’scurrenttransformationplan.Inthatregard,thetermisoftenasso- ciatedwithaviewofmilitarychangethatstartswiththetechnologiesandthen seeksproblemsforthetechnologiestosolve,insteadoftheotherwayaround.In lookingtothefuture,itiscriticalthatwestartwiththemilitaryproblemsand thenseeksolutions.Someof thesolutionswillbetechnical,butothersmaybe proceduralorconceptual. AnotherreasonIshyawayfromtheterm“transformation”isthattransfor- mationasoftentouted—largeandfundamentalchangeineveryaspectofmili- tary affairs—may be too much to hope for. Transformation, or revolution, is relativelyrareinlargeinstitutions,whichareconservativebynature;howdowe makeithappenunlesssomethingbigandbadoccurs?Inindustry,forexample, transformationismostlikelynotwhenafirmisridinghigh,butwhenithaslost marketshareandisworriedaboutitsverysurvival.Militarytransformationis mostlikelynotwhenastateenjoysoverwhelmingprimacy,astheUnitedStates doestoday,butwhenthemilitaryhaslostawarorotherwiselosttheconfidence ofcivilians.Thefactis,aninstitutionthatisalreadybest-in-classtypicallyfinds itdifficulttomakeevenmodestchanges,letalonetransformitself.Iworrythat whenthevisionof large-scaletransformationisnotrealized,disappointedad- vocatesmayloseconfidencethatevenmoremodestchangeispossibleorworth pursuing. For both these reasons,I prefer to talk about spurring the military to solve specificproblemsthatitwillfaceinthefuture.Ilookforinnovationorchangeto ROSSETAL. 33 meetconcreteneeds,ratherthanlistsof technologiesandtop-downefforts to find ways to use them—which often seem to be the unspoken goal of “transformation.” StrategyandResources When the Quadrennial Defense Review for 2001 began, the services did not wanttorepeatthemethodusedduringtheQuadrennialDefenseReviewof1997, aprocesstheycalled“budgetdriven”or“costdriven.”Theywantedinsteada“strategy-driven”reviewprocess.Iagreecompletelythatreviewsshouldbedrivenby strategy. But my understanding of strategy is quite different from the con- ceptthoseadvocateshaveinmind.Proponentsofa“strategy-drivenreview”say theywantfirsttolookatwhatthenationneedstodointheworld,andsecondto make a list of everything the military should be capable of doing. Next they woulddecidewhatforcesareneededtodoallthosethings.Finally,theywould figureoutthecostofthoseforcesinthefuture,addupthebill,andpresentitto theAmericanpublicintheexpectationthattaxpayerswillpayitinfull. Thatisnotstrategy.Ifthemilitaryhasalltheresourcesintheworld,ifitcan bringalltheforcesintheworldtobearateverypoint,itdoesnotneedastrategy. Thewholepointofstrategyistosetprioritiesandmakechoicesamongcompet- ing alternatives when resources are constrained. What the proponents of the laundry-listapproachhavederidedasa“budget-drivenprocess”istheessence ofstrategyitself. Settingatoplinefordefenseandworkingwithinitisfundamentaltodevising a strategy. The Defense Department needs to know how much money it will have,in order to know how deeply it will have to cut into the areas where,as MichèleFlournoylikestosay,itcanacceptgreaterrisk.Butthatdoesnotapply whensettingthetoplinefortheindividualservices.Inthe1997quadrennialre- view,thedefensebudget“pie”wasdividedupamongtheservicesusingthesame formulaaswasusedyearafteryearduringtheColdWar. Thatiscounter-strategic.Thedepartmentneedsnotonlyajointprocesstode- termineitsrequirementsbutajointviewtodetermineitsstrategy.Wemustdecide prioritiesnotonthebasisofwhatisbestfortheArmy,AirForce,NavyandMarine Corps,butonthebasisofwhatisbestforthenation.IfthismeansthattheNavy’s share ofthe defense budget grows while the Army’s shrinks,so be it. Allowingtheservices’budgetsharestoshiftfromyeartoyearmaybenefitin- novation.AsIdiscussedearlier,bringingaboutinnovationinalargeinstitution thatisalreadythebestisnoteasy.Unlessthemilitaryfacessubstantialcompeti- tionfromtheoutsideorfailsinwar,itisnotpredisposedtochange.Butoneway topromotechangeistorewardit,notonlyinindividualsbutinservices.Aser- vicethathasmoreinnovativeideas,thatlookstothefutureratherthanbackto 34 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW theColdWar,mightberewardedwithalargershareofthebudget.Itispossible tosetupanincentivestructurethatcouldatleastrewardandtherebyencourage innovation,ifnotthemoreambitiousgoalsofsweepingtransformation. NothingComesFree Tenyearsfromnow,keepingtoday’sstrategy,allof today’sforces(equippedin thewaythatiscurrentlyplanned),withtoday’sinfrastructure,isgoingtocost somewherebetweenthirty-fiveandfiftybilliondollarsayearmorethanitdoes today.However,itispossibleinsteadtohavestrongforcesandamilitarystrategy thatmeetthechallengesofthiscenturyinsteadofthelastone,andtodosoatto- day’s,orevenlastyear’s,levelof funding—thatis,withabudgetheldconstant forthenextdecade,adjustedonlyforinflationeveryyear. In fact,at least three possible military strategies and plans would allow the DefenseDepartmenttoholdthelineondefensebudgetsbutatthesametimeto stimulate a significant degree of innovation, pursue a strong modernization program,andstillpaythetroopsascurrentlyplanned.*Eachofthethreewould produce a very strong military, certainly stronger than today’s and probably stronger than the military we will have if we continue down the present path, even spending that extra thirty-five to fifty billion dollars.Of course,nothing comesfree.Savingtensofbillionsofdollarsmeansgivingsomethingup.Inthe threefutureplansIhavelookedat,themainengineofsavingsisforce-structure reduction. Each of these three plans cuts forces that are less useful and keeps thosethatwillbemoreusefulintheworldofthefuture.Eachalsomakesmod- ernizationcutbacksinareasthatdonotfitinwithitsstrategicconcept. Ofthesethreeplans,onewouldresonatewithanavalaudience,andalso,Ibe- lieve,withtheBushadministration,muchmorethanwouldtheothertwo.Itas- sumesthatthedangerousfaultlinethatexistedontheEurasianlandmass,where NatoandtheWarsawPactstaredeachotherdownacrosstheinter-Germanbor- der,isgone,moreorlessforgood.Instead,itpositsaneedformoreattentionto AsiaandthePacific.ItassumesthattheUnitedStatesenjoysoverwhelmingpri- macytodaybutthatwiththatprimacycomesomepitfalls.Oneofthemisthat weaker,andpoorer,countrieswhoopposeusaregoingtolookforthecheapest ways they can find to defeat our very expensive systems. That means mines, cheap submarines that operate in coastal waters, and man-portable air de- fenses—thekindsofthingsthatareoftenreferredtoas“asymmetricthreats.”It assumes,as Michèle Flournoy argues,that access to theaters is going to be in- creasinglydifficulttocomeby. *SeeCindyWilliams,ed.,HoldingtheLine:U.S.DefenseAlternativesforthe21stCentury(Cambridge, Mass.:MITPress,2001),reviewedinthisissue.