Table Of Content

(cid:2) The Joint Force Connico) Mc LKiuvwe afiirte, 2e0x0e1r.cise in World Wide Photos (John P/ A A Decade, No Progress By D O U G L A S A. M A C G R E G O R E ver since the passage of the In theory, jointness is the means Goldwater-Nichols Act, the through which the National Com- gaze of Congress has been mand Authorities achieve unity of ef- firmly fixed on the need for fort from diverse service competencies. jointness. The conviction that 21stcen- Yet for many members of the military, tury operations will involve land, sea, the idea of jointness presents a Pan- and air forces is buttressed by the per- dora’s box of unattractive possibilities. ception that technological advances Parochialism, not cooperation, re- combined with the genius of the mains the watchword despite the com- American military will transform the mon deference to jointness. Although Armed Forces into an information age Congress has argued for years that in- joint organization. creased jointness will produce a more efficient and effective military, Desert Storm together with the demise of the Soviet Union did not alter service atti- Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor, USA, is a senior military fellow in the Institute for tudes. Operations against the former National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and the author of Yugoslavia offer further evidence that Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21stCentury. the single-service American way of war 18 JFQ / Winter 2000–01 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2001 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2000 to 00-00-2001 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER The Joint Force. A Decade, No Progress 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,260 Fifth Ave SW,Fort Lesley J REPORT NUMBER McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 6 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Macgregor has changed little since the Persian Gulf War, leading Eliot Cohen to ob- serve that there are “four single-service warfighting establishments.” These points notwithstanding, funding a Cold War legacy force, with its origins in the experience of World War II, may no longer be possible. It is not an acci- dent that a budget of $300-plus billion is critical to maintaining services that are downsized versions of the same military that mounted Desert Storm. This is significant because jointness, transformation, and fiscal reality are on a collision course. After the Storm m Varhegyi) saIneirn rioeoVparl eilicretaytato ditroehyrnes s ri tenoa g wtianhaisnsei ssltPti tettIhrrleasa iqtae gvnwri odeGuerenun cldjfeo a ilfnneotddr. Intelligence analyst mera Squadron (Ji at Fort Bliss, Ca such a claim. Even though the Com- Roving Sands ’00. mbat mander in Chief, Central Command, Co prescribed a chain of command and 1st organized joint forces, operations largely conformed to World War II. Single-service warfighting organiza- practices of the Cold War. Integrating Naval forces were more circum- tions waged Desert Storm with only the enormous and increasingly precise spect in the wake of the Gulf War, be- broad strategic guidance. Therefore it is firepower of the Navy and Air Force cause participation by the Navy had not surprising that the services sought with landpower should have figured been significant in terms of numbers, to exploit success to validate their doc- into joint doctrine and postwar force platforms, and aircraft, but relatively trine, organization, and equipment. design by the Army. Despite the poten- modest in terms of actual warfighting. tial for jointness in the Air Another reason for self-examination Force expeditionary force was that in 1991 no other navy could unwavering faith that extended concept, without basic challenge the Nation for control of the bombing could have won the Gulf War changes in Army combat seas. Since recapitalization is expensive did not advance the cause of jointness organization, the idea of and time-consuming, the most intense organizing ground and air soul-searching of any service is ongo- forces to operate in tan- ing there. This was evident in the be- On the ground, the superior per- dem did not translate into jointness. havior and thinking of senior naval of- formance of the Army, especially in The unwavering faith of the Air ficers in the context of jointness. the culminating battles on February Force that extended bombing could Admiral Paul Miller, the first 26–27, should have afforded a strong have won the Gulf War by airpower Commander in Chief, Atlantic Com- argument in favor of a highly trained, alone did not advance the cause of mand (the forerunner of Joint Forces superbly equipped force consisting pri- jointness in that service. Instead, In- Command), became a champion of marily of combat troops organized and stant Thunder, the air operation adaptive force packaging—repackag- postured for rapid deployment in a against Iraq, became simply a model ing land, sea, and air forces in units new joint warfighting framework. In- for the future. Strategic airlift took sec- tailored for specific missions. His re- stead the Army of the Cold War simply ond place to the F–22, the post-war configuration of carriers in the Hait- got smaller. centerpiece of operations by the Air ian intervention that replaced air Victory in the Persian Gulf be- Force. That regime security could be wings with Army air mobile troops came the Army rationale for preserving more important to Baghdad than a and the concept of nodal warfare in the status quo. None of its initiatives conventional strategy did not enter the littorals created possibilities for naval since the war, to include Force XXI, analysis. Later, when formidable power in joint operations. Vice Chair- Army after Next, Strike Force, or the cur- ground combat power was needed man of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral rent Army Transformation Initiative, early to operate with airpower within a William Owens, not only fostered ex- challenged the ten-division structure, joint framework in the crisis over periments by placing Army tactical the warfighting paradigm, or the insti- Kosovo, it was unavailable. missile systems on ships, but organ- tutional policies and mobilization ized the Joint Requirements Oversight Winter 2000–01 / JFQ 19 (cid:2) JFQ FORUM and apply service-optimized systems, USS Coronado they discover that service optimization off Hawaii, produces suboptimum performance Strong Angel. within the joint operational framework. These points notwithstanding, knowing the joint task force will be the instrument of choice on the operational level, CINCs have pressed for increased joint training. General John Sheehan, USMC, who succeeded Miller, promoted joint operational level training and succeeded in bring- ing component headquarters to Suf- folk, Virginia, for interoperability training. Even though service-based headquarters are not organized, trained, or equipped to command and control joint forces, this represented a step toward genuine joint operations. Sheehan could not change the practice of forming JTFs from single-service component headquarters. The services would not tolerate joint command and control structures or standing JTFs as replacements for single-service structures. In the battle between service and S. Navy (Peter Jones) jtsoiyoisnntetaT mwrhyase r pfbsaouertretev , nwitchtoeieaus lfl ogdorr mafn soeepmrte wdae bortganhin.ned gro esnvt ortilhkuee- U. World War II paradigm of service dom- inated command and control that ob- structs the seamless integration of Council to promote jointness. Such jointness that might reduce service au- components with new air, space, and institutional developments led the tonomy and remove control over missile capabilities. In this regard, Joint Navy into uncharted waters. fixed-wing aviation or other assets are Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020 are With a tradition of living on the treated with suspicion. In addition, simply bumper stickers for single-serv- strategic periphery, the Marine Corps the Marines are among the most stri- ice programs and do not prevent com- moved more quickly than the Army to dent critics of the ramifications of the peting service requirements from dom- refocus on new forms of small-scale Goldwater-Nichols Act on training inating joint integration efforts. conflict. Recognizing that technology and officer development. Admiral Harold Gehman, while could enable smaller formations to be Commander in Chief, Joint Forces Jointness and CINCs decisive, the Marines examined con- Command, raised the issue of competi- cepts for employing forces in Sea While the services struggled with tion between joint and service experi- Dragon and Urban Warrior. Such exer- jointness, CINCs discovered the way mentation in 1998 as follows: cises involved new operational con- that the services responded to the pres- When it finally gets down to it, this cepts as well as the organizational sures of joint operations under the con- is going to be a choice of resources and structures to execute them. For the trol of unified commands. Clearly the doctrinal issues. My intent is, and my most part, notions of jointness ex- services link specific weapons and com- charter is, and my resourcing is that I will tended only to the Navy, and despite munication systems to activities re- be funded and manned and equipped to go innovations, the Inchon paradigm garded as most vital to their missions. out and get just as good an argument, that dominates Marine Corps thinking Therefore they seek to optimize the in- with just as much research and develop- and organization for combat did not tegrated performance of systems accord- ment, and just as much analysis, and just substantially change. ing to their needs rather than those of as much field trial and wargames, that The Marine Corps can argue per- the joint community. As a result, as uni- the joint way of doing something is just as suasively that it already fields a JTF fied commands attempt to integrate good or better than the service way of which integrates land, sea, and air re- doing it.1 sources—the Marine air-ground task force. Hence any efforts to increase 20 JFQ / Winter 2000–01 Macgregor Army and Air Force systems were Global Hawk during unable to quickly fuse and disseminate first flight,1998. the pictures from joint and single-service intelligence, surveillance, and re- connaissance sources in the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Vi- cenza during a fast-paced conflict. In part this was a consequence of information overload, as well as the struc- tural orientation of service systems. The command and control structure also did not integrate service staffs and organizations in a single Kosovo engagement zone operations structure under the supported commander, the joint force air component commander (JFACC). Operation Allied Force was di- rected by a JFACC staff, not a combat operations, combat plans, and strategy staff. The JFACC/AOC organization did not reflect that JFACC was the supported commander. AOC required ground liaison officers from the Army who would have worked for the air component commander and advised D on effectively attacking enemy ground O D forces. Moreover, launching NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia in March 1999 began the largest UAV deploy- A few years later, just before retir- an output in 1998 that was less than ment by Western forces since the Gulf ing, Gehman cited the constraints on two-thirds of the economic activity of War. Linking UAVs to CAOC via satel- accelerating transformation and recom- Fairfax County, Virginia, made resist- lite illustrated the value of an effective ance useless without Russ- joint system for coordinating opera- as Kosovo demonstrated, innovation ian aid. Belgrade could not tions with service air platforms and retain Kosovo without such distributing imagery across services. depends on organizational focus support. Serb women and The fact that most UAVs (except Air over a sustained period children would starve or Force Predators) belonged to ground freeze. Finally, Moscow units raised questions on joint man- warned of a possible U.S.- agement, control, and direction of mended that his successors serve for up led ground offensive. these vehicles. Without a joint opera- to eight years to outlast bureaucratic At the same time, the Alliance tional architecture embracing theater opposition and implement change. But faced grave obstacles in its mission to forces, such questions were largely re- as Kosovo demonstrated, innovation expel Serbian forces from the area. Al- duced to a fight among services for depends on organizational focus over a though unmanned aerial vehicles control and were not resolved. sustained period rather than any per- (UAVs) found some excellent targets, for A top-heavy Army command and sonal attempts to guide change. example, rules of engagement required control headquarters could not con- double or triple confirmation before duct joint operations. It declined to The Balkans Experience strikes. That made it difficult to develop send representatives to JFACC targeting NATO strikes lasted for 78 days an effective decision cycle because of board meetings. That a corps head- before Serbia agreed to pull its forces the fear that a mistake at 15,000 feet quarters with more than 500 officers, from Kosovo. The reasons for this deci- would jeopardize air operations. noncommissioned officers, and sol- sion were more self-evident than real- In theintelligence arena, the time diers was necessary to coordinate a ized at the time. The withdrawal of needed for remote command centers 5,000-man task force within the frame- support by Moscow under great pres- to get information to pilots from other work of an Air Force-based JTF re- sure from Washington left Belgrade than Air Force sources was too long. flected the rigidity of the existing without assistance in its bid to retain The Air Operations Center (AOC) sys- Army multi-echelon, single-service control of Kosovo. Simultaneously, de- tem proved too cumbersome to rapidly command and control structure. struction of its meager economy, with disseminate critical data to pilots on their way to target areas. Winter 2000–01 / JFQ 21 (cid:2) JFQ FORUM The Army refused to incorporate Marines operating attack helicopters in air targeting or- simulation system, ders. The approaches of the Air Force Urban Warrior ’99. deliberate planning process and the Army movement-to-contact method collided. If operations went as planned, the Army would have sacri- ficed electronic warfare as well as other air defense countermeasures routinely provided to Air Force pilots. These diverse approaches left the joint commander with no alternative to ineffi- cient sequential service operations. Because naval aviators lacked ade- quate target-imaging systems to drop mond) laser-guided bombs from F–14s and Des F–18s during training flights, they Chris lleesasr ntehda ni nh aclofm obf atth. eNira lvaasle ra itracrrgaeftts hiint Pacific ( Serbia, and thus Navy participation in Group, joint operations was constrained. mera The Joint Chiefs mobilized Ca enough equipment, intelligence, sur- mbat vweairllsa ntoc ec, aarnryd oreucto tnhnea ibsosamnbcein fgo rc atwmo- Fleet Co paign. For example, every joint surveillance aircraft instructor was called upon, disrupting training for years. mobility, the Kosovo experience replaced them at night, or that U.S. Kosovo also had a significant effect on demonstrated an overreliance on target analysts misinterpreted the in- real-world missions. With key assets strategic airlift, which in turn is de- formation received. such as tankers and electronic jammers pendent on a robust in-theater infra- Technologies developed since rushed to Kosovo, the Air Force had to structure that was inadequate in the Desert Storm should have decreased Balkans. But little was done decision cycle times and increased the in the absence of a joint operational to exploit alternative means ability to achieve battlefield effects to move men and matériel. more efficiently and effectively by em- framework, defeating an enemy will Army rotary assets could ploying all service capabilities during be expensive and time consuming have moved equipment from the Kosovo air campaign. But joint ship to shore. Despite success command and control concepts and with this type of joint opera- procedures did not fundamentally temporarily shut down no-fly operation in Haiti, it was not attempted in change, and U.S. forces were unable to tions over Northern Iraq. It reported Kosovo. exploit opportunities offered by new the need for a period of six months to Operations against Serbia demon- technology. In Operation Allied Force, reconstitute forces after the conflict. strated that the American way of war commanders and staffs from the serv- Service oriented operations also has changed little since 1991. The ap- ices were not postured to exploit infor- impeded joint logistics. While Albania plication of a single arm—air and mis- mation opportunities. Effective proce- lacked a deepwater port, its coastline sile power—allowed the enemy to dures began to emerge by the end of favored joint logistics over the shore adapt to the single threat—to hunker the air campaign, but they should (JLOTS). But that did not occur. JLOTS down and wait out the bombardment. have been in place at the start. What is has suffered from a shortage of fund- Assumptions on omniscient surveil- more, the distrust between ground and ing and a paucity of realistic exercises lance technology in connection with air commanders evident in 1991 per- for years, yet a sustained offensive de- battlespace knowledge and informa- sisted during the 1999 air campaign. pends on strategic sealift. U.S. forces tion dominance also turned out to be were thus unprepared for anything fallacious. In spite of enormous U.S. Shaping the Force other than the air campaign. and NATO superiority in every cate- In the absence of a joint opera- Although the military exists in a gory of technology, allied battlespace tional framework that integrates air, class by itself in the case of strategic awareness was often manipulated by space, and missile power with ground the enemy. Strikes on decoys indicated combat forces, defeating an enemy will that the Serbs let daytime reconnais- sance flights see real targets and then 22 JFQ / Winter 2000–01 Macgregor a good idea, but we need to move to F–15E after mission, standing joint task forces. Everyone Allied Force. says it is not good to go to war with a pick-up team. This is a step forward.”2 Yet organizing a standing JTF risks fail- ure if it ignores the fact that when service specific visions for warfighting, backed by extensive plans for weapons modernization, are not included in joint plans, the influence of the joint community is marginal. After all, the building blocks of JTFs must be modules based on core competencies that Allen) reside inside the services. Camera Squadron (Jeffrey vPiUsoe nnletustisanlB egltuneaorgrtneiiiala,s ylulWa. c ttCriohoa iitnvttiheci la eiHspa nofmouw utolseuenerar, ued d ameoonreesfd hsn j itoCnpaiool n intatn nsgs rhettehhsisfseest. mbat National Security Act of 1947 is en- Co acted to restructure the defense estab- 1st lishment within the context of reform, nothing of substance will occur. Lec- tures, demonstrations, and expressions be expensive and time consuming—if and oversight will not change the sin- of support by senior officers have not it happens at all. Service components gle-service warfighting establishments. and will not yield tangible results to must be organized to fit into JTFs with- The strong links between weapons advance jointness and rationalize the out intervening or redundant layers of procurement, doctrine, and organiza- allocation of increasingly scarce funds command and control. Redefining tion for combat puts this problem into in the years ahead. service force modules as the lowest sharp relief. For instance, if the Navy Perhaps the skepticism voiced by level at which operational units can buys joint strike fighters and new carri- Alfred Thayer Mahan that no service accomplish core competencies is vital. ers, it is likely to operate in basically can reform itself is valid. Change must At the same time, JTF headquarters the same manner in fifty years as it come from outside to transform the must contain sufficient expertise from does today. Moreover, this means that military and realize authentic jointness. all services to make the deployment of if joint control was exerted over service Otherwise the Nation could suddenly redundant single service command research, development, and acquisi- find that the Armed Forces are manning and control unnecessary. Current serv- tion, transformation to new structures an expensive high-tech Maginot Line ice transformation programs do not for warfighting can occur. Unfortu- that will inevitably be outflanked. JFQ address this need. nately, service target information sys- Enemies may attempt to strike tems are being funded and the Armed NOTES early to outpace a U.S. military re- Forces operate redundant assets. To 1Elaine Grossman, “As Lead Experi- sponse and act decisively with date, the Joint Requirements Oversight menter, Gehman Expects to ‘Duke it Out’ weapons of mass destruction to deny Council, Joint Staff, and U.S. Joint with Service Chiefs,” Inside the Pentagon, access. Accordingly, service operational Forces Command have been unable to vol. 14, no. 48 (December 3, 1998), p. 2. concepts and command and control overcome this predicament and replace 2Robert Holzer, “Stability at Top Is Criti- structures that obstruct jointness will the World War II paradigm with one cal to JFC’s Pentagon Clout; Also Calls for a have a profound impact. As implied that shapes decisions on force design Standing JTF Headquarters,” Defense News, above, jointness is not an end in itself and acquisition. Service control of vol. 15, no. 35 (September 4, 2000), p. 1. but rather a means to cope with the funding and influence in shaping such uncertainty and rapidity of change in a decisions remains unchanged. turbulent strategic environment. If information superiority and The recent initiative to organize a battlespace dominance are the organiz- core JTF is notable because it addresses ing imperatives that can determine many problems that resurfaced during how the services will fight in the fu- the U.S.-led air campaign in Kosovo. ture, then new joint operational con- As James Blaker has observed, “This is cepts and joint-capable organizations are keys to success. Transformation that occurs without joint influence Winter 2000–01 / JFQ 23