DTIC ADA525842: Evolution Beats Revolution in Analysis. Counterpoint to The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

Counterpoint to (cid:147)The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis
Evolution Beats Revolution in Analysis
Steven H. Ward
Editor.c Note This article gence reporting. She
responds to the views on intelli recommends what she calls a
gence analysis in the 2/st revolutionary model that would
century advanced by Carmen shift analysis from a focus on
Med/na onpage 23 ofthis issue. day-to-day developments(cid:148) to
forward-leaning, conceptual
thinking that is (cid:145)less indepen
dent and neutral(cid:148) and more
The recommendations pre tailored to the policymakers(cid:146)
(cid:147) sented in Carmen Medina(cid:146)s specific needs.
article, (cid:147)The Corning Revolu
tion in Intelligence Analysis: The article(cid:146)s main failing is that
Constructive self-
What To Do When Traditional its primary contentions fly in
assessments are Models Fail,(cid:146) come across as the face of history and recent
important to any solutions in search of a prob feedback from our consumers
organization, but 1cm. Her description of the and Agency leadership. This
Medina(cid:146)s] critique ofthe Directorate of Intelligence (DI) essay joins the debate by com
Directorate(cid:146)s current fails to take into account many menting in general on Meclina(cid:146)s
of the changes that the DI has thesis and defending, in particu
practices lapses from
made in the past decade. Con lar, the Dl(cid:146)s focus on (cid:147)develop
examination to structive self-assessments are ments(cid:148) as the basis of any suc
undeserved flagellation. important to any organization, cessful model of intelligence
hut this critique of the Director analysis.
ate(cid:146)s current practices lapses
from examination to uncle-
served flagellation. The author Continuity or Stagnation?
is well known for having been
thoughtfully engaged in seek Medina(cid:146)s description of the Dl
ing ways to improve the DI for as stagnating in comfortable sta
many years; therefore, the sus bility is demonstrably false.
picion arises that she crafted Change has been a constant
her article with the intent to feature of life in the Directorate
provoke as much discussion as in recent decades. The Dl has
possible. undergone numerous reorgani
zations and adopted new
In brief, Medina argues that the approaches to the training of
Dl(cid:146)s current model of intelli analysts to improve products
gence analysis is failing to and services. Analysts have
respond to rapid changes in developed closer working rela
consumer needs and prefer tionships with their counterparts
ences. She contends that the in the Directorate of Opera
Dl is insufficiently focused on tions, other agencies, and the
the consumer and is devoting milita(cid:146)y. The past decade, in
Steven R. Ward serves in the its resources to increasingly particular. has been tife with
Directorate of Intelligence. useless syntheses of intelli change, resulting in greater
29
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Counterpoint on Analysis
In asserting that DI work
procedures need to
emphasis on serving our pri change, Medina appears tions(cid:151)tliat policymakers need a
mary consumers, a goal that to confuse service to update them on
Medina identifies with her continuity...with developments and that the Dl
new(cid:146) model for intelligence in stagnation. has unique insights to tell them
the future. We have steadily what events mean~an he clis(cid:151)
increased our emphasis on the missed outright as outmoded,
so(cid:151)ca lied (cid:147)non(cid:151)traditional(cid:148) although the degree of their
issues (counterterrorism, applicability may be changing.
counter proliferation, and crime Her critique also fails to take
and narcotics), which Medina while probably amazed by into account the wide variety of
claims is lacking. Now, in the power saws, nail guns, laser consumers that the Dl serves,
21st century, we continue to levels, and new construction ranging from the Executive
experiment with ways to do our materials, would still recognize Branch and the Congress to the
lob and serve our consumers the basic work performed by military and foreign intelli
better, particularly (cid:145)at the Issue today(cid:146)s homebuilclers and cabi gence partners. The old
Group level and below.I Admit netmakers. Some tasks~-~~nd assumptions may no longer
teclly, sonic analytic tradecraft procedures are best completed apply well to some policymak(cid:151)
and management practices at in well-established ways. This ers at high levels, but they are
the office level and above may includes the handling of intelli still valid For nianv around the
appear static, hut the existence gence by the DI, which, it ts policy community Most of the
of some weak pockets does not probably fair to say, George so-calied (cid:147)new(cid:148) assumptions(cid:151)
\Vashington and possiblyJulius that policymakers already know
prevent the continual rise of
new ideas for ways to better Caesar would recognize and about events, understand their
serve our consumers with both understand as consistent with significance. and have their
(cid:147)finished(cid:146) intelligence (coordi the proper processing of infor own access to raw ~rnelli
mation used for statecraft and gence(cid:151)have been in play since
nated, reviewed, and polished
publications) and less formal military operations. Many Fun at least Robert Gates(cid:146)s tenure as
clamental aspects of what Deputy Director for Intelli
products and services.
Medina describes as the (cid:147)tracli(cid:151) gence (DDI) in the early 1980s.
tional model(cid:148) of (cid:145)analysis Again, the degree of applica
In asserting that Dl work proce
preceded the creation of the tion Ins varied over time, but
dures need to change, Medina
CIA and hold up as solid they are not new, whether
appears to confuse continuity
approaches to intelligence anal referring to our current focus on
and reliance on fundamental ysis even as our tools change. the l~resiclent as First Cus
processes with stagnation. To
tomer(cid:148) or our longstanding
underscore her point that not
engagement with lower-level
enough has changed,~she writes Old and New Assumptions policyniakers. To the Dl(cid:146)s
that a DI analyst from decades credit, it has constantly striven
ago would recognize our work Medina(cid:146)s breakdown of various to optimize(cid:148) itself, to use the
processes today. This should he assumptions about Dl trade- author(cid:146)s term, against the goals
no more surprising, however, craft into (cid:147)old(cid:148) and(cid:146) new(cid:148) implicit in these assumptions by
than the contention that a car categories is unconvincing.2 the changes made over the past
penter from centuries ago, None of the four (cid:147)old(cid:148) assump decade.
The author(cid:146)s call for certain ana
tn late 1996. the DI endenvent a majorre See pp 21-25 ofCarmen Medina(cid:146)s article.
organization. which entailed combining (cid:145)(cid:145)(cid:145)Ihe Goniirig Revolu ion in triteII genet lysts to specialize in (cid:147)complex
several office-level conipOncnus. convert Analysis What To Do Wl(cid:146)icn r-~htional analysis of the most difficult
ing division-level units into Issue Groups. Models Fail,(cid:148) in this issue(vol 46, no 3) of
and caihng stihordinare branches. (cid:147)teams-(cid:148) SittcI,c(cid:146)s in Iiile/Iigc(cid:146)i icc(cid:146) problems(cid:148) seems to ignore
30
CounterpointonAnalysis
The suggestions that
Medina presents as
(cid:147)heretical(cid:148) seem, when
signal efforts along this line that stripped of dramatic about a ne(cid:146)v environment of
the DI has already undertaken, information abundance mdi(cid:151)
such as DDI Douglas descriptors, to he a mix callv altei(cid:146)ing policyniaker needs
MacEachin(cid:146)s advocacy of struc ofthe current best are overstated. The)(cid:146) echo much
tured argumenradon through practices in the DI. of the (cid:147)new economy(cid:148) thinking
(cid:145)Iinchpin analysis(cid:148) or the cre that, as good as it sounds, is
ation two )(cid:145)ears(cid:146)(cid:146)ago of the increasingly unconvincing as it
Senior Analytic Service to pro has been put into practice. Not
mote in-depth work on too long ago, The 1%~is/af#igton
nuiltifaceted issues. Jack Davis Pusi ran a series of articles on
and others have led efforts (cid:147)The Rise and Fall of Michael
since the late 1980s to encour fundamental characteristics of Savior,(cid:148) the Microstrategv chief
age creative thinking and intelligence analysis carefully who became a multi(cid:151)billion
strengthen the Directorate(cid:146)s cus developed during the last half aire, then watched his wealth
tomer locus through alternative of the twentieth century (cid:147)3 The and his company collapse alter
analysis,(cid:148) which uses various suggestions that Medina pre had accounting practices took
methods to deal with uncer sents as heretical(cid:148) seem, when the luster off his vision of how
tainty, and opportunity stripped of dramatic descrip to handle the new environment
analysis,(cid:148) which identifies levers tors, to he a mix of the current of information abundance,(cid:146) The
for manipulation by US policy. best practices in the DI. Assign series reminds us that untested
Our success, or lack thereof, in ing more positive adjectives to theories, especially when pre
these fields may he open to the proposed 21st century sented iii glowing terms to
debate, hut the concepts are nioclel than to the traditional excite the imagination of inves
neither new nor exclusive (cid:237)a model(cid:151)(cid:146) bold,(cid:148) (cid:147)complex,(cid:148) pre tors and managers, often
21st century analysis. cedent-shattering(cid:148) versus promise more than can he
(cid:147)cautious, (cid:147)(cid:145)(cid:145)hierarchical, (cid:147)(cid:147)pre(cid:151) delivered and more than, in
As for Medina(cid:146)s recommenda cedent-based(cid:148)(cid:151)may reflect practice, anyone wants.(cid:148) The
tion that more attention he desirable areas of growth for DI, like many corporations,
given to non-traditional intelli the Directorate, but acids noth already has a good and useftil
gence issues,(cid:148) one can only ing substantial to the case for product. \Vhen consultants and
remark that the Counterterrorist abandoning our current model, others come to us saying that
Center recently celebrated its everything has changed and so
15th anniversary and the Crime
and Narcotics Center w(cid:146)as cre Revolution or Evolution?
ated in 1989. Moreover, our See the tour(cid:151)part series by Mark Leiiio(cid:151)
virch. (cid:147)Microstrategy(cid:146)s cEO Sped To the
analysts were supporting arms Claims of dramatic shifts in Brink.(cid:148) The 1F(cid:146)uh,i;gllm Pus!. p AD1, 6-9
control and analyzing arms large systems, ~vhetl~er the envi~ anuar)(cid:146) 2002
5A aimiIarexziiiipie isii~ecase oi Priceline,
transfers long before the term ronment, a national economy, an internet wehisite where customers
(cid:147)counterproliferation(cid:148) came into or a US government agency, annadmoeidlietrhesiern(cid:146)iocwesn pcrliceev(cid:146)ertomraraikreltiniengucaknedts
vogue, always need to he viewed with an ahilcv to sell investors on ii e pious se
sonic skepticism. Systems do olfowteheditnhteercnoetmpaantni~(cid:146)tthoerncea\c(cid:148)hcacomnaorrkien(cid:146)tacl(cid:151)ap
Medina(cid:146)s article proposes that not change overnight, espe itahi(cid:146),,a tion until, iota lxiii /ht(cid:146) e,i/ire (iS
(cid:147)as policymakers continue to cially those affected by some of acirra/is,hieediitioll,eiasr/lilIi/~li~l(cid:145)itieinmaitnelv)e(cid:146),stPorrisceldietietr(cid:151)
raise the standards for intelli the more immutable traits of mined that its business model (cid:147)as not
gcehnacnegeanmaolyrseis,th~a~n(cid:145)e jmusatyounreed to human nature. Medina(cid:146)s claims epnierossfs(cid:151)hitafaavibelleurebMse(cid:151)foler-ne(cid:146)orltrcrelaccceoenndtsl,yto, taEirnsiIsreoo~un~n(cid:146),coiafntbiutsaiIs(cid:151)
assumptions and work habits.(cid:148) business, debt, and accounting pi(cid:151)ctices
that (cid:147)crc hidden (cid:145)vii Iiin wliat analysts ant
completely revamping (cid:147)the 3 Scep 27 ot(cid:146)Medina(cid:146)s arricie in this issue the iiusiness press Iauded as cii31tiuOiia1)(cid:146)(cid:146)
31
Counterpoint on Analysis
No mailer how many
channels ofinformation
exist, a poilcymaker has
rbmeeusfsooturrewceei,snvteohsuetgihpntrgotspoiegrhnierfie(cid:147)pcsraponovtnese two aetarmso,satndtw2o4ehyoeusr,s in ersevpneectnitfmsiocadnecodlntdweernvotenilgoolnpymthfeaontctustsheeastctouhnre
it.(cid:148) a thy. expense of consumers, how
ever, calls for a strong counter-
Undeniably, the author is cor argument.
rect in asserting that more
information is moving through
more channels of communica Importance ofFocusing on
tion today than ever before. As Moreover, while concepts and Developments
was discussed on the (cid:147)Friends ideas that put facts to use are
of Analysis(cid:148) electronic database more valuable than facts alone, Policymakers(cid:146) intelligence
in the late l980s, the DI has we have to question whether demands in the wake of 11 Sep
been losing its comparative policymakers will extend a tember 2001 show the enduring
advantage as an information warm welcome to analysts value of analysts providing sup
supplier ever since the White seeking closer involvement in port that, at least in part,
House Situation Room was the policy process. Can we be responds to the (cid:147)old(cid:148) assump
established under President sure that most policymakers tions laid out by Medina: Senior
Kennedy. Today(cid:146)s data abun want the proximity proposed in officials needed help keeping
dance needs to he viewed Medina(cid:146)s article? Human nature current on, and interpreting,
realistically, however: much of being what it is, might they not (cid:145)developments(cid:148) related to g)o
the information is redundant, become more jealous and aloof bal terrorism. In any crisis, our
when dealing with policy-
and much of it, to he blunt, is consumers(cid:146) need for intelli
related ideas from analysts
garbage. The DI serves as a gence support is intensified.
useful filter for helping policy- (secrecy and surprise being val Historically, the Dl(cid:146)s first
makers deal with the infor ued as much by policymakers response has been to establish a
mation torrent. No matter how in interagency battles as by gen task force to provide a continu
erals iii wartime)?
many channels of information ous watch on developments
exist, a policvmaker has at most It is not this article(cid:146)s intent sim and to report on them in once-
two eyes, two ears, and 24 ply to gainsay everything or twice-daily Situation Reports.
hours in a day. Medina puts forward. Perhaps a These steps have generally
been well received(cid:151)and often
general critique of the article
No one disagrees that policy- could be summed up as: more vigorously demanded(cid:151)by our
makers benefit from intelligence proof needs to be shown that traditional consumers and the
tailored to their needs. This is the traditional model has failed inevitable new users among the
not new(cid:151)debates have raged and that significant change, military commands and civilian
in the Directorate about how to much less a revolution, in the agencies. Task force activities
harness new technology to bet DI is needed. As I see it, the do not reduce other intelli
ter sen(cid:146)e the policymaker for main problem with the tradi gence support. Instead, the
decades The issue about the tional model is that it assignment of some analysts to
right mix of more policy-linked occasionally(cid:151)albeit still too focus on breaking events frees
opportunity analysis(cid:148) versus often(cid:151)is inconsistently or other analysts(cid:151)often those with
more fact-based objective anal poorly applied. Medina(cid:146)s in-depth expertise(cid:151)to concen
ysis(cid:151)never truly an either/or trate on the broader picture, the
proposition(cid:151)goes back to the (cid:147)hard questions,(cid:146) and direct
Sherman Kent-Willmoore Ken (cid:147)See Pack Davis, (cid:147)The Kent-Kendall Debate responses to policymaker
dall debate of 1949.(cid:146) Of I919(cid:146) Studies (cid:145)ti J(cid:146)itet/igence (cid:147)01 35.
110 2 (Summer 19911. pp 37-50 requests
32
CounterpointonAnalysis
A focus on developments
is fundamental to
inteffigence analysis
I3etween October 2001 and away from the office, a director
under any conditions in
April 2002, analysts working on covering transnational issues
Afghanistan were inundated any century. piobably would welcome a
with requests from senior SEIB article that alerts her to the
policymakers to track develop need to shift her attention to
ments in tile region. Tile another country within her
resulting high(cid:151)level, event(cid:151) broad account. The CIA(cid:146)s
driven current intelligence(cid:146) information. If, as Medina says, \Vhite I-louse briefers and intel(cid:151)
was shown to be an essential, analysts require up to two ligence representatives assigned
but not necessarily the essential hours each day to read through to various policy agencies
part of a successful model of the overnight traffic, can busy should be specifically asked
intelligence analysis. Although policymakers cover the same how often they rely on fact-
details cannot be provided in an ubiquitous raw intelligence and based, descriptive background
unclassified article, the demand still read domestic and foreign notes that provide details about
for Dl updates and interpreta newspapers and periodicals and events and their historical con
tion was strong. One can argue work their professional and text to answer questions by
that crisis support is sufficiently informal information sources 111gb(cid:151)level policymakers during
different from routine support without any assistance from tile their morning briefings. Such
to policymakers that it only DI or other Intelligence Coin(cid:151) metrics are likely to confirm
temporarily tips the balance in munity (IC) analysts? Raw that knowledge about develop
favor of a focus on develop intelligence, especially material ments is critical to providing
ments at the expense of the with special controls, is not strong intelligence support
provision of more conceptual, widely available to policymak(cid:151) downtown.
policy-relevant products. In my ers outside the National Security
experience, however, policy- Council. Can the many policy(cid:151) To maintain credibility, an aria
maker requests support the makers who lack secure storage lyst would he wise to he as
view chat a focus on develop facilities adequately analyze raw conversant in developments
ments is fundamental to intelligence reports that they and disseminated raw intelli
intelligence analysis tinder any may see only briefly and recall gence as the policymaker being
and incorporate related infor
conditions in any century. served. Few things undermine a
mation without some help? policyinakers confidence as
Finally, can policymakers who rapidly as an analyst(cid:146)s lack of
Myth ofthe Well-Informed travel regularly conic tip to familiarity with widely
Policymaker speed easily upon their return?
available information about
developments in countries and
As Medina notes, most policy- For the exceptional policy-
makers are knowledgeable maker, the answer to the issues relevant to ongoing pol
icy discussions. Moreover,
about their areas and are well questions above may he yes,(cid:148)
read on issues relevant to their but most are likely to need help keeping current on events pro
vides the foundation for
responsibilities. They also are and probably value the ability
identifying the cliscontinuities
very busy people, however, to draw on Dl analysts for
in foreign happenings that the
who have constant denlandls on updates. Moreover, while the
their time and attention. In an Director for Near East Affairs at Dl needs to highlight to
era of information abundance, it the NSC might not read an arti
follows that policyrnakers will cle in the IC-supported Senior
be hard pressed to review and Executive Intelligence Brief 7byTbaisFoerxmaemrplDieiewcatsorporfovNiedaerdEtaosiliAeffaauirtshoart
synthesize for themselves all of (SEIB) except when catching up th~ Nsc and natiches the authors own cx
penence whileserving a! dieNS~and cov
the available worthwhile on developments while he was ering global issues
33
Counterpoint on Analysis
(cid:147)
It is a rare young analyst
who has the ability to
policymakers as potential warn perform at the level publication under the current or
ing signs of political/econornic/ required to support the proposed analytic models.~
military shifts inimical to US Medina(cid:146)s proposed
interests. model for analysis.
Getting From Here to There
,,
The Case for an Event-Focused No serious student of intelli
Publication gence analysis can take issue
iterative process of engaging with the contention that ana
As the univ IC-coordinated cur- with policymakers. lysts should aim to focus first
rent-intelligence product. the on the customer, concentrate on
SEIB tries Lu serve a wide audi But is such a broadly focused ideas, and think beyond fin
ence, drawing primarily on raw publication useful? Or is it ished intelhgence. Thc question
intelligence of routine sensitiv superfluous to the policy pro is how to reach this sege of
ity. ?vleclina accepts that analysts cess. Over the years, I have excellence. The quality of new
should understand current asked pohcymakers about the Dl analysts has probably never
developments, hut she seems to s(cid:146)alue of the 5E113/NID. Virtu been higher, but it is still a rare
view the recording and track ally no one has contended that young analyst who has the abil
ing of developments in a analysis presented in the daily it)(cid:146) to perform at the level
written publication as unwor publication has directly affected required to support Meclina(cid:146)s
thy of the Dl(cid:146)s energy and a policy decision. More than a proposed model for analysis.
resources. The SEIB is heavy few, however, have observed
with political analysis, the type that the daily publication has In recent years, the Dl(cid:146)s
of analysis that policyniakers often contributed to the tone of increa~eci emphasis on training
need least, in her view, because policy debate(cid:151)pritnartlv by reflected a corporate recogni
it is too general and does not capturing developments and tion of the need to build and
carry tile policy relevance of recording IC thinking, thus pro maintain basic tradecraft skills.
memos ~vritten in cliiect viding a common base of Current(cid:151)intelligence publica(cid:151)
response to consumer ques information. Many policy meet tiotts, which tend to be event
tions. Her description of the ings involve large groups of focused, are one of the few
SUB(cid:151)and its predecessor, the interested officials, ranging from remaining ways for analysts to
National intelligence DalI)(cid:146) those intimately involved with develop such skills and build
(NID)(cid:151)is on the mark, hut this the specific issue under discus the foundations for creative
is not necessarily a weakness. sion to those with broad or thinking. If the Directorate
Because political activity world secondary responsibilities. The wants all of its analysts to be
wide tends to he more dynamic SF113 serves as a widely avail able to answer policymakers
than economic or militan(cid:146) activ able point of reference on hard questions,(cid:148) it needs to
ity, it is logical that a publi foreign events relevant to (he give them opportunities to learn
cation operating under the discussion. Seen in this light. to trust their intuition, which
SEth(cid:146)s guidelines would be gen the daily intelligence publica
eral and political in its focus. To tion seems a lot less dis
criticize it for not being as spe pensable than it might look to TheSEIBalso hasvaluea.s an inieihgencc
cific as requested memos is an individual senior policy(cid:151) rqoeec~o.rtdi,ontsuarnedsptoondtiasnkgintgosptootibcriyemfakcoenrgr(cid:146)es
unfair and overlooks the SEIB(cid:146)s maker. A general point of sionaI and mitiian(cid:146) custonlers. niany an tn(cid:151)
role in prompting many of reference such as the SUB is abiay.cskt htahsroIuegehnStEhannkfaunliciFeorstthoeraehcailllnyntootgeo
those policvmaker requests in worth keeping. even as we (cid:145)vorthv events and speed prepaiations (cid:145)or
tile first place. In fact, we attempt to achieve more anibi tinhgesoenuniadveoaisd(cid:148) aabnlde d(cid:147)hiavredrsiqounesstfiornosm,(cid:146)foacsudse
should welcome such an tious objectives for the scriheti h~(cid:146) Medina
34
CounterpointonAnalysis
(cid:147)
The evolution of the
Directorate appears to be
working well and should
gdertoawilssooufttohefirmaasctceoruinntgstahned not be abandoned for an scpaeuesdeietrhapnrothcaetssprweistehnotuetdbientter
alleged speedier
polishing writing and presenta process. Medina(cid:146)s article.
tional skills. Once seasoned,
analysts can turn from devoting At its heart, the article is criticiz
time to current intelligence to ing the Dl(cid:146)s office-based
addressing specific consumer culture, where considerable
needs. Current intelligence pre consumers well while allowing autonomy can result in compo
~ to respond our analysts to benefit from the nents choosing different paths.
quickly to policymaker exercise of their tradecraft and, Many would argue that the
requests, easing the jump from dare we dream, revive some of problem is that the current
the descriptive and general the fun of writing for serial pub model for analysis has not been
analysis published in the SEIB lications, either as part of the applied consistently across the
to the more sophisticated think current intelligence process or Directorate. Many of the short
ing that goes into through the use of serial flyers comings that Medina lists are
memorandums, c(cid:151)mails. and and other products. the result of this uneven appli
phone responses directly to cation and the failure to solidify
policymakers. the corporate foundation of
The Traditional Model Can
basic tradecraft skills. This raises
Devoting time to other serial Work doubts that a new model would
publications also should he The goals expressed in (cid:147)The be any easier to adopt than the
seen as an investment in the Coming Revolution in Intelli current one. Successful change
flmueitvsuesrlet,phoenloidtceyvameadlikosetprrmsaectnmitaosny,cnTooovtpe-red gbuetncteheAynaslmysaicsk(cid:148) oafreanlauundaabtltea,in ieanictcaheenprytaeodrdgrsaahnimifatztaiitnciobanansdriecqwuiidreelsy
able perfection, especially when
in the Economic IntelIi8e,,ce so-called (cid:147)revolutionary(cid:146) principles or years of sustained
dWieeskc!o)n(cid:146)tionrusedomseerioafl tphuebloitchear changes are the solution. The attention to shaping processes
thioownes.vears,Mmeodsitnabrpaonicnthscohuite;fs atritciecsleanddistoovretrsloouorkscutrhreednitveprrsaitcy asenndiovrallueeasd.erIsnhbioptnheceadssest,o dem
and analysts who remember of the DI in an effort to onstrate what it truly values by
these types of publications legitimize the proposed new using the full gamut of its abili
regret their passing(cid:151)or should, model. This is a weak founda ties to proniote and reward the
desired behaviors.
if they do not. They were a tion on which to advance
valuable tool to develop young solutions whose unexpected
analysts through self-directed costs could include the neglect Rather than trying to jumpstart
research and peer and manager or abandonment of useful pro the process of altering the
Directorates oflhce-hased cul
review. Many of us remember cesses and institutional
them as valued outlets for destabilization. These potential ture with another round of
disruptive changes, the DI
exploring ideas and floating dangers~ are not, by themselves,
new lines of analysis. Like cur reason to reject a revolutionary would be better senreci by con
rent intelligence, serial approach to analysis, but they tinuing to seek improvements at
publications were primarily should impose caution on those the margins. Sonic Issue Groups
descriptive, and thus were also calling for radical change.~ For
a great repository of reference now, the evolution of the (cid:176) Richard Beus recently provided a useful
material. It is not beyond our Directorate appears to he work discussion on he osr, and hencflts orvar
collective wit in the DI to ing well and should not be ious approaches to reforniing intelligence.
Sec (cid:147)Fixing Intelligence,(cid:146) ForeigiiAj](cid:18)ir#s,
devise a process that serves our abandoned for an alleged January-F(cid:146)elniarv 21)02
35
Counterpoint on Analysis
and Teams have shown that his do it. The challenge is for our
possible to achieve an optinml senior leadership to show
balance between the attention through its actions that to
they pay to current develop achieve the most ambitious
ments and customer service, goals of responsiveness and rel
between building analysts(cid:146) skills
evance across the Directorate it
and pro~(cid:146)iding timely and valu
able responses to policymakers, will enforce a high corporate
tradecraft stanctarcl and sotidLfy
and between maintaining their
analytic integrity and tailoring our foundation of analytic and
support to meet policymakers(cid:146) managerial skills through train
needs. In short, we know what ing, opportunity. and
needs to he done and how to accountability.
36