DTIC ADA525517: Joint Fires Coordination: Service Competencies and Boundary Challenges

9 Pages·1.1 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

1421 D’Amico Pages 8/26/99 8:02 AM Page 70
n
Joint Fires
Coordination:
Service Competencies
Good)
and Boundary Challenges Russell J.
mpany (
Co
Signal
55th
By R O B E R T J. D’ A M I C O
T
he boundaries between close and deep where cross-boundary coordination is critical for
battlespace will vary among combatant synchronized actions that create economy of
commands in typical theaters of opera- force, unity of effort, and integrated joint opera-
tions. The point at which deep and tions. Joint doctrine does not sufficiently address
close battlespace meet rates attention from plan- intra-theater, cross-boundary joint fires coordina-
ners because it challenges joint force comman- tion. The answer lies in modifying doctrine. This
ders (JFCs) who must conduct tactical and opera- proposal can be examined in joint publications,
tional fires and maneuvers as well as joint fire joint universal lessons learned (JULL) archives,
support.One cause for this consideration is the combined forces command, and combatant com-
umbrella under which joint fires are placed, mand boundary relationships and sources. The
problem transcends service interests. More impor-
tantly, lives depend on adequate joint fires coor-
dination. A review of the differences between
terms of art and service perspectives on battle-
Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. D’Amico, USAF, is currently assigned to space reveals the implications of this issue for
the Air Staff; he completed this article while attending the Naval commanders and suggests some solutions.
War College.
70 JFQ / Spring 1999
Report Documentation Page Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it

does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
1999 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1999 to 00-00-1999
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Joint Fires Coordination: Service Competencies and Boundary
5b. GRANT NUMBER
Challenges
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,260 REPORT NUMBER
Fifth Avenue SW Bg 64 Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 8
unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
1421 D’Amico Pages 8/26/99 8:02 AM Page 71
D’Amico
Again joint fires can be operational or tacti-
Figure 1. Generic Joint Operations Area: Missions And Battlespaces
cal. The difference between them is their purpose:
the former have operational objectives and the
latter have tactical objectives. They can also be at-
tacks on close or deep targets with direct fire, di-
strategic attack
rect support, or deep supporting fire. Unfortu-
d
componfeonrwtjo cainortdm fbomoracuenn ddlaeanrr’dsy eep battle interdoifcfteinosnive counter air osnopauteerrlacyte,is o tnhstaealr teae n itsdh natoat c ttchiocena lsk efeniryse usd.s i Fsotonirn tcehxtieao mnppu blrepe,to wssoeem eonef
s
p
fire support ac them lies in the result, with operational fires hav-
coordination line e ing a decisive impact on the outcome of a major
direct fire close air support direct support operation or campaign.As shown in figure 1,
joint fires beyond FSCL occur in deep battlespace
forward line close battlespace
of troops and before it in close battlespace.
This notion of a generic joint operations area
(JOA) vividly depicts boundaries and typical mis-
sions. But what are deep and close operations?
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force doctrine does
not directly consider them.Only the Army con-
Toward a Common Understanding
ceptualizes these operations. In Field Manual
The services use different terminology to dis- 100-5, Operations, close operations involve imme-
cuss joint fires and close and deep battlespace. In diate contact and include corps/division current
Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, joint battles.The battlespace lies beyond the forward
fires are “fires produced during the employment line of troops. By contrast, deep operations may
of forces from two or more components in coor- defeat an enemy outright and include activities
dinated action toward a common objective.” The against opposing forces and functions beyond
Army distinguishes between operational and tac- close battle. Deep battlespace, moreover, is the
tical fires. In short, operational fires are lethal and area beyond FSCL.
non-lethal weapon effects that influence enemy In sum the inconsistency in service descrip-
operational forces, critical functions, and key fa- tions of joint fires and battlespaces makes debate
cilities to accomplish operational objectives in over joint fires coordination difficult. Cross-
mpany (Russell J. Good) close operationsi(s AnuipTnsAptvaoConrMtcl voeSf),e ef aiitdrhev eaar gnaacnien odspt efataaratnacicteo ti eoinlnacnauae lonml. r cmy hOa e iscnrsua s crmifatlanhpec a eebsi- getyono sot-.t psheFueoemrrrr-- cobdphfoeo prrufototnahnrndc ietaaz nerfaydodn r ada tcpa cutcltiaintooniicnntnayssel roifcsnifa.r vneeJosfo f lpioivnnrriottn .tv fghUii rdeoen e pcf soleguorrrpstaeuepta inotfoeiarngtrt heawelltyc i,fota ihrtnreee o rssmiym mniniy---
Signal Co immediate contact and include hleatnhda,l taocrt icanlo fnir-leest harael nwohliocghy c iasn n roatp itdhley saottlea cdki sdpeaerpit yta. rNgeetws pweerampeoantes
55t corps/division current battles weapon effects that the battlefield. Moreover, methodologies for es-
achieve tactical objectives tablishing intra-theater boundaries are missing
in direct support of a from joint doctrine.
major operation.ATACMS or multiple launch
rocket systems, for example, when fired at an Service Specialization
enemy heavy artillery position provide direct sup- Every service has weapon systems that tra-
port and realize tactical objectives. verse intra-theater boundaries. They can attack
Close and Deep Operations. The Air Force con- close and deep targets; thus command, control,
siders operational fires as deep operations, or oper- and coordination become critical operational de-
ational fires beyond the fire support coordination sign requirements. For example, the Army has
line (FSCL) which include air interdiction, strate- ATACMS and Apache helicopters; the Marine
gic attack, suppression of enemy air defenses, and Corps has F/A–18s, AV–8s, and LAMB aircraft;
offensive counter-air missions. The goal of these Special Operations Forces have direct action and
fires is to achieve a desired effect on a given target special reconnaissance teams; and both the Navy
set or system of targets. Tactical fires also include and Air Force have strike aircraft, cruise missiles,
close air support for ground forces in the close and unmanned aerial vehicles. Service weapon
battlespace before FSCL. systems can conduct close air support, strategic
attack, and interdiction missions as well as others
that affect deep battlespace.
Spring 1999 / JFQ 71
1421 D’Amico Pages 8/26/99 8:03 AM Page 72
n
JOINT FIRES
Barraza)
Alfredo
mpany (
Co
Signal
55th
AH–64 helicopter,
Joint Forge
in Bosnia.
A. Lasica)
Kristen
Unit (
AcCloVob–sr8eaB- aG piorr losdvu ’ipd9p8ino.grt, Marine Expeditionary
31st
Because of increasing service capabilities to and Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations,
attack deep targets, there is a growing need for discusses establishing supported and supporting
joint fire support and greater coordination for relationships between components.In a major
joint fires between close and deep battles. One theater war (MTW) like Korea, the commander in
perspective advocates that the joint force land chief of Combined Forces Command (CFC) sets
component commander (JFLCC) control all assets boundaries, areas of operations (AOs), and com-
which influence the close battlespace, such as mand relationships among subordinate comman-
A–10s, and that the joint force air component ders (see figure 2).
commander (JFACC) control all assets which in- Close battlespace describes the area between
fluence the deep battlespace, such as ATACMS. the forward line of troops (FLOT) and FSCL. As
Unfortunately, this approach to forming air and shown in figure 1, joint fires in this area consist
land commander boundaries may not solve the of close air support, counter air, direct support
inevitable requirement for synchronized cross- missions, and more. JFLCC is the supported com-
boundary actions during wartime. mander whose forward boundary extends well be-
Boundaries that separate deep and close bat- yond FSCL.In Korea this is called the deep battle
tlespaces are nominally well established within synchronization line (DBSL).It is important since
theaters of operations but are not clearly based on the airspace beyond it is controlled tightly by se-
joint doctrine. Joint fires crossing intra-theater quencing and prioritizing air assets to conduct si-
boundaries must be deconflicted to prevent fratri- multaneous missions in the air component com-
cide and duplication while supporting opera- mander’s deep battlespace. But from an Army
tional momentum, maintaining the initiative, perspective this boundary clashes with the inde-
and conducting maneuvers. pendence of JFLCC and need to shape opera-
The method of segmenting JOA varies tional depth. JFACC is the supported commander
among joint force commanders (JFCs). Various for deep operations beyond the land component
joint publications provide guidance. For example, commander’s forward boundary.In this AO, joint
Joint Pub 2, Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, fires consist of air and surface interdiction mis-
discusses supported commander responsibilities sions that affect operational maneuvers of JFLCC,
as well as support for special operations, strategic
attack, counter air, and direct support missions.
72 JFQ / Spring 1999
1421 D’Amico Pages 8/26/99 8:03 AM Page 73
D’Amico
area is not within the JFACC boundary.
Figure 2. Boundaries and Areas of Operations: Combined Forces Command
Unfortunately, joint doctrine offers little
direction on ensuring economy of force
and unity of effort in this critical
warfighting zone.
Joint Pub 3-0 briefly discusses control
supported commander and coordinating measures. It states that
FSCLs are permissive fire support coordi-
joint force air
nating measures established and adjusted
component commander
deep battle by JFLCC.Additionally, Joint Pub 3-09 as-
serts that commanders conducting joint
deep battle synchronization fires beyond FSCL must inform all affected
line (boundary)
commanders to avoid fratricide.Doctrine
fire support
coordination line specifically addressing joint fire support
deep battle synchronization line (boundary) declares that coordinating is critical to
forward line of troops “avoid conflicting or redundant attack
A. Lasica) close battle operaBteiocnaus.s”e an FSCL is a permissive fire
Kristen support coordinating measure, joint fires
Unit ( beyond this point allow for rapid attacks
Marine Expeditionary csoumpppjoooirnnttee ndfot crccooemm lmamnadannddeerr rear area clcotahyaft cpetilaoi etran.ag isMleriht zsatie pajo ossofrk nomoip nptupgehsor etaro ttbrguiodernno eiftwsrly eai (xnwnAigdhTb ilOccceoah )pme apnarmbloeai uawnlnigtnidhytih nrtoienogf-
31st supported commanders to attack time
sensitive targets beyond FSCL. Moreover,
FSCL is not a boundary. The synchroniza-
Supported Commanders tion of actions on both sides of it is normally the
The cross-boundary joint fires coordination responsibility of JFLCC out to the forward bound-
problem is intense between FSCL and the land ary. Furthermore, joint publications state that in
component commander’s forward boundary be- exceptional situations commanders unable to co-
cause both supported commanders in the close ordinate activities may attack targets beyond
and deep battles have time-sensitive missions FSCL. But failing to coordinate “may increase the
there. Overlapping actions must be synchro- risk of fratricide or waste limited resources.”If
nized since they are interdependent, but joint ground forces can attack targets without coordi-
doctrine offers little guidance on how to achieve nating with JFACC, then synchronizing actions,
it. In addition, the situation is exacerbated in coordinating targeting, and achieving objectives
rapidly mobile battles when FSCL and the JFLCC are jeopardized.
forward boundary move quickly. As a battle be- Joint doctrine offers little advice on the
comes more mobile, the distance between FLOT cross-boundary problem and in some cases af-
and FSCL grows, which increases the demand fords special status to a service. For example, Joint
for close air support (CAS) missions. Moreover, Pub 0-2,Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), pro-
controlling CAS in a rapidly moving battle is dif- tects a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF)
ficult (figure 3). from supported commanders who desire to use its
fire support coordination Furthermore, interdiction be- air assets.During an amphibious operation, the
yond FSCL but before the JFLCC integrated use of Marine air and ground forces is
lines are established and forward boundary must be pre- mandated because an amphibious objective area
adjusted by JFLCC planned to complement opera- (AOA) is vulnerable. But once an operation is
tional maneuvers, disrupt the complete and AOA disestablished, synchronized
movement of troops and equip- joint fires in the deep battle become problematic.
ment toward the close battle, and control the air- For instance, Joint Pub 0-2 indicates that excess
space. JFACC is normally the supported comman- MAGTF sorties go to JFC. However sorties for
der for interdiction; however, such missions are counter-air, long-range interdiction, and recon-
critical just beyond FSCL where JFLCC is nor- naissance do not qualify as excess since they fur-
mally the supported commander. This battlespace nish “a distinct contribution to the overall joint
force effort.”
Spring 1999 / JFQ 73
1421 D’Amico Pages 8/26/99 8:03 AM Page 74
n
JOINT FIRES
Self-propelled howitzers
and ammunition carrier,
Bosnia.
Suggs)
W.
Glenn
mpany (
Co
Signal
55th
Synchronization boundary.This allows freedom of maneuver, but
When AOA is disestablished and MAGTF with a loss of joint fires coordination and sup-
uses organic air to shape its deep operational ma- port, economy of force, and unity of effort. This
neuvers, joint fires among the services become separate organization fragments JFC command
nearly impossible to synchronize. Deconflicting and control because integrated MAGTF opera-
offensive counter-air, strategic attack, and inter- tions, even as part of an MTW, are protected.
diction missions is a priority to prevent fratricide. The complexity of this difficulty can be seen
The problem is that concerns for joint service de- in the controversy associated with Joint Pub 3-09,
confliction override those for synchronized ac- which was in coordination between 1994 and
tions when there is clearly an opportunity for 1998. It was published last year, but the lengthy
joint fires coordination which provides greater coordination is indicative of the joint fires contro-
economy of force and unity of effort. A simple so- versy and illustrates the complexity of the problem
lution to deconflict forces has been to provide of joint fires and the conflict among the services.
MAGTF with its own boundary (AO), which pro- Another indicator of the importance of this
trudes well beyond FSCL and the JFLCC forward issue is revealed in the JULLs database.Cross-
boundary joint fire was identified by U.S. Pacific,
U.S. Central, and U.S. Atlantic Commands as well
as CFC in exercises and real operations. For exam-
Figure 3. Static and Mobile Battlefields ple, a Marine unit in Unified Endeavor ’95 high-
lighted the need to integrate joint fire support effi-
static mobile ciently and effectively to support joint forces. The
boundary between a MAGTF air wing and JFACC
I I I assets in Cobra Gold ’94, and the unified use of
joint force land component joint service assets to reach JFC objectives, caused
commander’s forward boundary
major problems for planners.Difficulty during
Ulchi Focus Lens ’94 in coordinating joint fires be-
joint force land component fire support coordination line yond FSCL resulted in ATO production problems
commander’s forward boundary for JFACC and an increased likelihood of fratri-
close air support
fire support close air cide.Finally, the 82d Airborne Division identified
coordination line support FSCL placement problems during Gallant Eagle
forward line of troops forward line of troops
74 JFQ / Spring 1999
1421 D’Amico Pages 8/26/99 8:04 AM Page 75
D’Amico
at JULLs from Desert Storm to realize that this is
untrue. During that real-war operation, the Army
and Marine Corps applied different rules for cross-
boundary fires. The former service thought that it
could provide both direct and indirect fires in
deep battlespace while the latter treated FSCL as
the boundary.The Joint Staff recommendation
was to redefine the term. The new definition
found in the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associ-
ated Termsdescribes a boundary as a line delineat-
ing areas to allow coordination and deconfliction
between units, formations, or areas.Unfortunately,
it does not solve the problem of joint fires coordi-
nation across intra-theater boundaries.
Good) Implications of the Challenge
mpany (Glenn W. Suggs) Signal Company (Russell J. ostehcvueeesnr l-cydTion shar cietnrsh e doaet sfo p ijpnsoreigeicrn c vwtiiis secse aeeclp yrofvo nuainctntr etccosatav cipaoekanrn bsdtaiiaa llr iiltngs ipbeevseeto scclt aivotaueh lssstri iemoei ssuisu.tgu lWthtearsoani tunaehtt--
Signal Co High mobility artillery 55th ctolowsea radn dn edaere-pr ebaalt ttliemspea cinesf,o cromuaptlieodn w, itthhe a ctrroenssd-
55t rocket system. boundary problem is now acute.In the near fu-
ture, it may become overwhelming for opera-
’88. In short, maneuvering airspace for organic
tional commanders unless joint doctrine is
Army aviation assets was too small to provide ade-
crafted to address it adequately. Additionally, the
quate close air support for ground units because of
issue will affect many JFCs executing their war
the confined space between FLOT and FSCL and
plans. However, the problem is beyond the sight
because FSCL changes were not coordinated with
of many commanders in less developed theaters.
other component com-
In small-scale contingencies, establishing appro-
manders.
with ever increasing weapon
priate missions and tasks, tailoring forces, and or-
The Combined Forces
capabilities, the cross-boundary Command solution. In ganizing command structures may be overriding
goals during planning phases. This operational
Korea, CFC addressed
problem is now acute
challenge has immediate and future importance
this problem by ap-
to joint operations.
pointing JFACC as the
Despite a lack of attention in joint pubs, the
“coordinating authority” for operational fires
area between the JFLCC forward boundary and
between FSCL and DBSL.Moreover, he said that
FSCL is critical when synchronizing actions
in combat JFLCC can still attack time-sensitive
among joint forces, achieving economy of force,
targets between FSCL and the forward boundary
and establishing an optimal time-space-force re-
without informing JFACC. However, “such at-
lationship.Synchronization of actions beyond
tacks should be the exception rather than the
FSCL is key for operational momentum and inte-
rule,” according to the Deep Operations Primer-
grated operational maneuvers focused on JFC ob-
Korea.
jectives. Interdiction missions, for example,
In the Korean theater CFC efforts to resolve
should aim at enemy forces that affect opera-
the problem have not been totally successful. For
tional maneuvers; those not closely connected
example, synchronization problems identified
with operational maneuvers are irrelevant to
during joint and combined command and con-
ground commanders (and possibly have adverse
trol exercises (Ulchi Focus) involved direct sup-
effects on offensive operations and operational
port missions beyond FSCL. However, incorporat-
momentum). When JFLCC must attack a high
ing direct fire beyond FSCL was relatively easy to
priority target beyond FSCL with direct fire or
coordinate between supported commanders be-
deep supporting fire, joint fire support can re-
cause of short flight times of direct fire assets.
duce the vulnerability of some assets. JFACC can
Desert Storm. Some critics may argue that ex-
reprioritize or divert counter air or other deep
ercises and simulations are not suitable test cases
battle missions to provide joint fire support. In
to claim that a cross-boundary problem is signifi-
cant—possibly arguing that exercises are not ro-
bust enough or that operational leaders will re-
solve this real war challenge.One need only look
Spring 1999 / JFQ 75
1421 D’Amico Pages 8/26/99 8:04 AM Page 76
n
JOINT FIRES
Multiple launch rocket
system,Korea.
m Varhegyi)
Squadron (Ji
mera
Ca
mbat
Co
1st
Korea, the synchronization of actions in the area for close air support in front of FSCL and interdic-
between FSCL and the forward boundary is han- tion beyond it. In sum, rapidly moving battles at-
dled by two working groups, the JFLCC deep op- tempt to minimize time and capture objectives
erations coordination cell and the JFACC syn- quickly at the cost of requiring greater space and
chronization cell. Both ensure operational more forces. The synchronization of joint fires is
maneuvers are complemented with deep battle- critical for greater unity of effort, economy of
space missions. force, and achievement of objectives.
In addition, synchronizing JFACC and Joint fires coordination among supported
MAGTF actions can enhance the economy of commanders is a complex issue with significant
force as interdiction, counter-air, and close air implications. Individual service specialties, in-
support missions among services become comple- cluding doctrine and weapon systems, as well as
mentary (rather than deconflicted) and support the cross-boundary challenge to realize economy
JFC campaign objectives with a unified effort. of force and unity of effort, must be addressed
The isolation of a MAGTF in its AO after disestab- when campaigns are being planned. The solution
lishing an AOA allows it unity of command and rests in the heart of operational synchronization
independent operations; however, joint fire sup- which, according to Joint Pub 3-0, is the essence
port and coordination problems are intensified of campaign planning and execution. Problems
while unity of effort may be degraded. affecting both supporting and supported com-
Finally, the optimal relationship among manders exist. Currently the solution often lies in
space, time, and forces fits neatly with opera- flexible and innovative operational leadership.
tional designs that emphasize the synchroniza- But joint doctrine must be expanded to cope with
tion of joint actions around FSCL.For example, as this challenge because senior leaders depend on
shown in figure 3, FSCL placement becomes far- the Armed Forces to effectively provide the means
ther removed from FLOT during rapidly moving to achieve the desired political ends with the
battles. This increased space requires more forces greatest success at the least cost. Smaller budgets
and realigned roles and missions will make the
cross-boundary problem more important to solve.
76 JFQ / Spring 1999
1421 D’Amico Pages 8/26/99 8:04 AM Page 77
D’Amico
M–109 firing live round
during Joint Guard.
egyi)
Combat Camera Squadron (Jim Var 55Signal Company (Joel C. Miller)th
1st
In this post-Cold War period, we need to continu- n creating liaison elements within both JFLCC
ously improve campaign planning and work and JFACC staffs to focus on close and deep battlespace
through valid command and control issues. maneuvers; communication between supported com-
Intra-theater, cross-boundary coordination is manders is key
n appointing JFACC as the coordination authority
critical for JFCs in achieving objectives with the
for operational fires beyond FSCL to ensure unity of ef-
greatest unity of effort and economy of force.
fort and avoid duplication and fratricide
Synchronized joint fires in the deep battlespace
n minimizing uncoordinated cross-boundary joint
contribute to a soundly executed campaign plan.
fires and limiting them to time-sensitive and emerging
Thus joint doctrine should be modified to resolve critical targets
this challenge. Solutions range from organiza- n valuing cost-effective joint fires; cross-boundary
tional structural changes to increased command joint fires should not occur as a matter of convenience
and control to include: n keeping egos out of the solution—lives are at
stake.
n providing JFLCCs enough maneuvering area be-
yond FSCL to independently shape the deep battle- Most importantly, commanders, staffs, and
space—allowing for unity of command and centralized combatant units must focus on objectives and find
control the best options to achieve them. Solutions based
n synchronizing air interdiction missions with on service biases or special agenda only complicate
ground operational maneuvers a joint force commander’s mission. JFQ
Spring 1999 / JFQ 77