DTIC ADA525454: War Termination and Joint Planning

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Soucy Pgs 8/26/97 12:47 PM Page 95
War Termination
and Joint Planning
By R O B E R T R. S O U C Y I I,
K E V I N A. S H W E D O, and
J O H N S. H AV E N I I
Surrender ceremonies
in Tokyo Bay,
September 2,1945.
my
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S.
U.
Summer 1995 / JFQ 95
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War Termination and Joint Planning
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WAR TERMINATION
W
hile attending the Armed but asserted that the primary characteristic
Forces Staff College, the au- of war was its nature as a political tool and
thors took part in an exercise not chance itself. He wrote:
called Certain Challenge If we keep in mind that war springs from some
which exposed them to strategic and opera- political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of
tional concerns at the Joint Staff level. One its existence will remain the supreme consideration in
lesson of the exercise was the importance of conducting it....The first, the supreme, the most far-
guidance from the National Command Au- reaching act of judgment...is to establish by that
thorities (NCA) on how to end a war. That test the kind of war on which they are embarking....3
guidance was lacking throughout the plan- That test involves two factors: that war
ning process during the exercise and had a is a deliberate instrument of policy and that
ripple effect of uncertainty since, absent an it varies with given situations. War, in
end-state with specific criteria, the crisis pro- essence, reflects the motives of policymak-
cedures were left without a unifying theme. ers.4 This is important because it reveals that
What is more, volume one of Joint Pub 5- although war is in the realm of chance, it is
03, Joint Operation Planning and Execution more fundamentally a province of policy-
System (Planning Policies and Procedures), did makers who must inform manipulators of vi-
not provide us with guidance on how to in- olence—that, is military commanders—what
tegrate and analyze criteria for the termina- they want from war and how to end it. Sur-
tion of a conflict. prisingly ending war receives scant atten-
Even step-by-step crisis action checklists tion: “The fact is that of the three categories
which are part of the joint operation plan- of the spectrum of conflict,” writes Harry
ning and execution system (JOPES) lack clar- Summers, “war termination has been virtu-
ity on the subject of war termi- ally ignored. In our fascination
nation. One is not reminded to with the means of strategy, we
why does the United
consider termination criteria. have neglected the study of its
It is reasonable to assume that States fail to prepare ends—those objects which will
timely development and con- lead directly to peace.”5
for the end of war?
tinuous revision of criteria Why does the United
should be integrated into all States fail to prepare for the
phases of JOPES, yet there is a void in guid- end of war? Finding a definitive answer to
ance. The issue which confronted us was that question may prove elusive. Russell Wei-
whether this gap is real or the result of our gley has suggested that the American way of
unfamiliarity with joint doctrine. war follows a strategy of annihilation.6 If so,
The lack of clear guidance on war termi- this approach could predispose us to destroy
nation criteria is confirmed by recent opera- an enemy force while blinding us to other
tions in the Persian Gulf and Somalia as well means of achieving objectives. Furthermore,
as through an examination of joint doctrine. inflexibility can lead an adversary to fight
Concern over this issue—from Clausewitz to harder and prolong conflict. As Sun Tzu
a range of other prominent theorists of mused, a desperate foe should not be pressed
war—speaks to its historical as well as con- too hard, especially if he is returning home,
temporary relevance.1 While no one can pre- because he will probably fight to the death.7
dict how a conflict will end, Clausewitz A bloody battle of little strategic or political
knew the effect that chance has on conflict,2 import is a double tragedy.
The amount of bloodshed and violence
in a conflict has a bearing both on the war
and the peace that follows:
The modern desperation in war produces a bitter
legacy....All sides harbor bitter feelings because of
Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Soucy II, USAF, is
widespread death and destruction. The losing side ag-
chief Air Force special operations instructor at the
onizes over how much it gave and how much it lost.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College;
The winner resents the suffering endured in relation to
Major Kevin A. Shwedo, USA, is director of per-
the objectives achieved....Winning a better state of
sonnel at JTF-6; and Major John S. Haven II, USAF,
peace after a modern war may be the most difficult of
is an action officer in the Contingency Support
all tasks.8
Division (J-6), Joint Staff.
96 JFQ / Summer 1995
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Soucy et al.
On August 5, 1990, three days
after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Presi-
dent Bush articulated the following
objectives to Congress: “immedi-
ate, complete, and unconditional
withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from
Kuwait; restoration of Kuwait’s le-
gitimate government; security and
stability of Saudi Arabia and the
Persian Gulf; safety and protection
of the lives of American citizens
abroad.”11 As diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and limited military means
failed to achieve those objectives,
he ordered that the objectives be
Navy (Tony Joseph) amancicaloiltymasrtpy, ltaihschet ieocdon a.t lhiAtricoocnuo grldheia nodgfe frteso n tsroiinevdee
S. to think the conflict through from
U.
UNISOM troops leaving start to finish: “Bush and the other
for home under United allied leaders were careful to em-
Shield. As difficult as winning that state may be, phasize that the winning of the war had to be
it must be approached with an understanding followed by winning the peace.”12
of the consequences of considering war and The initial combat phase of Desert
peace in isolation. They are linked; actions in Storm was fought from the sky. Coalition
one affect the other. Based on the literature it aircraft struck targets in the theater for a
appears that there is one key connection be- month to prepare for the ground phase.
tween them, namely, the termination phase, Once started, the ground effort moved
that is grasped by the Nation. But recent con- quickly. In 72 hours “the coalition was about
flicts demonstrate that, while we may under- to accomplish...two key objectives—Iraqi
stand the concept of war termination, we army out of Kuwait and reestablishment of
have difficulty applying it. the legitimate government.”13 General Pow-
ell found the reports of carnage disturbing
Historical Perspective
and told General Schwarzkopf that a cease-
After identifying a potential flaw in the
fire could not be far away. He also relayed
joint crisis planning process, we tested our
his concerns to the President. Lawrence
insights against those of military planners in
Freedman wrote, “Politically the President
the Gulf War and Somalia. We had to estab-
had to judge whether the extra advantage to
lish definitions for two key concepts, end-
be gained by finishing off the remaining
state and war termination, before drawing
Iraqi units was worth the political costs of
conclusions. We chose to use John Fishel’s
the continuing carnage. [NSC staff member]
definition of end-state. He said it is “what
Richard Haass later observed, using an Amer-
the leadership desires the battlefield and the
ican football analogy, ‘We didn’t want to be
surrounding political landscape to look like
accused of piling on once the whistle had
when the war is over....Moreover, end-
been blown.’ If the war ended on a sour
states suggest descriptions, in fairly great de-
note, this could complicate post-war politics.
tail, of the goals of national policy.”9
For these reasons the President was now in-
Termination objectives “define the in-
clined to conclude the war.”14
tended manner of conflict termination and
Some analysts discovered that the desire
the required military and diplomatic achieve-
to end the war raised a problem for the
ments to obtain it.”10War termination criteria
coalition: “Once the basic objective of the
thus seem not only to establish the condi-
tions for a cease-fire, but also help comman-
ders and planners prepare for what follows
combat operations.
Summer 1995 / JFQ 97
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WAR TERMINATION
war—evicting Iraq from Kuwait—was accom- on termination criteria will not find it in
plished, there was no clear post-war path for Pub 5-0. Joint Pub 3-0 stands out by compar-
the coalition to follow.”15 One observer also ison.20 War termination was much on the
found confusion on the post-war path that minds of its authors and is covered in con-
the Nation should take: “The U.S. Govern- siderable detail. Planners are reminded to
ment... suggested another blend termination criteria into initial plan-
mutual understanding political objective for Kuwait ning and strategy formulation prior to oper-
that was not at all reflected in ational activity, to wit:
between policymakers
the end-state derived by the
Properly conceived conflict termination criteria are
and commanders requires
military planners. This objec- key to ensuring that victories achieved with military
constant attention tive was to move the Kuwaiti force endure...it is fundamentally important to un-
government to a more demo- derstand that conflict termination is an essential link
cratic mode.”16 And there was more confu- between national security strategy, national military
sion in the air. Fishel went on to note that strategy, and posthostility aims—the desired outcome.21
public rhetoric by President Bush caused Further, there is guidance on when to
some concern about whether the removal of consider criteria:
Saddam Hussein had become one of the cri-
Before forces are committed, [a JFC] must know
teria for war termination.17
how NCA intend to terminate the operation and en-
Somalia illustrated the troubled relation-
sure its outcomes endure, and then determine how to
ship between political leaders and field com- implement that strategic design at the operational
manders in crises. The commander of the level[emphasis added].22
10th Mountain Division, for instance, had
Pub 3-0 offers clear guidance on the rel-
difficulty in obtaining specific guidance
evance of war termination criteria in joint
from NCA about ending the operation. In an
planning. Since anyone who finds Pub 5-0
article describing the lessons of that experi-
lacking has another source, why worry about
ence, he observed that he and his staff
deficiencies in the JOPES manual? Is the an-
drafted proposed end-states to forward up
swer to simply to look up the guidance in
the chain for approval and also fashioned
another publication? The short response is
criteria to determine if the desired end-state
no. A better answer requires understanding
could be achieved.18 Mutual understanding
the JOPES role in national planning.
between policymakers and commanders re-
JOPES is much more than a manual. It is
quires constant attention.
an elaborate system run by many people
Doctrine who use procedures, publications, and auto-
Before analyzing joint doctrine, and matic data processing to integrate NCA pol-
specifically JOPES, one must briefly consider icy decisions with military planning and ex-
the joint doctrine system. It is relatively new ecution at national, theater, and supporting
and still incomplete with many publications organizational levels.JOPES supports this in-
in development. It uses keystone volumes as tegration by facilitating actions during delib-
foundation guidance for major areas of doc- erate planning or crisis action planning. De-
trine. Most joint planning guidance is con- liberate planning “is a cyclic process carried
tained in Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning out in peacetime to develop and refine plans
Joint Operations, and Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine to be used in wartime.” It is a detailed, intri-
for Joint Operations. JOPES is a subset of mul- cate five-phase process which can take 18 to
tiple volumes in the 5-0 series. A look at 24 months.23Yet nowhere in the chapters on
Joint Pub 5-0 and Joint Pub 3-0 with regard deliberate planning is the critical nature of
to termination criteria is revealing. war termination criteria discussed. This is
First, Joint Pub 5-0 does not discuss ter- not a serious problem because of the long
mination criteria or how they are related to timeframe involved; planners have plenty of
the end-state and planning military opera- opportunity to refer to Joint Pub 3-0 and all
tions. It focuses on basic principles and con- the pertinent information in other doctrinal
cepts of joint planning and describes the or-
ganization and structure for conducting
deliberate and crisis action planning.19 Any-
one using JOPES and in need of clarification
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Soucy et al.
publications while developing their deliber- so are conflict termination issues. Prompting
ate plans. to begin a dialogue between NCA and the
A crisis, on the other hand, requires a Joint Staff is not found in this part of JOPES.
different process, because there is a threat Guidance also is not on the supported
against U.S. interests that develops rapidly commander’s checklist. The JOPES checklist
and may call for a military response.24 Crisis does not lead supported commanders to
action planning, according to Pub 5-03.1, query the Joint Staff, CJCS, or NCA about in-
“provides for the rapid and effective ex- terwoven courses of action that they develop
change of information and analysis, the with certain termination criteria. They are
timely preparation of military [action] for told to take the same types of actions as the
consideration by crisis procedures, and the Joint Staff.29 Even guidance given by NCA
prompt transmission of NCA decisions to through CJCS at the end of the crisis assess-
supported military commanders.”25 Com- ment phase does not foster dialogue on ter-
manders use options previously developed mination issues. The Chairman’s warning
by deliberate planning if possible to solve order, according to the JOPES format, con-
crises quickly, but such plans have major tains general guidance on assumptions, a
shortcomings. JOPES points out that deliber- generic remark about political constraints,
ate planning is done for hypothetical crises and the requirement for a concise mission
and relies “heavily on assumptions regarding statement. Other guidance is given on
the political and military circumstances courses of action, operational security and
[which] make it improbable that any contin- deception, psychological operations, intelli-
gency plan will be usable without modifica- gence and counterintelligence, civil affairs,
tion.”26 In a crisis, military staffs are faced et al., but nothing specific about termina-
with a serious, rapidly developing situation tion criteria.30
for which they must produce a plan that The subject is never explicitly men-
takes into account the realities of a particu- tioned in phase two. Nor is it raised in
lar problem, not a hypothetical incident. phases three, four, or five. Only with phase
Moreover, they may not have a lot of time six (execution) and publication of the exe-
to consult the keystone doctrinal manuals. cute order does the concept appear. JOPES
JOPES helps alleviate the tremendous guidance states that CJCS “takes actions
pressure in a crisis by building a six-phase needed to effect a quick and successful ter-
process with a checklist of actions for antici- mination of the crisis.”31 This information,
pated problems. Are clear instructions given however, is in the basic chapter on crisis
on formulating war termination criteria and planning and not the checklist. In the latter,
a coherent strategy around them? Are crite- CJCS is advised to assess the accomplishment
ria articulated and passed on to operational of objectives and the supported commander
commanders? Unfortunately the answer to to replan or terminate the operation.32 This is
both questions is no; much guidance is the first explicit mention of crisis termina-
given, but little concerns conflict termina- tion and comes after all previous phases—
tion. For example, phase two of crisis action situation development, crisis assessment,
planning is crisis assessment. This phase COA development and selection, and execu-
“[begins] with a report from a supported tion planning—are finished. Despite being
commander and ends with a decision by the urged to integrate termination criteria early,
NCA or the Chairman...to develop possible the guidance given to commanders and
military COAs.”27 Joint planners are not ad- planners in a pressure-filled crisis situation
vised at this critical time to ask NCA about consists of only two references in the final
their concept for terminating a war or crisis. execution phase.
They are instead advised to review plans, co- The advice of James Reed, special assis-
ordinate noncombatant evacuation with the tant to the Secretary of the Army, is appropri-
Department of State, review legal obliga- ate: “War termination has been a neglected
tions, evaluate rules of engagement, update topic for doctrinal development...current
strategic lift, and redirect intelligence gather- operational doctrines display a serious blind
ing, et al.28 Such actions are important but spot with regard to the issue of conflict termi-
nation.”33 His proposal includes seven guide-
lines for ending the doctrinal silence on war
Summer 1995 / JFQ 99
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WAR TERMINATION
D. Trejo)
gbuacidkewlianreds-p floarn ennindgin agn tdh ceo dnodcittrioinnasl pslialennnceer so nsh woaurld t ewrmorikn atotiwona:r d my (Jose
Ar
S.
U.
Discussing cease fire
terms,March 3,1991.
termination, two directly related to this dis- formulation and issuance of specific guidance to
cussion: backward-planning and clearly defin- the military commanders.
ing the conditions military planners should t Such criteria, once developed, must be
constantly reassessed by all parties involved as
work toward. He trusts this would “prompt
the situation evolves.
increased communication between the civil-
ian and military leadership...to ensure con- Responses to conflict must be planned
gruence between operational objectives and and conducted to enhance prospects for
the larger policy aims of a campaign.”34 long-term peace and stability. One dimen-
A review of the theory, literature, issues, sion is knowing when, where, and how to
and doctrine leads to the following conclu- stop hostilities. There is a gap in the current
sions: JCS planning guidance, however, that may
t Winning the peace is as important as result in planners overlooking the impor-
tance of this factor during a fast moving cri-
winning the war and calls for judicious applica-
tion of force and knowing when to stop fighting. sis. Therefore, new guidance needs to be
t Current joint doctrine used for deliberate added to each phase of the JOPES crisis ac-
planning (especially Joint Pub 3-0) adequately tion planning system sections of the manual
sensitizes planners to the concept of war termina- as follows:
tion criteria.
t phase one (situation development)—guid-
t The practical application of the concept
ance that the theater commander’s assessment
in crises—as seen in the Persian Gulf War and So-
should incorporate thoughts on how to resolve
malia—seems haphazard.
the situation
t The absence of initial or updated political
t phase two (crisis assessment)—guidance
guidance about termination criteria in a crisis can
that CJCS should query NCA about termination
be critical. Such gaps may require commanders to
criteria and to include NCA termination guidance
alter the tempo of operations at critical times to
in the warning order to facilitate the supported
allow for guidance to be developed or to impro-
commander’s backwards planning
vise their own. Such unilateral military actions
t phase three (COA development)—first, guid-
may be counterproductive because they reverse
ance that theater commander must use the termi-
the critical flow between political guidance and
nation criteria from warning order to develop
the application of military force.
possible COAs; second, CJCS will evaluate the
t The current system for crisis action plan-
CINC’s estimate and recommended COA using
ning in JOPES does not highlight the need for
the termination criteria before submission for
the Joint Staff to facilitate the dialogue between
NCA approval
NCA and operational military commanders on
war termination criteria, nor does it mandate the
100 JFQ / Summer 1995
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Soucy et al.
t phase four (COA selection)—guidance that 14Ibid., p. 404.
CJCS should reconfirm the termination criteria 15James Blackwell, Michael J. Mazarr, and Don M.
with NCA; CJCS should also review the criteria in Snider, Center on Strategic and International Studies
either the planning order or the alert order to the Study Group on Lessons Learned from the Gulf War,
The Gulf War—Military Lessons Learned (Washington:
theater commander
t phase five (execution planning)—guidance Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 47.
16John T. Fishel, “Liberation, Occupation, and Res-
that the theater commander reevaluate the COA
cue,” p. 61.
selected by NCA in terms of the reconfirmed ter-
17Ibid., p. 60.
mination criteria; CINCs should, situation per- 18S.L. Arnold, “Somalia: An Operation Other than
mitting, bring any shortfalls or limitations to the War,” Military Review(December 1993), p. 34.
attention of CJCS and NCA before entering the 19Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
next phase (Washington: Government Printing Office, May 1993).
t phase six (execution)—guidance that CJCS It is important to note that this is still in the proposed
monitor the situation for potential changes in the stage of doctrine development and subject to change; as
currently structured it provides only very generic guid-
applicability of current termination criteria and
ance.
communicate them to all concerned parties.
20Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Wash-
The above recommendations will ensure ington: Government Printing Office, September 9,
that termination criteria are considered 1993). Chapter 2 fails to mention war termination crite-
ria or post-conflict concerns, but there are numerous
throughout the crisis planning process. Until
references elsewhere beginning with a three-page dis-
then, we will enter every crisis with a built-
cussion on p. III-30.
in handicap. The time to change JOPES to 21Joint Pub 5-03.1, Joint Operation Planning and Exe-
address this void is now. JFQ cution System, Volume 1, Planning Policies and Procedures
(Washington: Government Printing Office, August 4,
NOTES 1993), p. I-1. Five volumes and supplements address
various aspects of JOPES. Only volume 1 covers the
1A search revealed 37 books and articles from the minimum content for crisis action planning procedures
mid-1980s with an accelerating interest in the 1990s. which should address the areas where war termination
2See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and trans- criteria would fall if it had been properly covered. See
lated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: pp. I-2 and I-4.
Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 101 and following. 22Ibid., p. III-2.
3Ibid., pp. 87–88. 23Class notes from AFSC Pub 1, p. 6–4.
4Ibid., p. 88. 24This paraphrases the definition of crisis found in
5Harry G. Summers, Jr., “War: Deter, Fight, Termi- Joint Pub 5-03.1, volume 1, p. V-1.
nate; The Purpose of War is a Better Peace,” Naval War 25Ibid., p. V-1.
College Review, vol. 39, no. 1 (January–February 1986), 26Ibid., p. V-1.
p. 19. 27Ibid., p. A-2-1.
6Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A His- 28Ibid., pp. A-2-1 to A-2-2.
tory of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloom- 29Ibid., pp. A-2-2 to A-2-3.
ington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. xxii. 30Ibid., all of Annex C.
7Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford: Oxford Univer- 31Ibid., p.V-15.
sity Press, 1963), pp. 109–10. 32Ibid., pp. A-6-1 to A-6-2.
8Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, The Eagle’s 33James W. Reed, “Should Deterrence Fail: War Ter-
Talons: The American Experience at War (Maxwell Air mination in Campaign Planning,” Parameters, vol. 23,
Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988), p. 34. no. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 41–42.
9John T. Fishel, “Liberation, Occupation, and Res- 34Ibid., pp. 49–50.
cue: War Termination and Desert Storm” (Carlisle Bar-
racks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, August 31, 1992), p. 59.
10Armed Forces Staff College, The Joint Staff Officer’s
Guide 1993, AFSC Pub 1 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1993), p. I-I-41.
11U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian
Gulf War: Final Report to Congress(Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, April 1992), p. 19.
12Ronald Dannreuther, “The Gulf Conflict: A Politi-
cal and Strategic Analysis,” Adelphi Papersno. 264 (Lon-
don: The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
1992), p. 57.
13Lawrence Freedman, The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 403.
Summer 1995 / JFQ 101