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CH–53 landing on USS Dwight D.Eisenhower. Joint Shipboard U.S. Navy (Alisha M. Clay) Helicopter Operations By G E O F F R E Y C. L A M B E R T and M A R K M. H U B E R T he use of both Army and Air Force hel- of past operations speaks well of the skill of the icopters from ships during contingency squadrons and ships involved, failing to resolve operations in Grenada, Panama, Soma- incompatibilities belies a serious dysfunction: the lia, and Haiti suggests that helicopters inability to address lessons learned to improve of all services should be capable of operating joint operations. from naval vessels. But daunting incompatibili- Understanding joint shipboard helicopter ties exist between helicopters and ships from operations enables planners to efficiently prepare which they operate. Although the safe execution for the future. Such operations are likely to be short fused, highly visible, and dynamic in terms of the type and scale of missions. Considering Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, USA, directs the Center for joint shipboard helicopter operations in support Operations, Plans, and Policy at U.S. Special Operations Command and of Uphold Democracy in Haiti and Earnest Will Lieutenant Commander Mark M. Huber, USN, serves as an air allocations in the Persian Gulf is illustrative. officer at U.S. Special Operations Command. Winter 2000–01 / JFQ 83 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2001 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2000 to 00-00-2001 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Joint Shipboard Helicopter Operations 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,260 REPORT NUMBER 5th Avenue SW Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 6 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 (cid:2) JOINT HELICOPTER OPERATIONS Army helicopters on USS Enterprise, Uphold Democracy. Navy S. U. Operational Necessity much lesser effort but involved ships (such as The Navy facilitated the application of mili- frigates and destroyers) with much smaller avia- tary power in Haiti by embarking Army aviation tion facilities. Though deployment lead time was units aboard USS America and USS Dwight D. longer than in Uphold Democracy, equipment Eisenhower. The former embarked Joint Special compatibility and operational procedures issues Operations Task Force 188 with 2,200 personnel. had to be addressed after, not before, the arrival Special operations aviation units flew MH–53s, of helicopters aboard various ships. Earnest Will MH–47s, UH–60s, and light observation helicop- was a case of highly innovative teamwork by the ters from USS America for more than a month to Army and Navy. The payoff was evident when the support Uphold Democracy. Meanwhile, conven- helicopters caught Iran Ajr laying mines in inter- tional Army helicopter units flew personnel from national waters and attacked it. 10th Mountain Division ashore to Port-au-Prince In Earnest Will, though they were proficient from USS Dwight D. Eisenhower. in shipboard operations, neither the Navy nor In Uphold Democracy, special operations and Marine Corps could provide helicopters and conventional aviation units were required to con- crews for night, low-level countermine operations duct operations on short notice. Issues of interop- that might involve engaging small boats. While erability could only be raised in the time that it less proficient at shipboard operations, the Army took for carriers to transit from the east coast of had rotary-wing aircraft for such missions and the United States to assigned stations off Haiti. crews trained to operate in a low-level environ- Even though many aviators had never flown ment with night vision devices. Thus Earnest Will from ships before embarking in the carriers, they established that joint solutions to new problems were now tasked to conduct large-scale joint ship- are often the answer and that interoperability is board helicopter operations. key to winning on the asymmetric battlefield. Not all joint shipboard helicopter operations Uphold Democracy and Earnest Will reveal are major efforts, nor are they always conducted that future contingency operations are unlikely to from large carrier flight decks. Earnest Will is an provide adequate time for preparation and that example. Deploying Army special operations helicopters to the Persian Gulf in 1987 was not only a 84 JFQ / Winter 2000–01 Lambert and Huber are allowed to coast down. A Navy SH–60 heli- CH–46 on USS Tarawa, copter with a rotor brake stops blades within West Pacific Operation. 50–80 seconds but more quickly if necessary. De- pending on wind conditions, an Army UH–60 without a brake may take up to five minutes to windmill to a stop. At low RPMs, helicopter rotor blades are prone to flap up and down, creating a hazard to equipment and personnel and, at the least, placing stress on rotor head components which can cause damage. The blades are also sus- ceptible to flapping in turbulent winds com- monly produced at flight quarters. As a result helicopters without rotor brakes pose a shipboard Brien) hazard that routinely endures for relatively long O’ P. periods of time. Braden Rotor brakes are not the only concern. Ships S. Navy ( cshanunt odto wmna koef thuerlnicso dputerirn bgl atdhees dbiesceanugsaeg etmurenns te oxr- U. acerbate winds that make low-RPM blades vulner- able to flapping. Being unable to maneuver im- pacts on the ability to transit from one place to ship crews and aviation personnel must overcome another in a timely fashion and can make ships equipment compatibility issues quickly to estab- more assailable to attack. Minutes and seconds lish operational procedures for all participants. count when maneuvering large ships, and the ab- Experience suggests that future JFCs may sence of a simple device such as a rotor brake seize the opportunity to employ the same assets could have profound consequences. in other useful mission profiles to increase com- The lack of blade spread/fold systems on bat effectiveness. Thus joint planners must grasp Army and Air Force helicopters is more onerous. the general characteris- Again, both Navy and Marine helicopters have tics of joint shipboard automatic blade spread/fold systems, which in Army and Air Force helicopters helicopter operations the case of folding systems quickly reduces the often lack features that are and the means to ap- size of helicopters for storage on flight decks. preciate the realities in- Navy SH–60s can fold their blades in two min- considered essential by the Navy herent in the employ- utes. Manually folding the blades of Army ment of Army and Air UH–60s can take up to 30 minutes. Because a ship Force helicopters from Navy ships. Otherwise, must maneuver to keep winds within prescribed joint commanders may decide in crisis out of limits for blade fold operations, its capability to alignment with actual capability. do so expeditiously or defensively is restricted. In addition, helicopters with blades spread on flight Flawed by Design decks keep that location from being used to ei- Not all commanders and planners have ship- ther launch or recover aircraft. In the case of board or helicopter aviation experience, which fixed-wing operations from carriers, many Army can lead to the notion that joint shipboard heli- helicopters could not be started or shut down copter operations are nothing more than helicop- within the time constraints presented by a nor- ters taking off from and landing on ships. But the mal carrier cycle for flight operations, making challenges are many and can be broadly catego- fixed- and rotary-wing operations mutually exclu- rized as material and nonmaterial. sive. This inability to conduct simultaneous fixed- Material challenges are primarily related to and rotary-wing operations tremendously limits aircraft and ordnance. Both Army and Air Force the flexibility of joint force commanders. helicopters often lack features that facilitate ship- Ordnance also poses vexing challenges. It board operations and that are considered essen- makes little sense to operate Army or Air Force tial by the Navy and Marine Corps. Their absence helicopters from Navy vessels if they cannot does not necessarily preclude using helicopters at launch with the proper complement of defensive sea, but it will diminish the efficiency of ships and offensive ordnance. But not all Army and Air conducting flight operations; more troubling, the Force ordnance is certified for storage aboard absence of certain equipment may lead to major ships. Even when ordnance is certified, handling safety hazards. A rotor brake, for example, simply stops the movement of helicopter blades more quickly after engine shutdown than when they Winter 2000–01 / JFQ 85 (cid:2) JOINT HELICOPTER OPERATIONS and loading may be problematic. The Army 2.75 tasked to train and operate from ships. Likewise, inch rocket is a case in point. Naval procedures Navy experience with Army and Air Force aviation require mounting pre-loaded rocket pods on air- varies widely. Some ship crews are well versed craft so pods do not have to be replenished with with challenges of supporting non-naval helicop- rockets manually. The Navy method keeps rockets ters; others may have no experience whatsoever. safe from exposure to electromagnetic interfer- Repositioning aircraft on deck appears to be ence or accidental firing. But mounting pods on a simple procedure conducted countless times AH–6s invalidates boresight alignment and de- daily on large aviation ships. In fact, it is rife with grades their accuracy. Replacing pods poses a hard danger unless done by trained professionals. Air- choice: conducting boresight alignment with craft weighing tens of thousands of pounds are each reload or accepting some degree of inaccu- routinely maneuvered within inches of the edge racy. In either case, uploading rocket pods is more of decks and one another on a surface that is slick time-consuming than inserting new rockets in a with rain and grease, not to mention pitching pod attached to an aircraft—even without bore- and rolling motion. Mishaps involving aircraft sight alignment. Barring changes in existing pro- running over people or even slipping overboard tocol for reloading rockets, JFCs must accept mis- offer common and vivid testimony to hazards of sion degradation. One obvious alternative moving aircraft on deck. Flight deck personnel solution is finding ways to certify Army proce- safely effect aircraft movement because they as- dures for manually reloading rockets. siduously follow procedures. Introducing air- Even though Army and Air Force helicopter frames that were not designed for flight decks re- hardware issues impact on their capabilities once quires careful management of elevated risks. embarked, avionics challenges are also worth not- The AH–6 is a prime example. Navy and Ma- ing. First, some aircraft do not have navigational rine aircraft are moved on large decks by tow bars equipment to facilitate find- coupled to tractors. Tow points on AH–6s were de- Navy flight deck personnel ing and recovering aboard signed for winch and cable systems, not tow bars ships, especially at night or and tractors. Consequently, the only way to move must rely on Army squadron in poor weather. Second, aircraft on ships requires six people to push it, a members to move aircraft many Army and Air Force method that presents many more hazards afloat helicopter avionics and flight than ashore. Furthermore, Navy flight deck per- control systems are not de- sonnel are not trained to perform the procedure. signed to operate within the intensive electro- Thus they must rely on Army squadron members magnetic environment of ships. Often helicopters to move aircraft. This cumbersome situation could cannot land in close proximity to ship emitters disrupt the flow of flight operations, especially in because of interference or radar hazards. Conse- cases of unexpected aircraft movements. quently, JFCs find themselves on the horns of a Lack of familiarity with Army and Air Force dilemma. They may elect to secure some ship helicopters presents added challenges. Flight deck emitters, such as navigation or air defense radars personnel are well acquainted with associated that may be crucial to safety, to launch and re- hazards and fire-fighting and rescue procedures cover helicopters. Alternately, they can accept for naval aircraft operating from ships. The same limits while conducting flight operations, such as can’t be said of Army and Air Force helicopters. restricting the spots on deck that can be used, to AH–64s, for instance, create particular hazards for keep radar systems operating. Either choice flight deck personnel who might be required to means compromise in the overall capability of extract incapacitated pilots from cockpits. Cock- the joint force. pit windows can be jettisoned by explosive charges to expedite pilot egress. Without knowl- People Problems edge of this feature and procedures for gaining ac- Nonmaterial challenges—aircrew as well as cess to cockpits, Navy flight deck personnel could ship crew procedures—are significant as well. Fa- be injured trying to remove pilots from aircraft miliarity with shipboard operations among Army that are on fire or have crashed on deck. and Air Force helicopter aircrew and support per- Army and Air Force pilots with little experi- sonnel varies considerably. Special operations avi- ence of embarked operations have much to learn ation units are most accustomed to operations in order to operate from ships and all the more so aboard vessels; some personnel are as familiar when functioning with Navy or Marine aircraft. with the shipboard environment as naval pilots. When conducting cyclic flight operations, aircraft On the other hand, conventional units with virtu- carriers routinely launch and recover up to forty ally no shipboard experience are periodically aircraft at a time, making airspace deconfliction critical. Army and Air Force pilots must quickly be familiarized with launch and recovery procedures to avoid interfering with flight operations. 86 JFQ / Winter 2000–01 Lambert and Huber A. Zocco) UH–60A landing on Erin board USS Peleliu. Navy ( S. U. Moreover, shipboard Changing Course S. Navy (Erin A. Zocco) cfploaortovnsco.d erWdi tulihaoreeunnsn s u fclsdhiegod ho tnbr y odr etAe ccrakmol wsvypea oprytiyss- bcthhoeaa nrORdgfee fichsc oeeign loin cfti oaztciphntteigec S rste, hoctrapeetcet harlreanysti siqoooufnn eDsss , e fdfareionndmds e n p joeorstoit ncalebte dlaisusdhhr ieetpsdo-, U. are limited, pilots accus- a test and evaluation program in 1998. Desig- Briefing on procedures tomed to launching many nated the joint shipboard helicopter integration for Army helicopters. aircraft simultaneously may have to wait to cycle process (JSHIP) and located at Naval Air Station aircraft on the same spots for launch over a long Patuxent River, it is innovative in accomplishing period before rendezvousing and advancing to its mission and ultimately in providing more op- mission objectives. The inability to launch simul- tions to commanders. taneously can significantly reduce the radius of ac- Some of the most ambitious program tests in- tion, a critical consideration for joint planners. volve ship-helicopter combinations most likely to Finally, simply bringing Navy and Army or be used in joint operations. Compatibility issues Air Force units together can strain planning pro- are identified and tests are performed. After data is cedures and execution. Typically, ship companies evaluated, legacy products and recommended are unfamiliar with the embarking Army and Air changes to improve future operations result. Force unit organization and structure and vice There have been positive developments: im- versa. Confusion results as each organization en- proved ordnance handling procedures; changes deavors to learn the other’s functional counter- to simultaneously launching multiple helicopters parts. Until these relationships are understood, from large amphibious ships; training packages to coordination suffers, diminishing joint planning prepare aviation units to embark more easily; and effectiveness. electromagnetic vulnerability software designed to represent transmitter stand-off distances. Ulti- mately this process will result in a revision of Winter 2000–01 / JFQ 87 (cid:2) JOINT HELICOPTER OPERATIONS But can joint shipboard helicopter operations be enhanced if deliberate integration efforts no longer exists? Sadly, the answer is no. At the least, as the services acquire new classes of ships, aircraft models, and ordnance, the interoperability issues of today will appear. Unless Army and Air Force rotary-wing aircraft are designed with shipboard operations in mind—an expensive and unrealistic proposition—the same challenges will arise. Joint shipboard helicopter operations are dynamic in terms of mission type and scale, char- Worrell) athctaetr oisntiec sm tuhsatt raeraec hli,k geilvye tno tehned duyrne.a mA icco nnactluurseio onf M. mera (Sean siNsuo cnnhee otehpdeeerledast isto,o ni fsa , tdihsd itsrh epastrs o acenem sesne irdngu irinitnsgg p corhregsaaelnnleitz nafgotieromsn. Ca Combat csoeamsees otrog aenxiiszta tailotnog metahye rb aetc othmee e tnhde omf aitisn c rheaprotesir-, 1st tory of the program legacy products. Otherwise, HH–60 during Desert tools that deliver enormous operational advan- Rescue VII. tages to joint warfighters will be lost. Joint Pub 3-04.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Pro- One logical repository for legacy products cedures for Shipboard Helicopter Operations. and home for a reorganized and smaller JSHIP Though sea tests are the most visible mani- staff is U.S. Joint Forces Command. But it would festation of ongoing efforts, work in other areas be naïve to propose that this command or any also has promise. The program recognizes that other organization should assume responsibilities crew training is enhanced by flight simulators like these without sufficient resources. that more accurately replicate the shipboard environment. Toward that end, data has been col- Joint commanders will lead more joint ship- lected to develop simulation software that not board helicopter operations in the future. These only reproduces turbulent airflow encountered efforts will be short-fused and highly visible, but around ship structures but replicates pitch and variable or unpredictable in both their mission roll. The result will be flight simulations to pre- and scale. They will be demanding because of in- pare helicopter crews to operate in a joint ship- teroperability challenges presented by hardware board environment. and procedural differences among the services. By initiating test and evaluation efforts for JSHIP, the Reasonable Expectations Department of Defense realizes that lessons can It is unreasonable to expect Army and Air be learned and that joint shipboard helicopter Force helicopters to operate with the same ease operations can be improved to provide greater on ships as their Navy and Marine Corps counter- operational flexibility and reliable options. parts. Even with unlimited resources and time, Joint shipboard helicopter integration will the current program could not accomplish that allow for improvements to a degree, and for a result. In any case, the cost would be enormous. time. But additional steps must be taken to en- And although joint shipboard helicopter opera- sure that those improvements are available to tions have become more commonplace, they are joint force commanders in the future. JFQ still too infrequent to justify higher spending. The cost of retrofitting even a fraction of existing Army and Air Force helicopter fleets with rotor brakes and automatic blade fold and spread systems is prohibitive, much like the cost of certify- ing Army ordnance for shipboard storage. Realistically, joint planners must make operational compromises in dispatching Army and Air Force helicopters to fly off ships. Nevertheless, improvements should be made. With a five-year char- ter and total budget of $25 million, the current program is on track to provide JFCs with greater advancements than the resources devoted to it. 88 JFQ / Winter 2000–01