DTIC ADA521114: Space-Based Weapons: Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

SPACE-BASED WEAPONS
Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives
Captain David C.Hardesty,U.S.Navy
T
heU.S.AirForceTransformationFlightPlanreleasedinNovember2003re-
invigoratedthedebateontheissueofspaceweaponization.Takinga“snap-
shot in time”of that service’s ongoing and future transformation efforts, the
TransformationFlightPlanlaysoutcurrentprograms,advancedconcepttech-
nologydemonstrations,and“futuresystemconcepts.”1Manyofthesystemsde-
scribed can be interpreted as a significant move by the United States toward
weaponizationof space.AsRep.SilvestreReyes(D-Tex.)pointedoutduringa
recenthearingof theStrategicForcesSubcommitteeof theHouseArmedSer-
vicesCommittee,“puttingweaponseitheroffensiveordefensiveintospaceisa
major policy decision.”2 This decision will require thorough discussion and
analysis to ensure that American system deployments not only provide the
short-termbenefitspromisedbyserviceadvocatesbut
CaptainHardestyisamemberofthefacultyofthe contributetoincreasedsecurityinthelongterm.
NavalWarCollege’sStrategyandPolicyDepartment. Thisarticleaddressesonecomponentofthedebate
A1981graduateoftheU.S.NavalAcademyandana-
onwhetherornottoweaponizespace.Specifically,it
valflightofficer,hehashadanumberofoperational
andtrainingtoursintheE-2Caircraftcommunity,in- looksatwhetheradecisiontobaseweaponsinspace
cludingcommandofAirborneEarlyWarningSquad- would produce a net, long-term increase in relative
ron (VAW) 113. Additional assignments have
militarycapabilityfortheUnitedStatesorservetore-
includedtheU.S.AtlanticCommandjointtaskforce
training team, the Cruiser-Destroyer Group 3 staff, duce its current military dominance. It defines
andtheNavalStrikeandAirWarfareCenter,Fallon,
“space-based weapon”as a system placed in orbit or
Nevada.BeforejoiningitsfacultyheattendedtheNa-
deepspacethatisdesigned“fordestroying,damaging,
val War College as a student, participating in the
MahanScholarprogramandgraduatingwithhighest rendering inoperable, or changing the flight trajec-
distinction.
tory of space objects,or for damaging objects in the
Naval War College Review, Spring 2005, Vol. 58, No. 2 atmosphereorontheground.”3
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46 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
U.S.AirForceTransformationFlightPlanhasseveralprogramconceptsthat
includespace-basingofweapons.TheEvolutionaryAirandSpaceGlobalLaser
Engagement(EAGLE)conceptwilluse“airborne,terrestrial,orspace-basedla-
sers in conjunction with space-based relay mirrors to project different laser
powersandfrequenciestoachieveabroadrangeofeffectsfromilluminationto
destruction.”4Another,theSpace-BasedRadioFrequencyEnergyWeapon,will
“beaconstellationofsatellitescontaininghigh-powerradio-frequencytransmit-
tersthatpossessthecapabilitytodisrupt/destroy/disableawidevarietyof elec-
tronicsandnational-levelcommandandcontrolsystems...typically...usedasa
non-kineticanti-satelliteweapon.”5Athird,“hypervelocityrodbundles,”would
“provide the capability to strike ground targets anywhere in the world from
space.”6WhileothersystemconceptsandprogramsFlightPlandescribesareless
specificonthepoint,thereseemslittledoubtthatspace-basingofweaponsisan
acceptedaspectoftheAirForcetransformationplanning.Now,therefore,isthe
timetoanalyzetheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofbasingweaponsinspace—
in the end, either endorsing or recommending revision to this space-basing
assumption.
Intheevent,thisanalysisindicatesthatspace-basedweapons,thoughinthe
short term increasing military capabilities, are in the long term very likely to
haveanegativeeffectonthenationalsecurityoftheUnitedStates.Specifically,I
willargue,thevulnerabilitiesofspace-basedsystemswouldlargelynegatetheir
projected advantages. Further, potential enemies would react to U.S. deploy-
ments,eitheravoidingtheireffectsor,moreominously,space-basingweapons
oftheirown.Thesedeploymentswouldfundamentallyreducethecurrentrela-
tive advantages the United States enjoys in conventional forces and strategic
depth—reducingthetimeanddistanceinwhicheffectivedefensesmustbecre-
ated.Argumentsforthenecessityofspace-basingweaponsarepoliticallyunten-
able,basedonfalseassumptions,ornarrowlyfocusedonspace-centricconcepts
thatfailtointegrateandtakefulladvantageofcapabilitiesofterrestriallybased
forces.Finally,Iwillproposeabalancedpolicyandstrategythatshouldoptimize
maintenance of relative advantages while hedging against uncooperative
adversaries.
HIGH GROUND OR SITTING DUCK?
Spaceisfrequentlyreferredtoasthe“ultimatehighground.”Whilefewwould
disputethatspaceprovidesanexcellentvantagepoint,“highground”impliesa
greatdealmore,andinfactspaceisfarfrombeingthe“ultimatehighground.”
On earth, high ground has physical resources near at hand for shielding and hiding
behind. In space, the “high ground” has nothing: it’s a vacuum and there is nothing
there that you don’t bring with you. On earth, high ground is often a peak with a
HARDESTY 47
castle on it like the Krak des Chevaliers, a choke point, a symbol of power. In the
“high ground” of space, you’re a thin-skinned sitting duck with a bull’s-eye painted
on your side. Anybody has a chance to shoot at you whenever they feel like it. High
ground on earth provides you with a view of everything below you, while the people
down below can’t see you, because you’re up over the edge of the fortification. In
space, everybody can see you and people on the ground can hide from you, so all
those advantages are gone. On earth, from high ground you can strike anywhere
around you while those below are limited in reaching you. In space, the attacks that
you might make, the trajectories that your vehicles might follow, follow paths that
are predictable in advance, predictable in both space and time. Ground attacks,
meanwhile, on a point in space can be almost random; they are highly variable in
time and space and are unpredictable. On earth, on the high ground, you have weap-
ons that are more effective when you aim downward, but the “high ground” in space
is the easier target, being unprotected. Attacking uphill involves difficulty and delay
on the groundbutinspace,uphillanddownhillattackstakeaboutthesameamountof
timeandyour“highground”isverymuchhardertoresupplyandrearm.Lastly,on
earth,highgroundallowsapermanentcontroloversomestrategicroadorterritory,a
chokepointthatinterdictsallhostiletrafficaroundit.Inspace,theso-calledhigh
groundisashiftingMaginotlinethatiseasilyavoided,outwaitedandcircumvented.7
Aircrafthavelongperformedelevatedobservationaswellasaircontroland
groundstrikemissions.Itisthustemptingtoequatetheirdemonstratedability
toovercomegrounddefenseswiththatof spacecrafttodothesame.However,
formissionsinhigh-threatenvironments,varioustypesofaircraftaregrouped
in“packages”combiningoffensiveanddefensivecapabilitiesasspecificallyre-
quired.Routeselection,timing,anddeceptionarekeystosuccess,asaredeliber-
ateunpredictabilityandmaintenanceof theinitiative.Spacecraft,ontheother
hand,areinherentlypredictable,andcombinationsofsatellitesare“new”tothe
enemyonlyonthefirstorbit,afterwhichtheycanbeplannedagainstandlose
the initiative. Again, few similarities seem to exist between air and space
vulnerabilities.
The multiplicity of potential threats posed to U.S. space-based systems is
highlighted in the Transformation Flight Plan itself. In addition to the
space-basedweaponsalreadydescribedthathavespacecontrolmissions,several
terrestrial systems are also pertinent—such as the Ground Based Laser,which
would“propagatelaserbeamsthroughtheatmospheretoLow-EarthOrbitsat-
ellitestoproviderobustdefensiveandoffensivespacecontrolcapability.”8Op-
ponentswithmobileorhardenedlaserscouldconductspeed-of-lightattackson
space-basedsystemsattimesoftheirchoosing.TheAir-LaunchedAnti-Satellite
Missilewould“beasmallair-launchedmissilecapableofinterceptingsatellites
in low earth orbit.”9 Launching antisatellite weapons from aircraft could in-
crease the unpredictability of attack and provide additional kill mechanisms
48 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
againstourspace-basedsystems.Opponentsdesiringtoattackourspace-based
capabilitiesinthefuturewouldseemtohaveplentyofoptions.
THE SPACE CONTEXT
Objectsinspacearegovernedbyastrodynamics:“Thespeedanddirectionof
asatellitecannotbechangedaseasilyasanaircraft’s,andenormousamounts
ofenergyarerequiredtoaccomplishseeminglytrivialchangesinasatellite’s
altitudeororbitalinclination”(Howard).Themovementofobjectsinorbitis
highlypredictable—theoverwhelmingmajorityofsatellitescarryfuelonlyfor
minormaneuversatslowaccelerations.Orbits,oncechosenasbestsuitedto
thesatellite’smissions,arerarelychanged.
Lowearthorbit(LEO)(150–800km,or90–500miles)givesthebestimag-
ery resolution but limits time above the horizon with respect to any given
point on earth and renders satellites vulnerable to attack or interference.
Geosynchronousorbits(GEO)(approximately35,000km/20,000miles)have
periodsequaltotheearth’srotation;asatelliteobservedfromtheearthap-
pearstostayatornearthesamelongitude.GEOisexcellentforweatherob-
servation, communications relay, and other tasks requiring continuous
hemisphericcoveragefromasinglesatellite.BeyondGEOliehighearthorbits
(HEO).BetweenGEOandLEOisthemediumearthorbit(MEO)range.Highly
ellipticalorbitscanextendthetimeoveraparticularlatitude.
The“clean,”clutter-freebackgroundmakesobjectsinspaceeasiertode-
tect.Attemptstohidefrompassiveoractivesensorsoperatingatonefre-
quencycanmakedetectionbyothersensorseasier;asanexample,paintinga
satelliteblacktoreducereflectionsdetectabletovisible-lightsensorswould
causeittobecomehotterandthereforeemitlong-waveinfraredradiationde-
tectablebyinfraredsensorsatevengreaterrange.However,thetransparency
ofspaceissomewhatoffsetbyitsvastness;abovethelowestearthorbits,tre-
mendousvolumesmustbesearchedtofindsatellites,letalonestealthyvehi-
clesdeployedfromsatellites.“Spacesituationalawareness,”asaresult,may
be,inpracticalterms,arelativeconcept.
Allelementsofspacesystems—inspace,ontheearth,andinthelinkbe-
tween them—have vulnerabilities. Ground sites are vulnerable to threats
rangingfrommortarattacktosoftwareviruses;communicationslinksaresus-
ceptibleinvaryingdegreestojamming.Thespacesegmentsuffersnotonly
frompredictablemovementbutfromfragilityimposedbylaunchweightre-
strictions;“armorisheavy,”andasimpledevice“explodedinclose[would
send] shrapnel through solar arrays, battery systems, onboard computers,
guidancesystems,andsensorsalike”[Kennedyetal.].Iftimedcorrectly,
direct-ascentantisatelliteweapons(ASATs)firedfromearth“coulddisperse
somethingassimpleassandinLEO,leavinganythingpassingthroughit...
severelydamagedordestroyed.”Space,ground,orair-baseddirected-energy
weapons could conduct attacks on fragile satellite components without
warning. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and radiation generated by the
high-altitudedetonationofnuclearweaponsisperhapsthemostdevastating
threat,since“lingeringeffectsofradiationcouldmakesatelliteoperationsfu-
tileformanymonths”[SpaceCommission].
Sources:WilliamE.HowardIII,“SatellitesandNavalWarfare,”U.S.NavalInstitutePro-
ceedings(April1988);ColinS.Gray,ModernStrategy(Oxford,U.K.:OxfordUniv.Press,
1999); U.S. Congress, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control;
FredKennedy,RoryWelch,andBryonFessler,“AFailureofVision,”AirpowerJournal12,
no.2(Summer1998);U.S.AirForce,SpaceOperationsDoctrine;DeBlois,“SpaceSanc-
tuary”;andReportoftheCommissiontoAssessUnitedStatesNationalSecuritySpace
ManagementandOrganization.
HARDESTY 49
Space-basedweapons,likeallspacesystems,arepredictableandfragile,but
they represent significant combat power if used before they are destroyed—
leadingtoastrongincentivetousetheseweaponspreemptively,to“usethemor
lose them.” The problem is further complicated by the difficulty in knowing
whatisoccurringinspace.AstheCommissiontoAssessUnitedStatesNational
SecuritySpaceManagementandOrganizationpointedout:
Hostile actions against space systems can reasonably be confused with natural phe-
nomena. Space debris or solar activity can “explain” the loss of a space system and
mask unfriendly actions or the potential thereof. Such ambiguity and uncertainty
could be fatal to the successful management of a crisis or resolution of a conflict.
They could lead to forbearance when action is needed or to hasty action when more
or better information would have given rise to a broader and more effective set of re-
sponsive options.10
This lag in situational awareness can increase the effectiveness of attacks.
Thatis,strikingfirstislikelytomeaninflictingdisproportionatelossesonthe
enemy; waiting increases the chances of suffering disproportionate losses
oneself.
SPACE-BASED WEAPON CONCEPTS: ADVANTAGES, ISSUES,
AND REACTION
Iftechnicalandfiscalchallengesareovercome,thereislittledoubtthataninte-
gratedcombinationofairborne,terrestrial,andspace-basedlaserswithorbiting
relay mirrors would be a flexible weapons constellation. Striking at 186,000
milesasecond,laserweaponsandmirrorshelpovercometheproblemsposedby
the large distances and high speeds for targeting in and from space.11 Perhaps
theywouldbemosteffectiveatspacecontrol,buttheywouldalsobeusefulfor
boost-phaseinterceptofballisticmissiles.Thisisacriticalmissile-defensefunc-
tion,particularlywhendealingwithnuclear,chemical,orbiologicalwarheads.If
notdestroyedinboost,nuclear-tippedmissilesmaydeploydecoys,andchemi-
cal or biological warfare payloads might be broken into small, separate
submunitionsorcanisterreentryvehicles,eachofwhichisalethalweaponthat
mustbedestroyed.12Insuchcasesthereisahighlikelihoodthatdefenseswould
beoverwhelmed.
EvolutionaryAirandSpaceGlobalLaserEngagement(EAGLE)
Space-basedsystemswouldbelogicalforthisimportantmission.Byvirtueof
thespeedofthelaserandits“abilitytoaccuratelyplaceenergyontargetsthatare
thousandsofkilometersaway,”aconstellationwouldprovideworldwidecover-
ageagainstballisticmissilelaunch.13EAGLE—whichusesorbitingmirrorsthat
areeffectivelyspace-basedweapons—mightprospectivelybejustsuchasystem.
50 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
Itseffectiveness,however,canonlybegaugedintermsoftheprobablereaction
ofenemies.
AdeployedEAGLEmissiledefensesystembytheUnitedStateswouldholdat
risktheballisticmissileassetsofeveryotherstate.Evenstateswithenoughmis-
silestooverwhelmEAGLEiflaunchedsimultaneouslywouldfeelincreasedrisk,
sinceafirststrikemightreducetheirinventorybelowthesizerequiredtosatu-
ratedefenses.Inthatlight,opponentsmight:
•
Developfaster-burningmissilestoreducetheirperiodofvulnerability,or
hardenthemissilestoreducethelaser’scapacity
(cid:127)
Proliferatethemissilesandtheirlauncherstosaturatethelasers
(cid:127)
Developantisatellitecapabilitiesagainstthelasers
(cid:127) Shiftforcestructuretowardcruisemissiles.14
Thespace-basedsegmentofEAGLEwouldbehighlypredictableinitsmove-
ments.Anattackerwouldknowhowlargeasalvoofballisticmissileswouldhave
to be to overwhelm the defenses and when coverage would be at a minimum.
Furthermore,the one or two EAGLE laser-defense platforms that would have
engagementopportunitiesduringtheboostphaseofthemissilesalvocouldbe
attackedjustbeforeitwaslaunched.Defensivesensorscouldbedegradedusing
relatively low-powered lasers or decoys,while space-based weapons platforms
were attacked by ground-based lasers, orbiting space mines, or fast-burning,
hardened,direct-ascentantisatellite(ASAT)weapons.Inthisway,withrelatively
modestresourcesanenemymightoverwhelmtheextremelyexpensiveEAGLE
boost-phase capability. A more sophisticated foe might deploy clusters of
space-based mirrors to use in conjunction with mobile or hardened
ground-basedlasers.ThemirrorclusterscouldattacklargesegmentsoftheU.S.
defensivesystemwhenevertheycameovertheirtargets’horizon.
Giventhesevulnerabilitiesandinitiativepossessedbytheattackerinamissile
attack,itseemsunlikelythatEAGLEcouldprovideanythinglikeassuredboost-
phaseintercept.
Space-BasedRadio-FrequencyEnergyWeapon
Aconstellationofsatellitescontaininghigh-powerradio-frequency(RF)trans-
mitterswouldbeaflexiblesystemthatmeetscriticalspace-controlneeds.Dur-
ingrecentcongressionaltestimony,PeterTeets,UnderSecretaryoftheU.S.Air
Force,highlightedtheneedtopreventforeignpowersfromtargetingU.S.forces
and the “need to have capability to deny them the use of their space assets.”15
Power and modulation variations designed “to disrupt/destroy/disable a wide
varietyofelectronicsandnational-levelcommandandcontrolsystems”would
likelyprovideagreatdealofoperationalflexibility.16Inthepreludetocombatit
HARDESTY 51
mightjamordisruptsystemsinvolvedintargetingU.S.forces;duringconflict,
operatingathighpower,itcoulddestroyconfirmedenemysystems.
Here again, the question of enemy reaction is critical. It seems likely that
given the U.S. reliance on space assets, once the United States deploys RF
space-control weapons,other nations will find it to their advantage to do the
same.However,theirlackof detailedintelligenceontargetvulnerabilitiesmay
drivethemtodifferentspace-controlsolutions.Anopponentmightfallbackon
anoffensiveconcept,usinglargenumbersofdestructiveweapons—again,with
apremiumonfirstuse.
Placingspaceminesintheimmediatevicinityofhigh-valueAmericansatel-
liteswouldlikelybeamajorcomponentofanopponent’sstrategy.Theseweap-
onscouldbefairlylightweightandpossessconsiderablerange.“Forexample,a
directional fragmentation warhead similar to that of a Claymore mine could
project100,000one-grampelletsinapatternthatwouldcovera100x100meter
areawith10pelletspersquaremeteratarangeof1kilometer.”17Oneapproach
tothespacemineisto“designaverysmallstealthweaponthatismovedintopo-
sition over a long period of time”and in secrecy.18 However, while a stealthy
spaceminehasdefiniteadvantages,itisnotclearthatanunobservedapproachis
required.Inafullyweaponizedspaceenvironment,U.S.space-basedlasersand
mirrors, each capable of attacking satellites thousands of kilometers away,
threatendistantsatellitesasmuchaswouldaspacemineincloseproximity.In
anycase,untilspaceminesactuallydamagedorinterferedwiththeirvictims,it
would be difficult to challenge their legitimacy.To attack or disable them as a
potential threat would set a precedent for preemptive strikes against U.S.
space-basedweapons,ifnotallitssatellites.
Thus, it is likely that other countries will respond to deployment of
space-basedweaponsbytheUnitedStateswithspace-controlprogramsoftheir
own.Lower-technology kinetic weapons may even be seen as attractive deter-
rents to the sophisticated, reversible effects preferred by the United States.
Wouldwejamasurveillancesatellite,howeverimportant,ifitmeanthavingone
ofoursdestroyedbyaspacemine?Wouldwenotbedeterredbytheprospectof
seeingthecriticallow-earthandgeosynchronousorbitalzoneslitteredwiththe
debris of kinetic weapons? In this area,simplicity may offer advantages to the
opposition.
HypervelocityRodBundles
As far as can be known from unclassified sources,Hypervelocity Rod Bundles
aresimilartootherproposedkinetic-energyweaponsdesignedforuseagainst
terrestrialtargets.Theseweapons,frequentlyreferredtoas“erodingrods,”seek
“to destroy targets by converting the KE [kinetic energy] associated with the
52 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW
weapon’shighvelocity(5to11km/s[kilometers/second])intoworkandheat....
Forexample,atwo-meterrodweighing50poundsandpenetratingadepthof
six to eight meters is similar to detonating 50 pounds of explosive in a hole
slightlylargerindiameterthantherod.”19Thedestructiveforceoftheseweap-
onsisdirectedalmostentirelyinthepathoftheweapon’stravel;forthisreason,
suitabletargetsinclude“tallbuildings,missilesilos,ships,andhardenedaircraft
shelters.”20Duetotheirextremelyhighspeedandlackofvulnerablepoints,de-
fenseagainsttherods“wouldbeverydifficultinsidetheatmosphere”;thebest
approachmightbefindingandattackingtheminspacebeforethepenetratorre-
entryburniscomplete.21Foraconstellationoferoding-rodspace-basedweap-
ons,trade-offsbetweentotal“delta”velocity(energyneededtodeorbit),impact
velocity(destructivepower),areacoverage,andreentryanglesuitableforaccu-
racyseemtoyieldanoptimumorbitaltitudeofaroundeightthousandkilome-
tersandaresponsetimeof1.5totwohours.22Suchadeploymentwouldaddto
U.S. global strike capabilities, with responsiveness better than that of current
mannedaircraft,andsomeuniquemunitionseffects.
Onceagain,however,enemyreactionmustbeconsidered.Space-basedglobal
strikeweaponswouldconferonhostilenationsmuchgreaterincreasesincom-
bat power, in proportional terms, than they would for the United States. A
RANDstudyconcludedthat
because of their extremely high velocity, these [kinetic-energy] weapons are very dif-
ficult to defend against during their brief transit through the atmosphere and might
therefore be particularly interesting against heavily defended targets. These weapons
may be of only limited interest to the United States, which has other means of global
power projection. However, they may be a very good fit for another country, such as
one seeking global power projection without duplicating the American terrestrial in-
vestment or one seeking to deny access to U.S. power projection forces. For example,
instead of playing catch-up against highly evolved air and submarine defenses, a
country might prefer these space weapons to bypass the defense entirely.23
However,conventionalordnancefromspacecouldbesignificantlymorere-
sponsivethanevenkineticweapons.Becausetheydonotrequirehighterminal
velocitiesorsteepreentryangles,theycouldbeplacedinlowerorbits;asaresult,
“theresponsivenessoforbitalbasingcanreasonablybeabout20to30minutes.”24
Space-basingprecisionweaponsthatarealreadyavailabledoesnotrequirehigh
technology.Infact,a“shapecapableofcarryingalargenumberofsmartmu-
nitionsmightresemblealargerversionoftheoriginalDiscoverer/Coronafilm
returncapsules.”25Thecombinationofglobalaccess,rapidresponse,andmod-
erate technological development could eventually make space-based strike
weaponsthepreferredchoiceofanumberofcountries.
HARDESTY 53
Potentiallyhostilenations,however,arelikelytoconcentrateinsteadonfirst
strike. Rather than distributing their space-based weapons evenly and at alti-
tudes optimal for consistent,worldwide response,they might cluster weapons-
delivery platforms in lower orbits so as to reduce response time available to
defensesandincreasetheprobabilityofsaturatingthem.Evenasmallnumberof
weapons so deployed would have periodic opportunities for attacks on large
numbersoftargets.Potentialenemiesmightalsoemphasizethesurvivalofindi-
vidualweaponsenroutetotargets—forinstance,byfiring,nearlysimultaneously,
numerous submunitions that disperse even before reentry into the atmosphere.
Ingeneral,space-basingweaponswouldofferanenemyanumberofinteresting
targetingoptions.Evenasmallnumberofkineticweaponscouldhaveadevas-
tatingeffectonspace-launchorsatellite-controlfacilities,largewarshipsinport,
and sensors involved in space and missile defense. Large numbers of conven-
tionalsubmunitionscouldattackmilitaryandeconomictargetsacrossthecon-
tinentalUnitedStates.Iftheattackwerepreemptive,thechancesofdefeatingit
orpreventingextensivedamagewouldbeverylow.
Even more disturbing are the targeting options if an enemy chooses
nonconventional means. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) in orbit. However, “it is difficult to distinguish
space-basedWMDfromspace-basednon-WMD.”26Oncespace-basedweapons
becomecommonplaceandmunitionsdispensersareplacedinorbit,inspection
oftheircontentsisnexttoimpossible.Submunitionswithbiologicalpayloads,
suchasanthrax,wouldbeverydeadlyevenifinterceptedbyairdefensesinside
theatmosphere.“Afewkilogramsof thesporesdeliveredinaninhalableform
cancauseextremelylargenumbersoffatalitiesinareasofhighpopulationden-
sity.Againstthatkindofatargetareawiththatkindoflethality,precisiondeliv-
ery is not required,just widespread dispersal and rough timing relative to the
timeofdayandweather.”27Kinetic-energyweaponscouldaddtothedestruction
bytargetingsuchsitesasnuclearcontainmentbuildingsandmissilesilos.Given
currenteffortstodevelopamissiledefensesystemthatremovestheWMDthreat
totheU.S.populace,afuturewithspace-basedweaponscouldbeveryunappeal-
ingindeed.
THE ARGUMENTS FOR SPACE-BASING WEAPONS
Basing weapons in orbit, then, will not be in the long-term interests of the
UnitedStates.Still,therearethosewhodisagree.Thetwomostcommonlyheard
argumentsthatfullweaponizationof spacewouldbebeneficialfortheUnited
Statesarethatitisinevitable,andthatspaceisa“centerofgravity”thatthena-
tionmustweaponizeinordertoprotect.Athirdargumentlessfrequentlyheard