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Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen TheHonorableRyanHenryhasservedasPrincipalDep- utyUnderSecretaryofDefenseforPolicysinceFebruary 2003.Mr.Henry’sprofessionalcareerspanstwenty-four yearsofmilitaryservice,includingtoursasanaviation squadroncommander,congressionalstaffer,experimen- taltestpilot,andtechnology/warfarearchitect.Prior toappointmentasPrincipalDeputy,Mr.Henrywas CorporateVicePresidentforTechnologyandBusiness DevelopmentatScienceApplicationsInternationalCor- poration (SAIC). He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academyin1972andfromtheNationalDefenseUni- versityin1992.Hehasalsoearnedadvanceddegreesin aeronauticalsystems(UniversityofWestFlorida,1974) andsystemsmanagement(UniversityofSouthernCali- fornia,1982).Mr.HenryisacoauthorofTheInforma- tion Revolution and International Security(1998). ThisarticleappearsalsoasachapterinNewportPaper26,a collectionofstudiesofissuesrelatedtotheU.S.worldwide basingposture. 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THIS PAGE Same as 17 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen TRANSFORMING THE U.S. GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE Ryan Henry A ttheendof2004,theworldwaswitnesstoaneventthatnoonecouldhave foreseen.Evenmorestartlingthantheshockof theIndianOceantsunami itselfwasthescaleofitsimpact.Buttheverysuddennessandspeedwithwhich thetsunamistruckgaveaglimpseofhowvaluableitistopostureourforcesfor uncertainty.Hadthetsunamioccurredin1985,attheheightoftheColdWar,it isdifficulttoimaginethattheUnitedStatescouldhavesurgedtheforcesandlo- gisticalsupportneededtodeliverfoodandwatertotheareasoftheeasternIn- dianOceanthatwerethehardesthit.Itisevenmoredifficulttoimaginethatthe UnitedStatescouldhavedependedonanextensivenetworkofpartnernations toassistusinexercisingourglobalresponsibilitytoact.Onlythroughthetrans- formation of the U.S.military’s capabilities and the growing flexibility of our overseasposturewastheUnitedStatesabletorespondasquicklyandeffectively asitdidduringthiscrisis. Thesecurityenvironmentatthestartof thetwenty-firstcenturyisperhaps themostuncertainithasbeeninournation’shistory.Thisarticlefocusesonthe strategicrealitiesthataredrivingthetransformationoftheAmericanglobalde- fense posture to contend with that uncertainty, and the resultant changes the DepartmentofDefenseisworkingtobringaboutinourrelationshipsandpart- nershipcapabilitiesaroundtheworld. NEW STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE Theimpetusforthetransformationthatputusinapositiontorespondquickly andeffectivelytotheIndianOceantsunamiwastheemergenceofanewstrate- giclandscape.Since2002,theU.S.militaryhasbeenadaptingthepostureofits forces to address the key security challenges that our country will face in the T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Web\NWCRSP06web.vp Monday, April 17, 2006 8:46:13 AM Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen 14 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW twenty-first century. Traditional, state-based military challenges—for which our Cold War posture was optimized—will remain, but as the 11 September 2001attacksrevealed,abroaderrangeof securitychallengeshasemerged.The eventsof9/11showedthedestructivepotentialofterroristsandthevulnerabil- ityoftheUnitedStatesandofitsalliestounwarnedattack.Itshowedtheeffec- tiveness of asymmetric methods in countering U.S. conventional military superiorityandsoundedanearlywarningoftheapproachingconfluenceofterror- ism,state sponsorship of terrorism,and proliferation of weapons of mass de- struction(WMD)enabledbyglobalization.Itfocusedourattentiononahostile ideologythatopenlyadvocatesthekillingofinnocentsforpoliticalgain,andit proved that globalization has made failed states and ungoverned areas in the mostremotecornersoftheworldgravedangerstooursecurity. TheSecretaryofDefense’s2005NationalDefenseStrategyprovidesaconcep- tual framework for understanding this new strategic landscape,which may be saidtospanfourtypesofsecuritychallenges:traditional,irregular,catastrophic, anddisruptive. (cid:127) Traditional:statesemployingmilitaryforcesinwell-knownformsof militarycompetitionandconflict(suchasmajorcombatoperations employingconventionalair,sea,andlandforces) (cid:127) Irregular:nonstateandstateactorsemploying“unconventional”methods tocounterstrongerstateopponents(forinstance,terrorism,insurgency, civilwar,andothermethodsaimedtoerodeinfluenceandpoliticalwill) (cid:127) Catastrophic:terroristsorroguestatesemployingWMDorWMD-like effectsagainstAmericaninterests(forexample,massiveattacksonthe homeland,collapsingglobalmarkets,orlossofkeyalliesthatwouldinflict astateofshockuponpoliticalandcommercialactivity) (cid:127) Disruptive:competitorsemployingbreakouttechnologiesormethodsthat counterorcancelourmilitarysuperiority(e.g.,advancesinbio-,cyber-,or spacewar,ultra-miniaturization,directedenergy). As recent experience has shown, these challenges often converge and overlap. OuradversariesinIraqandAfghanistanhaveemployedbothtraditionalandir- regularapproaches,andterroristorganizationslikeal-Qa‘idaareposingirregu- larthreatswhileactivelyseekingcatastrophiccapabilities. THE BROAD VIEW OF “TRANSFORMATION” President Bush came to office in 2001 with an aggressive agenda for defense transformation.HechargedSecretaryofDefenseDonaldRumsfeldwithtrans- formingtheDefenseDepartmentforthechallengesofthetwenty-firstcentury. T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Web\NWCRSP06web.vp Monday, April 17, 2006 8:46:13 AM Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen HENRY 15 Theadministration’ssenseofthechangedstrategiclandscapeledtoanewassess- mentof ourneededglobal defense posture.Whatisemergingfrom thatas- sessmentisthemostprofoundreorderingofU.S.militaryforcesoverseassince WorldWarIIandtheKoreanWar.Thekeytounderstandingthisrealignmentef- fortistransformation. WhenhearrivedatthePentagon,SecretaryRumsfeldrecognizedtheneedfor change.He understood that the strategic and operational environment today is definedbyuncertainty,thattheworldischanginginrelationtothatenvironment, and that we need to view that world as it is and adapt to it as necessary. The threat-based planning system prevalent in the Cold War—through which we couldprojectaseeminglypredefinedandpredeterminedSovietthreatandhowto postureagainstit—hadbecomeobsolete.Overcomingourpreconceptionsofthat era,SecretaryRumsfeldledthedepartmentintakingthefirststepoftransforma- tionbyshiftingawayfromthreat-basedplanningandtowardacapabilities-based approachthataddressesthefullspectrumoffeasiblethreats.Thisapproachposits thatunlikeintheColdWar,wenolongerknowpreciselywhatthreatswewillface inthefuture,whowillposethem,andwhere,muchlesswhen.However,wedobe- lievetherewillbefuturechallengerstoAmericaninterestsandtotheinterestsof ouralliesandpartners,andthatwemustplanagainstthekindsofcapabilitiespo- tential adversaries may employ to exploit our vulnerabilities. Revisiting the framework of the four security challenges, this approach meansfirstrecognizingthattheDefenseDepartment’s(andthenation’s)com- fortzonehaslongbeenintherealmof“traditionalchallenges.”Throughtrans- formation,thedepartmenthasmovedbeyondthistraditionalfocusandbegun applyingitsthinkingandcapabilitiestotheotherthreesetsof challenges— irregular,catastrophic,anddisruptive.Ourglobaldefenseposturerealignment will leave us in much better shape to face the uncertainty that inheres within thesenontraditionalchallenges. Oursenseofthenewstrategiclandscape—andtheopportunitiesopenedup byemergingtechnologies—hasledtoanewwayofmeasuringmilitaryeffective- ness.Numbersof troopsandweaponplatformsarenolongerthekeymetrics. Rather, military effectiveness is now a matter of capabilities—speed, stealth, reach, knowledge, precision, and lethality. Thus, our defense planning should placelessemphasisonnumbersofforwardforcesthanuponcapabilitiesandde- siredeffectsthatcanbeachievedrapidly. Transformation also calls for increased effectiveness and efficiency. Within theDefenseDepartment,ithasstrengthenedjointnessamongmilitaryservices throughjointpresencepolicy,aswellassmarterbusinesspracticesforman- agingtheday-to-dayworkingsof theinstitution.Attheinteragencylevel,it hasimprovedtransparencyandgeneratednewapproachestoproblemsolving. T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Web\NWCRSP06web.vp Monday, April 17, 2006 8:46:13 AM Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen 16 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW Transformationhasalsostrengthenedmomentumforchangingtherelationship betweenthedepartmentanditspeople,bykeepingfaithwiththeirexpectations ofqualityoflifeinatimeofincreasedoperationaltempo. Ifchangingrelationshipsisahallmarkoftransformation,thegreatestimpact ofallhasbeenonAmericanrelationshipswithalliesandpartners.Theadminis- trationunderstandsthattheUnitedStatescannot“goitalone”inworldaffairs. Amongourcountry’skeystrategicassetsisthenetworkofalliancesandpartner- shipsthatallowsustoenjoythebenefitsofinternationalcooperationinvirtu- allyeveryendeavorweundertake.Thisnetworkisthemostvitalassetwehaveas anationintheGlobalWaronTerror.Itisinstrumentalindevelopingacommon understandingof sharedthreatsandinworkingjointlytocontendwiththem, particularlythroughpartnershipcapacitybuilding. Wecalltherelationshipsdimensionoftransformationsecuritycooperation.It is important to understand that this term is not synonymous with “engage- ment”—orwithshowingtheU.S.flagoverseasasanendinitself.Rather,secu- ritycooperationisthemeansbywhichtheDepartmentofDefenseencourages andenablesalliesandpartnerstoworkwithustoachievecommonstrategicob- jectives,therebybuildingthecapabilityandcapacityofthepartnership. Inasense,securitycooperationiscapabilities-basedplanningasappliedto relationships with our allies and partners.Whereas during the Cold War we supportedourNATOandPacificRimalliesagainstthreatstotheirborders,today we work with allies and partners who share our sense that security chal- lengestranscendspecificbordersandthreatensocietiesonaglobalscale.Justas capabilities-based planning positions the United States to contend with ad- versarialcapabilitiesinanuncertainenvironment,securitycooperationenables theUnitedStatestoconfrontaspectrumofthreatstoitsownsecurityandthatof alliesandpartners—anywhere,atanytime.Thisinvokesanimportant,symbiotic relationshipbetweensecuritycooperationandourglobaldefenseposture.Global postureservesastheplatformforimplementingsecuritycooperationactivities. Conversely,securitycooperationactivitieshelpdevelopandmaintaintheaccess needed for posturing our forces to contend with future uncertainties. Insum,transformationisfarmoredynamicthanthecommonconceptionof applyinghightechnologyinwar.FortheDefenseDepartment,itisabout: (cid:127) Acommandclimatethatsweptawaypreconceivednotionsofstrategic affairsandofthedepartment’straditionalroleinthoseaffairs (cid:127) Theshiftfromathreat-basedtoacapabilities-basedapproach (cid:127) Theneedforincreasedefficiencyandeffectiveness (cid:127) Theshiftfromengagementtosecuritycooperation. T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Web\NWCRSP06web.vp Monday, April 17, 2006 8:46:13 AM Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen HENRY 17 Transformationalthinkingrespectsthefacts,rejectsfixedideas,andpromotes new and necessary relationships and capabilities that position us to contend withtheuncertaintyofthenewstrategiclandscape. THE GENESIS OF THE U.S. GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE Beforeturningtohowthistransformationhashelpeddrivethestrategyforre- aligningourglobaldefenseposture,abitof historyisinorder.In1985,atthe height of the Cold War,the United States had 358,000 military personnel de- ployedinEurope,125,000inEastAsia,andninethousandinthePersianGulf.In Europe,ground,air,andnavalforceswerestationedinsupportof NATOfrom IcelandinthenorthwesttoTurkeyinthesoutheast.InthePacificregion,forces werestationedinKorea,thePhilippines,andJapan.Ourdefensepostureatthat timewastheproductof thecollectivelegacyof thewarsof themid-twentieth century,butourbasingandoperatingpatternswererelativelywellmatchedto thechallengesoftheColdWarera.ForcesinEuropeandAsiawereprimarilyde- signedtofightinplace—potentfordefensiveoperationsclosetogarrison,but difficulttodeployoutsideofthetheaterwheretheywerestationed.Essentially, wemaintainedforward-deployedforcesthatservedasdefensivetripwires. Theendof theColdWardramaticallyalteredthegloballandscape.Asare- sult,duringthefirsthalfofthe1990stheUnitedStatesclosedorturnedoverto hostgovernmentsabout60percentofitsoverseasmilitaryinstallationsandre- turnednearlythreehundredthousandmilitarypersonneltotheUnitedStates. During the 1990s the United States also closed large military facilities in the Philippines,Spain,andPanama. Bythemid-1990s,althoughwehaddramaticallyreducedtheoverallnumbers of forward-stationed military forces, they remained concentrated largely in WesternEuropeandNortheastAsia.AftertheendoftheColdWar,however,our operatingpatternshaddivergedfromourbasingposture.WesternEuropeand NortheastAsiahadbecomespringboardsforoperationsintheBalkans,thePer- sianGulf,andlater,CentralAsia.Theresultwasashiftintherationaleforour forwardposture—forceswerenolongerexpectedtofightinplace.Rather,their purpose was to project into theaters that were likely to be some distance away fromtheirgarrisons.Inotherwords,whileaprimarypurposeofforwardpres- encewastoprovideforthedirectterritorialdefenseoftreatyallies,thiscouldno longerbethesolepurpose.Threatstothesecurityofournationandthatofour allieshadbegunemerginginunexpectedandfarawaylands. However,new necessities of geopolitics and operational flexibility overseas were not the only motivations for transforming our global posture.The other majorimpetuswasdomesticinnature.Stressesonourmilitaryforcesandtheir familiesalsodictatedthatwereviewourpostureglobally.“Accompaniedtours” T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Web\NWCRSP06web.vp Monday, April 17, 2006 8:46:13 AM Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen 18 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW (inwhichfamiliesmovedwiththeservicemembers)designedinaneraofstatic deployments had become more of a hardship for families as service members deployedmorefrequentlyfromtheirforwardstations.Inincreasingnumbers, accompanying dependents faced “double separation”—separated both from theirlovedonesinuniformandfromtheircommunitiesandextendedfamilies backintheUnitedStates. In his 2001 review of our defense strategy and capabilities, Secretary RumsfeldchallengedtheDepartmentof Defensetochangehowitconceptual- ized and projected American presence overseas so as to contend with uncer- taintyandsurprise.Someremainedunconvincedoftheneedforchange,butthe terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 abruptly dispelled any doubt. No one foresaw this catastrophic event, but our administration had already made the mental leap—expect uncertainty and surprise—inherently necessary to re- spond effectively. The attacks coincided in a tragic manner with the defense transformationalreadyunderway. The confluence of these transformational factors—the president’s sense of thenewstrategiclandscape,themandateforchangefromthe2001review,and the shock of 9/11—galvanized the forces of change. In the midst of these co- alescing events,the secretary of defense initiated the Global Defense Posture Review, a comprehensive, strategy-based reassessment of the size, location, types,andcapabilitiesofourforwardmilitaryforces.Wesurveyedthenewstra- tegic landscape and developed a global posture strategy that hinged upon achievinggeopoliticallysoundrelationshipsandadispositionofrelevantcapa- bilities forward to contend with uncertainty. This strategy was developed throughawiderangeofconsultations—withpolicymakersandmilitaryleaders throughoutthedepartment,withintheinteragencyrealm,andwithdefensein- tellectuals.Thesecretarythenturnedtohiscombatantcommanders*todevise specificproposalsforposturechangestoimplementthestrategy.Thisensured thatwhatseemedstrategicallysoundcouldbemadeoperationallyfeasible.The developmentof theseproposalslargelyrevolvedaroundthreegeneralareasof realignment: (cid:127) AdjustingourpresenceinEuropebyshiftingawayfromlegacyColdWar structures (cid:127) ReformingourpostureinthePacific,withincreasedemphasisonkey capabilitiestoassurealliesmoreeffectively,dissuadepotentialcompetitors, deteraggressors,anddefeatadversariesifcalledupontodoso *Thecombatantcommanders,whoreportthroughthechairmanoftheJointChiefsofStafftothe secretaryofdefense,arecurrentlythoseoftheU.S.Central,European,JointForces,Northern,Pa- cific,Southern,SpecialOperations,Strategic,andTransportationcommands.Seewww.jcs.mil. T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Web\NWCRSP06web.vp Monday, April 17, 2006 8:46:13 AM Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen HENRY 19 (cid:127) Developingtheoperationalflexibilityanddiversityinoptionsneededto contendwithuncertaintyinthe“arcofinstability”—thevastregionfrom NorthAfricaacrosstheMiddleEastandSouthAsiatoSoutheastAsia. In2002,thepresidentconfirmedthechangeofdirectionindefenseplanningin theNationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnitedStates:“Tocontendwithuncertaintyand tomeetthemanysecuritychallengesweface,theUnitedStateswillrequirebases andstationswithinandbeyondWesternEuropeandNortheastAsia,aswellastem- poraryaccessarrangementsforthelong-distancedeploymentofU.S.forces.” TheDefenseDepartment’sstrategywasexportedtotheU.S.governmentasa whole,sothattheGlobalDefensePostureReviewwouldnotbedrivenjustby militaryconsiderations.TheDefenseDepartmentcollaboratedcloselywithits interagencypartners—particularlytheStateDepartment—fromthestart.The National Security Council, as the body overseeing posture changes, provided high-levelguidanceandinput.Thustheglobaldefenseposturerealignmentbe- camethestrategyoftheU.S.government. TheDefenseDepartmentalsoconsultedextensivelywithalliesandpartners. InNovember2003thepresidentformallyannouncedintensifiedconsultations withalliesandpartnersontheGlobalDefensePostureReview.Subsequently,se- niorDefenseandStateofficialsheldjointconsultationsinovertwentyforeign capitals,manyofwhicharestillgoingoninvariousforms. GLOBAL POSTURE STRATEGY UNVEILED On16August2004,inaculminatingpointforDefenseDepartmentplanners, the secretary’s new global defense posture strategy,molded by interagency in- put,wasadoptedbythepresidentinanannouncementoftheadministration’s intentiontomoveforward:“TodayIannounceanewplanfordeployingAmer- ica’sarmedforces....Thenewplanwillhelpusfightandwinthewarsofthe21st century.It will strengthen our alliances around the world while we build new partnershipstobetterpreservethepeace.” WhiletheglobalposturestrategydoesnotcompriseeverythingtheAmerican defenseestablishmentisdoingoverseas,itsimplementationservesasthefoun- dationforchangingU.S.defensepolicyabroad.Itisthedepartment’svehiclefor translatingtransformationintorelevantandeffectivedefenserelationshipsand capabilitiesfortheemergingsecurityenvironment.Theglobaldefenseposture strategyiscomposedoffivekeythemes,whichemergedfromthereviewandthe evolvingtransformationalthinkingof thedepartmentdescribedearlier.These themesnowserveasthemeasuresofeffectivenessforglobalposturechanges. ImproveFlexibilitytoContendwithUncertainty.Much of our existing over- seasposturewasestablishedduringtheColdWar,whenwethoughtweknew T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Web\NWCRSP06web.vp Monday, April 17, 2006 8:46:13 AM Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen 20 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW wherewewouldhavetofight.Today,however,weoftenhavetodeploytoplaces thatfewpeople,ifanyone,wouldhavepredicted.Thus,weshouldplaninways thatmitigatesurprise.Ourgoalistohaveforcespositionedforwardonacon- tinualbasis,withaccessandfacilitiesthatenablethemtoreachanypotential crisisspotquickly. StrengthenAlliedRolesandBuildNewPartnerships.Changes to our global postureaimtohelpouralliesandfriendsmodernizetheirownforces,strategies, anddoctrines.Weareexploringwaysinwhichwecanenhanceourcollectivede- fensecapabilities,ensuringthatourfuturealliancesandpartnershipsarecapa- ble,affordable,sustainable,andrelevant.Atthesametime,weseektotailorour military’soverseas“footprint”tosuitlocalconditions,reducefrictionwithhost nations,andrespectlocalsensitivities.Acriticalpreceptinourglobalposture planningisthattheUnitedStateswillplaceforcesonlywherethoseforcesare wantedandwelcomedbythehostgovernmentandpopulace. Create the Capacity to Act Both within and across Regions.IntheColdWaryears, we focused on threats to specific regions and tailored our military presence to thoseregions.Nowwearedealingwithsecuritychallengesthatareglobalinna- ture,relationshipsthatmustaddressthosechallengesaccordingly(e.g.,Japan’sin- volvement in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, or NATO’s involvement through the InternationalSecurityAssistanceForceinAfghanistan),anddefensecapabilities thatmustbeglobalinreach.Weneedtoimproveourabilitytoprojectpowerfrom one region to another and to manage forces on a global basis. DevelopRapidlyDeployableCapabilities.Wenolongerexpecttohavetofight inplace.Ourforcesneedtobeabletomovesmoothlyinto,through,andoutof hostnations.Thisputsapremiumonestablishingflexiblelegalandsupportar- rangementswithouralliesandpartners.Italsostrengthensthedemandforca- pabilities that provide increasingly global reach, such as the Army’s Stryker brigadecombatteams,theworldwidedispositionofkeyprepositionedmateri- als and equipment, and improvements to global en route infrastructure and strategiclift. FocusonEffectiveMilitaryCapabilities—NotNumbersofPersonnel,Units,or Equipment.Ourkeypurposeistopushrelevantcapabilitiesforward—capabil- itybeingdefinedastheabilitytoachievedesiredeffectsundercertainstandards and conditions. We now can have far greater capabilities forward than in the past,evenwithsmallerpermanentlystationedforces.TheColdWarpracticeof “bean counting”numbers of personnel in administrative regions is no longer thecase.Capabilitiesmatter,notnumbers. T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Web\NWCRSP06web.vp Monday, April 17, 2006 8:46:13 AM