DTIC ADA519339: The Spectrum of Warfare Challenge. Joint Center for Operational Analysis Journal, Volume 11, Issue 2, Spring 2009

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The Spectrum of Warfare Challenge Joint Center for Operational
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Analysis Journal, Volume XI, Issue 2, Spring 2009
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JCOA Journal Survey
The Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) is currently running a survey to determine the
relevance and impact of the Journal to our readers. The survey questions
involve the timeliness of subject areas and their relevance to those who receive
the Journal. The Journal Survey is available on the JCOA Homepage on the
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you can also access all previous editions of the JCOA Journal in a pdf format
that is available for downloading.
Journal Survey link: http://jecs.jfcom.mil/jcoa/
Message From the Director
BG Anthony G. Crutchfi eld, USA
Director, JCOA
In February 2009, General James Mattis, warfare, where a less powerful adversary seeks
Commander United States Joint Forces to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and
Command (USJFCOM), stated that the US advantages of a more powerful, conventionally
military must transform to a hybrid force capable armed military force, which often represents the
of both conventional and irregular warfare (IW). nation’s established regime.”
He also stated that the US will fi ght future wars
within hybrid conditions and that IW must become Hybrid warfare, then, represents the ability of a
a core competency for US forces. This Joint military force to accommodate and shift between
Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) Journal the demands of conventional and irregular warfare
presents articles that provide insights and lessons during a confl ict.
into hybrid warfare (HW). As used here, HW
refers to the use of a combination of actions Included in this Journal is an article on the
and reactions that incorporate aspects of both Second Lebanon War – Three Perspectives; an article
conventional and irregular warfare by both state from the Asymmetric Warfare Group on the Russia
and non-state combatants to achieve their goals. – Georgia confl ict; an article on Multinational Force
HW can include insurgent forces as well as nation - Iraq Strategic Communications lessons learned;
states. Currently, there is no offi cial Department and an article on the Sadr City engagement. We
of Defense (DOD) defi nition for HW, but its have also included two articles from the Norwegian
use in the military and public arena has become Institute for International Affairs dealing with
widespread. Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The fi nal two
articles are an historical comparison between
Likewise, according to Joint Pub 1, IW is “marked the confl icts in Iraq and Viet Nam, and an article
by a violent struggle among state and non-state discussing the need for modern US soldiers to be
actors for legitimacy and infl uence over the diplomats as well as soldiers.
relevant population. IW favors indirect and
asymmetric approaches, though it may employ My hope is that this issue of the JCOA Journal will
the full range of military and other capacities, in prove to be of great benefi t to you in the fi eld and
order to erode an adversary’s power, infl uence, those who are planning for future contingencies.
and will.” IW can incorporate insurgency,
terrorism, organized criminal activity, and
information operations to infl uence the local
populace. As presented in the USJFCOM
Anthony G. Crutchfi eld
seminar on HW in February 2008, “IW has
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
emerged as a major and pervasive form of Director, Joint Center for Operational Analysis
JCOA UPDATE
The United States Joint Forces Command 2009 Lessons (DOS) combined study captures the innovations, best
Learned Conference, hosted by the Joint Center for practices, successes, and challenges of the 2007 and
Operational Analysis (JCOA), was held 17–20 March 2008 comprehensive counterinsurgency and stability
2009, in Newport News, Virginia. The conference operations in Iraq, with emphasis on the civil-military
welcomed 169 participants—including 29 United cooperation from the strategic to tactical levels. The
States (US) and multinational general/fl ag offi cers resultant Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,
(GO/FO) and US Senior Executive Service (SES) Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and
members—from the US and eight partner nations. The Policy (DOTMLPF-P) changes are in various stages
purpose of the conference was to capture lessons from of development. Next up in support of Multinational
recent complex joint/combined operations around the Force - Iraq (MNF-I) and requested by GEN Odierno,
world, and to support near-and long-term improvement is an Information Operations (IO) study to identify,
of joint capabilities. The four day event was organized capture, and disseminate successes, lessons learned,
into plenary and working group (WG) sessions with and remaining challenges at the strategic, operational,
the WGs divided into four focus areas derived from and tactical levels. We will be conducting Continental
the US National Defense Strategy: Joint Adaptation to US (CONUS) and Outside CONUS (OCONUS) data
Irregular Warfare (JAIW), Joint Warfi ghting (JWFX), collection and interviews from May through June
Homeland Defense (HLD), and Security Cooperation 2009, with fi ndings presented by the end of August
(TSC). To encourage candid discussion of the 2009 and a written report produced later.
issues, the WG discussions were considered “not for
attribution”; therefore, the conference report does not As the nation’s priority shifts to Afghanistan, so will
list the identities of presenters or participants in any of JCOA’s. The IO study could be the last major study
the four groups. JCOA provided a senior US military we do in Iraq as the shift has already begun. The
lead (O-6), a senior civilian analyst, and two recorders new JCOA strategy is rapidly being developed and
for each working group to facilitate the discussions executed accordingly.
and document the fi ndings and recommendations.
The WG met for fi ve sessions over the fi rst two days
“... we’ll see a lot of conventional, but there will also be
of the conference and for a back-brief production
irregular warfare there. Hybrid is where we take the same
and preparation session on the third day. On the fi nal
geographical area at the same time and mix these
day of the conference, each working group presented
together. We can not go in with a purely conventional
their group’s fi ndings and recommendations to all
mindset or a purely counterinsurgency mindset
conference participants, including the GO/FO and SES
– we are going to have to mix our responses.”
members who were in attendance. The fi nal conference
Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces
report summarizes the fi ndings and way ahead strategy
Command
for integrating the fi ndings into the appropriate
organizations and institutions.
We have completed the Comprehensive Approach:
Iraq Case Study (CAI) and have executed a very
robust roll out plan that includes 4-star and AMB
Mr. Bruce Beville
level engagements. Requested by GEN Petraeus, this
Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State Deputy Director JCOA
iv JCOA Journal, Spring 2009
Contents
The Second Lebanon War: Three Perspectives ................................................................................. 1
Russian-Republic of Georgia Confl ict .............................................................................................. 9
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Strategic Communication Best Practices 2007-2008 .............. 14
“One T-Wall at a Time”: Battle of Phase Line Gold, Sadr City, Iraq, March – May 2008 ............. 25
COIN Revisited: Lessons of the classical literature on counterinsurgency and its
applicability to the Afghan hybrid insurgency ........................................................................... 48
“Flipping the COIN”: Unity of Effort and Special Operations Forces ........................................... 70
Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam ..................................................................................................... 80
“Soldier-Diplomat” - Lessons from Captain George Pickett and The Pig War .............................. 83
JCOA Products List ......................................................................................................................... 92
Points of Contact ........................................................................................................................... 101
JCOA Journal Staff:
BG Anthony G. Crutchfi eld, US Army, Director JCOA 757-203-7317 anthony.crutchfi [email protected]
Mr. Alan D. Preisser, Editor and Layout Designer 757-203-7497 [email protected]
JWFC Graphics, Cover Design
JCOA Journal, Spring 2009 v
vi JCOA Journal, Spring 2009
The Second Lebanon War: Three Perspectives
Major Tom Nelson, USA
JCOA Analyst
Since the 1970s, the Israel-Lebanon border has been a What happened? Why? And what are
source of continuing confl ict. The Palestine Liberation the implications for future confl icts?
Organization’s (PLO) cross-border attacks from south-
ern Lebanon into Israel resulted in the Israeli Defense
Lessons Learned
Force (IDF) responding with equal force. Only rarely
did events escalate beyond measured responses.1 In
What follows is an attempt to view the Second Lebanon
order to secure the restive border, Israel invaded south-
War through three lenses---those of the United States,
ern Lebanon in 1978 and again in 1982, withdrawing in
Israel, and Hezballah. Generally, the American view
2000 after eighteen years of occupation.
of the lessons learned and the failure of the IDF to
achieve the goals delineated by Prime Minister Olmert
In 2006, the world watched as Israel responded to the
is the same as the Israeli view, with a few exceptions.
12 July killing of three IDF soldiers and the kidnap-
The American view is primarily informed by Israeli
ping of two additional IDF soldiers by fi ghters of the
sources, and tends to be largely focused on performance
Islamic Resistance, the military arm of Hezballah.
at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
Over the course of the next month, Israel struggled to
Lessons range from the failure to identify achievable
use military force and diplomacy to achieve the goals
strategic goals by the civilian leadership, to the failure
set out by Prime Minister Olmert in his 17 July address
of infantry and armor to properly maneuver in a satu-
to the Knesset:
rated environment.
• The return of the hostages, Ehud (Udi) Goldwasser
The Israeli analysis informs and concurs with many of
and Eldad Regev
these same observations, but also looks a layer deeper.
• Fulfi llment of United Nations (UN) Security Council
Their impressions of the Second Lebanon War are
Resolution 15592
often viewed through the prism of Israeli society as
• A complete cease fi re
a whole. Their analysis tends to be more emotional and
• Deployment of the Lebanese army into all of south-
introspective, and takes into account the implications
ern Lebanon
of current failure extrapolated into future confl ict. The
• Expulsion of Hezballah from the area3
Winograd Commission spent a signifi cant amount of
time characterizing these failings:
When Israel did not achieve these goals through an
aggressive air campaign and a subsequent ground We chose to begin the discussion of the weak-
invasion of southern Lebanon, many observers began nesses we found with a discussion of the degree
to which the IDF’s values are observed and imple-
to question Israel’s military capabilities. As one offi cer
mented because one of the main facts we discov-
stated:
ered throughout the war was that many of the fl aws
and failings in the IDF’s performance did not result
Israel has defeated larger Arab armies repeatedly
from the fact that operational norms were not good
since its creation in 1948. The IDF enjoyed a repu-
or appropriate, but because the norms the IDF itself
tation of invincibility among its Arab neighbors
was supposed to assimilate and pursue were not
until last year.4
observed.5
It is noteworthy that the commission dedicated
considerable time to discussing the failure of the IDF to
adhere to its core values as a refl ection of Israeli society
at large.
JCOA Journal, Spring 2009 1
The Hezballah perspective of the war is less well known The focus on LIC, and the subsequent degradation of
to us. Because of limited sources of data and lack of the IDF’s ability to conduct maneuver warfare, reveals
American access to this organization, we base much a host of tactical lessons concerning anti-tank guided
of our analysis on leader Hassan Nasrallah’s public missiles (ATGM), cover and concealment, the use of
comments to the media, as well as Hezballah’s actions tunnels, improvised explosive devices (IED), swarm-
since the war. From these, we can infer some of their ing tactics, and other tactics that were employed by
key lessons learned. Hezballah on the battlefi eld. Additionally, changes in
Israeli logistics doctrine and organization that were
made in support of relatively stationary brigades con-
Lessons Learned - Israeli and ducting security operations reduced the IDF’s ability to
American Perspectives sustain itself on the battlefi eld.
Many of the major strategic, operational, and tactical
The government of Israel failed to defi ne clear, achiev-
lessons from the Second Lebanon War, as agreed upon
able, strategic level goals that could be translated
by Israelis and Americans alike, are a product of Israel’s
into operational objectives by the military. Anthony
willingness to openly and publicly discuss its fail-
Cordesman characterized this as a failing even before
ures and subsequent insights. The discussion of these
the war began, stating that there was not a clear linkage
failings below illuminates several key lessons.
between the heads of state, “diplomatic actions, war
fi ghting, and focus on confl ict termination.” 9
The Israeli military was unprepared for the Second
Lebanon War, a high intensity confl ict (HIC). Years
During wartime, simplicity is critical in analyzing the
of counterinsurgency and security operations (low
military mission, defi ning objectives, creating plans,
intensity confl ict, or LIC) in the West Bank and Gaza
and communicating orders. There were weaknesses in
prior to the 2005 withdrawal left an Army that was ill-
communicating the Israeli commanders’ intent to lower
prepared for maneuver warfare. US Army Captain
echelon leaders-and there were overly-intellectualized
Daniel Helmer discusses this issue:
concepts for planning that complicated and confused
Israeli planners (both at the strategic and operational
Throughout the [2006] war, the toll taken on readi-
levels). Many American analysts have blamed this on
ness by occupation duty in the West Bank and Gaza
was evident. Infantry, artillery, and armor coor- an overemphasis or reliance on effects based opera-
dination, once the focal point of Israeli doctrine, tions (EBO). Israeli critics and the Winograd Report
was signifi cantly degraded. Tactical expertise and have blamed multiple sources but not EBO specifi cally.
innovation were almost entirely absent a ll along the Regardless, orders, commands, and intent were not
border, where Hezballah had spent six years pre- clearly articulated in a concise manner from the strate-
paring for a defense in depth, IDF forces launched
gic, through the operational, to the tactical levels.
frontal attacks. The IDF reserves, on which the IDF
relies heavily, had not received maneuver training
The use of airpower in confl ict is often critical; how-
since the inception of the Intifada in 2000 - they
ever, its role, effects, and overall impact in asymmetric
were too busy with occupation duty. Even the active
warfare should not be overestimated. The Israeli Air
duty forces had not completed a major maneuver
training operation in more than a year. 6 Force (lAF) is credited in the Winograd Report and
by many analysts for destroying half of Hezballah’s
In consonance with the Israeli military’s focus on long range rocket capability and much of its re-
LIC operations, readiness and training for maneuver supply infrastructure.10 However, the IAF was not effec-
warfare had fallen short. Funding for high levels of tive in eliminating the Katyusha rockets that had an over-
readiness across active and Reserve forces had fallen, whelmingly strategic impact on the Israeli population.11
and commitment of forces to realistic exercises had Some analysts have referred to the Israeli overestima-
been allowed to atrophy. Training, including challeng- tion of airpower’s effects against Lebanese Hezballah
ing command post exercises, small unit and combined as “fi ghting another military’s last war,” referring to the
arms training, Reserve call ups, and large scale maneu- successful North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
vers, was not conducted.7 Prior to the 2006 confl ict air campaign in Kosovo in 1999.12 Lieutenant General
some organizations had not completed a large scale Halutz, the Israeli Chief of Staff (and an Air Force
maneuver exercise since 2000.8 pilot), was sharply criticized for his misperceptions of
2 JCOA Journal, Spring 2009
airpower’s role in resolving asymmetric confl ict, and the over-reliance on technology in general and on
is widely believed to have overestimated its capabili- airpower or network-centric warfare in particu-
ties and effects. Halutz resigned his position in January lar, or the illusion that thanks to technology such
countries can rely on ‘small but smart’ militaries,
2007 under heavy criticism for his “personal conduct
and that technology minimizes fatalities, eliminates
and the Army’s performance during the 34 day war.”13
friction, decreases the dependence on logistics,
In the end,
breaks the enemy’s will, and can achieve quick
victory by itself. RMA [Revolution in Military
Airpower did not achieve Israel’s strategic
Affairs] conceptions may be elegant and sophis-
objectives-the two soldiers [were not] returned and
ticated, but they cannot replace simple military
Hezballah was still launching 100 rockets a day into
notions that haven been held by military thinkers for
Israel up until the tenuous UN-sponsored cease-
centuries, such as the identifi cation of and operation
fi re ... 14
against centers of gravity-not just creating ‘effects’;
the role played by ground forces in battlefi eld suc-
There were signifi cant Israeli intelligence failures
cess; the importance of infl icting physical damage
regarding the capabilities of the enemy. The IDF under-
on the enemy-not just ‘burning its consciousness’;
estimated the short-range Qassam and Katyusha rocket and the fact that the enemy does not abide by the
threat and its strategic impact upon the Israeli popu- rules one wishes to dictate. 19
lation.I5 As Ralph Peters wrote, “Although capable of
identifying key fi xed or substantial mobile targets, Israeli American and Israeli analysts agree that there was
intelligence missed sites; underestimated the amount of an exaggerated expectation that technology would
weaponry available to Hezballah; [and] missed some reduce manpower requirements on the ground. In an
late -generation weapons entirely.” Intelligence that asymmetric fi ght, the situational awareness provided
was available did not make it to the ground command- by a human being on the ground often outweighs the
ers who needed it. In some cases, arcane and stove- capabilities of technology. At the same time, it is impor-
piped intelligence functions prevented intelligence tant to leverage the many useful technologies available
from reaching the tactical fi ght. 16 to support the warfi ghter.
Joint operations and synchronization of combined arms A number of American analysts concur with Israeli
capabilities were shown to be critical for success. There conclusions that there was an “excessive concern
were signifi cant differences and challenges between regarding IDF casualties.”20 The overwhelming need
the IDF ground force commander and the air force to maintain public support in the face of potentially
commander. The lack of synergy was clearly evident large numbers of Israeli casualties drove some leaders
in the early hours of the campaign. “The consequences and commanders to become overly hesitant in closing
of having no viable campaign plan and inadequate with the enemy. Hezballah, on the other hand, was not
joint training were quick to appear and punishing in concerned with taking large numbers of casualties as
their impact.”17 This lesson reinforced the need for long as it did not equate to defeat; partially as a result,
“jointness” and highlighted the problems that can arise the casualties on the Hezballah side were much higher.
when operations are not coordinated and planned in a The hesitancy on the part of commanders on the Israeli
joint environment. side contributed to their ineffectiveness. The lessons
derived from this experience reveal that clear commu-
Israel fell victim to a misplaced faith in high tech- nication of operational and strategic level objectives,
nology. Cordesman describes this overr eliance on along with a sober analysis of risk, must be undertaken
technology when he argues that the government and the by leaders at the start of confl ict.
military cannot rely solely on technological solutions
to asymmetric warfare.18 Avi Kober, an Israeli strate- The ineffective use of strategic communications
gic studies analyst, wrote about the over-reliance on was a major failing of the Israeli government. At the
high technology, including sophisticated airpower and beginning of the confl ict, many nations felt the Israeli
network-centric warfare: response to Hezballah was justifi ed; however, as time
progressed and Hezballah successfully manipulated
... the Israeli case is representative of both Western print, broadcast, and online media, the world increas-
democratic and high-t echnology countries wag-
ingly saw images of civilian casualties (both doctored
ing asymmetrical wars. It is a warning sign against
and real) and the tide of public opinion turned. There
JCOA Journal, Spring 2009 3