DTIC ADA519072: The Need for Technical Warriors PDF
Preview DTIC ADA519072: The Need for Technical Warriors
The Need for Technical Warriors COL J. DOUGLAS BEASON, USAF A hiatus exists between the inventor who knows what they [sic] could invent, if they only knew what was wanted, and the soldiers who know, or ought to know, what they want and would ask for it if they only knew how much science could do for them. You have never really bridged that gap yet. —Winston S. Churchill S INCE THE BEGINNING of World War II, the Air Force has seen the intro duction of jet aircraft, radar, atomic bombs, ballistic missiles, computers, lasers, precision-guided weapons, satellites, infrared (IR) (night) sensors, unmanned ae rial vehicles, stealth—the list of scientific and technical contributions made to weapon sys tems is long, and their contribution to the success of the war fighter is nothing short of remarkable. Science and Technology Advantage to the War Fighter But as fast as new weapons have been in troduced to the operational Air Force, ad vancements in science and technology have far exceeded even that pace, growing at an ex ponential rate. Records kept for millenia in dicate that the world’s knowledge, from the dawn of time until the 1950s, has doubled since the 1950s, and the pace is accelerating. This growth of knowledge has spilled over to the war fighter. Today’s warrior is now fight ing with more technologically sophisticated weapon systems than in the past, and that has resulted in fewer warriors being needed to fight on the battlefield. Figure 1 shows the dramatic decrease in number density (or warriors per square kilo- meter) made possible by the exploitation of advanced science and technology (S&T). In troducing S&T in the battlefield has enabled fewer war fighters to levy more damage with more accuracy than in the past. 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THIS PAGE Same as 7 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 THE NEED FOR TECHNICAL WARRIORS 71 10,000 eter 8,200 m o 7,500 kil e 5,900 ar qu 5,000 s er s p 2,500 2,200 or arri W 400 0 Civil War World War I World War II Europe, 1989 Figure 1. Manpower Density on the Battlefield (per Square Kilometer) (from Kenneth L. Adelman and Norman R. Augustine, The Defense Revolution:Intelligent Downsizing of Amer ica’s Military [San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1990], 53) the range of a spear was extended by the bow Science and Technology and arrow; that range and destructive power in the Battlefield was extended by a bullet, which was increased in turn by an artillery shell; and that was in- The S&T present in the battlefield is in- creased even more by aircraft and ballistic creasing. Tomorrow’s battlefield will consist missiles. of global networks keeping track of targets; In his National War College text on the sophisticated sensors; information-linked Strategic Defense Initiative, Col Simon P. combatants; stealthy air, land, and sea plat- Worden expanded on the exploitation of forms (both manned and unmanned); and S&T by defining military effectiveness as a long-range, conventional (nonnuclear), high- basic measure of a weapon’s military power.1 precision weapon systems, all linked with dig- Military effectiveness is a quantitative mea- ital computers.2 sure of a weapon’s range, accuracy, and Figure 2 shows there has been an expo- lethality (or destructive power) expressed in a nential increase of military effectiveness due single number. to advancements in S&T, and this trend will Figure 2 shows the dramatic increase in continue. This means that in the future the military effectiveness due to S&T through the Air Force will experience not just increases of years. Here, the y-axis is shown as the expo- a few percent, or even a doubling of military nent of powers of 10, so that the maximum effectiveness, but increases of many thou- value of “25” is not a simple factor of five sands of times, all due to the exploitation of greater than “20,” but 105 or 100,000 times S&T. greater. The implication is that the US military’s For example, by Worden’s analysis, today’s overwhelming superiority is directly due to re- nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic mis- search investments in defense S&T made 20 siles (ICBM) are 104, or 10,000 times more ef- to 30 years ago.3 This well-substantiated fact is fective than artillery was in 1930. Although embodied in such products as the F-117 military tactics and strategy have played a role stealth fighter; the B-2 stealth bomber; the in improving the lethality of these weapons, Global Positioning System (GPS); cruise mis the stunning increase in military effectiveness siles; lasers; microelectronics; information is chiefly due to one reason and one reason tasking, exploitation, processing, and trans- alone: the advancements made in S&T and mission; and small space platforms, to name a their transition to the warrior. few.4 S&T investment decisions made decades 72 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2000 25 20 s) s e n e v cti 15 e Eff y ar Milit 10 g ( o L 5 0 1000 1500 1800 1900 1930 1950 1970 2000 2020 Year Figure2 . Increaseo f“ MilitaryE ffectiveness” (LogS cale)D uet oS &T (fromS imonP . Wor den, SDI and the Alternatives [Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1991], 15) ago have gotten us to where we are today, so generated the S&T that would be exploited that warriors at the “pointy end of the stick” for producing the next major weapon system. are sharper, faster, less visible, farther reach- The end of the cold war forced the nation to ing, more accurate, more mobile, and more turn away from maintaining a unique de- deadly than ever before—while producing fense-industrial base and rely on the commer less collateral damage. cial marketplace to accomplish a significant Therefore, the lesson is that today’s ad- fraction of the S&T needed for tomorrow’s vances in S&T will produce the next genera- weapons. tion of weapon systems for the war fighter. But the commercial marketplace has also But advances in defense S&T do not happen undergone change. Most worrisome, long- overnight; nor do they happen in a vacuum. range industrial research has dramatically In the words of a former researcher at the dropped. Corporations now focus on short- prestigious Bell Laboratories, “Quality work term demands, such as manufacturing and requires sustained support. You just can’t turn time-to-market problems, and have moved on the spigot and have Nobel Prizes away from producing the advancements in overnight.”5 As in any other successful en- S&T that once served as the basis for longer deavor, S&T requires perspiration and per- range projects.6 While some industries will sistence, as well as creativity. In other words, continue to evolve technologies to develop defense S&T needs to be nurtured, looked and retain market share, in general there will after, and sustained. Or it will die. be less risk taking and less innovation. And while some enabling technologies of impor tance to the military will be developed, there Science and Technology in the will be less integration of technologies for de- Changing Defense-Industrial Base fense purposes. Without the necessary infrastructure or In the past, an infrastructure consisting of profit enticements, the commercial market- defense laboratories, industry, and academia place has no motivation to perform research THE NEED FOR TECHNICAL WARRIORS 73 in some unique areas required by the military field. Warriors have to be involved in this services—such as the refinement of bomb- process, and they must have the right back- sights or the cleaning of stealth surfaces, for ground from which to do it. These warriors example. In addition, defense industry has must be technical officers who are competent significantly reduced its research and devel in S&T and are able to understand and influ opment (R&D) investments as military pro ence all phases of the acquisition process— curements have been drastically reduced, from the scientist performing basic research, which greatly decreases industry internal to the industry executive building the weapon R&D (IR&D). Aside from the opportunities system—to get the war fighters what they to establish joint interests in such dual-use need. Unlike civilians (including retired mili areas as space technologies, industry is mov tary), technical warriors provide an immediate, ing away from long-term research. operational context to focus S&T for maximum Although defense laboratories are in a po utility. sition to take up the slack, they are also suf Technical officers have been exposed to a fering significantly as they too downsize and much greater breadth of military experience have difficulty attracting top talent. This than their civilian counterparts. This makes problem is not unique to the Department of the officer an “insider” to the war fighter’s Defense (DOD); the Department of Energy’s confidence and needs—a true “technical war national security laboratories have the same rior.” This is especially important when tran problem.7 Despite this, the DOD laboratories sitioning S&T, since defense S&T is inextrica have a vital function in providing the critical bly tied to its final products—the weapons of transition bridge of S&T so that the right war. Furthermore, sophisticated weapon sys weapon with the right enhancements gets to tems demand that no discontinuities exist the war fighter. across the research and implementation phases from their birth to their use. Other- wise, this “interface” problem of transitioning The Need for Technically S&T may cause something that is well inten Competent Warriors tioned but operationally lacking to be deliv ered to the field. The sophisticated nature of S&T demands Therefore, the best way to ensure that a the attention of experts. Just as it takes many credible transition exists is to have a warrior years of experience to become an Air Force be accountable for the weapon from birth to pilot, to exploit the appropriate S&T for the death. This demands a small but dedicated war fighter demands years of schooling and cadre of technically smart warriors—those research experience. who are closest to the war fighter yet have an Certainly a cadre of technical civilians is impeccable grasp of technical subtleties, cou needed to support the defense S&T base. pled with savvy and strong common sense—to They would provide long-term continuity and maintain the continuity. But they cannot do it allow the eagerness for the future to be tem alone. These technical warriors must interact pered by reality and the lessons of the past. closely with long-term civilian S&T experts, as Some even argue that because the mission of well as industry, academia, and other national the military is to fight and win wars, this cadre assets. of scientific personnel should consist only of civilians—leaving the war fighting to the war Reasons for Having Technically riors and allowing this civilian cadre to pro duce new weapons. There is a good point to Competent Warriors the argument that the military should focus on its core competency of fighting. The following reasons for nurturing a But war fighters cannot be insulated from cadre of technically competent warriors have the process of getting the right weapon to the been culled from a wide variety of sources— 74 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2000 from bench-level scientists to vice presidents severely constrained the budget for “getting in major corporations, and from war fighters anything at any cost, and getting it done yes to senior executives throughout the govern terday.” These problems require long-term ment. Because of the dynamic job responsi strategies that lie beyond the quick reaction bilities of Air Force decision makers, it is im time needed of the war fighter. These are portant that these reasons be highlighted so classes of persuasive threats and emerging that leaders can be made familiar with the un challenges. Two examples are national missile derlying arguments. defense and space control. Responding to these highly technical, 1. The Air Force needs technical warriors to be strategic problems requires a cadre of war smart buyers. By wearing the uniform, techni riors with the scientific backgrounds that sim cal blue suiters are treated differently from ply cannot be obtained through short-term their civilian counterparts. The operational training courses. These officers can couple experience of officers (or even the perception the war fighter’s short-term needs with long- of this experience) gives them a stamp of au term strategies to meet future threats and thenticity among industry, academia, and needs. In addition to having an operational other government agencies. An officer knows viewpoint, these technical warriors can un firsthand what the war fighter needs. And derstand the realities, capabilities, and limita that knowledge just cannot be conveyed as tions of what S&T has to offer. convincingly through a civilian because it is the presence of the uniform and the proximity to op 3. The Air Force needs technical warriors to serve as erational experience that make the difference. honest brokers. War fighters need to have access But wearing the uniform is not enough. to the skills of a technical facilitator and trans The technical officer must have the appropri lator who can easily move between two ate academic credentials and research experi worlds—that of the warrior and the S&T com ence to be trusted by the S&T community. munity—and who can rise above parochial Just as the wings of a trained pilot give a interests. stamp of credibility to rated officers, a doc Simply witness the number of companies torate degree is the “union card” that can vying for defense contracts. It is hard for the open doors outside the Air Force.8 It has been war fighter to make a sound technical deci sion after hearing conflicting presentations proven that technical blue suiters can be ac that sound equally promising or baffling. cepted and can move between both worlds, However, having one of their own as an hon serving as smart buyers to get the war fighters est broker allows the war fighters to do what what they need and when they need it. Plus, they have been trained to do: win the war. officers with a doctorate degree solve prob lems differently than war fighters do. They 4. The Air Force needs technical warriors to keep the provide the ability to conceptualize, general S&T community honest. The S&T community ize, and synthesize, giving the war fighter ac knows the technical warrior is a peer and not cess to a greater breadth of information. an outsider, one who can be neither baffled 2. The Air Force needs technical warriors to have a nor patronized. Thus, the technical warrior strategic view. The war fighter must react to can call a bluff and “run up the BS flag” if the short-term threats that may require quick S&T community is not forthright. technical solutions. Technical warriors with Conversely, technical warriors can serve as operational knowledge can help, either be- advocates for the S&T community if there is a cause of direct knowledge or by having access technical breakthrough that deserves imme to the appropriate technology. In addition, diate, high-priority attention—witness the as there are longer-range problems that require tonishingly short development time for the more time and thought than simply reacting “bunker buster” penetrator during the Gulf on a crash basis. The end of the cold war has War. Presenting better weapons to war fight- THE NEED FOR TECHNICAL WARRIORS 75 ers with the facilitation of technical warriors Most importantly, technical warriors can will help win wars. keep the weapon focused on its ultimate use of supporting the war fighter. They can en- 5. War fighters need technical warriors to be exten sure that it doesn’t become burdened with sions of themselves. Technically competent war additional requirements, which are usually riors are needed to integrate across the seams placed on weapons by a well-meaning bu of weapon-development stages, from cradle reaucracy. And they can do this by following to killer. They must be equally at home, from the weapon through its life cycle from the sci the scientific bench to the office of the indus entific bench to the hands of the war fighter, try executive who is producing the new providing a seamless transition. weapon system. Fundamental to this require But as noted before, obtaining a cadre of ment is acceptance as a technically savvy, high-quality technical officers doesn’t happen knowledgeable peer. overnight. As with any group of motivated By having a warrior in this role, the war people, technical warriors must be shown ca fighter works with a trusted blue suiter, one reer incentives if the highest caliber individu who has access to the fast-paced and danger als are to be retained. Otherwise, the best and ous climate of a war zone, as well as the eso brightest will seek upward mobility elsewhere. teric research lab. The bottom line is that To that end, the Air Force Scientific Advi technical warriors have the war fighter’s best sory Board (SAB) recently recommended to interest in mind because they themselves are the secretary of the Air Force and the chief of warriors. staff that “we must have a path for more sci entific and technical officers to attain the highest positions in our Air Force.”9 Thus, Growing Technical Warriors “the Air Force should consider career man Just as the Air Force would not hesitate to agement of technically oriented officers with put a rated officer in charge of a flying wing, the same vigor as that of the rated force.”10 put a military doctor in charge of medical In blunt language, this means providing care, or make a judge advocate general re technical officers with a clear and unambigu sponsible for resolving legal issues, ensuring ous path for promotion. Science and technol that the best S&T is exploited for national se ogy assignments must be viewed as career en curity demands no less than a military, scien hancing, and leadership opportunities must tific professional overseeing S&T concerns. exist at all levels. For example, the Air Force In this era of exponential growth of scientific Research Laboratory (AFRL) provides an ex knowledge, not having a cadre of scientifically cellent opportunity to grow superior techni competent officers responsible for defense cal warriors. By making slight modifications S&T is akin to conducting a battle with no war to its already successful structure, the AFRL fighters. The idea is simply unthinkable. could be a model for defense S&T. Technical warriors can transition discover To illustrate the point, most major Air ies in basic research, through a creative con Force units have adopted the traditional wing cept of operation, to a weapon that satisfies a structure. Test wings exist, and even the US war-fighting requirement. Carrying the fledg Air Force Academy’s Office of the Comman ling weapon across the “seams” through the dant of Cadets has become a wing. By using sophisticated stages of the development waivers and by acknowledging the AFRL’s process ensures continuity. Technically com similarity to a numbered Air Force by both petent warriors are needed to recognize the the presence of a flag command and by size, future utility (or futility, as illustrated by the it would be easy to establish “research wings” Navy’s A-12 debacle) of a discovery and to located at the major research sites already in transition the concept to become a militarily existence. This would provide real wing-level useful weapon. opportunities for a spectrum of technical of- 76 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2000 ficers, from squadron and wing command, to not true technical warriors. For example, the S&T finance and S&T logistics. In addition to Navy has made a commitment to produce bringing the S&T structure in line with the and promote its technical officers through a operational Air Force, it would provide ample rigorous, well-defined program for “EDs” (en leadership opportunity for growing technical gineering duty officers), who are tasked with warriors. a wide spectrum of technical duties, from ship to flag position. Finally, a clear, upward path must be available Conclusions for technical officers. A pool of technical war S&T is fundamental to the war fighter. The riors is needed in the officer corps, with the best way to exploit S&T is to have technical means to choose or identify the best and to warriors—competent military officers who place them in senior leadership positions. Re- have credibility both with the war fighters and search wings under the Air Force Research the S&T community. The only way to ensure Laboratory umbrella would provide an ideal the highest quality technical warriors is for structure. In these days of highly visible, na the Air Force to make a commitment to edu tional-priority, high-tech programs—space cate and promote a small cadre of officers to based lasers, national missile defense, air- fulfill this role. borne lasers, and directed-energy weapons, to If the Air Force wants to maintain its S&T name a few—technical warriors are needed edge, it must have officers who can “speak the for the Air Force’s future, now more than ever. language,” who can competently serve as an Finally, to paraphrase a recent Air Force interface between both the warrior and in SAB study, in today’s rapidly changing, uncer dustry, and who have both technical vision and tain world, the technical warrior must provide experience. These officers need to be grown and the Air Force with capabilities to conduct any need to have a technical mind-set—not just offi mission, meet any contingency, dominate any cers who have been exposed to S&T; for you battlefield, and win any war. Only then will will then simply get officers with advanced de the ultimate goal of defense S&T be accom grees and a casual acquaintance with S&T— plished—winning the war. ■ Notes 1. Simon P. Worden, SDI and the Alternatives (Washington, 7. J. Douglas Beason, DOD Science and Technology Strategy for D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1991), 13–15. the Post-Cold War (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University 2. Kenneth L. Adelman and Norman R. Augustine, The De Press, 1997), 76–77. fense Revolution: Strategy for the Brave New World (San Francisco: In 8. The quintessential story of what can go wrong is of the dy stitute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1990), 53. namic captain sent to brief industry. After a presentation that im 3. Genevieve J. Knezo, Defense Basic Research Priorities: Funding pressed industry officials, the captain was asked to view some and Policy Issues (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research In equipment in the laboratory. The officials were dismayed when stitute, 90-506 SPR, 24 October 1990), 12. the captain did not even recognize the very equipment that he 4. Institute for Defense Analysis, “Report of the Task Force had just briefed. It was then discovered that the captain had for Improved Coordination of Science and Technology Pro- memorized a “canned briefing” and had not understood a single grams,” Washington, D.C., August 1988, 8. concept outside of his presentation. 5. Dr. Cammy Abernathy, professsor of material science at 9. New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century, the University of Florida, quoted by Robert F. Service in “Re- summary volume (Washington, D.C.: USAF Scientific Advisory launching Bell Labs,” Science 272 (3 May 1996): 639. Board, 1995), 62. 6. “Basic Research White Paper,” R&D Magazine, October 10. Ibid., 69. 1997, 9; on-line, Internet, May 1998, available from http://www. rdmag.com.
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