DTIC ADA518156: Terrorist Use of the Internet: The Real Story

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Terrorist Use of the Internet
the Real Story
using instant messaging or Web forums.
Instructions, intelligence information,
and even funds can be sent and received in
seconds via email. Second, Internet use is a
low-cost proposition. Terrorist organizations
can now affordably duplicate many of the
By iRvinG lachow capabilities needed by modern militaries,
governmental organizations, and businesses:
and couRtney RichaRdSon
a communications infrastructure, intelli-
gence-gathering operation, training
system, and media-savvy public
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
used streaming
media on Web sites terrorist organizations
promoting terrorism can now affordably
duplicate many
capabilities needed
by modern militaries,
governmental
organizations, and
businesses
Web site showing nuclear attack
on large city
affairs presence. Third, the ubiquity
of the Internet means that small ter-
rorist groups can have a global cyber presence
C
yberterrorism conjures images of and well coordinated, all of which make them that rivals that of much larger organizations.
infrastructure failures, economic harder to stop.1 Furthermore, these groups Terrorists not only can communicate with
disasters, and even large-scale loss have become expert at using the Internet to each other from almost anywhere in the
of life. It also receives a great deal manipulate both public opinion and media world, but they also can create a Web site that
of coverage in the press. While the threat of coverage in ways that undermine American is viewed by millions and possibly even exam-
cyberterrorism is real, the hype surrounding interests. In short, rather than attacking the ined daily by media outlets for news stories.
the issue often outpaces the magnitude of the Internet, terrorists are using it to survive and Fourth, the growth in bandwidth combined
threat. In addition, the term itself deflects thrive. with development of new software has enabled
attention from a more mundane but equally This article examines why the Internet unsophisticated users to develop and dissemi-
serious problem: terrorist organizations effec- is so useful for terrorist organizations. It then nate complex information via the Internet.
tively using the Internet to stymie U.S. efforts considers how terrorists use the Internet for For example, in December 2004, “a militant
to win the Long War. strategic advantage and why the threat of Islamic chat room posted a twenty-six-
The Internet enables terrorist groups to cyberterrorism may be overstated in many minute video clip with instructions on how
operate as either highly decentralized fran- cases. The article concludes with a set of to assemble a suicide bomb vest, along with a
chises or freelancers. Similar to information observations and recommendations. taped demonstration of its use on a model of a
age businesses, these groups use the Internet bus filled with passengers.”2 Finally, modern
to create a brand image, market themselves, Why the Internet? encryption technologies allow Internet users
recruit followers, raise capital, identify part- The Internet has five characteristics that to surf the Web, transfer funds, and com-
ners and suppliers, provide training materials, make it an ideal tool for terrorist organiza- municate anonymously—a serious (though
and even manage operations. As a result, these tions. First, it enables rapid communications. not insurmountable) impediment to intel-
groups have become more numerous, agile, People can hold conversations in real time ligence and law enforcement organizations
trying to find, track, and catch terrorists. To
Dr. Irving Lachow is a Senior Research Professor in the Information Resources Management College at the achieve anonymity, terrorists can download
National Defense University (NDU). Courtney Richardson is a Research Associate in the Center for Technology various types of easy-to-use computer security
and National Security Policy at NDU. software (some of which is commercial and
100 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu
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lachow and richardSon

Terrorist Use of the Internet some of which is freely available) or register words of one expert, “it is the strategic—not horrific physical effects via cyber means. The
for anonymous email accounts from providers operational—objectives of the jihadi move- most likely scenario of this type is an attack
such as Yahoo! or Hotmail. ment’s use of technology that engenders the on the control systems that manage parts
most enduring and lethal threat to the United of the Nation’s infrastructure (for example,
Internet as Strategic Tool States over the long term.”7 dams, trains, and powerplants). The con-
The combination of characteristics sequences of an attack of this kind would
described above makes the Internet a valued Cyberterrorism? be serious, so this threat deserves attention.
strategic asset for terrorists. In fact, one could It is evident that terrorist groups are However, the actual likelihood of such an
argue that the Internet, along with other extremely effective in using the Internet to attack is unknown; different analyses have
modern communications technologies, is a further their missions. Are they also using, or reached different conclusions.10
sine qua non of the modern global extremist planning to use, the Internet to launch a major Two things are certain: successfully
movements. Successful terrorism requires cyber attack on the United States? We do not launching such an attack would not be easy,
the transformation of interested outsiders know, but there are a number of factors that and the consequences are difficult to predict
into dedicated insiders.3 Once someone has suggest the answer to this question is no. Ter- due to the incredible complexity and inter-
become an insider, less intense but still con- rorism, by definition, is focused on obtaining dependence of critical infrastructures. Given
tinuous interactions are required to maintain desired political or social outcomes through a choice of conducting either a cyber attack
the needed level of commitment to the cause. the use of tactics that instill fear and horror in whose consequences are unknown (and which
target populations. Cyber- may not have the desired effect
terror can be defined as: even if it does work) or a physical
attack that is almost certain to
a computer based attack cause graphic deaths that will
or threat of attack create fear, it is understand-
intended to intimidate able why terrorists have (so far)
or coerce governments chosen the latter.
or societies in pursuit of
goals that are political, Observations
religious, or ideological. Terrorists use the Internet
The attack should be suf- Islamic Web site to harm U.S. national security,
Subtitle on militant Web site stating
ficiently destructive or disruptive to generate but not by attacking infrastructure or military
“the crime which indicated a complete
abandonment of human values” fear comparable to that from physical acts assets directly. Instead, terrorists use the
of terrorism. Attacks that lead to death or Internet to improve their operational effec-
Before the advent of advanced com- bodily injury, extended power outages, plane tiveness while simultaneously undermining
munications technologies, this process was crashes, water contamination, or major eco- our military and diplomatic efforts to win the
entirely based on face-to-face interactions, nomic losses would be examples....Attacks war of ideas. There is little doubt that they are
which limited the scope of a given group. that disrupt nonessential services or that are doing both things well. While there is a possi-
However, the Internet allows groups to create mainly a costly nuisance would not.8 bility that they may use the Internet to launch
and identify dedicated insiders—and to a cyberterror attack against American targets,
maintain fervor in those already dedicated to History shows that the vast majority of this threat falls under the broad umbrella of
the cause—on a global scale.4 Advanced tech- cyber attacks, even viruses that cause billions critical infrastructure protection—a topic that
nologies also allow the extremists to deliver of dollars of damage to an economy, are not is getting a great deal of attention at all levels
well-coordinated propaganda campaigns going to cause the levels of fear desired by of government.11 This issue is not addressed
that increase the levels of support among the most terrorists. In comparison, using physical here. Rather, the focus rests on the other two
general public, which in turn allows terror- means to create terror is fairly easy and quite uses of the Internet—issues that are equally
ists to operate freely in these societies. For effective. Put in these terms, it is not surpris- important but often receive comparatively less
example, one of al Qaeda’s goals is to use the ing that terrorists prefer to inflict damage focus, energy, and resources.
Internet to create “resistance blockades” in with physical means and then use the Internet Terrorist Operational Effectiveness. The
order to prevent Western ideas from “further to magnify the results of their handiwork. Internet enables terrorist organizations to
corrupting Islamic institutions, organiza- Indeed, while there is clear evidence that operate as virtual transnational organiza-
tions, and ideas.”5 One technique they use is terrorists have used the Internet to gather tions. They can use it to raise funds, recruit,
to distribute Internet browsers that have been intelligence and coordinate efforts to launch train, command and control, gather intel-
designed to filter out content from undesir- physical attacks against various infrastructure ligence, and share information. Clearly, it
able sources (for example, Western media) targets, there has not been a single docu- is in the U.S. interest to either disrupt or
without the users’ knowledge.6 mented incidence of cyberterrorism against undermine these activities. The good news is
In summary, the development and pro- the U.S. Government.9 that relying on the Internet is a double-edged
liferation of the Internet have enabled the rise One could argue that terrorists would sword for terrorist organizations: despite
of loose, decentralized networks of terrorists use the Internet to attack cyber assets that the many benefits associated with using the
all working toward a common goal. In the control physical systems, thereby creating Internet as their main intelligence, command
ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 / JFQ    101
Terrorist Use of the Internet
and control, and communications system, net to propagate their ideological agenda. This be done for such examples to become the rule
this approach carries a few liabilities. Ter- problem is part of the much broader war of rather than the exception.
rorist reliance on Web sites and discussion ideas against the extremist Islamic movement. A related point is that the Nation must
forums allows outsiders to monitor their Efforts to date have not proven successful, as view the war of ideas as equal in importance
methods and track trends. For example, there evidenced by the following statement from to the military and law enforcement aspects
are groups such as the SITE Institute that former Secretary of Defense Donald Rums- of the war on terror. The war-of-ideas aspect
focus on monitoring terrorist Web sites and feld: “If I were grading I would say we prob- of any decision involving the Long War must
providing information to a wide range of ably deserve a ‘D’ or a ‘D-plus’ as a country as be considered at the highest levels of U.S.
interested parties, including elements within to how well we’re doing in the battle of ideas policymaking. That emphasis must then be
the U.S. Government.12 Reliance on the Inter- that’s taking place in the world today.”15 This communicated down the chain so that all
net also creates the opportunity for outsiders is a complex issue that does not lend itself to players understand the importance of message
to pose as insiders in order to provide misin- easy answers. in this war. Strategic communications cannot
formation or simply to create doubt among be seen as an afterthought of a military opera-
the terrorists about whom they can trust. Recommendations tion or as the sole responsibility of an office
To that end, the United States should U.S. efforts to influence must be tied to buried within the State Department. The
make every effort to infiltrate extremist virtual real-world actions. While it is easy to focus recent announcement that the Office of the
communities in order to gather intelligence on the principles of effective communications Secretary of Defense is creating a new office
strategies, our words focused on strategic com-
will ring hollow if they munications is a move in the
are not related to the right direction. Similarly,
realities experienced information operations
by the target audience. cannot be viewed simply as
Thus, it goes without a set of activities done by a
saying that what the local commander in support
United States does is as of tactical objectives. It is
important, if not more clear from past experience
so, as what it says. To that such approaches are not
that end, diplomatic effective in the long run if
Fatah commander in Lebanon with and military influence Islamic Media Center Web site listing they are not tied to strategic
ties to al Qaeda using Internet operations must ensure Web sites promoting terrorism considerations.
that target audiences are Countering terrorist use of
and begin planting the seeds of mistrust that aware of the positive actions undertaken by the Internet to further ideological agendas
can disable terrorist cells. We presume that the United States in the Muslim world, while will require a strategic, government-wide
governmental activities of this kind are under simultaneously highlighting the negative (interagency) approach to designing and
way. Surprisingly, nongovernmental organiza- actions of our enemies. implementing policies to win the war of
tions appear to contribute to these efforts as The corollary to this point is that the ideas. For example, to counter terrorist influ-
well. For example, individual citizens have United States must effectively get its story ence operations, all Federal agencies should
infiltrated terrorist networks via chat rooms out before the terrorists or insurgents can use use the same specific and accurate language
and then worked with governmental agencies the Internet to spin events in their favor. It is when referring to Salafist extremists. It is
to bring about several arrests.13 much harder to respond to or discredit initial of the utmost importance that American
The bad news is that terrorists are doing stories, even ones that are untrue, than to policymakers set their terms of the debate.
their best to minimize the liabilities associated establish the baseline facts or perceptions in Expressions such as jihad and mujahideen are
with heavy reliance on the Internet. They are the first place. There are certainly elements of part of the popular lexicon describing antiter-
quick to learn from mistakes and to dissemi- the U.S. Government making heroic efforts rorist operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
nate best practices on how to defeat the tactics in this area. For example, the Department of elsewhere. However, such terms disempower
used by intelligence and law enforcement State maintains a Web site in a number of lan- the United States. Jihad literally means “striv-
agencies.14 Terrorist groups are adept at quickly guages (including Arabic, Farsi, and French) ing” and is frequently used to describe every
moving their Web sites from host to host, that is devoted to countering false stories that Muslim’s responsibility to strive in the path
which makes them difficult to track and shut appear in extremist sources. It also focuses on of God. Mujahideen is closely translated to
down (trusted members of these groups use countering disinformation likely to end up in mean “holy warriors.” Such a term may have
chat rooms, email, and other forums to share the mainstream media. U.S. Embassies have worked to U.S. advantage in Afghanistan
information about the new location of a moved used this resource to counter disinformation against the Soviet Union—however, terms
site). They also like to masquerade some activi- in extremist print publications in Pakistan such as these now pit the United States as the
ties as legitimate business operations. and elsewhere. There are also military units enemy against holy warriors in a holy war.
Terrorist Influence Operations. One of deployed overseas that are exhibiting best Rather, terms such as hirabah (“unholy war”)
the most difficult challenges facing the United practices in operational level influence opera- and irhabists (“terrorists”) should become
States is countering terrorist use of the Inter- tions.16 Unfortunately, much work remains to part of the popular lexicon.17
102 JFQ / issue 45, 2d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu
lachow and richardSon
As important as it is for the United States ideology, manipulate the public and media, 10 For differing perspectives on this issue, see
to improve its own communications efforts, a recruit and train new terrorists, raise funds, James Lewis, “Cyber Terror: Missing in Action,”
Knowledge, Technology & Policy 16, no. 2 (Summer
key part of countering extremist misinforma- gather information on potential targets, and
2003), 34–41; and Dan Verton, Black-Ice: The
tion and propaganda is to have messages come control operations. If these activities can be
Invisible Threat of Cyber-Terrorism (New York:
from a variety of sources—preferably some of curtailed, then the viability of the terrorist
McGraw-Hill/Osborne, 2003).
them local. For example, it is critical for the groups themselves may be put into question.
11 See, for example, The White House, The
United States to promote the views of well- To that end, the United States needs to focus
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February
respected Muslim clerics, who counter the more resources into two areas: countering 2003; and Department of Homeland Security,
claims made by Islamic terrorists and extrem- the operational effectiveness associated with National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006.
ists. Such efforts have been undertaken by the terrorist use of the Internet, and undermining 12 See Benjamin Wallace-Wells, “Private Jihad,”
government of Saudi Arabia, but American Internet-based terrorist influence operations. The New Yorker, May 29, 2006.
efforts in this area have been lacking.18 In If it can successfully meet these two chal- 13 For example, see Blaine Harden, “In
effect, the Nation should do everything pos- lenges, the United States will make significant Montana, Casting a Web for Terrorists,” The Wash-
sible to enable moderate Muslims to develop progress toward winning the Long War. JFQ ington Post, June 4, 2006, A3.
14 For example, see Abdul Hameed Bakier, “The
a strong, vibrant, and responsive Internet and
Evolution of Jihadi Electronic Counter-Measures,”
media presence of their own. NOTES
Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 17 (September 8, 2006).
15 See <www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/27/
1 See Statement of Henry A. Crumpton,
Coordinator for Coun-
terterrorism, Department
of State, Committee on
Senate Foreign Relations,
June 13, 2006.
2 Gabriel Weimann,
Terror on the Internet:
The New Arena, the New
Challenges (Washington, Internet image showing
DC: U.S. Institute of Osama bin Laden
Peace, 2006), 126–127.
Internet café 3 This process,
and the impact of the Internet upon it, are
terror/main1442811.shtml>.
described in Marc Sageman, Understanding
16 An excellent example is found in Colonel
Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Penn-
Last but not least, resources must be Ralph O. Baker, USA, “The Decisive Weapon: A
sylvania Press, 2004), 158–161.
made available to support all of these efforts, Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective
4 The recruiting process is usually not entirely
plus others that are not mentioned here on Information Operations,” Military Review
done in cyberspace. At some point, face-to-face
but are equally important, such as training (May-June 2006), 13–32. This article should be
meetings are used to assess the level of commitment
required reading for everyone in the U.S. Govern-
and education to improve understanding
of potential members. See Sageman, 163.
ment remotely involved in the Long War, and
of Muslim cultures and languages spoken 5 Jarret M. Brachman, “High-Tech Terror:
especially for Active duty forces heading to Iraq and
within these cultures. Current U.S. resources Al-Qaeda’s Use of New Technology,” The
Afghanistan.
dedicated to strategic communications, public Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 30, no. 2
17 For more detail, see Douglas E. Streusand
diplomacy, and information operations are (Summer 2006), 160.
and Harry C. Tunnell, “Choosing Words Carefully:
woefully inadequate.19 On the military side, 6 Matthew Kovner, “Jihadist Web Browser,” Language to Help Fight Islamic Terrorism,” Center
the lack of training and education in infor- Terror Web Watch, Terrorism Research Center, for Strategic Communications, National Defense
February 3, 2006, available at <www.trc.com>. See
mation operations at all levels—strategic, University, available at <www.ndu.edu/csc/prod-
also Brachman, 152.
operational, and tactical—often requires ucts.cfm>; and Jim Guirard, “Hirabah versus Jihad:
7 Brachman, 150. Emphasis in original.
commanders to learn on the job and build Rescuing Jihad from the al Qaeda Blasphemy,”
8 Dorothy E. Denning, “Is Cyber Terror Next?”
information operations teams “out of hide.”20 The American Muslim, July 6, 2003, available at
in Understanding September 11, ed. Craig Calhoun,
<http://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/
While some leaders will certainly rise to
Paul Price, and Ashley Timmer (New York: The
articles/terrorism_hirabah_versus_jihad_rescu-
the occasion, this approach is not a recipe New Press, 2002), 193.
ing_jihad_from_the_al_qaeda_blasphemy/>.
for success in a complex, media-heavy war 9 Evidence of the former is cited in Stephen
18 For more details, see Robert Spencer, “Losing
against adversaries who are highly adept at Ulph, “Internet Mujahideen Intensify Research
the War of Ideas,” FrontPageMagazine.com, Febru-
conducting their own influence operations. on U.S. Economic Targets,” Terrorism Focus 3,
ary 5, 2004.
no. 2 (January 18, 2006). The latter observa-
19 See, for example, Office of the Under Secre-
Terrorists use the Internet to harm U.S. tion comes from several sources, including tary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Weimann, 149; and Joshua Green, “The Myth
national security interests, but not by conduct- Logistics, Report of the Defense Science Board Task
of Cyber-Terrorism,” Washington Monthly,
ing large-scale cyber attacks. Instead, they use Force on Strategic Communication (Washington,
November 2002, available at <www.washington-
the Internet to boost their relative power to DC: Department of Defense, September 2004).
monthly.com/features/2001/0211.green.html>.
plan and conduct physical attacks, spread their 20 Baker, 20.
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