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United StatesMarine Corps Command and StaffCollege MarineCorps University 2076 SouthStreet MarineCorps CombatDevelopmentCommand Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068 MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES =============================================================== JOINT SEABASINGAND JOINT VISION 2020 SUBMITTED INPARTIALFULFILLMENT OFTHEREQUIREMENTS FORTHEDEGREE OF MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES LCDRCHRISTOPHERL. SUTHERLAND AY 08-09 =============================================================== Mentorand Or D~sepCommitteeMember: Dr. CraigA. Swanson Approved: '~In~. Date: zq I '2tJtlC7 Me~: OralDefense Conlnittee Oy.};¥les D. McKenna LP~<Z+..Y. j~ Approved: Date: 21./ lTf'fUl. 200<7 -- -_.._---------------------------------------------, Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2009 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Joint Seabasing and Joint Vision 2020 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps REPORT NUMBER Combat Dev,Marine Corps University, 2076 South Street,Quantico,VA,22134-5068 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 30 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 J EXECUTIVES~RY Title: JointSeabasing and JointVision 2020 Author: LCDR ChristopherL. Sutherland Thesis: TheUnited States armedforces andits coalitionpartners need to embrace and develop JointSeabasing due to increasinglydifficultpoliticalrelations and areduced numberoffriendly facilities in orderto successfullyfight future wars andfulfill the full spectrumdominance requirements ofJoint Vision 2020. Discussion: This studyseeks to explore whatSeabasingis, while also determiningifit wouldimprovethe currentcapabilities ofthe UnitedStates Military. This document also seeks to fully understand the conceptofJointSeabasing as definedbythe JointIntegrated Conceptanddetermine whetherthe capabilities presentedmeet therequirements ofthe Joint Vision 2020report. Aspects ofSeabasinghavebeenutilized byUnited States Navalforces throughoutits historywith greatsuccess, buttheconcepthas been expanded bythe UnitedStates Navy to be oneleg ofa triadofmaritimepowerprojection. The concepthas beenfurther expandedbythe JointIntegrated Concept (nC) to include all of DepartmentofDefenseforces andcoalitionallies to bringtheconceptto theforefront of warfighting. Conclusion: Ifthe UnitedStates andits coalitionforces woulddedicate resources to developingtheplatforms andcapabilities necessaryto makethe JointSeabasingareality they wouldmeettherequirements oftheJoint Vision 2020report. Thereis still significantresearch, development, andexecution to bedonein orderto make the concept areality. Theresources ofall ofthe military services workingin concertwith one .anotherutilizingthe modelas outlinedinthe JointIntegrating Conceptcanbecomea reality. ii DISCLAIMER THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREINARE THOSE OF THEINDIVIDUAL STUDENTAUTHORAND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OFEITHERTHE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE ORANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULDINCLUDE THEFOREGOINGSTATEMENT. QUOTATIONFROM, ABSTRACTIONFROM, ORREPRODUCTIONOFALL ORANY PART OFTHIS DOCUMENTIS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENTIS MADE. iii LIST OFILLUSTRATIONS Figure 1: SeaPower21 (Pictorial) Figure 2: HeavyLiftTransferCrane (Picture) Figure 3: Skin-to-skinTransfer (picture) Figure4: VerticalLiftTransfer (Picture) Figure5: Synopsis ofthe Central Idea; Seabasing OverarchingView (Pictorial) Figure 6: OverallDepiction ofJoint OperatingArea (pictorial) iv TABLE OF CONTENTS REPORT DOCUMENTATIONPAGE EXECUTIVE SUMMARy .ii DISCLAIMER .iii LIST OFILLISTRATIONS .iv TABLE OFCONTENTS v INTRODUCTION " ~ 1 BACKGROUND 3 SEABASING: JOINTINTEGRATED CONCEPTVERSION 1.0 7 CentralIdea 8 Principles of Seabasing 9 Application ofConcept. 10 Operational Context. " 11 Implications for National Security 14 JOINT VISION 2020 14 Strategic Context. 14 Full Spectrum Dominance 15 Dominant Maneuver 15 Precision Engagement. ~ 16 FocusedLogistics 17 Full Dimensional Protection 18 JointCommand andControl. 18 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 19 ENDNOTES 21 BIBLIOGRAPHY 23 v INTRODUCTION This paperwill discuss thebackground and utility ofSeabasingutilizing historical references andmodem day visions. Itwill also define whatinnovations, technologies, platforms andcapabilities thatcharacterizethe Joint Seabasingconcept. Itwill then describe, in detail, the tenents ofthe JointIntegrated Conceptv1.0 for Seabasing and how theyimprove operability ofthe warfighter. Thepaper will then analyze the requirements oftheJoint Vision 2020documentinrelation to thecapabilitiesprovidedbyJoint Seabasing. Utilizingthis analysis the paperwillprovide conclusions and recommendations to theUnited States and DepartmentofDefense. Thenature andcomplexityofthe securityenvironments expectedbythe United States due to increasingly complexinternationalpolitics, extremistterrorism and the potentialconsequences ofthese actions have causedmanyfriendly nations to change theirpolicyonUS military access. These countries have chosen and maycontinueto limitordisallow US forces access to their territoryfor intheaterbasing or airtransit access. Militaryleaders have also realized thatinmany situations its presence actually hinders the strategic situation andpresents security challenges thatmay threaten operationalobjectives. TheUnited States, however, still depends on strategic access and the abilityto actglobally against any threatto national security. As enemypossession of weapons ofmass destructionincreases, and the availabilityofoverseas bases decreases, it is necessary to reducethe vulnerabilityofUS forces through expandeduse ofsecure, mobile, networked seabases.! TheJoint Vision 2020 documentagrees with this possiblepoliticalenvironment andmandates thatthe UnitedStates workinginconjunctionwithits coalitionpartners 1 willpresent ajointforce capableoffull spectrum dominance achieved through interdependentapplication ofdominantmaneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, andfull dimensionprotection.2 JointSeabasingcapabilitiesprovide an answer to theseissues byincreasing access to hostile environments through freedom of movementandaction atseato stage, projectand sustain combatpowerfrom its resources.3 TheUnited States armedforces andits coalitionpartners mustembrace and develop JointSeabasing due to increasingly difficultpoliticalrelations and areduced numberoffriendly facilities inorderto successfullyfightfuture wars andfulfill the requirements ofJoint Vision 2020. As anaval conceptSeabasingfulfills stated goals inA Cooperative Strategyfor 2jSt_CenturySeapowerand The National DefenseStrategy throughforward deployed, decisivepowerprojectionandjointcollaborationthroughoutmaritime services. These attributes are expanded greatlythrough the JointIntegratedConcept's (JICs) vision of Seabasing anddirectlysupporttherequirementsofJointVision 2020, especiallyin the areas ofdominantmaneuverandfocused logistics. TheSeabasing concept discussedin this paperis notarevolutionarynewNavy and/orMarine Corps tactic or strategy, buta combination ofinnovations andcurrentcapabilities thatenableincreasedmilitary speed, enduranceand strike capacityfor all services. Itis notalocationorfortress at sea as describedbyMobile OffshoreBases (MOBs), but an operational scheme ofmaneuverfor 4 the DepartmentofDefenseto utilize. Ithas been described as "ahybrid systemof systems consisting ofconcepts ofoperations, ships, forces, offensive and defensive weapons, aircraft, communications andlogistics" operatinginconcertthroughflexible distributionandnetworked systems.5 This conceptofSeabasingis notenvisionedas a 2 f f new orinnovativeconceptofwarfighting byits champions within the military structure, butwhenlooked atthrough ajointlens trulydefines innovation. Issacson states that, "innovationis manifested bythe developmentofnew warfighting concepts andlornew means ofintegratingtechnology.,,6 JointSeabasingnotonl)'calls for, but demands that the military services innovatethroughexpansion oftheirdoctrine, tactics, and training and trulyfight togetherinJointAreas ofOperation. Themilitary services have to break outoftheirstovepipes andrealize the benefits that trueinteroperabilityprovides. The DOD's ConceptofOperations mustrecognize the JIC Seabasing conceptand directthe militaryservices to adhere to theGoldwater-Nichols mandateforjointservice.? The DOD mustrealize Seabasing as more than an integralpartofthe Seapower21 triad, but as ajointglobalassetand directsupportfor funding ofnecessarynew technology, platforms, doctrine and training. BACKGROUND History has demonstrated thatSeabasingis apotentability thatcanhave a dramatic affecton an operation. As early as 1865,jointforces ofDnionArmy, Navy, and Marines defeated the: Confederateenemyin decisivefashion from a seabase ofover60 s ships delivering 12000troops to FortFisher, nearWilmington, North Carolina. The sea baseusedfor the assault on Okinawa, Japan duringWorldWarIIutilizedover 1200 ships; over500,000 soldiers, sailors, Marines and coalitionforces; and asupplylinethat stretched over4000 nautical miles to Pel:}.flHarborHawaii. This was atrulyjointventure thatsucceededinits design and setthe stagefor theinvasionofthe Japanesehome islands utilizingall aspects ofthe UnitedStates andcoalitionmilitary mightand revised doctrine specificto the situation.9 Both ofthese operations weremomentous in history, 3 butoccurredduring differenttimes withdifferentmindsets. Thelargequantity ofships, supplies, andpeopleutilized as well as the casualties expectedduringboth ofthese campaigns far outweighthe amount thatwouldbe possibletoday. After years ofongoing war, theUnitedStatespublicwill nottolerateexcessivebudgets, assets, soldiers, loss of lives, orloss valuable equipment. TheChiefofNaval Operations in 2002, AdmiralVern Clark, outlinedhis vision inSea Power21 ofutilizing the seabase as the hub from which SeaStrike and Sea Shield willprojectdominantoffensivepower, defensive assurance and operational independenceto JointForce Commanders.lO ThevisioninSea Power21 is anextension ofthe ExpeditionaryWarfareConceptofOperations that the Navy and MarineCorps haveproven overtime. Admiral Clarkconceptualizes a threepronged approach (Figure 1)to Naval warfare utilizing SeaShield, SeaStrike and SeaBasingto facilitate maneuver, precision strike, organic defense, andintegratedlogistics networked via integratedcommand and controlfunctions (ForceNet) to provide strategic andoperational effectiveness.11 4