DTIC ADA509401: Do Not Sacrifice the Marine Corps for MARSOC to Succeed the MARSOC Closed Loop Personnel Policy Proposal

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

DO NOT SACRIFICE THE MARINE CORPS FOR MARSOC TO SUCCEED
The MARSOC Closed Loop Personnel Policy Proposal
Captain R.L. Diefenbach
CG9
Maj Revoir
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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
2006 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2006 to 00-00-2006
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Do Not Sacrifice the Marine Corps for MARSOC to Succeed the
5b. GRANT NUMBER
MARSOC Closed Loop Personnel Policy Proposal
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps REPORT NUMBER
Combat Development,Marine Corps University, 2076 South
Street,Quantico,VA,22134-5068
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
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13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
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a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 13
unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
The United State Marine Corps has always stood as the
nation’s force in readiness, prepared to respond to any crisis
that may arise. In the modern era, multiple worldwide crises
have arisen, and the nation has relied on its Marines again to
resolve these crises. The Marine Corps, through the Marine
Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), is working to
be more than crisis response, but is trying to prevent crises
before they arise. As a major subordinate command of the United
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MARSOC Marines
deploy to partner nation countries in order to assist them in
the Global War on Terror. Despite belonging to USSOCOM, the
Marines and Sailors of MARSOC must not lose their identity or
become a replica of the United States Army Special Forces
Command, yet the closed-loop policy proposed for MARSOC Marines
and Sailors will lead to that end. MARSOC must avoid creating a
closed-loop personnel system because this practice will not
increase SOF interoperability within the Marine Corps and will
deprive junior Marines of SOF trained mentors and trainers.
BACKGROUND
Since 2005, with the activation of the Foreign Military
Training Unit, the Marine Corps, under the direction of then
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, began integrating with
USSOCOM. As the combatant command tasked with synchronizing the
GWOT, USSOCOM has the responsibility to fight terrorist
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organizations around the globe regardless of which geographic
combatant command they are in and the Marine Corps is prepared
to contribute in this arena as it has done for the nation
throughout its history. USSOCOM directed that the Marine Corps
not contribute in the way that most Americans associate with
Marines, through direct action; instead, Marines and Sailors are
tasked with utilizing the indirect approach, through foreign
internal defense (FID) and unconventional warfare (UW), so that
partner nations will fight with U.S. support, leaving no safe
haven for our enemies.1
USSOCOM, unique among the combatant commands as both a
force provider and an operational command, has developed
policies in personnel assignment for many of its special
operations forces (SOF) operators that have allowed it to
capitalize on the training its personnel has received; however,
these policies will not serve the Marine Corps well. These
policies, which create a closed-loop system that allows SOF
personnel to remain in USSOCOM in some capacity, were created in
order to retain the knowledge and experience base of SOF
operators. Additionally, the closed-loop is intended to protect
SOF operators from perceived threats from their parent services.
These threats include minimizing the relevance of the respective
SOF communities for budgeting purposes and stifling advancement
so that future leaders will be unable to serve their respective
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community on par with other branches. It is for these reasons
that in 2006 the Navy distinguished the Special Warfare Operator
(SO) and Special Warfare Boat Operator (SB) ratings, “by
allowing sailors to focus on rating specific technology and
training systems, the Navy will reduce training infrastructure
costs, while broadening the professional development, career
opportunities and quality of service for our sailors.”2 The Army
had established a separate Special Forces branch as the example
that the other services follow.
MARSOC is attempting to create a similar system for Sailors
and Marines serving in its ranks, known as SOF for life, which
would allow Marine special operations forces (MARSOF) to remain
within USSOCOM for their entire career once they have passed the
Recruiting, Screening, Assessment, and Selection (RSAS) process.
After serving with the initial unit to which the Marine or
Sailor is assigned, that individual would then serve either in
the MARSOC headquarters or in a joint capacity; the
possibilities for joint billets include serving with the USSOCOM
headquarters, with a sister service, or abroad with the Special
Operations Component of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC).
Despite wearing a similar uniform, these Marines would never
return to the Corps, and would have little connection to the
parent service anymore.

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SOF INTEROPERABILITY
While this policy has served the other services well,
protecting Army Special Operations Forces Soldiers or Navy
SEALs, MARSOC must avoid implementing the closed-loop personnel
system because it will not enhance SOF interoperability for the
Marine Corps as a whole. Part of the strength of the Marine
Corps is its ethos and history, it is the most selective
service, an elite unit in which every member can rise to
service: “every Marine a rifleman.” Should MARSOC achieve its
closed-loop goal, this policy would serve only to cause
divisions in the Marine Corps, rather than increasing SOF
interoperability. The Marine Corps tries to achieve a quality
spread in its ranks, but those individuals who pass the RSAS
will consist of some of the highest quality warfighters the
Marine Corps has to offer, effectively removing them from the
operating forces and weakening the foundation of excellence on
which the Marine Corps rests. Paraphrasing General Victor H.
Krulak, “our success in the counterinsurgency conflict would
depend on a complete and intimate understanding by all ranks
from top to bottom” of the principles of foreign internal
defense and counterinsurgency operations.3
These outstanding Marines and Sailors should be allowed the
opportunity to join MARSOC and increase their experiences in the
joint environment because it would both enhance their personal
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skills and in turn improve the Marine Corps as a whole. After
garnering these experiences, they should then rejoin the
operating forces so that they can share their experiences with
younger generations of warriors. As a part of USSOCOM, MARSOC
receives more funding for training than conventional Marine
units, and also has access to schools that conventional forces
do not. Gaining access to these schools would provide Marines
and Sailors with experience that they could then share with
their subordinates and seniors alike, extending the value of
training throughout the operating forces. Additionally, as more
Marines attend these schools both the students and instructors
will develop relationships improving interoperability with SOF
operators throughout the services, which will only increase
interoperability within the joint community and with the Marine
Corps as well.
MENTORS AND TRAINERS
Should MARSOC implement a closed-loop personnel system,
this would remove a vital aspect of the Marine Corps, removing
skilled and mature mentors from the Corps. The current experts
on FID/UW are the Army’s Special Forces Groups and MARSOC Marine
Special Operations Advisor Group (MSOAG, formerly FMTU).
However, conventional forces are conducting FID as a part of the
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations taking place in both Iraq
and Afghanistan. Conventional forces are denied access to the
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training that the Special Operations Forces troops undergo in
order to prepare for these missions, despite the fact that
winning in both of these countries is critical to success in the
GWOT. If Marines serve as members of MSOAG, they can take their
experiences and improve the ability of conventional Marines to
serve as combat advisors with fewer of the problems that have
been experienced to date. While the Marine Corps has been very
successful in Anbar province in Iraq, that success could have
been achieved sooner if the Marines tasked with the mission had
more education and guidance on how to be combat advisors, or how
to train indigenous forces.
Marines pride themselves on adaptability and willingness to
take on and succeed in any mission; the successes in the Banana
Republic wars are well documented, but even in the modern era,
conventional Marines have conducted FID in numerous countries in
Africa, Colombia, and El Salvador, alongside or independent of
Special Forces Soldiers. The Marines’ success in these
countries demonstrates how the Marine Corps is prepared to
undertake these unique missions and the addition of competently
trained MARSOF will only improve the situation, particularly
with their knowledge of language and culture for various regions
of the world.
Allowing Marines to serve in both MARSOC and conventional
forces will facilitate a return by the Marine Corps to its roots
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as the organization that created Small Wars Manual, which is
still a preeminent document for FID, UW, and COIN operations.4
History provides ample evidence of Marine success in FID/UW
operations. From the Marine Corps’ earliest days, the legacy of
Lt Presley O’Bannon and his Marines part in furthering the
United States’ goals in Tripoli. In Vietnam, the Combined
Action Platoon (CAP) program is widely known and espoused as one
of the few success stories of that conflict.5 The men who planned
it may not have taken part in the Banana Republic wars, but they
were still heavily influenced by the experiences of the Marine
Corps’ forebears, having Marines as teachers and mentors who had
served in those conflicts.6 Even the training teams to places
like El Salvador in the 1980s were influenced by the Marines who
had taken part in the CAP program.
This unique relationship, senior to subordinate, is the
hallmark that has helped distinguish Marines amongst the other
services. Throughout the history of the Marine Corps, Marines
who have deployed have taken their experiences and shared them
with younger generations, creating units that operate more
effectively as a result. Having Marines and Sailors who have
deployed as MARSOF will only continue this tradition, making
Marine battalions better suited for operating in the current
operating environment and in future conflicts. Further, the
networking that will occur between conventional and SOF units
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will improve, allowing dissimilar units “to communicate
laterally” helping the Marine Corps as a whole become a more
“flexible, networked organization.”7
RECOMMENDATION
In USSOCOM, there is an organization that reflects the best
method for MARSOC to rotate its personnel, the 75th Ranger
Regiment. This storied unit has maintained its connection to
the big Army while operating as subordinate element of USSOCOM
as well. These Soldiers are elite light infantry whose
interoperability with SOF has demonstrated their utility in
places like Somalia during the Battle of Mogadishu and the
direct action raids prior to the battle or throughout the world
in the GWOT. The members of the 75th Ranger Regiment are
volunteers who must undergo either a Ranger Orientation Program
or a Ranger Indoctrination Program prior to gaining entrance
into one of the Ranger Battalions.8 Although it is conducted
differently, the concept is similar to the RSAS that every
Marine and Sailor must undergo prior to joining one of MARSOC’s
major subordinate elements (MSE). More importantly, though, is
that these Rangers return to conventional battalions and share
their knowledge and experiences, which has strengthened the
regard for Rangers throughout the Army.
The author, Sean Naylor, documents how officers’ ability to
serve in the Rangers and return to conventional forces served
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