DTIC ADA495443: U.S. Africa Command and the Principle of Active Security (Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 51, 4th Quarter 2008)

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

U.S. Africa Command and the
Principle of Active Security
By William E. Wa rd and T hom as P. G alvi n
I
n 2000, the Zambezi River experienced Mozambique’s capabilities to mitigate and to channel the waterways so the impact of
significant flooding, and the nation of respond to the next major flood. Several Ameri- flooding could be reduced. It also collaborated
Mozambique was ill equipped to deal can agencies got involved. The U.S. Agency with Mozambique on a land management
with the humanitarian disaster that for International Development established the program to move people, as practicable, out
followed. Homes were swept away, thousands Mozambique Integrated Information Network of hazardous areas and provide them with
of people were displaced, and 700 perished, for Decision-Making, which enhanced the suitable homes in safer locations. Separately
leading to the deployment of a U.S. civilian nation’s ability to prevent human losses and during later years, other DOD activities served
disaster assistance response team and U.S. economic disruptions from natural hazards. to enhance Mozambique’s humanitarian assis-
military forces to provide medical assistance The project strengthened early warning systems tance capacity. U.S. medical officers exercised
and security to help Mozambique stabilize the for cyclones and flooding, improved disaster in Mozambique under the Medical Civil
situation. Although floods on the Zambezi management and contingency planning, and Action Program (MEDCAP) to train their first
have been routine, Mozambique had developed expanded local early warning and response net- responders, and the United States also helped
neither the infrastructure nor the response works. It educated and involved communities in build hospitals and clinics that could absorb
capabilities to handle such tragic events. Con- disaster preparedness and mitigation, training the impact of the next disaster.
sequently, the episode caused tension between community volunteers in early warning report- The Zambezi River flooded again in 2008.
the government and the people. Left unre- ing and educating children in schools. The Although the deluge was even more severe
solved, this tension could have led to instability. Geological Survey was a major contributor. than in 2000, Mozambique was better prepared.
At Mozambique’s request, the U.S. Gov- On the Department of Defense (DOD) Boats and helicopters swiftly responded to
ernment and international partners provided side, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers evacuate 90,000 from affected areas. The death
various programs over several years to bolster helped Mozambique build the infrastructure toll was reduced to about 30, far fewer than it
could have been. The numbers affected by the
flood were reduced from more than a million to
about 115,000. Overall, Mozambique managed
the disaster mostly by itself. The request for
assistance from the United States was dramati-
cally reduced due to Mozambique’s capabilities.
No U.S. military assets deployed.
Since the 2008 flood, the government
of Mozambique has been working to become
even better prepared as the Zambezi River will
surely rise again. It is enlisting the support of
various aid organizations to ensure quicker
access to and distribution of food and relief
supplies. It is encouraging displaced families
to build their homes in safe areas instead of
returning to low-lying areas near the river.
Should these efforts succeed, the impacts of
future floods will be reduced, as will any poten-
Michael Larson) tial for instability or insecurity.
Camera Group ( GU.eSn. eArfarli cWai lClioammm Ea. “nKdi. pC”o Wloanredl ,T UhSoAm, aiss CP.o Gmamlvainn,d er,
Nigerien soldiers participate in State Department’s Trans-Sahara mbat USA, is Director, Commander’s Action Group, and
Co Special Assistant to the Commander, U.S. Africa
Counterterrorism Partnership training program Fleet Command.
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 51, 4th quarter 2008 / JFQ 61
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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
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U.S. Africa Command and the Principle of Active Security
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6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
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National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,Fort REPORT NUMBER
Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319-5066
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SPECIAL FEATURE | The Principle of Active Security
Addressing Real Needs that are essential to the security and eco- Building Capacity
This vignette illustrates the ulti- nomic well-being of allied governments. As a Active Security is a persistent and sus-
mate purpose of U.S. Africa Command partner requests a particular good or service, a tained level of effort focused on security assis-
(USAFRICOM). In support of U.S. foreign program is established or expanded. Program tance programs that prevent conflict in order to
policy and as part of a total U.S. Government managers are assigned to execute the transfer, contribute to an enhanced level of dialogue and
effort, USAFRICOM’s intent is to assist Afri- usually in the form of an Office of Security development. The goal of Active Security is to
cans in providing their own security and stabil- Cooperation (OSC).2 When the program is enable our partners to marginalize the enemies
ity and helping prevent the conditions that complete, the management mission is con- of peace; minimize the potential for conflict;
could lead to future conflicts. The command cluded, and the OSC is disbanded or moved. foster the growth of strong, just governments
will do this by employing the principle of But the real needs of our partners go and legitimate institutions; and support the
Active Security, which governs who we are beyond receiving goods or services; these development of civil societies.
and what we plan to do. It is the basis for our nations are exercising a vision of their security The meaning of the term programs is
theater strategy. goals and objectives. Many of the require- greatly expanded beyond that inferred from
The types of activities described above ments that emerge are nebulous because their the Security Assistance Management Manual.
fall within the spirit of security assistance as perspectives are different from ours, although It refers to the combination of all actions a
defined in DOD Publication 5105.38–M, we often have mutual interests. While existing unified command conducts to address partner
Security Assistance Management Manual, program vehicles such as Foreign Military needs in support of U.S. foreign policy. A
dated October 2003. However, these activi- Sales and International Military Education program results in the creation or improve-
ment of a partner’s capability, which may or
Commander, Joint Task Force Operation Atlas
Response, inspects flood damage to hospital in USAFRICOM’s intent is to assist
Machanga, Mozambique, 2000
Africans in providing their
own security and stability and
helping prevent the conditions
that could lead to conflicts
may not include procurement of a system. The
land management program for Mozambique
was an example where the result was the
creation of a process within the Mozambican
government that permitted greater indigenous
crisis response in the event of another Zambezi
River flood. For USAFRICOM, potential focus
areas for programs include enabling Africans
mphries) taon dd eafdendrde tshs erierg hioonmale lcaonndfsli,c dtse fteharto tuegrrho fruisrttsh, er
Hu
Cary development of peacekeeping capacities.
Air Force ( Ccaopmacmitya ntod pprrootgercatm cisv wiliialln a plsoop buulailcde sl,o ccoanl duct
U.S. disaster relief, and respond to health crises.
The components that could comprise a
ties did not all follow the strict definition of and Training (IMET) can provide means by program include procurement (sales, grants,
“programs, authorized by law, that allows the which our partners can meet specific objec- leases, and loans), training, education, logistics
transfer of military articles and services to tives, these partners also look to us for subject and sustainment, exercises, activities, employ-
friendly foreign Governments.”1 While the matter expertise and other intangible forms of ment, and communication. The goal of these
assistance provided did “increase the ability of assistance. Furthermore, many of our partners components is to further the partners’ abilities
our friends to . . . help foster regional stability,” have security concerns whose resolutions fall to build the capacity to self-sustain their newly
much of the above involved the transfer of outside of the DOD purview or that overlap gained capabilities, which broadens the context
subject matter expertise and not necessarily multiple U.S. agencies. The narrow view of of these components. For example, training is
the “transfer of articles or services.” programs reaffirms stovepiped responsi- more than supporting the acquisition of new
Unfortunately, this has led to a cultural bilities, predetermining who administers a skills by the partners’ servicemembers and
paradigm where security assistance and program and causing all others to step aside. train-the-trainer capabilities of their leaders;
the management thereof are defined and The modern dynamic security environment it is about assisting the partners’ development
resourced based on a very narrow definition requires that we address security from a of the training base to ensure these skills are
of “program,” which regards only the sales, holistic perspective and integrate our efforts retained. Education is more than offering
grants, leases, or loans of goods or services horizontally across the U.S. Government. IMET slots; it is about fostering the develop-
62 JFQ / issue 51, 4th quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu
WARD and GALVIN
ment of comparative educational programs think of it as an integral part of any program. in our partners that as situations change and
that further military professionalism across However, communication is vital in building new requirements emerge, USAFRICOM will
the total force, officer and noncommissioned the relationship that sets the conditions for a be there to help.
officer, in accordance with the partners’ needs. program to succeed and for our partners to
A component worth further explanation capitalize on that success over time. Paradigm Shifts
is activities. These are events that achieve the To employ communication effectively, Active Security requires a holistic look
objective of a program by demonstration or the unified command must be a listening and that encourages us to work in unison across
example. An example is the deployment of learning organization. It will be a culturally agencies, and fosters greater ability for our
medical personnel to perform humanitarian aware command that promotes dialogue over partners to build capacity to conduct opera-
assistance in a grief-stricken region. They do debate, possibilities over procedures, consul- tions with well-trained, disciplined forces that
not necessarily transfer skills or expertise as do tation over informing, and consensus over respect human rights and the rule of law, with
training or exercise events, but they establish cookie-cutter solutions. It fosters innovative the ultimate goal of preventing conflict. As
goodwill and further relationships with our thinking that allows us to continuously assess applied to USAFRICOM, it will also prepare
partners. However, such activities conducted in our effectiveness and find ways to improve on African forces to better address shared chal-
isolation and not as part of an overall program our activities. It leverages modern informa- lenges, strengthen legitimate governments, and
normally fail to produce lasting positive bene- tion technologies that allow instant access to make less likely the requirement for the United
fits and therefore do not further our objectives. an unlimited wealth of knowledge, perspec- States to conduct unilateral operations.
Employment, the use of a newly gained tives, and ideas that can contribute in new Active Security requires us to be a trusted
capability to meet a real-world need, is often and innovative ways. A listening and learning and reliable partner, something that is neither
thought of as an end result or measure of a pro- organization proactively and rapidly analyzes easy nor automatic. Building partnerships in
gram’s success. By this thinking, the program the environment, consults with partners, and Africa requires time, patience, consistency,
concludes with the capability being put to use proposes programs that meet their unique and understanding. To be effective, we must
in operations with sustainment from the United needs. It eschews the easy solution of blindly develop mutual confidence in what we can do
States, and the program is then assessed accord- tapping into an existing large program because together at the theater, regional, and bilateral
ing to whether the capability is proven. In it is there and available and because programs levels. We must maintain mutual respect, rec-
reality, many of the capabilities gained through often do not exactly fit our partner’s needs or ognizing that our needs and theirs are equally
our programs are employed immediately or deliver the desired effects. important, not mutually exclusive, and are
continuously to meet current partner needs, These components together comprise the probably complementary. Most importantly,
and the results of that employment must be fed persistent and sustained level of effort. As pro- the result is the mutual confidence and compe-
back into the communication process to refine curement activities are completed, the require- tence that allow us to act as a combined team
the requirements and adjust the program. ments for communication rise. Second-order when necessary.
Communication is an important impacts of a program need to be assessed in the Active Security involves a cultural change
but often underappreciated component. It context of changes in the security environment. within unified commands and the broader
expresses the breadth of communications The incorporation of training and sustainment joint and interagency processes that employ
between us and our partners related to the into the partner’s institutional base normally it. In particular, there are three culture shifts
development of a capability. It includes con- lags behind the original fielding of equipment already visible within USAFRICOM.
tacts that focus on learning about, refining, and acquisition of new skills. Also, most security Focused on Small Activities. Security-
developing, and promulgating requirements assistance is conducted on a bilateral basis, but based activities do not always require significant
that become a program, as well as the series we also want to ensure that regional objectives employment of forces to achieve great results.
of assessments and followup contacts that are met and encourage regional communication Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans-Sahara
keep the program on track or that adjust it as among partners to leverage these new capabili- (OEF–TS) is a perfect example. In support of
needed. It includes mentorship that establishes ties to meet broader U.S. and partner interests. nine African nations, OEF–TS strengthens
developmental relationships between U.S.
subject matter experts and partner leaders,
training is about assisting the partners’ development of the
encouraging broader understanding of the
training base to ensure these skills are retained
capabilities built and their employment. But
most importantly, it includes dialogue in which
we talk with our partners in order to explore The job is hardly done once equipment counterterrorism and border security efforts,
our respective assumptions and promote is fielded. Short-term programs cannot achieve promotes democratic governance, reinforces
greater understanding without necessarily these results because the impact of a short- bilateral military ties, and enhances development
achieving conclusion, as one seeks in a debate. term program is felt only by those elements and institution-building. It assists governments
Dialogue reinforces partnerships by encourag- trained and lasts only as long as those elements seeking to control their territories and prevent
ing learning and keeping options on the table remain together. Programs exercised under a terrorist groups from using their uncontrolled
that could be useful as the strategic environ- persistent and sustained level of effort mature areas as safe havens. OEF–TS has produced
ment changes. This component is underappre- over time and allow adjustments, so better extraordinary results, yet the majority of activi-
ciated because it does not necessarily produce information can be used to gain better effects ties involve only a handful of Servicemembers
anything tangible; therefore, we tend not to on a wider scale. They also instill confidence scattered among the participating countries.
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 51, 4th quarter 2008 / JFQ 63
SPECIAL FEATURE | The Principle of Active Security
Other examples are the MEDCAP and organizations, or partnering with other nations regional presence while employing a minimal
Veterinarian Civic Action Program. These who have similar skills is another way of pro- footprint ashore. With west coast African
activities involve small numbers of doctors, viding security assistance. nations from Senegal to Angola participating,
nurses, veterinarians, and other medical special- Poised to Leverage Opportunities. APS conducted training on Maritime Security
ists deploying to partner nations. In addition to Active Security means a unified command is Awareness, operational medicine, damage
curing the sick and healing the wounded, they postured to take full and immediate advantage control and firefighting, at-sea interrogation
techniques, procedures for boarding rogue
ships and securing their personnel, and hand-
security-based activities do not always require significant
to-hand combat training.
employment of forces to achieve great results
APS accomplished far more than train-
ing. It welcomed partners on board such as the
build medical capacity in accordance with what of opportunities as they arise. The Africa Part- nongovernmental organization Project Hope,
partners request, build field hospitals or clinics, nership Station (APS) is a perfect example of which provides medical assistance and training
and provide emergency response training. The leveraging an opportunity. The concept behind for doctors and emergency services. While in
results are increased capacity for partners to the deployment of APS to the Gulf of Guinea Ghana, a team of Navy Seabees helped con-
provide for the needs of their own people, new was a result of the Gulf of Guinea Ministerials struct a medical clinic for use by both military
experience and knowledge for our own medical in Cotonou, Benin, in November 2006. The and civilian personnel. And it got the call to
people, and greater goodwill between those sentiments of those in attendance were that assist in crisis response. The APS moved early
nations and the United States. maritime security was crucial to ensuring the to Cameroon to aid with the Chad relief effort,
One challenge of smaller programs, region’s economic development and stability delivering 27 pallets of food and medicine to
however, is that they usually require U.S. and that regional solutions were necessary. ease the refugee crisis in northern Cameroon.
Servicemembers who have high-demand The ministers, as a collective, enumerated their The development of APS was possible
because we were poised and postured with
the capability to respond quickly. As a result,
we greatly contributed to maritime stability
and security in the Gulf in both the short and
long terms.
However, in general such quick responses
will be challenging for several reasons. First,
USAFRICOM will not have forces perma-
nently stationed in theater. Therefore, it must
compete with the global force pool to source all
its programs, and priority understandably goes
to unit rotations in combat operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Second, although programs
such as APS and other security assistance ven-
tures provide immediate gains for the receiving
nation, the longer term impact is much greater
but difficult to quantify. In our measurement
of success, we tend to look for “guaranteed”
mares) return on investment, which steers us toward
Palo more short-term projects. Third, the demands
Robert on the force have caused us to seek greater
Aid workers retrieve flood relief supplies dropped Horn of Africa ( ptinirocenrde ioacfst iaunbngiil tilstey at odin tt hitmhe eeu san.p iTfpiheodirst ciioso nmemsmpeenacnti adalnsly,d tt hrauulleso cfoar-
by U.S. Air Force in rural Kenya CJTF– the high-demand, low-density capabilities that
play vital roles in security assistance. Hence, we
skills or subject matter expertise. Certainly needs and priorities. We listened and were will be challenged to maintain flexibility, which
that is true with the special forces involved in postured to respond with tailored training is essential to Active Security and allows us to
OEF–TS and medical personnel participating and assistance that also supported U.S. foreign leverage the opportunities that could arise.
in MEDCAPs. Currently, the pools of such policy goals. The solution is to reexamine our
talent are very limited, and such assets are also The APS deployed to the Gulf of Guinea operations and make sure there are adequate
in great demand elsewhere. Enlarging the pools region from October 2007 through April 2008 numbers to support current operations,
of resources, whether through expansion of to improve maritime security and safety. It planned operations, and security assistance
military assets (that is, more special forces), has established an at-sea training platform requirements, and then to have a special pool
building cooperatives with nongovernmental onboard a single ship, providing a sustained set aside that allows us flexibility and versatility.
64 JFQ / issue 51, 4th quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu
WARD and GALVIN
The situation in Africa is dynamic and assistance is welcomed as a partnership rather U.S. Government. The notion of a “persistent,
complex, and the pressure on the national gov- than as interference from a foreigner. sustained level of effort” is not peculiar to the
ernments for securing their territory and caring APS is a successful U.S. program that military. It can be exercised by all the elements
for their people is great. Many have limited could spawn an African initiative providing of national power, especially informational.
resources and significant needs. USAFRICOM similar training and exercise opportunities But for it to succeed, all these elements must
must be poised to respond with programs and on a continuous basis. For the moment, let work in harmony. It requires balancing the
resources when those nations reach out to us. us call it a Gulf of Guinea Maritime Safety perspectives of each agency, mapping the
Postured to Help the Africans Lever- and Security Academy. In addition to APS authorities and responsibilities in such a way
age Success. Everywhere we have traveled in rotations of finite duration, such an academy that collective solutions can be found, so
Africa, we are given the message by the leader- would be available to all sailors in the region, Washington is perceived as responsive and
ship that Africans want to provide for their with readily tailored curricula that address reliable. It also requires openness and transpar-
own stability and security and not depend on current maritime issues, challenges, and ency to give partners a greater understanding
foreign assistance. It is also in our interest to threats. Sailors trained by APS personnel of our perspectives. This way, as political
avoid creating dependency. USAFRICOM’s could become instructors in this academy, decisions are made about the expenditure of
approach is two-fold: partnering with African forging useful relationships not only with the resources for USAFRICOM activities, partners
initiatives whose goals are compatible with our U.S. Navy, but also with other navies that have follow the rationale sufficiently that the team
m)
demands on the force have Merria
precadouicfs teuadnb iiutlisst y tt ooin ts hteheee ku anglirlfioeecadate tiro n S. Navy (Elizabeth
U.
commands, thus increasing
lead times
own and leveraging successful U.S. military
programs as a means by which the Africans
can build their own indigenous capabilities.
Two examples of the former were the subject
of our visit to Mali earlier this year.
The Bamako Peacekeeping School is an
initiative of the Malian government to train its
personnel to conduct peacekeeping missions.
Its curriculum is based on the requirements of
the Economic Commission of West African
States, and it accepts students from 10 African
nations. Argentina, Canada, France, and the
West African naval officers participate in exercise led by U.S. Coast Guard
Netherlands have provided instructors, and International Training Division
the United States is an associate member on
the council and has provided automation similar goals. The APS would have been suc- effort is sustained and healthy even as direct
equipment. In its first year of operation, the cessful at adding value to stability and security government support experiences temporary
school trained 600 students and is working to in the long run. reductions in response to changes in the global
increase that capacity. Also, its initial charter security environment. (Both the Department
was individual training of officers, but it seeks Interagency Inroads of State and U.S. Agency for International
to expand to collective training. USAFRICOM Openness and transparency on our part Development have been providing persistent,
is becoming an active partner in this endeavor. are essential. It is well known that there have sustained assistance for decades.)
The Military Intelligence Basic Officer been lost opportunities to establish programs Active Security is a philosophy grounded
Course–Africa (MIBOC–A) is an initiative to or partnerships because of misunderstand- in strategy. It requires clearly defined strategic
provide basic training for military intelligence ings or conflicts within the U.S. Government ends and the identification of ways and means
officers in Africa. When we visited, 26 officers or where lines of authority established for to support them. However, it challenges some of
from seven West African nations were in atten- particular situations created bottlenecks the current processes found in joint doctrine as
dance. While we played an integral role in the or inhibited rapid response under new well as DOD business practices used by unified
development of this school, it is run by Africans. circumstances. commands to develop their theater strategies.
Both of these activities enjoy the advan- Active Security, while currently being For example, the current strategy develop-
tage of Africans providing for their own needs applied only in the context of USAFRICOM, ment process is designed to function over a
so they become self-sustaining endeavors. Our can overcome deficiencies across the entire multiyear basis. That is, developing the ends and
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 51, 4th quarter 2008 / JFQ 65
SPECIAL FEATURE | The Principle of Active Security
ways today generates the means in future years. required. However, aligning priorities across Furthermore, Phase Zero and Phase One
It is grounded in a largely sequential process of the interagency community has been next to have proven to be apples and oranges. Unlike
assessing the security environment, identifying impossible, not so much because the priori- Phases One through Four in a traditional
threats, developing courses of action to respond, ties naturally differ but because of the lack of campaign, the alleged transition from Phase
and therefore identifying resources necessary transparency in the decisionmaking processes. Zero to Phase One is unclean and unpredict-
to execute those courses of action. While this Consequently, decisions made by one agency to able, and in fact may not actually occur. In the
process serves well the existing force allocation reduce or alter support to a given nation cannot case of Mozambique, should the Zambezi have
processes that apportion forces over the course be addressed by other agencies in a manner that flooded in 2004 with the programs having
of Program Objective Memorandum cycles, it permits either alternate support mechanisms to yet to be completed, the Phase Zero activities
makes it difficult to exploit opportunities as they be developed or helpful communication with would likely have continued during any U.S.
arise, particularly for unified commands that that partner. Greater transparency is needed if joint operation that might have occurred.
lack permanently assigned forces. It also causes we are to exercise the flexibility, versatility, and Phase Zero and Phase One would not only
mismatches with the shorter resourcing cycles consistency that Active Security demands. occur simultaneously; they would probably be
of our interagency partners. The dynamics of fully independent of one another.
the African environment and impacts of con- Beyond Phase Zero
tinuous sustained security engagement with our Because theater security cooperation Active Security represents a fundamental
partners require a flexible and responsive model plays such an important role in Active Security, shift in the way we address and prioritize secu-
of translating requirements into programs some may believe that it is just another name rity assistance. It is clearly within our national
and resources in a shorter time frame. It also for Phase Zero, which attempted to capture strategic interests to prevent conflict and foster
requires business rules that work in harmony and codify the types of theater security coop- conditions that permit development in Africa.
with other government agencies. eration activities that geographic combatant Doing so requires a full understanding of the
It also puts forth a sizeable challenge commands performed outside of named perspectives and needs of our African partners,
to the force allocation models used to priori- operations. However, as both a moniker and a so we can provide them with programs that
tize missions. Notwithstanding the fact that philosophy, Phase Zero falls short. meet their needs and support U.S. foreign policy
ongoing and demanding operations such First, joint doctrine describes Phase Zero and national security objectives. It requires
as Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom are as “Shape,” which is the opposite of an Active new business rules that permit unified com-
rightly our top priorities, in general those Security approach.3 Shaping asserts our influ- mands the flexibility and versatility to exercise
activities that serve to prevent conflict, such ence over the environment in such a way that those programs quickly and effectively and that
as the security assistance programs described conditions are favorable for future operations. exercise the necessary persistence to ensure the
above, have almost always tended to fall in the Active Security recognizes that the environ- programs produce the desired long-term effects.
lowest priority. Therefore, programs that have ment belongs to our partners, and it is our rela- We have had tremendous success with
reduced the need to commit U.S. forces in the tionships with those partners that determine a number of programs in Africa precisely
long term often are at risk. the nature of that environment. This is why because Active Security principles have been in
Programs do not always produce Active Security requires us to be a listening and force. However, we have treated such principles
immediately measurable results. While one learning organization. Our full appreciation of as the exception. In USAFRICOM, they will be
can measure the numbers of African soldiers our partners’ perspectives and support of their the rule. It is what our partners want from us,
and sailors trained during APS missions or needs are what ultimately set conditions that and it is in our national interest. JFQ
MIBOC–A classes or the number of clinics are favorable for preventing conflict and avoid-
built, the real measures of success relate to the ing the need for conducting operations. Contributors: Angela Sherbanou, Jerry Lanier,
true goals of preventing conflict and establish- Next, by referring to it as a “phase,” many Command Sergeant Major Mark Ripka, USA, Lieutenant
ing self-sustained security and stability. These (including our partners) misunderstand it Colonel John Roddy, USA, and Tracy Sharp.
are elusive. The opportunity to gauge how well as a natural precursor to traditional military
a nation can respond to crisis sometimes only operations. When certain conditions arise in
comes when a crisis occurs. The real results of Phase Zero, go to Phase One. But this is more
NOTES
security assistance efforts manifest themselves than a perception issue. The definition itself
after years or decades. We acknowledge that poses problems: “In joint operation planning,
1 Department of Defense Publication 5105.38–M,
occasional setbacks due to unfavorable political a [phase] is a definitive stage of an operation or
Security Assistance Management Manual (Washington,
or economic conditions are a possibility. The campaign during which a large portion of the
DC: Department of Defense, October 2003), 33.
wrong answer is to become too fickle when this forces and capabilities are involved in similar or 2 These come under various names, including
occurs, as it may cause us to forfeit our standing mutually supporting activities for a common Offices of Defense Cooperation and Offices of Mili-
as a nation rebounds. Again, a persistent and purpose.” Yet in reality, activities associated with tary Cooperation.
sustained level of effort is critical. Phase Zero are by nature indefinite and endur- 3 Joint Publication 3–0, Joint Operations (Wash-
Meantime, while security is a neces- ing. Active Security takes that notion one step ington, DC: U.S. Joint Forces Command, February
sary precondition to development, progress further—that these activities must be exercised 2006), IV–27; Joint Publication 5–0, Joint Opera-
tion Planning (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Forces
in development is a factor in maintaining at a persistent and sustained level of effort
Command, December 2006), IV–35.
lasting security and stability. In other words, through all other phases. Phase Zero had no
a comprehensive government approach is such qualifier.
66 JFQ / issue 51, 4th quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu