DTIC ADA491157: Task Force 1/6 in Ramadi: A Successful Tactical-Level Counterinsurgency Campaign

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TASKFORCE 1/6INRAMADI:
A Successful Tactical-Level Counterinsurgency Campaign
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Task Force 1/6 in Ramadi: A Successful Tactical-Level
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Counterinsurgency Campaign
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UnitedStatesMarine Corps
CommandandStaffCollege
Marine Corps University I
2076South Street
Marine Corps CombatDevelopmentCommand
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068
I
MASTEROFMILITARY STUDIES
TASKFORCE 1/6IN RAMADI:
ASuccessfulTactical-LevelCounterinsurgency Campaign
SUBMITIEDINPARTIALFULFILLMENT
OFTHEREQUIREMENTSFORTHEDEGREEOF
MASTERSOFMILITARYSTUDY
MAJORR. M. HANCOCK, USMC
AY 07-08
Mentor and Oral Defense CommitteeMember:, _
Approved:, _
Date: ---'- _
Oral Defense CommitteeMember: _
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ExecutiveSummary
Title: TaskForce 1/6 inRamadi: A SuccessfulTactical-Level CounterinsurgencyCampaign
Author: MajorR. M. Hancock, United States MarineCorps
Thesis: From September2006 to May2007, TaskForce 1/6 achieved success ina tacticallevel
counterinsurgencycampaignin support ofOperationIRAQI FREEDOMdue to superb campaign
design, through the employment ofaflexible and effectivetaskorganization, andthrough
successfulpartnership withIraqi SecurityForces.
th
Discussion: FromSeptember2006 throughMay2007, TaskForce 1/6,the 1stBattalion, 6
MarineRegiment conducted a counterinsurgencycampaign as partofthe 1stBrigadeCombat
Team, Multi-NationalForces-Westin supportofOperation IRAQIFREEDOM. Duringthese
nearlyeightmonths, TaskForce 1/6 achievedsignificant successinprovidingsecurityto the
most significantportionofthe cityofAr Ramadi, the capital ofAl AnbarProvince. Indesigning
thebattalion's operational concept, TaskForce 1/6personnelbeganwitha comprehensive
understandingoftheimplications ofthe situationinRamadi, anddeveloped a clear assessment
ofthat situation. This sharedunderstanding enabledtheformulation ofatactical-level campaign
thatfocused onthreelogical lines ofoperations, and appliedthatplanina systematicwayto
achieveintermediate objectivesthatultimatelyledto the achievement ofthebattalion's endstate.
Theinherentflexibility ofthe taskorganization establishedbyTaskForce 1/6-bothwithinthe
taskforceheadquarters as well as withinthetaskforce's subordinateunits-specificallythe
shiftingofnon-kineticoperationsresponsibilities from the taskforce operations officerto the
taskforce executive officer enabledthe execution ofextensiveplanningforbothkinetic andnon
kineticoperations with equal focus-thereby allowingfor the simultaneous conduct of
operations alongtwo ofthebattalion'sthreelogical lines ofoperations. TaskForce 1/6's
organizationofits subordinateunits enabledthose subordinateunits to conduct operations along
all three ofthe designatedlines ofoperations. TaskForce 1/6's successfulpartnership withIraqi
SecurityForces was aliteral force-multiplier for thebattalioninits counterinsurgencyfight in
Ramadi. The focusing oftheTaskForce's MilitaryTransition Teamonthe training and
proficiencyofthe Iraqi Armybattalionstaffenabledits partneredIraqiArmyBattalionto gain
its independence from coalitionforces. Additionally, TaskForce 1/6 significantlybenefited
from its commander's creationofaugmentationteams to performliaison, coordination, and
trainingfunctions withpartneredIraqi Police and Iraqi Armyunits. Theresultofsuch efforts
enabledtheTaskForce command.erto effectively controlnotonlyhis taskforcebutto also
employnearly500 IraqiArmysoldiers and approximately 1,200IraqiPolicemen.
Conclusion: Themodemday counterinsurgent canbenefitfrom astudyofTaskForce 1/6's
tactical level counterinsurgencycampaign. Byconducting athorough design, throughthe
establishmentofa flexible taskorganizationofsubordinateunits andthroughthe assessment of
roles andresponsibilities ofstaffmembers, aunitcan ensure success across theirestablished
logical lines ofoperations. Finally, modemday counterinsurgents cansignificantlybenefit
through expandedpartnerships withindigenous forces; therebyincreasingtheforces available
for the conductofcounterinsurgencyoperations.
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Table ofContents
DISCLAIMER i
Preface .ii
TASKFORCE 1/6 INRAMADI: A Successful Tactical-Level Counterinsurgency
Canlpaign 1
BACKGROUND 2
ArRanladi, Iraq 2
FriendlyForceUnits 2
BATTALION LEVELCAMPAIGN DESIGN. 4
Franlingthe Problem : 4
CanlpaignDesign 6
Logical Lines ofOperatioI\ 7
Intermediate Objectives , 9
TASKORGANIZATION 11
Headquarters StaffOrganization andResponsibilities , : .11
SubordinateUnitTask Organization 14
, ,
ISFPartnership 16
Mindset 16
MilitaryJransitionTeanlEmployment 16
AugmentationTeanl Concept 17
"I
CONCLUSIONS 19
Notes 21
AppendixA 22
1
DISCLAIMER
THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREINARE THOSE OF THE
INDIVIDUAL STUDENTAUTHORAND DO NOTNECESSARILYREPRESENT
THEVIEWS OF EITHERTHEMARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF
COLLEGE ORANY OTHERGOVERNMENTAGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS
STUDY SHOULD INCLUDETHE FOREGOING STATEMENT
QUOTATIONFROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, ORREPRODUCTION OFALL OR
ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.
11
Preface
Thefollowingthesis is aresultmyexperience as the Operations Officerfor 1stBattalion,
6thMarines inRamadi, Iraqfrom August 2006 to May2007 andmycontinued studyinthis area.
This continuedstudywouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthemanydiscussions ofthe area
withmysenior and subordinate commanders, and fellow staffofficers who sharedthe same
experience. This documentis anattemptto provide an answerto a question oftenaskedofme,
thatof"whatdid TaskForce 1/6 do to secureRamadi?" Itwas thatquestionthat drovemeto
attemptthe following explanation. Intheend, anyamountofplanningthat I conductedinmy
previouspositionwas baseduponthe ideas and solidfoundation ofmycommander, Lieutenant
ColonelWilliamR. Jurney, USMC, the finest commanderwithwhom I'vehad thepleasureto
serve.
This documentislabeled "ForOfficialUse Only" dueto the citationsmade ofthe
interviews ofMarines from TaskForce 1/6 conductedbythe Marine Corps Centerfor Lessons
Learned staffaboard Camp Lejeune, NC. I amindebtedto theMCCLL for capturingthis
information.
Lastly, I amindebtedto the staffofthe MarineCorps Command and StaffCollegewho
helpedto make this workpossible; includingmymentorProfessorErin Simpson.
1
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TASKFORCE 1/6 INRAMADI: A SuccessfulTactical-LevelCounterinsurgency
Campaign
"It's anotherswelteringafternoon in the mostdangerousplace inIraq.... Nowhere is thefighting
more intense than inRamadi, the capitalofAnbarprovince andfor the momenttheseething
heartofthe Sunni-ledinsurgency.... The city remains a strongholdofinsurgents loyal to [al
Qaeda inIraq]... .,,1
Theprecedingquote appearedinMichaelWare's Timemagazine coverstorypublished
onMay29,2006. WithU.S. public opinionfor Operation IRAQIFREEDOM sinking, Ware's
articleraisedthenation's awareness ofthelevel ofviolenceinArRamadi, the capital cityof
Iraq's Al Anbarprovince. His article demonstrated aless thanpositiveoutlookonthe execution
ofIRAQIFREEDOM, andhisprognosis for the future, whilepositive, was measured:
improvementis happening, and will continueto happenvery, veryslowly. On September 16,
2006, thenationagainawakenedto news thatthewarinAl Anbarprovincewas not goingwell.
Onthis date, Major General RichardZilmer, Commanding General ofMulti-National Forces
West, commentedinresponseto aleaked classifiedreport from a seniorMarineintelligence
/
officer, Colonel PeterDevlin, thatthe "political andsecuritysituationinAnbarhad deteriorated
so muchthatonlymore aid and anotherdivisionoftroops...couldtumthings around.,,2 Today,
nearlytwo years sincetheprintingofthatarticle, ArRamadi andAnbarProvince as awhole are
seen as themodels forthe conductofthe counterinsurgencyfight withinIraq. Whathappenedto
makethis difference?
Whilemanyreasons canbe citedforthe drastic, positiveimprovements to the security
situationinRamadi-includingthe surgeofU.S. forces beginninginJune 2006 withthe
deploymentoftheArmy's 1stBrigade, 1stArmoredDivision(theReadyFirst Combat Team)
and the organizationandsupportoftribal leadersknown as the "AnbarAwakening" who ordered
theirfollowers to "assisttheAmericans againstthejihadists"byjoiningthenewlyforming Iraqi
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police3--thispaperwill focus onthetactical-level counterinsurgencycampaignconductedby
TaskForce 1/6, the 1stBattalion, 6thMarines, andwill demonstratehowthis battalionwas able
to capitalizeontheimproving securitysituationto achieve campaign objectives thatwere truly
greaterthanthe sumofthebattalion's individualbattles andcounterinsurgencyactions. From
September2006 to May2007, TaskForce 1/6 achieved successinatacticallevel
counterinsurgencycampaignin supportofOperationIRAQIFREEDOM due to superb campaign
design, throughthe employmentofaflexible and effectivetaskorganization, andthrough
successfulpartnershipwithIraqi SecurityForces.
BACKGROUND \
ArRamadi, Iraq
Ar Ramadi lies alongthe Euphrates River, approximately70miles west ofBaghdad, and
is known as the southwestern-mostpointofthe "Sunni Triangle". Ramadi was home to
approximately450,000 Iraqis priorto the2003U.S. invasion, and estimateswerethat
approximately 150,000persons livedinthe cityduring TaskForce 1/6'sparticipationin
Operation IRAQIFREEDOM. Priorto TaskForce 1/6's arrival, Ramadi hadbeenthe
responsibilityofmultiple U.S. ArmyandMarineunitsincluding: 2dBattalion, 4thMarines; 2d
Battalion, 5thMarines; 1stBattalion, 5thMarines; 3rdBattalion, 7thMarines; 3dBattalion, 8th
Marines, and 1stBattalion, 506thInfantry.
Friendly Force Units
InMayof2006, the ReadyFirstCombatTeamwas directedto move from Tal' Afarto
Ramadi to relievethe 2-28thInfantry, aNational Guardbrigade serving as the 1stBrigade
CombatTeamofMulti-National Forces-West. TheReadyFirst CombatTeamwas chargedwith
duplicatingits sutcess at securing andrestoringlocal governanceinTal'Afar, anddeployed to
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Ramadiwithan additional threebattaliontaskforces, raisingthe strengthofU.S. forces in
Ramadi to fivebattaliontaskforces. Thebrigade developed a campaignstrategythat centered
uponthenewlyforming counterinsurgencydoctrineof"clear, hold, andbuild" andbeganto
participateina complexfight employingkinetic andnon-kinetictactics to achievesuccess. As
statedinthebrigade's after-actionreport, ReadyFirst CombatTeam's "willingness to accept and
managerisks inherentinpositioningforward andutilizingfoot patrols instead ofmounted
armoredpatrols, andthrough sustained effortsto buildrelationships withthelocal leadership and
generalpopulation, the effectiveintegrationofIraqi Police and IraqiArmyinto theirfight and
the willingnessto initiate Civil Military Operations (concurrentinmanyinstances with security
operations) ledto noteworthysuccess...,,4
TheReadyFirst CombatTeamdid achievenoteworthysuccess inthe three-months of
their campaignpriorto theintroductionofTaskForce 1/6; however, the enemyhaddecided to
make a standinthe areaofoperations that TaskForce 1/6wouldassume and therefore opposed
rd th
everymove conductedbyTaskForce 3 Battalion, 8 Marines (TaskForce 3/8)-TaskForce
1/6'spredecessors. Consequently, the campaignplandesignedbyReadyFirstCombatTeam,
whiledescriptiveofthe fight tobe conductedinRamadi, provided greatlatitudeto TaskForce
1/6, and enabledtheunitto develop its ownplanto achieve success.
TaskForce 1/6 deployedto Ramadi, to conduct areliefinplace andtransferofauthority
withTaskForce3/8 in September2006. TaskForce 1/6'sprimarymissionwas to conduct
combinedcounterinsurgencyoperations to neutralize anti-Iraqi elements inzone andassist the
reestablishmentoflocalIraqi governancebyimprovingthe securityand stabilityofWest-Central
ArRamadi. TaskForce 1/6 operated as amajorsubordinate commandofthe ReadyFirst
CombatTeam and assumed control ofits areaofoperations (AO) atmidnighton September21,
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