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/'I UnitedStates Marine Corps Command and StaffCollege Marine Corps University 2076 SouthStreet Marine Corps CombatCommandDevelopment Command Quantico, Virginia22134-5068 MASTERS OFMILITARY STUDIES TITLE: THEUSE OFCULTURALSTUDIES INMILITARY OPERATIONS SUBMITTED INPARTIALFULFILLMENT OFTHEREQUIREMENTS FORTHEDEGREE OF MASTERS OFMILITARY STUDIES AUTHOR: Alejandro P. Briceno LieutenantColonel United States Marine Corps Reserves AY 07-08 Mentor ~efenseCommitteeMem~'iSaHolmes-Eber, PhD L I-k hvo.r;.~~ Approved: Co 'Vb Date: 16 £ I OralDefense:jq.'nv.ni Approved:.....~F.:v~$£.lc--b::>Jf64::bL~---- Date:....::5~-=-~L..Q... ..,.L+ _ Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2008 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER The Use of Cultural Studies in Military Operations 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION United States Marine Corps, Command and-Staff College,Marine Corps REPORT NUMBER University, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,2076 South Street,Quantico,VA,22134-5068 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 30 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Executive Summary T,itle: TheUse ofCulturalStudies inMilitaryOperations . Author: LieutenantColonelAlejandro Briceno, UnitedStates Marine Corps Reserve Thesis: Inconflicts whereideas orperceptions are pivotalto establishinglastingresolutions, meaningfulculturalunderstandingis the corner stone to success. Cultureis at the crux ofthis issue, therefore we mustdevelop amethod to evaluatevarious culturalnorms andpresentthem in a direct way to theoperationalforces headinginto uniqueenvironments. Discussion: Operational units, regardless oftheir size orcomposition, always have to deal with gaining anunderstanding ofthe uniquecultures thatthey will be operatingin during a deploymentormilitaryoperation. Understanding theintrinsic values ofan enemy's ideology, thecivilianpopulation, and thefriendly forces thatwe will encounterwill enable ourforces to makedecisions that will minimizeunintendedconsequences and maximizeourintended influencein the mostpositivemannerpossible. In a war where perceptionis moreimportant thanbullets, cultural cognizance atthe tactical, operational, and strategiclevels are vital to achieving alonglastingpeace. Ourculturalunqerstandingofafuture operational areacomes from a variety ofsources such as theCIA CountryFactbook and CountryHandbooks producedbythe Marine Corps IntelligenceActivity. There are avarietyofother sources thatcouldbereferencedto complementthe officialregionalliterature, buthow we translate thatinformationin a tangible manner to ourleaders and troops is critical. Ifwe cannotparleythis information clearlyand concisely, itbecomes problematicfor the troops that are tasked with operatingin the region and difficultto relay to units that will assumethat samebattle spacein thefuture. One aspect to always keep inmind, the outputmodel orbriefwill onlybe as accurate anduseful as the data thatis usedto createit. Conclusion: A simple graphicalmodel thatgrades cultural dynamics againsteachother and backs up the conclusions withreferencedresearchcouldhelp bridgethis information gap. The dynamic modelcanbe createdwithinitialinformation ona specific area andupdatedas new information is gatheredthroughresearchorexperience. As cultural awareness is enhanced, itcanbe leveragedwithvarious communicationmethods to shapeperceptions andfuture events, as well as highlightoperationalculturefriction points before an incidentoccurs. Operationally, the model couldbeusedfor aunitto maintainculturalawareness and communicatecultural considerations for future units thatwill take overtheirareaofresponsibility. :', ) I, I DISCLAIMER THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREINARETHOSE OFTHE INDIVIDUALSTUDENTAUTHORAND DO NOT NECESSARILYREPRESENTTHE VIEWS OFEITHERTHEMARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE ORANY OTHERGOVERNMENT AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THEFOREGOINGSTATEMENT. QUOTATIONFROM, ABSTRACTIONFROM, ORREPRODUCTION OFALL ORANY PART OFTHIS DOCUMENTIS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWELDGEMENTIS MADE. Preface Whileattemptingto notover simplifycultural dynamics, Ihope to create a startingpoint thatwill sparksomethought onmethods to develop culturalvalues understanding. Deeprooted research shouldproduceinformationthatcanbeused, as itapplies to any given region orsmall groups ofpeople, to shapeperceptions through well crafted communications thatwill resonate withtargeted audiences. Anyone thathas studied Counter-Insurgency Operationsrealizes that civil operations, based offofculturalunderstanding, area vital front towards denying the insurgencythe criticalpopular supportrequired to sustaintheiroperations. In orderto affect positivelonglasting change, we have to be able to understandthecurrent culturalframework so thatwe mayinfluencechanges to thatculturein a meaningful wayand, often, invery subtle manners towards strategic goals. Thefinal metrics thatwill determineifwe are successfulin usingculturalknowledge and understanding will be determinedbyestablishing andmaintaining meaningfulcommunicationwitha group ofpeoplethathold onto an historicallydifferentvalue systemandminimizethe effects ofnaturalculture friction points betweenthehostnation's norms and ourown. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. IN"TRODUCTION 1 II. MILITARYAPPLICATION OF CULTURALIN"TELLIGENCE 2 m. MARKETIN"GYOURMESSAGE 4 IV. CULTURALVALUES DEFINED 7 V. PROBLEM STATEMENT 9 VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION 10 A.IN"TRODUCTION OFSOLUTION 10 ,~ B.APPLICATIONOFSOLUTION 11 VII. CASESTUDy 15 vm. CONCLUSION 19 IX. APPENDICES 21 A.STRUCTUREDBELIEFS MODEL 21 -, B.NOTES 22 C. BIB-LIOGRAPHY 24 I J I " I. INTRODUCTION In allcultures there existintrinsic values with varied degrees ofemotional ties. Itis through these values thatpeopleidentifythemselves, guide their actions, andperceivetheworld around them. Thevalue systemofany group ofpeople derives frombothformal andinformal pressures andis specific to thatgroup people. Understanding the priorities, theirdegree of significance, andtheirrelationship to the dynamics ofaregion would enable U.S. militaryforces to bemorelucidofouractions inthecontextofourenvironment andreduce the unintended ,'. .::. consequences. Thequestion thenbecomes, how do we access culturalvalues andpresentthe informationinaneasilyunderstandable format? Priorto deploying overseas, amilitaryunit receives information onthecountries and regions that theywillbe entering. Theinformation comes from countryhandbooks, CIAcountryfact book, independent study, professionalreading, andfromregionalexperts. Thequantity ofinformation canbe daunting to the averageperson andfiltering the informationto makeitmeaningful to the average militarypersonnelis difficult atbest. Inorder to distill the information andpresentitin ausablefashion to operationalunits, we canemploya model thatgrades the mostimportantaspect ofa cultureandpresents thefinding in a graphical representation. Thepurposeis to conducta qualitativeanalysis ofthe cultureand highlight possiblefriction points when takeninconjunction with ourownvalue system. In addition, the model shouldbeflexible enoughto change as informationis gathered andrefined to a granular levelto more specific groups ofpeople (i.e. sub-regions, cities, ethnic groups, orreligious groups). Ifyou want to know someone, you have to know whatis importantto thatperson. Ifyou c' wantto know how to interactwith thatperson, then you mustbe ableto compareyourvalues to 1 thatperson's values. Theseideas apply to personalrelationships as well as diplomatic relationships between sovereignnations and should beleveragedto assistwith establishingbetter workingrelationships with ourallies as well as civilianpopulations, enemies, and those who have yetto takesides. Onlythroughthe use ofa detailedrepeatablemethodology canwe accuratelybaselinethe value systemofany given region andmakeituseful to operational commanders onthe scene as itapplies to thehuman terrain ofhis battlespace. In the 1940's Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, one section specificallystates that we mustbemindful of threefundamental considerations: 1. Social customs suchas class distinctions, dress, andsimilaritems shouldbe recognizedand receive due consideration. 2. Politicalaffiliations orthe appearance ofpoliticalfavoritism shouldbe avoided; while a thorough knowledge ofthepoliticalsituation is essential, a strictneutrality in such mattersshouldbe observed. 3. [A] respectfor religious customs.1 Theunderliningrequirements inthe SmallWars Manualoutlines the need for theUS Military units to gain a familiarity andrespect ofthelocal culture- t<;> includethelanguage, political and social structure, andeconomic factors- in orderto preventunintentionally creating ahostile environmentandto methodicallypromote "thespiritofgood Will.,,2 II. MILITARY APPLICATION OF CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE CounterinsurgencyFM 3-24expands upon thepremise ofcultural applicationby stating that"CivilConsiderations" is anessentialpartofthe IntelligencePreparation ofthe Battlefield andis "critical to the success ofoperations.,,3 Although the cultural aspectofoperational 2 preparationis now becoming astandardinplanning, itis evenmore vitalin respect to Counterinsurgency operations whereinfluence ofthe masses will ultimate achieve victory or resultin defeat. Themanual specificallycalls outsix "socio-cultural"factors thatshouldbe analyzed to geta clearerpicture ofthepeoplein yourAreaofOperation: society, social structure, culture, language, power, authority, andinterests.4 As weconductourin depthcultural analysis, itis inevitablethat we will discovercertain aspects thataremoreprominent and influential in a givenculture. Societies are builtoffof political authority, territory, and sharedidentitywith varieddegrees ofimportance. By assigning numericalvalues to the critical aspects, wecanbeginto quicklydifferentiate culturalvariations within the sameregion. This would apply to social structures that are created as aresultof tribes, religion, nationality, and ethnicidentity.5 Even amongstcoalitionpartners thatspeakthe samelanguage, cultural differences can affectoperations andrelationships in significantmanners. DuringWWII, the British and American soldiers experienced a greatdeal offriction overperceivedcultural insensitivities, suchas the waytheyspoketo eachotherorthey waytheyinteractedwith members ofthe opposite sex from differentnationalities. Ina study of"TheApplicationofAnthropologyto Cross National Communications", DrMeade discovered differences inchildrearing that 6 manifestedthemselvesin adulthoodthrough themannerinwhichwecommunicate. Although the British andAmericans sharedthe ideal that the strong are obligatedto help the weak, they developedmisconceptions ofeach otherdue to moreand less aggressivemethods of communication. Theinterpretationwas the Americans likedto 'boast' and the British were 'arrogant'. We sharedthe same goals inthe warandmanycommon culturalvalues butlearned habits from childhoodtranslatedinto communicationgaps thatresultedinmisplaced animosity.7 3 Theideaisto evaluatehow amemberofa culturalgroup sees himself, whatis important to him and consideritwhen developing ouroperational objectives, goals, and the methods we use to achieve them. The wayitis definedbythe United States Marine Corps' Operational Culturefor the Warfightermanualis that Operational Cultureis "Thoseaspects ofculture that influence the outcome ofamilitary operation; conversely, the military actions thatinfluencethe culture ofan areaofoperation."g Thefruit ofthis type ofresearchis ultimately an increaseinthe quality andeffectiveness ofourcommunications with various competing groups ofpeoplein any given areaofoperation. III. MARKETING YOUR MESSAGE Whencommercialindustries markettheirproducts overseas, they complete a comprehensive studyto aid themin sendingthe correctmessage to specificparts ofthe world. Theyunderstand that amessage thatresonates wellinthe U.S. may nothave the same effectin a different culture. As aresult, theyunderstand that thedifferencebetween success and failure is determinedin largepartbythe way they market theirproductto appeal to the unique local perception as itrelates to theirculture. Wein the military have amessage thatwe often want to conveyto unfamiliarpeople. Theeffectiveness oftransferringourmessage canlikewisebe equatedto operational success orfailure. An example takenfrom thecommercial sector canbe takenfrom Chrysler's campaign to marketthe JeepinFrance and Germany. The companyhiredacultural anthropologistbythe nameofDr. ClotaireRapaille to conductresearch andmakerecommendations to guidethemin this area. Duringthe course ofhis research, he used amodel know as the "CultureCode" to assisthim. Theideaof"thecode" was to be able to determinethree things: 1) how we see f;. 4