DTIC ADA490846: The Long War Concept: Using the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force to Address Irregular Threats through Shaping and Deterrence

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UnitedStates Marine Corps
CommandandStaffCollege
Marine Corps University
2076South Street
Marine Corps CombatDevelopmentCommand
Quantico Virginia 22134-5068
MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES
TheLongWar Concept: Using the Security CooperationMarineAir Ground Task Force
to Address IrregularThreats through Shapingand Deterrence
SubmittedinPartial Fulfillment ofthe Requirementfor
theDegree ofMasterofMilitaryStudies
Author: MajorThomas Ziegler, USMC
AY 07-08
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Mentorand OralDefens1llo=:e R. L. DiNardo
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Mentorand O~enseCommitteeMember: LtColR. L. Morin
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2008 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008
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The Long War Concept: Using the Security Cooperation Marine Air
5b. GRANT NUMBER
Ground Task Force to Address Irregular Threats through Shaping and
Deterrence 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
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United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps REPORT NUMBER
Combat Development Command,Marine Corps University 2076 South
Street,Quantico,VA,22134-5068
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: TheLong WarConcept: Using Security CooperationMarineAir Ground TaskForces to
Address IrregularThreatsthrough Shapingand Deterrence
Author: MajorThomas Ziegler, USMC
Thesis: Security cooperationis avalidandrelevant concept, andthe security cooperation
MarineAir GroundTaskForce (SC MAGTF) givesthe Marine Corpsthe capabilityto address
thechallenge ofbuilding and sustainingpartner security capacityto assistincounteringthe
challenge ofthe LongWar.
Discussion: As thenationcomesto gripswiththemomentous taskofcombatingterrorismand
otherirregularthreatsinthe LongWar, itmustcontinually asses the effectiveness offoreign
policy, and especiallythe employmentofmilitaryforce. Securitycooperation, aimedatbuilding
partnernation's securitycapacity, is quickly becomingan attractive alternativeto directmilitary
force for combatingthe causalfactors ofglobal instability,terrorism, irregularthreats. Security
cooperationefforts canenabletheframework forprovidinganinternationalresponse to these
emerging globalthreatsthatthe LongWarwill bring. TheMarine Corps is currentlypoisedto
increase security cooperationandacceptsecuritycooperationas a deliberatemission. The
Marine Corps creationofanewunit, the Security CooperationMarine Air Ground TaskForce
(SCMAGTF) will be aneffectivemeanstoprojectforce and conduct security cooperation
efforts. This paperwillexplainthe nature ofthe Long Warandhowsecuritycooperationcan
counterirregularthreatsbyhelping to reduce ungoverned spaces. Itwill explainhowthe Marine
Corps iswell suitedto conduct security cooperationoperations andhowthe employmentofthe
SCMAGTF canbe aneffectivemeansfor conducting security cooperation.
Conclusion: Securitycooperationis avalidconceptto counterthe irregularthreats the nation
nowfaces inthe LongWar. TheMarine Corpsneedsto increase security cooperationefforts and
embrace effortsto reduce causal factors ofinstability andterrorism. Theadoptionand
employmentofthe SCMAGTFisthe Marine Corpsbestopportunityto provide effective
security cooperation.
I. DISCLAIMER
THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREINARE THOSE OF THE
INDIVIDUAL STUDENTAUTHORAND DONOT THIS NECESSARILYREPRESENT
THEVIEWS OF YOU THEMARINE CORPS COMMANDAND STAFF COLLEGE OR
ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTALAGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDYSHOULD
INCLUDE THEFOREGOING STATEMENT.
QUOTATIONFROM, ABSTRACTIONFROM, ORREPRODUCTION OFALL ORANY
PART OF THIS DOCUMENTIS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER
ACKNOWLEDGMENT IS MADE
1
II. Table ofContents
I. DISCLAIMER
1
II. TABLE OF CONTENTS
11
III. INTRODUCTION 1
IV. THEPREDOMINANTIRREGULARTHREAT 2
V. IS SECURITYCOOPERATIONA VALID CONCEPT TO
COUNTERIRREGULARTHREATS? 4
VI. REDUCINGUNGOVERNED SPACES THROUGH SECURITYCOOPERATION 7
VII. SECURITYCOOPERATIONSUCCESS INRECENTHISTORY 8
VIII. SHOULD THEMARINE CORPS ADOPT SECURITY
COOPERATIONAS A CONCEPT? 11
IX. THEDESIGN OFTHE SECURITYCOOPERATIONMAGTF 12
X. SCMAGTF CAPABITIES, OBSTACLES,AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15
XI. CONCLUSIONS 20
XII. APPENDIX 1FIGURE 1 23
XIII. APPENDIX2FIGURE 2 24
XIV. APPENDIX3: FIGURE 3 25
XV. BIBLIOGRAPHY 26
XVI. NOTES 27
ii
"We willdeny sponsorship, supportandsanctuaryto terrorists byensuringotherstates accept
theirresponsibilities to take action againstthese internationalthreatswithin theirsovereign
territory...We willdiminish the underlyingconditions thatterroristseekto exploitbyenlisting
the internationalcommunitytofocus its efforts andresources on the areas mostatrisk..."
-National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
III. Introduction
InfluentialmilitarytheoristCarlVonClausewitzpositsthatthe supremeactofjudgmentfor
the statesmenandcommanderisto understand the kind ofwaronwhichthe nationis embarking.
Thenationis currently engagedinwhathas been calledthe LongWar. This conflictwill most
likely spandecades asAmericaandits allies battleto defeatIslamic extremismandtheideology
thatfuels it. Nearlya decade sincethe attacks of9/11, thenationas awhole is beginningto
understandthe characterofthis struggle and is reorientingand adapting to face the challenges.
The emerging characteristic ofTheLongWaris anincrease inthe number ofirregularthreats,
particularlyradical, ormilitant, Islamicterrorismaimedatdestabilizingthe currentwor1<;l order.
Post 9/11 events servetohighlightthe limitations oftraditional military solutions to counter
irregularthreats andforced thenationto develop abetterstrategyforthe applicationofmilitary
power. One solutioninthis transformationofstrategy, outlinedinthe 2006NationalSecurity
Strategy ofthe UnitedStates (NBS) and inthe 2005NationalDefense Strategy (NDS), isto
maximizeglobalteamworkbybolsteringthe security efforts ofallies andpartnersthrough
securitycooperation.i
Bothofthe previouslymentioneddocuments provide guidanceto eachbranchofthe military
to increase security cooperationefforts. To addressthis direction, the Marine Corpspublished a
Long War conceptintwo seminal conceptpapers, Marine Corps OperatingConceptsfor a
ChangingSecurityEnvironmentandSendin the Marines: A Marine Corps Operational
EmploymentConceptto Meetan UncertainSecurityEnvironment. ii Thesetwo Marine concept
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papers forecast arenewedimportanceinsecurity cooperationto counterirregularthreats, and the
creationofaneworganizationwithinthe deploymentcycle, the Security CooperationMarineAir
Ground TaskForce (SCMAGTF).
This paperwillanswerthree questions. First: Is securitycooperationa valid conceptto face
today's irregular challenges? Second: ShouldtheMarine Corps adopt security cooperationas a
Mission? And, third: Isthe Marine Corps concept ofthe Security CooperationMarineAir
ground TaskForce (SCMAGTF)aneffectivemeansto conduct security cooperationefforts? To
answerthese questions, this paperwill ftrst explainthe irregularnature ofthe LongWarandhow
security cooperationcancounterirregularthreats byhelpingtoreduce ungovernedspaces. Then,
the paperwillhighlightsomerecent examples ofsecuritycooperation successes. Finally, this
paperwill explainhowthe Marine Corpsis suitedto conductsecurity cooperation operations and
howthe employmentofthe SCMAGTF canbe an effectivemeans for conductingsecurity
cooperation. Ultimately, this paperintendsto provethat Security Cooperationis a valid concept
to counterirregularthreats, ~hatthe Marine Corps shouldincrease security cooperationefforts,
andthatthe SCMAGTF gives the Marine Corpsthe capabilityto addressthe challenge of
buildingpartnersecuritycapacityto assistincounteringthe challenges ofthe LongWar
IV. ThePredominateIrregularThreat
TheLong Warwillbeanirregularwaragainstenemieswho cannotbe defeatedsolelyby
conventional combatpower. AlongwiththethreatofIslamicterrorism, thereisthe ever-present
potentialfor conventional conflict,humanitariancrisis,natural disaster, andthe growingmenace
ofweapons ofmass destruction. Whenmixedtogetherthesethreats create avolatile security
environmentthatis bothdaunting anduncertain.iii This uncertaintypresents a dilemmafor how
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the Marines Corps shouldprepareto confronta growingirregular challengewhile maintainingits
competitive edge as theworld's premier expeditionarywarfighting force.
Irregularmethods makesensefor enemies ofthe United States. These enemies
understandthevalue ofasymmetric strategywhendealingwiththe overwhelming conventional
combatpowerofthe United Statesmilitary.iv Conventional applications ofcombatpowercan
be counterproductive againstthese irregularenemieswho canoftenbe difficultto locate and
impossibletopattern. Marineforces mustcontinueto adaptto theseirregularenemieswho will
shrewdly evolveto capitalize onanyweakness andavoidany strength.
Theirregularthreatisinmanywaysvery differentfromthe enemiesthe Marine Corps
trainedto fight inthepre-9/11 era. Pre-9/11 trainingfocused onnation state enemies fighting
with staticuniformedarmies. These enemieswere predictable, homogenous, rigid, hierarchical,
and slowto change. The currentirregularthreatis dynamic, unpredictable, diverse, fluid,
networked, andconstantly andrapidly evolving. Today'sreal enemies includehostile or
potentiallyhostile states,transnationalterrorists, organizedcrime affiliates, drugtraffickers, and
insurgents embitteredandmotivatedby long-standingreligious, ethnic, ortribal conflicts.v
Theinterdependence ofterroristand criminal organizationsiswell developedandnotyet
fully understood. For example, insurgency, terrorism, and drugtrade oftenworktogetherina
"symbioticrelationship", forming anetworkofillegal and destabilizingactivity. vi Principal
amongtheseirregularterroristthreats ismilitantIslam. TheNational Security Strategyofthe
United States ofAmerica (NBS) identifiesterrorism, specificallyIslamicterrorism, as,the
principal irregularthereatfacingthe United States and"the enemy" inthe LongWar.vii
Counteringirregular enemies, especiallyterroristnetworks, canbe difficult using
conventionalapplications ofmilitaryforce, suchasrelying solelyonkilling orcapturinghigh
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valueterrorists. First, actualterrorists and international criminalshaveprovendifficultto
viii
locate. Terroristnetworks canconcentratepowerwhere andwhenneeded, and thenrapidly
disperse for survivability. A strategy ofkillingor capturingterrorists hasproven only
marginally effectiveinreducingthethreatofterrorismaroundtheworld.ix Inmany cases,
militaryforce canunderminethe overall strategic objective. Directmilitary force canoftenhave
unforeseenrepercussions aswell. Foreignpolicythatrelies too heavily onmilitaryforce can
makeAmericaappearto be aheavyhandedoppressorandfail to address the causes and support
ofterroristorganizations. A strategyofkill orcapture canalso indirectlyassistthe improvement
ofterroristorganization,by eliminatinglessintelligentterrorists leavingthe smartonesto adapt
andevolvetheirtactics.
Thelimitations ofeffective deterrenceby force andtherealizationofthe environmentin
whichterrorists operatehas ledtheMarine Corpsto develop amodifiedapproachto prevention
andshapingthrough security cooperation. Theseterrorists thriveinungoverned andunder
governed spaces oftheworld. Security cooperationcanreduce ungoverned spaces andindirectly
changethe environmentterrorists needto thrive. Counteringirregularthreats indirectlythrough
security cooperationratherthanrelying mainlyon a ona "killandcapture" strategyis a
promisingconcept.x
V. Is Security Cooperation aValid Conceptto CounterIrregularThreats?
xi
Counteringirregularthreats isthe central securitytaskoftheLongWar. Inthe
precedingpages,thispaperdiscussedthelimitations ofusingconventionalapplicationof
militarypoweras a solemeansto counterirregularthreats andwill nowpresentsecurity
cooperationas abetteralternativeto counterirregularthreats.
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TheDepartmentofDefense definitionfor security cooperationis:
AllDepartmentofDefenseinteractionswithforeign defense establishmentsto
build defense relationships thatpromote specific US security interests, develop alliedand
friendly;militarycapabilitiesfor self-defense andmultinational operations, andprovide
US forces withpeacetimeandcontingencyaccess to ahostnation."xii
Security cooperationaimsto assistAmerica'spartners and allies to contributeto global
securityandthefight againstirregularthreats operatinginandaroundtheir countries. These
treats are commoninweakandfailing statesthataremostthreatenedbyterroristandother
transnationalcriminals andwhoseweakness directlythreatensnotonlythe United States'
security, butalso the openness andprosperity ofall free societies.xiii
Security cooperation, counter-insurgency, foreign internal defense, andtrainingand
advisorymissions seemmuchmorerelevanttodaythan ColdWar-erahigh-intensity operations
the Marine Corpspreparedfor andpracticedpriorto OperationEnduringFreedom. Security
Cooperationaimsto preventsome ofthe conditionsthatcontributeto instability, such as lack of
governance, uncontrolledboarders, andineffectivemilitaryforces. Terroristnetworks andthe
illegal activitythatfunds themthrive inareas wherethereis little orno effective government.
Counteringirregularthreats across the globe is an enormous endeavor. TheUnited States
xiv
does nothavethemanpowerorthe resourcesto conductsuchoperations alone. Concerned
countries andinternational, regional, andsub-regionalorganizationsneedto assume
responsibilityfor peacekeepingandstabiliza,tion.xv Inarecentspeech, President George W.
Bushannouncedthetime of"paternalism"inU.S. foreignpolicyis over. Americanforeign aid
to troubled countries is an"investmentandnota donation."xvi The president's commentsmay
reflectyears ofspendingwithlittleprogress orsecurityimprovementinplaces likeAfrica.
Security cooperationis amore directwayto assistcountries inmanagingtheir ownsecurity
5