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Crisis in the Acquisition OWPorIkNfIoOrcNe: Some Simple Solutions CRISIS IN THE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE: SOME SIMPLE SOLUTIONS James H. Gill The military acquisition system is facing a crisis of significant proportions, with the imminent loss, through retirement and attrition, of a substantial portion of its experienced workforce, which is responsible for the development, production, and deployment of new weapons. Implications for vital national security issues, for both the near and long term, are serious. The potential inability of the acquisition process to provide quality weapons in a timely manner and at a reasonable price should be disturbing to senior leaders within the Department of Defense (DoD). What can be done about the potential loss of this acquisition leadership? Here are some creative approaches, although they will require bucking entrenched bureaucracies to implement, that could resolve the current shortfall and prevent future ones. T he acquisition workforce is aging. specialized civilian workforce. This is a “given” and has been doc- Further, 50 percent will be eli- umented by the Acquisition 2005 gible to retire by 2005. In some Task Force Final Report: “Shaping the occupations, half of the current Civilian Acquisition Workforce of The employees will be gone by 2006. Future” (2000). The report identifies the problem as follows: This potential loss may or may not have significance on the ability of the Services [DoD] is facing a crisis that can to provide weapons to their customers dramatically affect our Nation’s (i.e., the warfighter), but the potential ability to provide warfighters with implications can’t be ignored. modern weapon systems needed While the composition of the acquisi- to defend our national interests. tion workforce is normally not an issue After 11 consecutive years of that has significance to senior national downsizing, we face serious im- security policy makers, in this instance balances in the skills and experi- they must pay appropriate attention. The ence of our highly talented and quality and the quantity of the civilian 83 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2001 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2001 to 00-00-2001 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Crisis in the Acquisition Workforce: Some Simple Solutions 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Space & Missiles System Center,Launch Programs Office,Los Angeles REPORT NUMBER AFB,CA,90245 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Acquisition Review Quarterly, Summer 2001 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 10 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Acquisition Review Quarterly — Summer 2001 workforce, and the continuation of ca- AN AGING WORKFORCE pable leadership within that discipline, is a critical issue. First, there can be no argument that the National security policy is a truly glam- acquisition workforce is aging. The DoD orous field of study that draws the atten- study released last year acknowledged the tion of the best and the brightest. Acqui- problem and contained recommended sition, especially the acquisition work- changes that would mitigate the conse- force, is less glamorous and usually takes quences of losing a significant portion of a back seat in the discussion of how to the workforce at one time. These changes revitalize the capabilities of the nation’s were divided into three major areas: military to project power in an often unfriendly world. It is certainly highly (cid:127) what we can do immediately; unlikely that the new Presi- (cid:127) what we should start in the near term; “The quality and dent has come and the quantity of the to office with civilian workforce, an agenda that (cid:127) what we need legislative authority to and the continua- includes fixing do. tion of capable a deficient ci- leadership within vilian acquisi- Why is this an issue? Given the fact that that discipline, is a critical issue.” tion workforce within the next 5 years about 50 percent pool. While of the current workforce will be eligible not high on the to retire, there are truly significant conse- agenda, the ability of the acquisition pro- quences to the ability of the acquisition cess to provide critical weapon systems system to provide quality weapon systems in a timely manner can have a serious in good time. How did it happen? During impact upon the ability to accomplish the 1990s, DoD experienced a sizable high-priority, vital national security mis- reduction in the acquisition workforce. sions. The best foreign policy can be held During this reduction, the median age of hostage to an acquisition process that is DoD civilians rose from 41 to 46 years of not able to get weapons to warfighters age. The workforce was reduced by about when they are needed. 35 percent, and the acquisition workforce This article will describe the problem had even greater cuts. The cuts were jus- of an aging acquisition workforce, spe- tified on the basis that acquisition reform cifically those identified in “The Refined would streamline the process and reduce Packard Key Acquisition & Technology the need for business as usual. The reduc- Workforce.(Group IIA Organizations)” tion in the overall workforce was a direct (1999). It will discuss the ramifications result of the end of the Cold War, and the and consequences of failing to remedy the recognition that the United States no problem, and finally, identify viable ini- longer needed (or could afford) to main- tiatives that can mitigate the potential tain a military structure that was created impact of the aging workforce. to respond to a now-absent Soviet threat. From an economic standpoint, as well as 84 Crisis in the Acquisition Workforce: Some Simple Solutions a political one, it was critical that the infrared system, and evolved expendable “defense dividend” would translate into a launch vehicle) require at least that de- significant bonus to the U.S. Treasury. velopment period — even with the implementation of many new “best practices.” There is also a cycle time associated with DOWNSIZING: MILITARY VS. CIVILIAN developing skilled acquisition personnel. This cycle may vary from discipline to Both Presidents George H. W. Bush and discipline, but it is certainly also requires Bill Clinton saw a need to have a reduc- 5 to 10 years. tion in the size of the military. This was a If we are to field a growing number of natural and beneficial consequence to both systems in that period, it seems reason- geopolitical and political forces. The prin- able that either additional people will be cipal differences lay primarily in the use needed, or the processes must be changed of the military and in what areas the to simplify and streamline the acquisition remaining funds would be spent (e.g., system itself. operations and maintenance, procurement, While acquisi- personnel). The ensuing surge in the tion reform has “Both Presidents George H. W. Bush economy and the resultant surplus in the improved these and Bill Clinton saw U.S. Treasury has caused a rethinking of processes, some a need to have a the “correct” sizing of the military. Per- capabilities re- reduction in the size haps some additional funding would be quire time and of the military.” prudent given the way that the military has experience to been used to implement foreign policy absorb. If a sig- during the past 8 years. There is a general nificant portion of the workforce leaves recognition that too many missions have within the next few years, where do we drained much of the morale that was find replacements? Under normal condi- evident at the end of the Persian Gulf War. tions, replacements would come from After witnessing 10 years of down- younger, lower-grade individuals who sizing, a growing number of analysts are would have been hired during the previous positing that we need to provide more 5 to 10 years. funding to improve existing weapon sys- Unfortunately, the civilian portion of tems and develop replacement systems in the DoD took a slightly different approach order to maintain our superpower status. to downsizing than did the military. The If we are to develop and field new weapon military had selective early retirement systems, the acquisition system must have boards, or SERBs, which effectively enough skilled personnel in the acquisi- pruned some less capable individuals from tion workforce. There is a cycle time the military. They then brought on board associated with the development and younger individuals (lieutenants). When production of weapon systems that — the senior members (lieutenant colonels even after several years of reform — does and colonels) retired, the junior officers not allow for less than a 5- to 10-year would have enough experience to replace cycle. The most highly touted systems in them. The use of SERBs was not trouble- the Air Force (F-22, the space-based free. Good officers were asked to retire 85 Acquisition Review Quarterly — Summer 2001 F-22 Raptor Air-Superiority Fighter rolls left before they were ready, and morale suf- candidates to replace those about to leave, fered to an extent. While disruptive, it was and there is inadequate time to train new by most accounts enacted humanely. Pre- ones. vious pruning by DoD during the 1970s saw many career military personnel forced out with no retirement — in some cases FACING THE STAFF SHORTAGE with as many as 18 years of service. The civilian workforce was spared this We now encounter the negative conse- disruption and suffered a much less severe quences of those downsizing decisions. blow to its morale. While there was some There will be too few qualified managers disruption in cases where a base or orga- to keep the system operating effectively nization was closed, there were minimal unless action is taken. What options are reductions in forces. Consequently, the available to policy makers? Incentives to workforce aged as a group, and there was retain individuals eligible for retirement minimal hiring of junior employees to act are one way to mitigate this problem. Un- as replacement parts when the workforce fortunately, this stopgap remedy will not aged and subsequently retired. The civil- succeed over the long term because it fails ian workforce management effectively to address the underlying problem: the postponed the inevitable, kicking the lack of younger workers to maintain can down the line, so to speak. Now they continuity. It would, however, buy some face the reality that there are insufficient time to bring on board replacements, and 86 Crisis in the Acquisition Workforce: Some Simple Solutions ensure that they have training and military life — not dissatisfaction with the experience. work itself. These individuals have a A second recommendation is to retain proven track record and are familiar with employees as potential replacements for the military and the DoD acquisition senior members. Employees leave the fed- system. eral workforce for a number of reasons: The downside to this approach is that Some move to other organizations within we are robbing Peter to pay Paul. Each the federal government and some leave loss of a junior officer takes away a po- for the private sector. Incentives that mo- tential manager that would support the tivate younger employees to stay within same acquisition system. One difficulty DoD would reduce the percentage of with this approach is the competition that departures. exists with the private sector for estab- Some defense contractors have initiated lished, proven performers. Once again, it retention programs to allow them to keep is difficult to compete when the private staff who possess critical skills on pro- sector can pay more and offer additional grams that would otherwise face serious benefits. If the defections. In some cases government economy goes “We need a long- contracts have been rewritten to include into a recession, term solution, but provisions that provide an additional fee this may be a immediate need to contractors who implement employee viable alterna- may force the retention programs (e.g., Titan, Defense tive, but it is Services into Support Program). Since there are cur- risky to depend an interim rently inadequate replacements in the sys- on possible eco- band-aid fix. ” tem, this temporary solution must be ac- nomic down- companied by one that adds qualified in- turns as a strategy to retain these civilians dividuals to the replacement pool. The task as government employees. force recommended several reasonable Another approach would be to enhance initiatives to accomplish these improve- the productivity of those that remain ments. within the acquisition system. Along these Where will the DoD find experienced, lines, the DoD has tried to implement the knowledgeable, trained individuals to re- Acquisition Workforce Demonstration plenish the workforce? One source is the Project. I served on the “train the trainer” private sector. But it is an unlikely one, group for the Space and Missile Systems since DoD can’t offer incentives competi- Center (SMC) as well as on the imple- tive with the private sector (salary, work- mentation team. I was disappointed with ing conditions, retirement benefits, etc.). the lack of support from the unions dur- A second option would be to attract jun- ing the implementation attempt. I believe ior officers leaving the military who have that this approach had some merit, but the requisite experience and training to can’t solve the critical workforce short- step quickly into a Government Service age envisioned for the near term without (GS) position. Some military officers across-the-board support. leave the Services because of family con- The problem is time. We need a long- siderations or dissatisfaction with the term solution, but immediate need may 87 Acquisition Review Quarterly — Summer 2001 force the Services into an interim band- simplified line of management. This aid fix. A source must be found for skilled, would necessitate the creation of private experienced workers ready to eliminate companies prohibited from competing for the shortage now. The greatest need is for business (i.e., the development and qualified managers, but there also is a production of weapon systems). shortfall at the journeyman level. Many Some companies presently have divi- individuals at this grade level also will be sions that are prohibited from competing eligible to retire soon. The staff shortage for business in the specialized arena for will affect many areas. For example, which they provide systems engineering within the contracting field, the ranks will and technical analyses (SETA) support. contain too few negotiators, contracting Others are federally funded research and officers, and staff for various levels of development centers (FFRDCs) such as management. The Aerospace Corporation and MITRE. These companies also provide engineering analyses and technical support to DoD REDEFINING “GOVERNMENT FUNCTION” in support of weapon systems acquisition. Further, they are not prohibited from of- Here are two potential solutions to ex- fering salaries competitive with those of plore. The first and perhaps the most radi- the private sector and can attract and re- cal solution is to redefine the meaning of tain highly skilled technical people who an inherently governmental function into would not be available to the government. the most narrow sense. The traditional in- Given the opportunity, these companies terpretation has contributed to the creation (among many others) could provide the of a sizable bureaucracy for the acquisi- services necessary to contract for the de- tion of weapon systems. It encompasses, velopment and production of weapons among others, program managers, con- systems — and some would say at a more tracting spe- reasonable price than today’s federal ac- cialists, and fi- quisition bureaucracy. This would truly be “There will be nancial man- a radical approach, requiring buy-in from too few qualified agers. NASA Congress. It would also require a period managers to keep uses a more of overlap during which pilot programs the system operat- narrow inter- were evaluated, and potential problems ing effectively pretation that were identified and resolved. Politically, unless action is allows it to hire there would be resistance from unions and taken.” private compa- other groups within the bureaucracy. nies to do a While offering a promising alternative, significant amount of the work currently this approach is highly unlikely given the done by civilians and military in the DoD. vested interests allied against it. Unless If the acquisition role was defined to mean there were substantial and dramatic fail- that of the program manager and the ures in the existing system, one cannot contracting officer, then a large portion expect such a revolutionary change to be of the associated bureaucracy would be- implemented. And it is neither prudent nor come obsolete, and there could be a more proactive to rely upon a policy based upon 88 Crisis in the Acquisition Workforce: Some Simple Solutions the need for a major failure before a because they would not be civil servants solution is implemented. and would not have the benefits and pro- tections that accompany such standing. They could be brought in on a very selec- A THREE-PART PLAN tive basis, giving management the needed flexibility to put out fires as they occur. Perhaps a more evolutionary approach The federal unions will no doubt resist this would be a three-pronged attack on the initiative. problem: The second prong would be to identify and hire individuals retiring or separating (cid:127) Implement financial incentives aimed from the military with critical skills. Spe- at retaining older workers. cial hiring criteria could be used to attract individuals from the private sector. Man- (cid:127) Recruit recently retired workers. agement could reduce bureaucracy by reducing inher- (cid:127) Institute a recruitment program aimed ently govern- at college students. mental roles “Perhaps a and contracting better synergy could come from The first prong would be to implement out those that the creation of a financial incentives to retain individuals don’t meet the business manage- eligible to retire soon. Incentives could revised criteria. ment development include increased salary, bonuses, addi- For example, program within tional time off, better funded educational the Air Force the military opportunities, scholarships for depen- could imple- academies….” dents, free space-A travel on military ment the NASA flights, and improved retirement pay and interpretation benefits for those staying on. The best and contract out contract specialist approach would be to bring in a manage- (buyer), contract analyst, and procurement ment analysis team to survey the targeted clerk positions. This would obviate the employees, discern what incentives would impact when buyer is promoted to con- be effective, and implement the most tracting officer. Other positions — such feasible ones. as financial analysts and even some project Along with this initiative, outreach officers — could fall into this category. should be made to recently retired indi- The third prong would require a some- viduals, providing them with exemptions what radical approach to the traditional from “double dipping” civil service rules. hiring practices of the DoD. Currently, Special groups could be hired as consult- there are intern programs that offer recent ants to work high-profile acquisitions, college graduates the training and experi- bringing to bear their extensive experience ence to get to the journeyman-level and capabilities. This would give them the position. Starting at the GS 5 or 7 grade, freedom to choose projects and decide they are rotated through various offices how many hours per week to spend upon and sent to acquisition training. A supple- them. This approach would save money, ment or an alternative to this somewhat 89 Acquisition Review Quarterly — Summer 2001 shotgun approach would begin even ear- development program within the military lier, and implement a program similar to academies, which would graduate acqui- the military’s Reserve Officer Training sition professionals rather than military Corps (ROTC). It could offer college tu- professionals. This is a truly radical pro- ition at appropriate participating univer- posal and would most likely be resisted sities to individuals willing to commit to by the military. The curriculum could be 4 to 6 years in the DoD acquisition sys- established by the existing Defense tem. Based upon the ROTC, it would Acquisition University and implemented provide training in DoD weapons acqui- by the Service academies (West Point, sition in addition to the regular curricu- Annapolis, and Air Force). The respective lum. A summer tour at a system center universities already have a business man- would provide additional resources, plus agement degree program that could be a head start on candidates’ eventual careers expanded to include several squadrons of with the DoD. Some would take the civilian cadets. These cadets would not be education and leave; some would stay as military cadets but rather acquisition career employees. cadets. In theory, this enhanced skill level The benefit to the creation of such a would contribute to a better, faster, subgroup within the academies would be cheaper acqui- to take advantage of an existing problem sition system, — the underutilization of the academies “By bringing to- helping reduce as they are currently staffed. The acad- gether acquisition the total over- emies were originally structured to turn and military all cost for ac- out a greater number of graduates than are students, one quisition per- required in the downsized military. Given would facilitate the appreciation sonnel. These the size of the current graduation classes, of military values individuals, the academies could accommodate an and traditions similar to the increase of several squadrons, with no not duplicated at graduates of impact to the quality of education. The other civilian the military new cadets (acquisition) would merely fill universities.” service acad- space that already exists. These cadets emies, would would be appointed similarly to the mili- form the foundation of the acquisition tary ones, and have many of the same corps, and would form the core group of duties and responsibilities. They would future leaders within the acquisition have the same honor code and the same workforce. The government would exert intramural and intercollegiate sports additional quality control over the curricu- opportunities. lum and the mix of courses in which these Special consideration could be given students would matriculate. Obviously, to those physically challenged in some this would only provide a pipeline for way. Also, it would be easier to attract can- those critical fields of study that are pro- didates if the carrot were the possibility jected to be in high demand in the future. of a fast track within the government or Perhaps a better synergy could come from training for future employment opportu- the creation of a business management nities in the private sector (e.g., with major 90 Crisis in the Acquisition Workforce: Some Simple Solutions DoD contractors such as Boeing or spend their summers on assignment with Lockheed Martin). Along with the com- military acquisition organizations in order mitment to work 4–6 years in the acquisi- to help with their assimilation after col- tion workforce, there could be some in- lege. They would be for all intents and centives to motivate retention, such as purposes fellow cadets, the difference guaranteed promotion within the GS would become apparent only at gradua- workforce. It would be reasonable to ex- tion when one group would become mili- pect that the career track to senior execu- tary officers while the other would enter tive service would be similar to that of the the civil service with a commitment. general officer for military cadets. A 20- year retirement option could be offered to those who enroll in the acquisition CONCLUSION program. By bringing together acquisition and There is a consensus within the military students, one would facilitate the acquisition community that a crisis in the appreciation of military values and tradi- civilian workforce looms. It will take cre- tions not duplicated at other civilian uni- ative and forward thinking to solve this versities. This would contribute to the as- problem before it prevents the acquisition similation of the acquisition graduates into community from providing quality the DoD environment. One of the more weapon systems to our military services difficult issues with regard to DoD senior in a timely manner. It is possible that, as executives is the lack of a military back- with most bureaucracies, the acquisition ground that assists them in relating to their community will resist change until the military counterparts. This program would consequences are so dramatic that they facilitate the working relationships that cannot. The consequences of waiting, would begin during their college years. however, may be the degradation of the Acquisition cadets could take electives in warfighter’s ability to fight and win a war. military science courses. They could also James H. Gill is currently the deputy chief of contracts for the Launch Programs Office at the Space and Missile Systems Center at Los Angeles Air Force Base, CA. Gill was an officer in the U.S. Air Force for 7 years. He has a master’s degree in defense and strategic studies from the University of Southern California. Gill was previously recognized as the Outstanding Civilian in Systems and Science and Technology Contracting by the Air Force. ([email protected]) 91