DTIC ADA456065: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Defense & Arms Control Studies Program

37 Pages·3 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

M A S S A C H U S E T T S INS T I T U T E OF T E C H N O L O G Y
Defense Arms
*
Control Studies
Program
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1. REPORT DATE 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED
1996 N/A -
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology Defense & Arms Control Studies
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Program
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Security Studies Program Massachusetts Institute of Technology 292 REPORT NUMBER
Main Street (E38-600) Cambridge, MA 02139
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a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE SAR 36
unclassified unclassified unclassified
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
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CONTENTS
4 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
12 FACULTY
i6 WORKING GROUPS
i8 SEMINARS
2I SELECTED PUBLICATIONS
23 PROGRAM PUBLICATIONS
24 CONFERENCES AND SYMPOSIA
26 TEACHING
29 DEGREE RECIPIENTS
29 GRADUATE STUDENTS
3I VISITORS
35 ROSTER
Cover: Statue of GeneralJoseph Hooker, Commanding General of the Union Forces in 1863.
The statue was commissioned by the Commonwealth ofMassachusetts and is located at the
Massachusetts State House. Sculptor Daniel ChesterF rench modeled the figure of General
Hooker; the horse was modeled by animals tatue specialist, Edward Clark Potter. The unveiling
ceremony held on June 25, 1904, drew one of the largestpublicg atherings in Boston to date.
Photo: Boston Globe
DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL STUDIES PROGRAM
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
292 Main Street (E38-603)
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
TEL [phone]
FAX [phone]
DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL
STUDIES PROGRAM
he Defense and Arms Control Studies (DACS) Program is a graduate-level research and
educational program based at the MIT Center for International Studies. It traces its ori-
gins to two initiatives. One is the teaching on international security topics, and most par-
ticularly on defense budgeting, that Professor William Kaufmann began in the I96os in the MIT
Political Science Department. The other is the MIT-wide seminars on nuclear weapons and arms
control policy that Professor Jack Ruina and Professor George Rathjens created in the mid I970s.
The Program's teaching ties are primarily, but not exclusively, with the Political Science
Department at MIT. The DACS faculty, however, includes natural scientists and engineers as well
as social scientists. Distinguishing the Program is its ability to integrate technical and political
analyses in studies of international security issues.
Several of the DACS faculty members have had extensive government experience. They and the
other Program faculty advise or comment frequently on current policy problems. But the
Program's prime task is educating those young men and women who will be the next generation of
scholars and practitioners in international security policy making. The Program's research and
public service activities necessarily complement that effort.
The Center for International Studies is a major unit of the School of Humanities and Social
Sciences at MIT and seeks to encourage the analysis of issues of continuing public concern. Key
components of the Center in addition to DACS are Seminar XXI, which offers training in the
analysis of international issues for senior military officers, government officials, and industry exec-
utives; and the MIT Japan Program, which conducts research and educational activities to further
knowledge about Japanese technology, economic activities, and politics.
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DIRECTOR' S STATEMENT
OVERVIEW
y colleagues and I are often asked to identify the strategy the United States should adopt
now that the Cold War has become a fast fading memory. What guidance can we offer
those in government who formulate national policy? For what wars should American
forces prepare? How should defense firms think about their futures? Will Russia reemerge soon as a threat
to international stability? What about China's growing power? Will we be involved in more Bosnias and
Haitis or was our withdrawal from Somalia the start of a trend toward isolationism? How big should the
defense budget be and what should be its strategic and technological focus?
We each have cogent answers for all of these questions and occasionally even agree among ourselves. Of
course, in providing our answers we often resort to the standard academic hedge - on the one hand this
is possible and on the other that. And the record on our ability to predict the future is slightly marred by
our collective inability to foresee the happy end of the Cold War, the public's rejection of George Bush so
soon after his Gulf War triumph, and the deployment of American ground forces to Bosnia.
What I believe we are especially good at is framing issues, not prescribing policies, when the security
future is the subject. Life is full of the unexpected - favorable and trying events that both tempt and test
us. How we react to the temptations and challenges should be without surprise. By mapping the options,
the frameworks we offer help decision makers avoid the confusion that surprise events often produce.
Barry Posen in several excellent publications has outlined well America's grand strategy options. They are
what he calls Primacy, Cooperative Security, Selective Engagement, and Restraint. Among us are articu-
late advocates for all of these strategies save perhaps Primacy, and even then such advocates are not more
than one or two subway stops away. Primacy is a post-Cold War Pax Americana where America makes
certain no rival emerges to challenge our power. Cooperative Security is the modern expression of
Wilsonianism where America the Good leads coalitions of like-minded nations to protect and expand
democracy. Selective Engagement is the strategy where America follows realist principles in choosing
when and against whom to do battle. And Restraint is a nice way to say America is quite secure and
should stay home rather than to patrol the world as its unelected guardian, underpaid policeman or
pushy balancer. Barry describes the policy boundaries and force requirements for each of these strategies.
The rest of the DACS faculty have framing contributions to make as well. Steve Van Evera has examined
the efficacy of past U.S. interventions to determine when intervention works best. In his view, interven-
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Ambulances fom the British contingent of UNPROFOR drive through Vukovar, Croatia,J uly 1992.
tion is always a difficult venture, but the more it leans toward domestic political engineering the less like-
ly it is to succeed. Carl Kaysen and George Rathjens, who have led a very popular DACS Working
Group on Post-Cold War policies, have described in some detail the military and political requirements
for a standby international intervention force, another option to consider. The hope is that with such a
force interventions can occur early enough to stop a crisis from spiraling out of control.
Prevention may be the only reasonable option when it comes to the effort to control the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. Marvin Miller, a leading nonproliferation expert, has been examining the
opportunities for what might be called "deep prevention," international restrictions on the access to
advanced education in sensitive fields by citizens of nations likely seeking weapons of mass destruction
capabilities. Here one norm - prevention - bumps into another - open universities and the free
exchange of ideas.
When prevention does not work, thought often turns toward defenses. Our Technology Working Group,
led by Ted Postol and George Lewis, has been at the forefront in defining the boundaries for effective
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DIRECTOR'S
STATEMENT
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The aluminum bridge to a post-Cold War strategy.
defenses, and, most particularly, the boundaries for leakage out of Russia of nuclear weapons materials
theater ballistic missile defense. The implications and talent, but even here the harms are easier to
of the development of defensive systems for the imagine than to identify.
ABM Treaty and for U.S. relations with the major
nuclear nations, including allies, has also been a National strategy in practice is neither exclusive
focus for the group's work as it has been for Jack nor fixed. The United States is a big, complex
Ruina's research and commentary. country with a governmental structure that is
intentionally divided and conveniently porous to
The Soviet Union may have collapsed, but some organized interests. Containment was our main
still worry about a resurgent Russia, which would strategy toward the Soviet Union during the Cold
seek first the protection of Russians caught in the War, but there was also some mix in the brew of a
outer circle of the old Soviet empire and then set- rollback strategy where we occasionally pressed
tle scores with its former client states and the West. hard against Soviet borders, and a detente strategy
Stephen Meyer, our expert on the Russian military, where we hoped to induce a cooperative relation-
believes the disruptions that resulted from the col- ship to develop. The spirit of anti-Communism
lapse make the resurgent scenario a very distant ebbed and flowed during the long conflict with the
possibility. The greater danger may come from the Soviet Union. I must confess that I am not sure
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what the last 25 years of the Cold War was all casualties dominates our interventions. American
about. We did, after all, have a very secure second troops in Bosnia refer to themselves as the
strike capability by the mid to late 1960s. "Prisoners of Peace" and "Ninja Turtles." They
consider themselves to be prisoners of peace
The defense budget reflects the implementation of because they are restricted to base when not on
national strategies, but other factors as well. duty. They are strictly forbidden from mixing with
Obviously, there are regional economic needs to the locals. And they consider themselves to be
consider in formulating defense budgets. It is also Ninja Turtles because they must wear body armor
necessary to remember that several politically when on patrol, back and front ceramic plates car-
important industries are heavily dependant upon ried in battle vests. No one goes anywhere alone.
defense expenditures for their survival. And each Rather movement is always in large, monitored
of the armed services has powerful incentives to convoys with armor, artillery, and tactical air sup-
influence the defense budget given that the budget port on call. They are so restricted and protected
determines their relative opportunities. During the that as one recent study pointed out, they suffer
Cold War we had a relatively coherent strategy and fewer injuries and illnesses than garrison troops
big defense budgets. Today we have strategic con- back home.
fusion and big defense budgets. National strategy
is only part of the budget equation - and a Thus assuming both that we continue to explore
declining part at that. new missions and that we keep the defense budget
at or near the level it was at the low point of the
Recognizing that budgets are built in large part Cold War, we will focus on force projection, preci-
independently of strategy gives us, I believe, a new sion strike and nonlethal weapon options.
way to understand America's post-Cold War Avoiding casualties - ours, theirs, civilians, oppo-
options. If one adds to the analysis the debate over nent military - will be the requirement so as to
new missions for American forces - the debate keep public support for new mission ventures.
about the desirability of intervening abroad for And this means a concern for ways to do things to
humanitarian relief, and/or the expansion of hurt only the most obvious of bad guys. A bolt of
democracy - then one has a basis for a twofold lightning is a good symbol of this happy state.
table that would provide guidance for policy mak-
ers. In keeping with the great Boston consulting But now assume that the money for the
tradition, each box has a silly symbol to make Department of Defense starts to dry up, that
remembering its lesson easier for non-Bostonians. Medicare and Medicaid are not to be touched and
that taxes are not to be raised, yet we continue to
Like several of my colleagues, I have been absorbed pursue the new missions - saving failing nations,
by the effort to understand the military implica- and attempting to stop intergroup conflict around
tions of a strategy based on the new missions. the world. In this case we will search harder for
There can be no doubt by now that the fear of substitutes for American troops. Not only will we
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want to avoid Americans becoming casualties, but Cheney, recently Secretary of Defense, is the Chief
we will want to save money also. This means doing Executive Officer of Brown & Root's parent cor-
more with contractors, replacing as many poration, and Brown & Root holds the logistics
American support troops and even combat troops support contract for Haiti and Bosnia.
DIRECTOR'S with locals, allies or hired guns as possible.
STATEM E NT Contracting out may not in fact save much It is possible, of course, that the budget will stay
money, but it does give the potential to dispense large, but that new missions will fall from favor. A
with pensions, health care and stand-by manning Haiti, Bosnia or a Rwanda can easily lead into an
costs. With the budget threatened but things to unpleasant, long-term obligation. Add the
do, contracting will look attractive. Here I would prospect of continuing casualties and the political
use the Brown & Root logo as the symbol. Dick system's tolerance for these ventures will likely
BUDGET BIG
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fade. Budgets are not necessarily tied tightly to War with the intent of deciphering its political
missions. The political interest in preserving jobs, lessons. Steve Van Evera, our resident theorist,
especially contractor jobs, will remain highly inde- talked about the dozen or so articles or books that
pendent of experiments with new roles for the mil- need to be written on the Cold War, each seeking
itary. Shipbuilding and military aircraft produc- to answer an important question that he cannot
tion have constituencies outside the armed services find effectively addressed in the literature. Carl
and are loosely bound by military purpose. It is Kaysen, a colleague with a distinguished Cold War
not surprising that pork comes to mind for this as well as academic career, looked back upon the
box. war to understand its causes and structure. And in
a day-long symposium at Endicott House that
The final combination is declining budgets and no marked George Rathjens' retirement from MIT
new missions. Transfer payments - welfare for the and his long involvement in the effort to control
poor and the middle class - generate enormous the arms race, George and a flock of his students,
financial requirements especially when the baby young and not-so-young, reflected on the arms
boom generation moves to retirement. With no control experience. These were wonderful sessions.
one willing to offer new taxes as the solution, the
defense budget cannot stay high for long. Assume Fortunately retirement at MIT does not mean you
both that we tire of new missions and are forced have to leave DACS. George Rathjens will stay
into a very constrained environment for defense active in the program just as has Jack Ruina and
spending. Here the strategy for contractors, the Carl Kaysen, both of whom retired earlier from
military and any other element in the defense teaching. And Marvin Miller, who retired this year
business would be to claim uniqueness that they as Senior Research Scientist in the Nuclear
alone offer, the provision of a service or technology Engineering Department, moved over to the pro-
absolutely vital for the security of the nation. The gram where he will base his future research.
unicorn is the obvious symbol for this box. Even
with a two percent of GDP or less defense budget, This year marked also the renewal of DACS profes-
we will maintain our nuclear skills, and the ability sional educational efforts. In June we organized a
to design, if not build, first line ships, aircraft and week-long set of sessions on security studies as part
missiles. Our interest in reconnaissance satellites of the MIT Summer School. I suspect this type of
and other warning systems is not going away. activity will grow again at DACS as we found a sig-
There are some unicorns in the defense herd and nificant interest in industry and government
this would be a time to claim to be one. research centers both in the United States and
abroad in the sessions. But our first obligation
ACTIVITIES AND PERSONNEL remains to our graduate program which attracts out-
Looking back on the past can help you to under- standing students. We are proud of their work and
stand the future. During the year we began a series feature it often in our conferences and publications.
of faculty presentations reflecting upon the Cold
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