Working Paper 03-13 Departamento de Economía de la Empresa Business Economics Series 03 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid March 2003 Calle Madrid, 126 28903, Getafe (Spain) Fax +34 91 6249608 DDEETTEECCTTIINNGG AABBNNOORRMMAALL MMAARRKKEETT BBEEHHAAVVIIOORR UUSSIINNGG RREESSAAMMPPLLIINNGG TTEECCHHNNIIQQUUEESS Lucía Cuadro-Sáez(cid:244), J. Ignacio Peña‡ and Juan J. Romo‡ AAbbssttrraacctt This article improves the assessment of market sentiment through risk neutral implicit density functions estimates. The main finding is an indicator of “abnormal market behavior”, which allows us to measure the degree to which the market is behaving normally and is not expecting bad news. We test the results on two kind of events in four out of the five main crises in emerging markets of the last decade: defaults on debt and devaluations or strong depreciations. We find evidence that, in many cases, this new indicator could have anticipated the main critical episodes of the crises shortly ahead. We use confidence intervals based on bootstrap percentiles for the skewness and kurtosis of the implicit risk neutral density functions to detect whether the market behaves normally or shows excessive risk aversion. Keywords: Market sentiment, risk aversion, implicit risk neutral density function, bootstrap, skewness and kurtosis. JEL Codes: G14, G15, F34. (cid:244) Banco de España and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. ‡ Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. We gratefully acknowledge Miguel de Las Casas for his help and suggestions. Also we thank Jose Maria Cuadro for interesting discussions at early stages of preparing this paper; and Jose Manuel Campa, Daniel Navia and Alicia García-Herrero for useful comments. All remaining errors are our own. The ideas expressed in the paper represent the personal opinion of the authors, which do not necessarily coincide with those of Banco de España. Corresponding address: [email protected] Abstract This article improves the assessment of market sentiment through risk neutralimplicit density functions estimates. The main …nding is anindica- tor of “abnormal market behavior”, whichallows us to measure the degree to which the market is behaving normally and is not expecting bad news. Wetesttheresults ontwokindofeventsinfourout ofthe…vemaincrisesin emerging markets of the last decade: defaults on debt and devaluations or strong depreciations. We …nd evidence that, in many cases, this new indi- cator couldhave anticipated the maincritical episodes of the crises shortly ahead. We use con…dence intervals based on bootstrap percentiles for the skewness andkurtosisof theimplicit riskneutraldensityfunctions todetect whether the market behaves normally or shows excessive risk aversion. Contents 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3 Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2.1 Implicit risk neutral density functions . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.2.2 The bootstrap method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 1. Introduction Financial markets have experimented a deep transformation throughout the last two decades. Financial development and new technologies allow for more trans- parencyon tradingoperations, lowercostsandan greaterinformation availability. Thereisnodoubtaboutthegrowingin‡uencethestockmarketexertson …nancial 3 development, not just in terms of size but also in terms of e¢ciency. Neverthe- less, one should be aware of the drawbacks associated to this development since, we have witnessed severe crashes on the stock markets during this period. Fi- nancial market drops sometimes lead to market crashes or …nancial crises, which may be dependent on market sentiment. “Self-ful…lling expectations” are critical determinants of market crashes, specially when the country is dependent on for- eign investment and therefore, vulnerable to external shocks1. This is the case of emerging market economies, which have su¤ered more dramatically the impact of …nancial crises, either due to problems within the country or caused by conta- gion among countries. This paper contributes to the literature by examining the role of expectations during crises events using an indicator of imminent negative event. This new methodology aimed at predicting “abnormal market behavior” lays on the implicit risk neutral density function (PDF), as a measure of market expectations, on the skewness and kurtosis of the PDF, as indicators of the risk aversion. Ourmain contribution, consistson theidenti…cation of therisk aversion limits within “normal market behavior”. The idea is to determine the risk aver- sion limit, at a given con…dence level, over which themarket behavesabnormally. Therefore, we can detect the abnormality by examining thoseobservations out of the con…dence intervals. We test this new approach in four crises su¤ered by non industrial countries 1See García-Herrero (2001). 4 duringthenineties2: the Asian in 1997, theRussian in 1998, theBrazilian in 1999 and theArgentinean crisis in 2001. Theresults show that our indicator is able to foresee “abnormal market behavior”. The rest of the article is organized as follows: the next section presents a literaturereviewon implicitrisk neutraldensityfunctions, thethird onedescribes the data and the methodology used, the fourth section presents the results and the last one concludes. 2. Literature Review After the 1987 stock market Crash, the Black and Scholes model presents a de- viation on the volatility curve, named as volatility smile. When comparing the moneyness degreewith theimplicitvolatility, the function presentsasmile-shape, pro…le indicating an excessive volatility of the very in the money options and of the very out of the money options, with lower volatility for the at the money options. The deviation from the constant volatility assumed by the Black and Scholes model becomes signi…cant after the crash, and re‡ects a di¤erent pricing rule: the market behavior seems to be risk averse3. Another way of measuringthe same fact is to look at the implicit risk neutral 2See García-Herrero, A. (2001) 3Peña, Rubio and Serna (1999) …nd that time to expiration is a main determinant of the volatility smile. Thisisconsistentwiththe ideathatthe implicitdistributionfunctionmay vary with the time to expiration. 5 probability function,which alsopresents adeviation thatisinterpreted astherisk averse behavior of the market. After the 1987 Crash, the implicit risk neutral distributions became leptokurtic and left skewed4. This excessive skewness and kurtosis are re‡ecting the risk averse behavior, provided that the left skewness (for the call options) and the higher kurtosis are indicators of the probability assigned to a market drop. The point is that before the Crash, the market did not take intoaccountthepossibilityof acrash. However, ithappened,themarket learned, includingthisknowledgeintheoption valuation weobservethereafter. In the followingparagraphs we review the literature on implicit risk neutral density functions. The seminal paper on the implicit density functions is Breeden and Litzen- berger(1978) wheretheystudytherelation between thepriceof an European call option and the probability of gain when executing the contract. In other words, they look for the relationship of the call option price and the probability of the strike being lower than the price of the underlying asset at the expiration date. This literature on implicit risk neutral probability functions can be classi…ed intotworesearch trendsdependingon theparametricornon-parametricapproach. The parametric vs. non-parametric distinction adopted in this paper is similar to that presented in previous studies5. A parametric approach assumes that the 4See Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996) 5 Ibid 6 distribution function of the PDF is well known and that its coe¢cients need to be estimated. The non-parametric approach, does not assume any distribution function, therefore it allows for the estimation of any probability function. There is no consensus in the literature on the best method to be applied. Furthermore, it seems that there is a proper method for each empirical study. Withinthenon-parametricliterature,Rubinstein(1994)developsan optimiza- tion criterion toextract the PDFs fromoptions prices. HeobtainsthePDFsfrom a binomial tree, composed by the strikes of the options and their probability of gain. In the same line, Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996) base their investiga- tion on the paper by Rubinstein (1994) and develop an alternative optimization criterion that is tested it in the American S&P500 options market. They prove that the PDFs look like a lognormal in the period prior to the Crash of 1987 and that it becomes leptokurtic, left skewed and sometimes multimodal, after it. Finally, Manzano and Sanchez (1998) apply the results of Breeden and Litzen- berger(1978)toderivetheimplicitriskneutralprobabilityfunctionof theSpanish option market on interest rates. By contrast, the other research trend applies parametricmethods to compute the PDFs. This literature is represented by Melick and Thomas (1997) who assumea mixtureof threelognormal distributions for the PDFs of oil prices, and by Malz(1994), who obtains the probability of realignment of the exchange rates during the European Monetary Crisis by assuming the lognormal shape for the 7 PDFs and a jump di¤usion process for the option prices. Bahra(1997) compares some distributions proposed in the existing literature and selects the mixture of two lognormal distributions to characterize the PDFs. Finally, Söderlind and Svensson (1996)selecta mixture of n lognormal distributionsfor the shapeof the PDFs. This paper adopts a non-parametric approach, by computing the PDFs as Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996) propose. We go one step further transforming the put options prices call option prices using the put-call parity. This transfor- mation permits the observation of a wider range of moneyness given the limited liquidity of the Spanish out of the money option market. Therefore, the range of moneyness for which we compute the PDFs is wider than that we could obtain by simply using the call options or the put options data. 3. Data and Methodology 3.1. Data The empirical research presented in this paper is based on the data provided by Mercado Español de Futuros Financieros de Renta Variable (MEFF RV) for the European type options and futures on IBEX35 index, and by Mercado Continuo de Bolsa de Madrid for the underlying index, IBEX 35. The database includes daily closing prices from December 9th, 1996, to October 7th, 2002. 8 The PDFs are calculated using both call and put options so we can complete the database including all the information available on option prices. No dis- tinction is made on the type of option, since both put and call prices provide information on the risk aversion considered by the market. Put option prices are transformed into call option prices using the put-call parity: c = p+S X(1+r) t t ¡ ¡ Where c isthe call option price, p is the put option price, S is the asset value t at t and X(1 +r) t is the actual value of the strike price. ¡ Weexcludeall thoseoptionspresentingnull volatilityortheirpricebeingequal to zero or not satisfying the put-call parity. 3.2. Methodology Theobjectiveofthepaperistheassessment of themarket feelingon theextremes. Weidentify the point up towhich the market can be considered as behavingnor- mally in terms of risk aversion. The graphs in Appendix 1 show the di¤erent shapes of the PDF depending on the market sentiment that we catalog as “nor- mal”,“rare” and “abnormal market behavior”. Theclassi…cation re‡ects thelevel of excess risk aversion detected by our indicator: “normal” days do not present any excess risk aversion, “rare” days do not have enough information to con…rm the excess risk aversion, although we think that these are non- normal days; and 9 …nally an “abnormal market behavior” day, in which we can ensure at a 90% con…dence level that there exist an excess of risk aversion in the market. ThePDFis ameasureof market sentiment. This…eld hasbeen largely studied and we use the approach of Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996) to compute the distributions. This is a non-parametric method in the sense that the resulting PDF may adopt any shape, either lognormal or any other distribution function. Oncewehave the assessed marketfeeling, weevaluateriskaversion by looking to the deviation from the risk neutral assumption. Under a risk neutral behavior the PDFs should not present any excess of skewness or kurtosis. The excess of (left)skewnessobservedin thePDFsof the(call)optionpricesisinterpretedasthe market’s consideration of the possibility of a large drop in the future (the option expiration date). In other words, the greater drop considered by the market, the higher left skewness, other things left equal. The excess kurtosis indicates the probability mass assigned to the drop. This means not only that the market considers the possibility of a drop, but that it may become extremely worrying when the market assigns a high probability to a large size drop. “Self-ful…lling expectations” constitute a key factor in determining whether a large drop in the market may become a crisis. At any point in time, we can have the skewness and kurtosis of the PDF, but we need a benchmark to determine whether the observation responds to an abnormal behavior or not. Indeed, we should have many PDFs on the same day 10
Description: