Table Of ContentData Mining and
Predictive Analysis
Intelligence Gathering and
Crime Analysis
Second Edition
Colleen McCue
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
McCue, Colleen.
Data mining and predictive analysis : intelligence gathering and crime analysis / Colleen McCue. -- 2 Edition.
pages cm
ISBN 978-0-12-800229-2
1. Crime analysis. 2. Data mining in law enforcement. 3. Law enforcement--Data processing.
4. Criminal behavior, Prediction of. I. Title.
HV7936.C88M37 2015
363.250285’6312--dc23
2014031816
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN: 978-0-12-800229-2
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Dedication
This book is dedicated to Naval Criminal Investigative Service,
Supervisory Special Agent (Ret.) Richard J. McCue, my
partner in crime and everything else that matters.
v
Foreword
If ever there was any doubt about the presence of evil in our world, one need
only conduct a quick Internet search for Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance
Army. Over a horrific generation, Kony has marauded his way across central
Africa—Uganda, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central
African Republic—killing and maiming uncounted thousands, many of them
children, almost all of them innocents. To its great credit, the government of
Uganda, along with its neighbors and a dedicated cohort of international and
nongovernmental organizations, has been relentlessly pursuing Kony and his
henchmen in an effort to protect local populations from the LRA’s attacks and
to aid survivors and escapees.
The United States had long, but inconsistently, supported anti-Kony efforts,
but that changed with President Obama’s signing into law the Lord’s Resis-
tance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009. And in
2011 Mr. Obama ordered the deployment of approximately 100 U.S. Special
Operations personnel to aid in the multinational effort to bring Kony and his
top leaders to justice. Among the many challenges, including language, culture,
logistical support in remote regions, and many more, was the fundamental
difficulty of finding Kony and his top lieutenants in a vast area of Africa—an
area roughly the size of the state of Colorado that is densely forested with little
infrastructure and even less governmental reach. At United States Africa Com-
mand, intelligence analysts and seasoned Foreign Service Officers aggressively
sought methodologies and processes to more quickly and accurately predict
where and when LRA activities might occur. Traditional pattern analysis and
tracking procedures just weren’t working. Enter Dr. Colleen McCue.
Dr. McCue’s work with the Richmond, Virginia Police Department had demon-
strated the value of more detailed, refined predictive analysis. It appeared that
her approach might prove useful in a vastly different region and in a military,
vice law enforcement endeavor. That approach was quickly proven accurate.
Dr. McCue, using the same methodologies as she has so successfully applied
in Virginia, was able to help military analysts sift through mounds of data
and incident reports in the effort to find the real nuggets of information that xi
xii Foreword
would allow the forces in pursuit of the LRA to predict future attacks and even
their heretofore clandestine routes of travel. Within just a few months, using
Dr. McCue’s methods, Ugandan and American forces were able to interdict
LRA routes, deter village attacks, and capture or cause the surrender of several
key Kony associates. While Joseph Kony himself remains at large, the results
of Dr. McCue’s work mean that this notoriously vicious warlord is operating
largely in survival mode rather than roaming the region with impunity.
In this new book, an update from her initial 2007 publication, Dr. McCue
makes a compelling case for the effectiveness of predictive analysis in a wid-
ening array of functional communities. She clearly and concisely lays out the
processes she has developed, affording analysts and academics the opportunity
to thoroughly assess and examine her work. But, she does so in a way easily
understood by operators (like me) who possess neither the academic nor re-
search credentials of those who normally work in this space. It is this aspect of
Dr. McCue’s writing that appeals to me and, I have found, to others across a
wide variety of operational interests—police work, to be sure, but also disaster
preparedness and relief specialists, the counter-illicit trafficking community,
even those who focus agricultural and medical trends. One can see ready appli-
cability for commercial enterprises as well. Essentially, what Dr. McCue offers
is a now well-tested and proven method for decision-makers, private or gov-
ernmental, to choose how to most effectively apply scarce resources to address
a given problem.
Dr. McCue’s well-crafted second edition not only provides additional and more
current examples of how her processes have been applied operationally in an
ever-expanding array of activities, but also addresses how developing concepts
and capabilities aid in data mining and predictive analysis. The art of her work
lies in the manner in which she takes complex analytical capabilities from the
scientific and academic worlds and translates them into real-world issues of
understanding and predicting human behavior in support of operational deci-
sion makers. It is this blending of analytics with operational experience and ex-
pertise that will be of greatest interest to those in law enforcement, military, or
other security fields. In short, when operators gain an appreciation of the pow-
er of data mining and predictive analysis and when analysts better understand
the needs of operators, a synergy is obtained that benefits all (well, maybe not
criminals or terrorists). The essence of Dr. McCue’s work is to translate science
into meaningful action and she makes a powerful case for doing so.
General Carter Ham
U.S. Army (Retired) Former Commander, U.S. Africa Command
Preface
So many things have changed since the first edition of this textbook, particular-
ly as relates to data, technology, and tradecraft. Some things have not changed,
however, including my love of science and desire to develop innovative solu-
tions to some of the really challenging public safety and security challenges.
Operational security analytics, at its core, is designed to effectively characterize
bad behavior in support of information-based approaches to anticipation and
influence. Whether “influence” entails prevention, thwarting, mitigation, response,
or consequence management, we are trying to change outcomes for the better.
In the beginning of my operational security analytics journey, I became pro-
foundly intrigued by how many of the seasoned detectives I worked with were
often able to generate quick yet accurate hypotheses about their cases, some-
times only moments after they had arrived at the scene. Like the “profilers” on
television and in the movies, many of them seemed to have an uncanny ability
to accurately describe a likely motive and related suspect based merely on a
review of the crime scene and some preliminary knowledge regarding the vic-
tim’s lifestyle and related risk factors. Over time, I started to acquire this ability
as well, although to a lesser degree. It became much easier to read a report and
link a specific incident to others, predict future related crimes, or even calculate
the likelihood that a particular case would be solved based on the nature of the
incident. Drawing on my training as a scientist, I frequently found myself look-
ing for some order in the chaos of crime, trying to generate testable hypoth-
eses regarding emerging trends and patterns, as well as investigative outcomes.
Sometimes I was correct. However, even when I was not, I was able to include
the information in my ever-expanding internal rule sets regarding crime and
criminal behavior.
Prior to working for the Richmond Police Department, I spent several years
working with that organization. Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects
of this early relationship with the Department was my weekly meeting with
the officer in charge of violent crimes. Each week we would discuss the homi-
cides from the previous week, particularly any unique or unusual behavioral
xiii
xiv Preface
characteristics. Over time, we began to generate casual predictions of violent
crime trends and patterns that proved to be surprisingly accurate. During the
same time period, I also began to examine intentional injuries among incarcer-
ated offenders. As I probed the data and drilled down in an effort to identify
potentially actionable patterns of risk, it became apparent that many of the
individuals I looked at were not just in the wrong place at the wrong time, as
they frequently indicated. Rather, they were in the wrong place at the wrong
time doing the wrong things with the wrong people and were assaulted as a result
of their involvement in these high-risk activities. As I explored the data further,
I found that different patterns of offending were associated with different pat-
terns of risk. This work had immediate implications for violence reduction
efforts. It also had implications for the analysis of crime and intelligence data.
Fortunately, the field of data mining and predictive analytics had evolved to
the point that many of the most sophisticated algorithms were available in
a PC environment, so that everyone from a software-challenged psychologist
like myself to a beat cop could begin to not only understand but also use these
incredibly powerful tools.
Although I did not realize it at the time, a relatively new approach to market-
ing and business intelligence was emerging at the same time we were engaging
in this lively speculation about crime and criminals at the police department.
Professionals in the business community were exploiting artificial intelligence
and machine learning to characterize and retain customers, increase sales,
focus marketing campaigns, and perform a variety of other business-related
tasks. For example, each time I went through the checkout counter at my local
supermarket, my purchasing habits were coded, collected, and analyzed. This
information was aggregated with data from other shoppers and employed in
the creation of models about purchasing behavior and how to turn a shopper
into a buyer. These models were then used to gently mold my future behavior
through everything from direct marketing based on my existing preferences to
the strategic stocking of shelves in an effort to encourage me to make addition-
al purchases during my next trip down the aisle. Similarly, data and informa-
tion were collected and analyzed each time I perused the Internet. As I skipped
through web pages, I left cookies, letting the analysts behind the scenes know
where I went and when and in what sequence I moved through their sites. All
of this information was analyzed and used to make their sites more friendly
and easier to navigate or to subtly guide my behavior in a manner that would
benefit the online businesses that I visited. The examples of data mining and
predictive analytics in our lives are almost endless, but the contrast between
my professional and personal lives was profound. Directly comparing the state
of public safety analytical capacity to that of the business community only
served to underscore this shortcoming. Throughout almost every aspect of
my life, data and information were being collected on me and analyzed using
Preface xv
sophisticated data mining algorithms; however, the use of these very powerful
tools was severely limited or nonexistent in the public safety arena in which I
worked. With very few exceptions, data mining and predictive analytics were
not readily available for the analysis of crime or intelligence data, particularly
at the state and local levels.
Like most Americans, I was profoundly affected by the events of September
11th. In the week of September 10th, 2001, I was attending a specialized course
in intelligence analysis in northern Virginia. Like many, I can remember exactly
what I was doing that Tuesday morning when I saw the first plane hit the World
Trade Center and how I felt as the horror continued to unfold throughout
the day. As I drove back to Richmond, Virginia that afternoon (the training
had been postponed indefinitely), I saw the smoke rise up over the Beltway
from the fire at the Pentagon, which was still burning. Those of us working in
the public safety community were inundated with information over the next
several days, some of it reliable, much of it not. Like many agencies, we were
swamped with the intelligence reports and BOLOs (be on the lookout reports)
that came in over the teletype, many of which were duplicative or contradic-
tory. Added to that were the numerous suspicious situation reports from con-
cerned citizens and requests for assistance from the other agencies pursuing
the most promising leads. Described as the “volume challenge” by former CIA
director George Tenent, the amount of information threatened to overwhelm
us. Because of this, it lost its value. There was no way to effectively manage
the information, let alone analyze it. In many cases, the only viable option
was to catalog the reports in three-ring binders, with the hope that it could be
reviewed thoroughly at some later date. Like others in law enforcement, our
lives as analysts changed dramatically that day. Our professional work would
never again be the same. In addition to violent crimes and vice, we now have
the added responsibility of analyzing data related to the war on terrorism and
the protection of homeland security, regardless of whether we work at the state,
local, or federal level. Moreover, if there was one take-home message from that
day as an analyst, particularly in Virginia, it was that the terrorists had been
hiding in plain sight among us, sometimes for years, and they had been en-
gaging in a variety of other crimes in an effort to further their terrorist agenda,
including identity theft, forgery, and smuggling; not to mention the various
immigration laws they violated. Many of these crimes fall within the purview
of local law enforcement.
As we moved through the days and weeks following the attacks, I realized that
we could do much better as analysts. The subsequent discussions regarding
“connecting the dots” highlighted the sad fact that quite a bit of information
had been available before the attacks; however, flaws in the sharing and analy-
sis of information resulted in tragic consequences. Although meaningful in-
formation sharing remains an important goal, advanced analytical techniques
xvi Preface
are available now. The same tools that were being used to prevent people from
switching their mobile telephone service provider and to stock shelves at our
local supermarkets on September 10th can be used to create safer, healthier
communities and enhance homeland security. The good news is that these
techniques and tools are being used widely in the business community. The
key is to apply them to questions or challenges in public safety, law enforce-
ment, and intelligence analysis.
Again, I thoroughly enjoy science and particularly like the new concept of
“data science,” which really captures the creative aspects of analysis and as-
sociated promise of transdisciplinary approaches. As someone who likes to
color outside the lines and explore novel approaches to analysis, I am intrigued
by the use of advanced analytics to improve other aspects of my life and see
data science as a means to an end; as a means by which to better understand
behavior—good, bad and otherwise—so that we can use it to anticipate and
influence outcomes, particularly in support of enhanced public safety and se-
curity. Almost everything in my professional life for the previous 20 years has
been in direct support of that mission. The second edition of this textbook is
no exception.
Although I say “I” quite a bit in this book, it certainly was not created in a
vacuum. Countless individuals have helped me throughout my career, and
a few have truly inspired me. What follows is a very brief list of those that con-
tributed directly to this effort in some way.
I am tremendously honored by General Carter Ham’s willingness to write the
Foreword to the second edition. General Ham has been a great mentor and
guide, particularly as relates to improving my understanding of the challenges
facing the people of Africa. Our work modeling violent extremism in Africa
has been some of the most rewarding for me professionally. The ability to suc-
cessfully apply western models of crime analysis to the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA), underscores the importance of foundation-level concepts in under-
standing violent crime and other predatory behavior; concepts that will enable
us to effectively respond to other challenging situations, including those that
have not yet emerged. This particular problem space is complex and there will
be no easy solutions; however, the saying “African solutions to African prob-
lems” reinforces the importance of a local approach in support of meaningful
and sustainable answers to some of our hardest problems. Moreover, the more
that I learn about Africa, the more that I see parallels, not only in our under-
standing of challenging behavior, but also in the importance of local solutions
to problems in other communities struggling with violence, including those in
the United States.
I would like to thank Pam Chester from Elsevier for originally approaching
me about a second edition. Marisa LaFleur, my new editor, has brought a fresh
Preface xvii
perspective and approach, which has been a great benefit. Nancy Coleman and
Turner Brinton from DigitalGlobe, and Brian Wagner from McBee Strategic
Consulting, have provided great insight and guidance regarding the impor-
tance of narrative and context in conveying the critical points in the new case
material.
Most of the early work referenced came out of some very lively discussions that
began several years ago with my colleagues at the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion. In particular, Supervisory Special Agents Charlie Dorsey and Dr. Wayne
Lord provided considerable guidance to my early research. Over time, they
have become both colleagues and friends, and my work definitely reflects a lev-
el of quality that is attributable directly to their input. Also with the FBI, Mr. Art
Westveer taught me almost everything that I know about death investigation. I
learned a tremendous amount from his lectures, which were punctuated with
his dry sense of humor and wonderful anecdotes from a very successful career
with the Baltimore Police Department. His untimely passing was a significant
loss to our community. Rich Weaver and Tim King graciously allowed me to
attend their lectures and training at International Training, Inc. on surveillance
detection in support of my research. They also provided some very unique op-
portunities for field testing many of my ideas in this area to see how well they
would play in the real world.
Although many of my former employers merely tolerated my analytical pro-
clivities, the Project Safe Neighborhoods folks provided funding, as well as on-
going support and encouragement for much of the early work outlined in this
book. In particular, Paul McNulty, the United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of Virginia, carried the message of our success far beyond the audience
that I could reach alone.
I also would like to thank Dr. Harvey Sugerman. I still remember the day when
he called me out of the blue and told me that he thought that I should be
paid for the work I had been doing. A single mother, I had been responding
to homicide calls on my own time in the evenings in an effort to gain addi-
tional knowledge and insight into violent crime and the investigative process.
That particular act made a tremendous positive impact in my life. I gained
invaluable experience through my affiliation with the university, but his gentle
mentoring and decision to offer me compensation for my work only begins to
underscore the kindness in his heart.
I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the software and consulting companies
that provided me with excellent case study material, without which the second
edition would be very thin and not terribly interesting. In particular, David
Korn, Allen Sackadorf, and John Tomaselli from SAP NS2; Kevin Mergruen,
and Ted Desaussure from Information Builders; Bill Wall from Praescient Ana-
lytics; Dr. Rick Adderly from A E Solutions (BI) Ltd.; Dave Roberts from the
Description:Data Mining and Predictive Analysis: Intelligence Gathering and Crime Analysis, 2nd Edition, describes clearly and simply how crime clusters and other intelligence can be used to deploy security resources most effectively. Rather than being reactive, security agencies can anticipate and prevent crim