Control Motivation and Social Cognition

352 Pages·1993·5.631 MB·English

by  Jack W. Brehm (auth.), Gifford Weary Ph.D., Faith Gleicher Ph.D., Kerry L. Marsh Ph.D. (eds.)

Control Motivation and Social Cognition
Gifford Weary Faith Gleicher
Kerry L. Marsh
Editors
Control Motivation and
Social Cognition
With 23 Illustrations
Springer-Verlag
New York Berlin Heidelberg London Paris
Tokyo Hong Kong Barcelona Budapest
GIFFORD WEARY, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology, Ohio State University, 142 Townsend Hall, 1885 Neil
Avenue Mall, Columbus, OH 43210, USA
FAITH GLEICHER, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology, University of California at Santa Barbara, Santa
Barbara, CA 93106, USA
KERRY L. MARSH, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556,
USA
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Control motivation and social cognition / Gifford Weary, Faith
Gleicher, Kerry L. Marsh, editors.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN-13: 978-1-4613-8311-6 e-ISBN-13: 978-1-4613-8309-3
DOl: 10.1007/978-1-4613-8309-3
1. Control (Psychology) 2. Motivation (Psychology) 3. Locus of
control. 4. Social perception. I. Weary, Gifford, 1951-
II. Gleicher, Faith. III. Marsh, Kerry L.
BF611.C66 1993
153.8'5 - dc20 92-42359
Printed on acid-free paper.
© 1993 Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover 1s t edition 1993
All rights reserved. This work may not be translated or copied in whole or in part without
the written permission of the publisher (Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue,
New York, NY 10010, USA), except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or
scholarly analysis. Use in connection with any form of information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed is forbidden.
The use of general descriptive names, trade names, trademarks, etc., in this publication,
even if the former are not especially identified, is not to be taken as a sign that such names,
as understood by the Trade Marks and Merchandise Marks Act, may accordingly be used
freely by anyone.
Production coordinated by Chernow Editorial Services, Inc. and managed by
Christin R. Ciresi; manufacturing supervised by Jacqui Ashri.
Typeset by Best-Set Typesetter Ltd., Hong Kong.
Printed and bound by Edwards Brothers, Inc., Ann Arbor, MI, USA.
987 6 5 4 3 2 1
To Our Husbands
David A., David B., and Bill W.
Preface
Over the past two decades theorists and researchers have given increasing
attention to the effects, both beneficial and harmful, of various control
related motivations and beliefs. People's notions of how much personal
control they have or desire to have over important events in their lives
have been used to explain a host of performance and adaptational outcomes,
including motivational and performance deficits associated with learned
helplessness (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) and depression
(Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989), adaptation to aging (Baltes &
Baltes, 1986; Rodin, 1986), cardiovascular disease (Matthews, 1982),
cancer (Sklar & Anisman, 1979), increased reports of physical symptoms
(Pennebaker, 1982), enhanced learning (Savage, Perlmutter, & Monty,
1979), achievement-related behaviors (Dweck & Licht, 1980; Ryckman,
1979), and post abortion adjustment (Mueller & Major, 1989).
The notion that control motivation plays a fundamental role in a
variety of basic, social psychological processes also has a long historical
tradition. A number of theorists (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965;
Kelley, 1967), for example, have suggested that causal inferences arise
from a desire to render the social world predictable and controllable.
Similarly, control has been implicated as an important mediator of cognitive
dissonance (Wicklund & Brehm, 1976) and attitude phenomena (Brehm
& Brehm, 1981; Kiesler, Collins, & Miller, 1969).
Despite the apparent centrality of control motivation to a variety of
social psychological phenomena, until recently there has been relatively
little research explicitly concerned with the effects of control motivation
on the cognitive processes underlying such phenomena (cf., Pittman &
D' Agostino, 1985). This is no doubt due, in part, to the reign of "cog
nitivism" and information-processing models of social behavior during the
last decade. However, such a singular focus on "cold" cognition now
seems to have given way to an increased interest in the interrelations
of motivation and cognition-the so-called "warm look." As evidence of
this new "Zeitgeist," we are seeing volumes such as the Handbook of
Motivation and Cognition (Higgins & Sorrentino, 1990; Sorrentino &
vii
viii Preface
Higgins, 1986) that include chapters focusing on many new and exciting
research programs in the "warm look" tradition.
In this book, we seek to present the only volume to date that highlights
work on control motivation and social cognition. While there are other
volumes (e.g., Higgins & Sorrentino, 1990) that examine a variety of
motivational bases of social-cognitive processes, we believe that a volume
devoted solely to work on control motivation and cognition is needed.
Why? First, control has been viewed as a fundamental psychological
need, and there is an enormous body of literature concerned with psy
chological control. Second, there now exists a growing body of research
concerned with the social-cognitive antecedents, correlates, and con
sequences of a desire for control. Third, we believe that the two literatures
referred to above have developed, in many instances, in parallel; much
could be gained by a cross-fertilization of work on psychological control
and on control-motivated social cognition. We believe that a systematic
review of the literature on psychological control will offer new theoretical
and methodological avenues for our understanding of control-motivated
social cognition, and vice versa.
In the current book, we attempted to bring together a broad collection
of contributors whose research is at the forefront of the psychology of
control and scholars whose work represents the many individual strands
of research bridging control motivation and social cognition. The book is
divided into four major sections.
The first section is intended to present a discussion of the major
theoretical perspectives on control. In his chapter on control and its loss,
Jack W. Brehm (Chapter 1) sets the stage by defining what we mean by
perceived control, various types of control beliefs that have been identified
in the literature, and types of control motivation, no small task given the
diversity of current definitions for all of these constructs. Brehm then
turns to a discussion of a number of the currently prominent theories of
control motivation and provides an overview of the strengths and short
comings of these theories, as well as the evidence available with respect
to them. In this context, particular attention is given by Brehm to reac
tance theory; a basic premise of this chapter is that consideration of the
reactance literature will do much to illustrate the types of variables and
alternative interpretations that must be considered by any theory of
psychological control.
Each of the authors in Section II emphasizes the importance of perceived
control for social and individual functioning. They agree that perceptions
of control allow individuals to construct plans of future action and con
tribute to their perceptions of well-being and satisfaction. The unique
contributions of the chapters in this section, then, lie in their analyses of
the determinants of control perceptions and, in the case of Anderson and
Deuser's chapter, in its assessment of the significance of control motivation
in attribution. One distinction that emerges among the approaches taken
Preface ix
in this section concerns the relationship of perceptions of response
outcome contingencies and perceptions of control. Perceived behavioral
contingency traditionally has been emphasized by learned helplessness
theorists, and is also the focus of Lauren B. Alloy, Caroline M. Clements,
and Linda J. Koenig's chapter (Chapter 2). These authors review a wide
variety of research bearing on situational and personal determinants of
perceptions of contingency and suggest that perceptions of control are
likely to be multiply determined through the effects of both cognitive and
motivational mechanisms on perceptions of contingency. They suggested
self-esteem maintenance, impression management, and a commitment to
goal achievement as motivational determinants; and focus on the effects
of associative learning, expectancies, and self-focused attention as
potential cognitive determinants.
Miroslaw Kofta (Chapter 5), on the other hand, does not consider
perceptions of response-outcome contingencies as central to perceptions
of control. Rather, he proposes an "informational model of learned
helplessness" that emphasizes the significance of individuals' ability to
cognitively construct models of their environments. According to the
informational model, people normally actively incorporate information
from their environments in order to understand causal relations and
construct a cognitive frame to guide their future behavior. Uncontrollable
situations, with their lack of consistent informational feedback, prevent
the individual from forming reasonable hypotheses about the nature of
the situation. Kofta reviews evidence in support of his informational
perspective and speculates provocatively about the implications of
informational helplessness for depression, performance in school,
creativity, and personality growth.
A second area of difference among the chapters is in their domain
of focus (i.e., laboratory or naturalistic settings). Whereas Kofta and
Alloy and her colleagues focus primarily on laboratory studies in which
individuals are temporarily deprived of control, Suzanne C. Thompson's
research (Chapter 3) examines control perceptions in naturally occurring
situations of low control. Her work with cancer and stroke patients and
with members of health maintenance organizations also emphasizes the
notion of multiple determinism of control perceptions. In her chapter,
Thompson focuses on how three interacting factors-realism, optimism,
and flexibility-might influence control perceptions in low-control settings.
Finally, Craig A. Anderson and William E. Deuser (Chapter 4) ex
plore the significance of the control dimension in the formation of attri
butions and in the effects of attributions on thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors. According to their "attributional functionalism" approach,
attributions of both self and others serve the primary function of allowing
for prediction and control of future outcomes. For this reason, these
authors predict (and find) that when people think about causes, they
typically think in terms of controllability and locus, the two dimensions
x Preface
that provide the most information about future control. Further, these
two dimensions contribute most importantly to the effects of attributions
on related thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.
One way to recognize the instrumentality of a psychological variable is
when its relative absence is as informative (and interesting) as its presence.
For researchers interested in social cognition, such is the instrumental
function of control motivation. In Section III, the authors provide over
lapping, yet distinctive, approaches to understanding how our processing
of social informat;on is shaped by the extent to which our control needs
are satisfied.
Whether exploring individual differences in control motivation, or the
implications of control deprivation, or postulating a concomitant need for
uncertainty-reduction, a prevailing view is that the motivation to gain
control is manifested in a processing style commonly characterized as
vigilant, effortful, extensive, and complex. Where such processing is
thought to be less extensive or less accurate is in those situations where
information processing may be relatively uninformative about control,
when extensive processing will further threaten control, or when processing
is skewed toward maintaining perceived control.
Beyond this, the chapters in this section provide different perspectives
on how to conceptualize and engage control motives. Control needs are
construed by some as originating primarily from within the individual,
either because of a generalized predisposition to desire control, or because
of chronic prior exposure to threatened control, or rather as a reflection
of a more general need to learn about one's capabilities. Other authors
emphasize that situational or interactional forces can induce control needs,
or threaten perceived control.
That control motives can be engaged by the situation is seen in the two
chapters (6 and 7) which address the role of control motivation in the
areas of interpersonal influence and power. In Thane S. Pittman's chapter
(6), he suggests that events that threaten control can result in temporary
boosts in control motivation. As a result, control-deprived persons often
process information in a more accurate and effortful manner. Pittman
extends his previous work on control deprivation into the domain of
attitude change and finds that control-deprived persons are more persuaded
by the strength of the message content than by more superficial heuristic
cues in a persuasive message. In the next chapter, Eric Depret and Susan
T. Fiske (Chapter 7) provide a compelling case for an interactional under
standing of control motivation, suggesting that social power (control over
others' outcomes), rather than residing in the individual, is better con
ceptualized as a structural characteristic of relationships. They suggest
that when one's outcomes are asymmetrically dependent on the other,
this power imbalance can result in a feeling of control deprivation. More
over, such a loss of social power results in increased attention to the other
person, and increased dispositional attributions about the powerful other.
Preface xi
The remaining three chapters in this section illustrate how individual
differences in control needs impact the way people seek out, attend to,
process, and behave in response to control-relevant information in a
variety of domains. Jerry M. Burger (Chapter 8) examines the individual
difference variable of desire for control. His research demonstrates that
persons high in desire for control are particularly attentive to control
information, and show attributional patterns consistent with a heightened
desire to see events as under their control. Finally, he suggests that
people high in desire for control may be more susceptible to gambling
and depression as a result of motivated responsivity to control information.
Michael J. Strube and John H. Yost (Chapter 9) present their self-appraisal
model, an outgrowth and extension of earlier research on type A behavior
and reactivity to control loss. Their dynamic model of self-seeking suggests
that control over the environment is essential for accurate self-appraisal;
moreover, persons high in desire for self-appraisal are especially motivated
to reduce uncertainty about their abilities. For example, they show more
accurate control perceptions when tasks are diagnostic about their
abilities. Finally, Gifford Weary, Kerry L. Marsh, Faith Gleicher, and
John A. Edwards (Chapter 10) present a model of how individual dif
ferences in depression impact causal uncertainty, and consequently,
information processing in those social tasks that lack clear outcome
criteria. Their research suggests that mild to moderately depressed
individuals show increased sensitivity and seeking of social informa
tion in simple impression formation or social comparison tasks, and
reveal more extensive, complex, and effortful modes of processing such
information.
In the final section, Richard M. Sorrentino presents a classification of
each of the chapters in terms of their relative positions along three
dimensions. The first dimension has to do with whether the theory
presented is primarily motivational, primarily cognitive, or both. The
second dimension is a rationallnonrational dimension that asks whether
the chapter focuses on the rational, thoughtful processing of social
information, or nonrational, nonconscious cognitive processes. The third
dimension asks whether the theory concerns individual differences in
control motivation and social cognition. This classification scheme and
the presentation of several important issues addressed in the author's own
research program on uncertainty orientation prove extremely useful in
highlighting points of convergence and divergence of, as well as con
ceptual lacunae common to the various chapters in this volume.
This volume is intended for a graduate and professional-level audience.
We have tried to emphasize ideas and approaches that we believe will
have durability and that will influence in a substantial way the future of
work on control-motivated social cognition. We believe the volume will
be appropriate as a supplementary text in basic, graduate-level courses in
social psychology or as the sole text for advanced seminars. Further, we
xii Preface
believe that the book will be useful not only to social psychologists, but
also to scholars in clinical and personality psychology.
Finally, we wish to express our sincere thanks to many people. Foremost,
we must thank the contributors of this volume without whose enthusiasm,
hard work, and adherence to oftentimes difficult schedules this book
would not have been possible. Second, we would like to thank our
publisher, Springer-Verlag, whose support was invaluable. Third, we
would like to thank Shannon Riley for her help with the preparation of
parts of this manuscript. A final thanks goes to our husbands whose
patience and support was essential during the planning stages and through
out the entire project.
GIFFORD WEARY
FAITH GLEICHER
KERRY L. MARSH