Contingent A Priori Truths: Metaphysics, Semantics, Epistemology and Pragmatics PDF
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Synthese Library 443 Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science Marco Ruffino Contingent A Priori Truths Metaphysics, Semantics, Epistemology and Pragmatics Synthese Library Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science Volume 443 Editor-in-Chief OtávioBueno,DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofMiami,CoralGables,USA EditorialBoardMembers BeritBrogaard,UniversityofMiami,CoralGables,USA AnjanChakravartty,DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofMiami,Coral Gables,USA StevenFrench,UniversityofLeeds,Leeds,UK CatarinaDutilhNovaes,VUAmsterdam,Amsterdam,TheNetherlands DarrellP.Rowbottom,DepartmentofPhilosophy,LingnanUniversity,TuenMun, HongKong EmmaRuttkamp,DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofSouthAfrica,Pretoria, SouthAfrica KristieMiller,DepartmentofPhilosophy,CentreforTime,UniversityofSydney, Sydney,Australia The aim of Synthese Library is to provide a forum for the best current work in themethodologyandphilosophyofscienceandinepistemology,allbroadlyunder- stood.Awidevarietyofdifferentapproacheshavetraditionallybeenrepresentedin theLibrary,andeveryeffortismadetomaintainthisvariety,notforitsownsake, butbecausewebelievethattherearemanyfruitfulandilluminatingapproachesto thephilosophyofscienceandrelateddisciplines. Specialattentionispaidtomethodologicalstudieswhichillustratetheinterplay of empirical and philosophical viewpoints and to contributions to the formal (logical,set-theoretical,mathematical,information-theoretical,decision-theoretical, etc.) methodology of empirical sciences. Likewise, the applications of logical methodstoepistemologyaswellasphilosophicallyandmethodologicallyrelevant studiesinlogicarestronglyencouraged.Theemphasisonlogicwillbetemperedby interestinthepsychological,historical,andsociologicalaspectsofscience. In addition to monographs Synthese Library publishes thematically unified anthologies and edited volumes with a well-defined topical focus inside the aim and scope of the book series. The contributions in the volumes are expected to befocusedandstructurallyorganizedinaccordancewiththecentraltheme(s),and shouldbetiedtogetherbyanextensiveeditorialintroductionorsetofintroductions if the volume is divided into parts. An extensive bibliography and index are mandatory. Moreinformationaboutthisseriesathttp://www.springer.com/series/6607 Marco Ruffino Contingent A Priori Truths Metaphysics, Semantics, Epistemology and Pragmatics MarcoRuffino DepartmentofPhilosophy UniversityofCampinas(UNICAMP) Campinas,Sa˜oPaulo,Brazil ISSN0166-6991 ISSN2542-8292 (electronic) SyntheseLibrary ISBN978-3-030-86621-1 ISBN978-3-030-86622-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86622-8 ©SpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2022 Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpartof thematerialisconcerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,reuseofillustrations,recitation, broadcasting,reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyotherphysicalway,andtransmissionorinformation storageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilarmethodology nowknownorhereafterdeveloped. Theuseofgeneraldescriptivenames,registerednames,trademarks,servicemarks,etc.inthispublication doesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexemptfromtherelevant protectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse. Thepublisher,theauthors,andtheeditorsaresafetoassumethattheadviceandinformationinthisbook arebelievedtobetrueandaccurateatthedateofpublication.Neitherthepublishernortheauthorsor theeditorsgiveawarranty,expressedorimplied,withrespecttothematerialcontainedhereinorforany errorsoromissionsthatmayhavebeenmade.Thepublisherremainsneutralwithregardtojurisdictional claimsinpublishedmapsandinstitutionalaffiliations. ThisSpringerimprintispublishedbytheregisteredcompanySpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG Theregisteredcompanyaddressis:Gewerbestrasse11,6330Cham,Switzerland ForDaniela,AnaLuísaandJúlia,mythree littlestars Acknowledgements This book grew out of my interest for the fascinating phenomenon discovered by Kripke in Naming and Necessity (1980) that there might be truths knowable A Priori that are, nevertheless, contingent. At some point, it came to my attention that the kind of cases discussed by Kripke are the product of stipulations, and stipulationsarenot,fromtheperspectiveofillocutionaryacts,ordinaryassertions. Along the years, I had the fortune to discuss some of the ideas here developed and get critical background from Ernie Lepore, Peter Ludlow, François Recanati, Dirk Greimann, Célia Teixeira, Eros Corazza, Philip Atkins, Ludovic Soutif, AndréLeclerc,EleonoraOrlando,GenovevaMartí,ManuelGarcía-Carpintero,José Zalabardo,SantiagoEcheverri,SílvioPinto,MaxFernándezdeCastro,MaxKölbel, Camilo Vergara, Filipe Martone, Max Freund, Rafael Albiero, Ricardo Santos, GalenStrawson,JefersonSantos,ThaináDemartini,IagoBatistela,GiorgioVenturi, Emiliano Boccardi, and the now late Maite Ezcurdia and Daniel Vanderveken, among many others. They helped to shape my proposal and to correct many mistakes. (The remaining mistakes are all my own contribution.) I warmly thank allofthem.MatheusValentemadeaverycarefulandcompetentrevisionofafinal draftoftheentiremanuscript.ArthurPaganiandGilsonOlegariohelpedwithmany technical detailsrelatedtoLATEX.Thanks arealsoduetoOtávioBueno, theeditor oftheSyntheseLibrary,forhissupportandpatience. Mygreatestdebt,however,istomywife,Patrícia,forherunconditionalloveand encouragementthroughtheyears. Someofthematerialpresentedhereappearedinpartinearlierpublications: (cid:129) Chapter 3 appeared in part in “Descriptive Reference Fixing and Epistemic Privileges”inAufklärung8:123–132(2021). (cid:129) Chapter4appearedinpartin“TheContingentAPrioriandDeReKnowledge” inCarloPenco,MassimilianoVignolo,ValeriaOttonelli,andCristinaAmoretti (eds). Proceedings of the 4th Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy. Genoa: CEUR-WS.org,2007,pp.45–58. (cid:129) Chapter 6 appeared in part in “Superficially and Deeply Contingent A Priori Truths”,CroatianJournalofPhilosophy16(2):247–266(2016). vii viii Acknowledgements (cid:129) Chapter 10 is a slightly modified version of “Contingent A Priori Truths and Performatives”,Synthese198(Suppl22):S5593–S5613(2021). Ithanktheeditorsoftheabovejournalsandcollectionsfortheirkindpermissionto usesomeoftheprintedmaterialhere. ResearchforthisbookwassupportedbyGrant2018/17011-9fromtheFAPESP andGrant428084/2018-4fromtheCNPq(Brazil). Introduction It has been nearly fifty years since Kripke gave the famous series of lectures later publishedunderthetitleNamingandNecessity(1980).Perhapsthemostsurprising theses defended in the lectures (or at least the consequences that attracted most attention and sparked most discussion in the literature) were two consequences of Kripke’sconsiderationsabouttherigidityanddirectlyreferentialnatureofnames. The first is that there might be truths that are necessary but, nevertheless, can be known only a posteriori, i.e. only through some sort of empirical investigation. The prototypical examples are identities involving only ordinary names such as ‘HesperusisPhosphorus’andidentitiesinvolvingnaturalkindtermssuchas‘Water is H O’, but we can find examples that are not identities, such as ‘This table is 2 composed of molecules’. This thesis is particularly shocking in view of a long and established philosophical tradition of considering apriority an intrinsic aspect of necessary truths. Being necessary, they must be true independently of how the world is and, hence, no empirical investigation concerning any particular feature of the actual world that distinguishes it from other possible worlds would seem to be relevant to convince us of their truth. Kripke’s discovery that things are not so straightforward, and that some necessary truths not only can but must (given our epistemic limitations) be known a posteriori, triggered a revision of our perspective on identities in general, and on basic scientific laws in particular. OnevividillustrationofKripke’simpactonthisfrontistheadventoftheso-called two-dimensional semantics—a research program whose main motivation (at least in the writings of leading authors such as Stalnaker, Jackson and Chalmers) is the development of a conceptual and technical framework to accommodate Kripke’s casesofnecessaryaposterioritruths. The second thesis is that there might be truths that are contingent and, never- theless, knowable a priori because they are the product of linguistic stipulations. Althoughitisasrevolutionaryandshockingasthefirstthesis,ithasbeenthesubject of considerably less attention in the literature and, as I see it, the consequences of the existence of this kind of truth have not yet been fully appreciated. Most of the intense discussion in the literature that followed Kripke’s lectures treats contingentaprioriandnecessaryaposterioritruthsastwofacesofthesamecoinor, ix x Introduction to put it differently, two manifestations of the same basic phenomenon.1However, althoughmostphilosophers(atleastthoseimpressedbyKripke’sideasconcerning the rigidity of proper names and the distinction between epistemic and alethic modalities) are convinced by the examples of necessary a posteriori truths, there isatendencyofskepticismregardingthethesisandexamplesofcontingentapriori truths, and a widespread feeling that these cases are artificial, built only for the purposeoftheoreticaldiscussion.2 Shortly after Kripke’s lectures, there was the appearance of Kaplan’s seminal work(1977)onthesemanticsofdemonstrativesandpureindexicalswithanalogous thesesforsentencescontainingthesekindsofexpressions.Sentencessuchas‘Iam here now’ can be known to generate true propositions in any context of utterance, although the propositions must be contingent. From that point on, one issue that dominatedtheliteratureconcerningKripke’scasesofcontingentaprioritruthswas whether all cases of such truths are due to the presence of (explicit or implicit) indexicals, sothatthewholephenomenon couldbeseenaspartofthesupposedly lessproblematicphenomenonofindexicality.3 ThemanyreactionstoKripke’sexamplesof(andtotheprinciplesthat,according tohim,arebehind)contingentaprioritruthsarethemselvesworthstudyingbecause they reveal different approaches to many important issues, such as the nature of stipulative reference-fixing, rigid reference, singular thought, de re a priori knowledge, and so on. While I shall review different attempts of dealing with Kripke’s cases of contingent a priori truths, the main purpose of this book is to develop my own perspective regarding his examples in the first place and, more broadly,onthephenomenonofcontingentaprioritruthsasawhole.Theperspective that I defend does not see Kripke’s cases as resulting from explicit or hidden 1Forexample,Evans’(1979)influentialdiscussionconsiderswhathecallsdeepandsuperficial contingenciesasmoreorlessthesameassuperficialanddeepnecessity,respectively.Davies,in thespiritofEvans,characterizesthecontingentaprioriandthenecessaryaposteriorias“mirror- imagepuzzles”(Davies,2004,p.83). 2Forexample,thisistheviewexpressedinEvans(1977);Evans’ownreconstructionofthecases ofcontingentaprioritruthsisbasedonthenotionofdescriptivename,whichisahighlyartificial kindofnameand,asEvanshimselfrecognizes,veryrareinordinarylanguage.Contrastingthe casesofnecessaryaposterioriwithcontingentaprioritruths,Stalnakersaysthat In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke presented some striking examples that convinced many philosophers that there are truths that are both necessary and a posteriori and also truths that are both contingent and a priori. The classic examples of the former are identitystatementscontainingpropernames(Hesperus=Phosphorus)andstatementsabout thenatureofnaturalkinds(Goldhasatomicnumber79).Realisticexamplesofthesecond kindofstatementarehardertocomeby—perhapstherearenone—butonceoneseesthe idea,itiseasytoconstructartificialexamples.(Stalnaker,2001,p.141) 3Many authors tend to be more comfortable with Kaplan’s cases of indexical sentences that producetruepropositionsinanycontext.ThisissoprobablybecauseanimportantpartofKaplan’s theoryofindexicals,namely,thedistinctionbetweencontent(i.e.thepropositionexpressed)and character, has already become the received view, so that apriority and contingency are seen as belongingtodistinctdimensions.
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