considering character and excuses as blame mitigation

242 Pages·2016·2.04 MB·English

by  Eero Kaila

Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Helsinki
Finland

CONSIDERING CHARACTER AND EXCUSES
AS BLAME MITIGATION
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STRAWSONIAN AND ARISTOTELIAN
ACCOUNTS OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

Eero Kaila

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences of
the University of Helsinki, for public examination in Auditorium XIII,
University main building, on the 28 of January 2017, at 10 am.

Helsinki 2017
ISSN 2343-273X (pbk.)
ISSN 2343-2748 (PDF)
ISBN 978-951-51-2583-5 (pbk.)
ISBN 978-951-51-2584-2 (PDF)

Unigrafia
Helsinki 2017
ABSTRACT
This dissertation is aimed at clarifying the concept of moral responsibility
within Anglophone, analytic ethics broadly defined, as well as looking at the
concept of character to inquire about its role embedded within these
theories. In this work, it is claimed that considerations of character matter
when moral responsibility is assessed.
Two families of theories of moral responsibility are compared with each
other starting with Peter F. Strawson’s sentimentalist theory, originated in
his influential article “Freedom and Resentment” (Strawson, 1962) and
followed by work of others including R. Jay Wallace (1994). Scholarship on
Aristotle's theory provides the basis for a similar framework of responsibility
for action (NE III.1).
Other aspects of Aristotle’s work provide additional depth to his concept
of moral responsibility however. Character differs greatly in emphasis in
Aristotle's theory from that of Strawson. It is claimed here that character is
an essential part of human agency, and is thus a defining factor for actions
taken. It is also claimed since that character is not a precise concept, taking it
fully into account presents a formidable challenge to all theories attempting
to explain responsibility exhaustively.
In Strawson’s case, the further claim is made that what is traditionally
discussed in terms of character is rephrased in terms of pleas and special
conditions, which amount together into excuses instead. One common
concept that both of these doctrines utilize is blame. Blame (usually
accompanied with praise) is identified as a crucial component of
responsibility by a majority of thinkers writing on the subject, and this
reasoning is followed here as well.
An aporetic conclusion supporting critical sources is reached in terms of a
common understanding of moral responsibility in Part I. The Aristotelian
notion of character and the Strawsonian notion of excuse will be re-visited as
examples of blame mitigation within the context of these theories in the
systematic section of Part II. Analysis is conducted based on Bernard
Williams’s (1993 & 1997) explication of elements of responsibility, where a
comparison is done between character and excuses appearing in the two
families of theories of responsibility. Based on the findings it is concluded
that the two theoretical families share similarity of structure regardless of the
difference in their age, in a way that no matter whether character or excuses
are used to describe the alteration of initial judgment, in terms of the end
results blame mitigation appears to happen identically in all cases.
Examination of character in the context of philosophy of responsibility
shows that there is room for expansion in the narrower attempts to define
the concept. Comparisons of both of these theoretical alternatives are
illustrated with examples and further discussion is called for.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The conception of this thesis owes a great deal to the “Responsibility: A
Philosophical Enquiry into Ethics and Politics of the Concept” research
project, from which gave this effort a great start, the project leader and
supervisor Dr. (docent) Olli Loukola having been a constant source of
assistance. I've worked most in a team with Markus Neuvonen. Our
discussions as well as the conference presentations we’ve done together have
been hugely important for this work. Liuda Kočnovaitė's philosophical
insights, not to mention her organizational skills, have also been remarkable.
Additionally, even though with us only for a short time, Frank Martela was
present at a key moment in terms of seeking initial funding for our three-year
project. He has since been a great influence as a prolific public writer as well.
Thanks to Joonas Leppänen and Sanna Tirkkonen for being good friends
and co-workers as room-mates at the “oppiaine”. My senior colleagues
Teemu Toppinen, Annamari Vitikainen and Simo Kyllönen, with whom I
have shared work-space as well, have all done extremely well in academia,
and thus have set the bar high. Additionally, Henrik Rydenfelt, Johanna
Ahola-Launonen, Dina Babushkina, Malin Grahn-Wilder, Säde Hormio,
Juhana Lemetti and Ville Paukkonen, to all of whom I am equally indebted,
are people who have been especially efficient in organizing, presenting and
giving feed-back at the various conferences, seminars and other occasions
that we have met at. These thanks really extend to each and every person
working on floors 5 and 6 in the A-wing of Metsätalo now and in the past.
The number of helpful, brilliant people there has been too large to be
possible for me to thank individually. Please accept my apologies for the
inevitable omissions.
Professors Timo Airaksinen, Uskali Mäki as well as the university
lecturers Olli Loukola, Heta Gylling and Arto Siitonen were in charge, while I
was at the department. Professors Jaakko Kuorikoski and Aki Lehtinen have
done good work recently. Long-time head of department Kristian Klockars
has also been very gracious in his trust in my abilities leading to my
occasional stints as an assisting teacher at the department. The invaluable
commentary provided by the pre-examiners Mikael Karlsson and Jussi
Suikkanen helped to clarify key features of this final version. Thanks to Ilpo
Halonen and Karolina Kokko-Uusitalo for running the office without a hitch.
Of professors from other institutions whom I’ve met, Jane L. McIntyre,
Christia Mercer, Jonas Olson and Henry Rosemont Jr. have made a positive
impression as being exemplary academicians.
Extra special thanks go to aforementioned colleagues, who took great
pains in reading and commenting on my (awful, awful) drafts. To these
people, I am eternally grateful. Thanks to Inkeri Koskinen for informing me
about a work space (suoja). Salutations to Severi Hämäri, Tero Ijäs and Pii
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Telakivi too for sharing your struggles at a writing club a while back. Grateful
thanks to Markku Oksanen for advice on structure, and to Matias Slavov and
Aino Lahdenranta as well for recommending me as a session chair at the
Hume Society conference, where at I met countless smart and delightful
people, including the author of one of the articles referred here, professor
emerita McIntyre. Grateful thanks to all my friends who have given me
positive encouragement throughout the years.
The research completed for this dissertation has been funded for the most
part by the University of Helsinki and its various offices, including three-year
funding for the above-mentioned project, personal grants from The Research
Foundation of the University of Helsinki, The Fund for Humanities and
Social Sciences, as well as the Faculty of Social Sciences. All of these grants
have helped the work progress. Additionally, the Department of Political and
Economic Studies has employed me sporadically as a teacher and as a
supervisor of exams, for which I am also grateful. The Emil Aaltonen
Foundation provided me with a much needed boost for the finalization
period with their encouragement grant in the summer of 2016. Finally, I
have enjoyed travel grants provided by the Chancellor’s office in Helsinki, the
former national Doctoral School of Philosophy and a very generous one from
the University of Oslo.
Last, but not least, my unending gratitude goes to my wife Katja and my
son Helmer. Throughout my graduate studies, Katja has been working all the
while, supporting our family. My son, Helmer, naturally the most important
person in my life, is doing well in school. The years shared with Katja,
Helmer and Alisa the Basset Hound have been the best, and I hope for many
more. My heart-felt thanks go to my family including parents Erkki and Pirjo,
sisters, Ella, Marja and Anna, grandparents Helmi✝, Leena and Mauno, as
well as the families of aunt Raija, in-laws Paavo and Marja and sisters-in-law
Kirsi and Karita.

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Chapter 5 is based on scholarly work done in preparation for the previously
published, peer-reviewed Finnish-language article on the topic of Aristotle's
conception of responsibility in Historiallinen aikakauskirja 02/11 (Kaila
2011). Since its publication, the work on the article has been expanded from
these efforts and presented at the World Congress of Philosophy XIII in
Athens, Greece in August 2013.
Parts of the thesis have been additionally presented at the following
venues: Two graduate student conferences of the former Finnish Doctoral
School of Philosophy were participated in Tampere in 2011 and 2012. The
topics of these were focused on moral sense theory. A general presentation of
the concept of character in theories of responsibility was held at the same
venue in 2013. The analysis section (chapter 7) was later presented and
discussed at the University of Helsinki’s Moral and Political Philosophy
Research seminar in December of the same year. A paper was read at a
graduate seminar in 2014 held by (the new) doctoral programme of
University of Helsinki. This occasion was dedicated to the methodology
section of this work, which is found in chapter 2. Finally, a presentation on
Wallace's exemptions (ch. 4.1.2) was presented at the University of Turku in
spring of 2016.

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For Katja & Helmer

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CONTENTS
Abstract ................................................................................................................... 3
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................. 3
Contents ................................................................................................................. 8
1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 11
2 Methodology and Scope ............................................................................... 17
2.1 Methodology ....................................................................................... 19
2.2 Literature review .................................................................................24
Part I: Two Theories of Responsibility ...................................................... 31
3 Strawsonian Responsibility ......................................................................... 32
3.1 Responsibility in “Freedom and Resentment” .................................. 40
3.1.1 The Problem of Determinism ..........................................................42
3.1.2 Reactive Sentiments and Blame ..................................................... 49
3.1.3 Special Considerations or Pleas ....................................................... 56
3.1.4 The Web of Human Attitudes and Feelings .................................... 59
3.2 Summary .............................................................................................62
4 Responses to Strawson ............................................................................... 64
4.1 R. Jay Wallace’s Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. ............. 65
4.1.1 Wallace’s Strawsonian Responsibility ............................................ 66
4.1.2 Excuses and Exemptions .................................................................70
4.1.3 Reflective Self-control and the Morality System ............................. 74
4.2 Discussion: The Current Debate on Blame ....................................... 83
4.3 Criticism ............................................................................................. 94
4.3.1 Herbert Fingarette: “Responsibility” .............................................. 98
4.3.2 Marion Smiley: Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of
Community ................................................................................................100
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4.3.3 Bernard Williams: Shame and Necessity & “Moral
Responsibility and Political Freedom” ...................................................... 103
4.3.4 Gary Watson “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil:
Variations on a Strawsonian Theme” ........................................................ 110
4.4 Summary ............................................................................................116
5 Aristotelian Responsibility ........................................................................ 118
5.1 Aristotle’s Theory of Responsibility ................................................. 120
5.1.1 Responsibility for Action ............................................................... 123
5.1.2 Character, Virtues, and Moral Responsibility ............................... 133
5.1.3 The Political Responsibility of the Citizen ..................................... 140
5.2 Discussion: Responsibility for Character in NE III.5 – Moral
Responsibility or Moral Education? .............................................................. 144
5.3 Summary ........................................................................................... 155
End of Part I “What does responsibility mean here?” .............................. 156
Part II: Character and Excuses in Theories of Responsibility ........... 160
6 Concepts of Character and Excuse ............................................................ 163
6.1 Moral Character ................................................................................ 166
6.2 Moral Excuses: From Strawson’s Special Considerations to
Watson’s Exemptions .................................................................................... 175
6.3 Examples ........................................................................................... 190
6.4 Summary ........................................................................................... 196
7 Analysis ..................................................................................................... 200
7.1 Aristotle’s Character-based Blame Mitigation ................................ 203
7.2 Strawson’s and Wallace’s Excuse-based Blame Mitigation .............205
7.3 Findings ............................................................................................ 210
8 Concluding Statements.............................................................................. 213
8.1 The Argument of this Work .............................................................. 213
8.2 Discussion ......................................................................................... 216
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9 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 227
Bibliography ...................................................................................................... 232
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