Table Of Content

Consciousness as Complex Event Consciousness as Complex Event: Towards a New Physicalism provides a new approach to the study of consciousness. The author argues that what makes phenomenal experiences mysterious is that these experiences are extremely complex brain events. The text provides an accessible introduction to descriptive complexity (also known as Kolmogorov Complexity) and then applies this to show that the most influential arguments against physicalism about consciousness are unsound. The text also offers an accessible review of the current debates about consciousness and introduces a rigorous new conception of physicalism. It concludes with a positive program for the future study of phenomenal experience. It is readable and compact and will be of interest to philosophers and cognitive scientists, and of value to advanced students of philosophy. Key Features • Provides a new approach to the study of consciousness, using information theory. • Offers a valuable discussion of physicalism, of use in other disciplines. • Contains an introduction to the main literature and arguments in the debate about consciousness. • Includes an accessible overview of how to apply descriptive complexity to philosophical problems. Craig DeLancey is Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York. He is the author of Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal about Mind and Artificial Intelligence (2001) and A Concise Introduction to Logic (2017). Consciousness as Complex Event Towards a New Physicalism Craig DeLancey First published 2023 by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 and by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 Craig DeLancey The right of Craig DeLancey to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-032-33450-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-34131-6 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-32068-5 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003320685 Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC For Aletheia and Lorena Contents Preface ix 1 Complexity in Mind 1 2 The Inadequacy Claims 38 3 Strong Physicalism 69 4 Refuting the Anti-Physicalist Arguments 94 5 Subjectivity and the Sample Bias 141 Afterward: Consciousness as Complex Event 157 Bibliography 159 Index 166 Mortal, that thou mayest understand aright, I humanize my sayings to thine ear, Making comparisons of earthly things, Or thou mightst better listen to the wind, Whose language is to thee a barren noise, Though it blows legend-laden thro’ the trees. —Keats Preface 0.1 Key Claims of the Text This book defends a theory about consciousness. My concern is with the quali- tative nature of consciousness and, in particular, with a class of phenomenal experiences that I call the “paradigmatically mysterious phenomenal experiences.” By this, I mean the kinds of phenomenal experiences that philosophers typically cite as mysterious. The theory rests on three claims. 1. Paradigmatically mysterious phenomenal experiences have constitutive properties that are extremely complex. 2. Our current theories, and our current observations, about phenomenal experiences do not include all the information required to explain those experiences. These theories and observations are much less complex than the properties that constitute the phenomenal quality of paradigmatically mysterious phenomenal experiences. 3. Our judgments about a paradigmatically mysterious phenomenal experience, and our memories of that experience, cannot include all the information required to explain that experience. Rather, our judgments and memories typically include sufficient information to distinguish the kind of experience from relevant other kinds of experiences. These claims require significant clarification, but if correct, they show that our theories and beliefs are not sufficient to enable accurate judgments about what is possible with respect to phenomenal experiences. As a result, the contem- porary arguments against physicalism about phenomenal experience all fail. The notion of complexity used here will be explained at some length in the text, drawing upon that branch of logic variously known as descriptive complexity or Kolmogorov complexity, and which is closely related to minimal description length (MDL) theory. These are empirical claims, and ultimately their defense must rest upon fur- ther corroboration. However, I give a number of reasons to believe that each is true. Furthermore, one reason to pursue the theory is because of its produc- tivity and utility. Most of my work in this book is to explore the implications