Conceiving Nature after Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel : The Philosopher’s Guide to the Universe.

310 Pages·2017·1.91 MB·English

by  Winfield

Richard Dien Winfield
Conceiving Nature after Aristotle, Kant, and
Hegel
The Philosopher’s Guide to the Universe
Richard Dien Winfield
Department of Philosophy, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA
ISBN 978-3-319-66280-0 e-ISBN 978-3-319-66281-7
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66281-7
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017950399
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher,
whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation,
reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any
other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation,
computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in
this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor
the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material
contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains
neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Cover illustration: © 2010 Luis Argerich
Printed on acid-free paper
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
In memory of my father-in-law, Suresh Gupta (1930–2016)
Contents
1 Introduction
2 The Presuppositions of Ancient and Modern Conceptions of Nature
2.​1 Theology, Philosophy, and the Presuppositions of Natural Science
2.​2 Ancient Theology and Ancient Science of Nature
2.​3 Nature as Product of Making Versus Nature as Product of Generation
2.​4 Theological and Philosophical Presuppositions of Modern Science
Bibliography
3 How and Where to Begin Conceiving Nature:​ Three Fundamental Options
3.​1 The Aristotelian Approach to Nature
3.​2 With What Should the Philosophy of Nature Begin?​
3.​3 Aristotle’s Privileging of Place as Primary
3.​4 The Kantian Approach to Space and Time
Bibliography
4 Space-Time and Matter
4.​1 Hegel’s Account of the Emergence of Matter from Space, Time, and Place
4.​2 Problems Arising in Aristotle’s Conception of Matter
4.​3 Kant’s Dynamic Account of Matter
Bibliography
5 Matter and Motion
5.​1 Aristotle’s Account of Locomotion and Its Relation to the Other Changes of Nature
5.​2 The Abiding Problem of Self-motion
5.​3 Kant and the Problem of Determining Mass
5.​4 Mechanics and Absolute Motion
Bibliography
6 From Relative to Absolute Mechanics
6.​1 Implications of Aristotle’s Account of Motion
6.​2 The Impoverishment of Natural Process by Kantian Pure Mechanics
6.​3 Hegel’s Rethinking of the Mechanics of Matter in Motion
Bibliography
7 Physical Process and Light
7.​1 Preliminary Outline of the Divisions of Physical Process
7.​2 Aristotle’s Physics of Light
7.​3 Hegel’s Account of Light
7.​4 Light and Qualitative Physics
Bibliography
8 The Physical States of Matter
8.​1 The States of Matter
8.​2 The Lessons of Aristotle’s Account of the Elements
8.​3 Kant and the Physical States of Matter
8.4Hegel’s Account of Density, Cohesion , and the States of Matter
Bibliography
9 The Physics of Particular Qualities
9.​1 The Void, Density, Elasticity, and Pure Mechanics
9.​2 Kant and Chemical Process
9.​3 Kant and the Problem of Physical Form in Natural Science
9.​4 Hegel’s Physics of Particular Individuality
9.​5 Density
9.​6 Cohesion
9.​7 Elasticity, Sound, and Heat
Bibliography
10 From Thermodynamics to Electromagnetism​
10.​1 The Ambiguous Position of Hegel’s Account of Thermodynamics
10.​2 Shape and the Physics of Total Individuality
10.​3 Polar Charge and Electricity
10.​4 Magnetism
10.​5 Magnetism and Crystal Formation
10.​6 Magnetism, Crystallization and the Physical Independence of Shape
10.​7 Shape in Relation to Physical Processes
10.​8 The Relation of Shape to Light
10.​9 Shape in Relation to Transparency, Refraction, and Color
10.​10 Refraction and Physical Shape
10.​11 Color and Physical Shape
10.​12 Odor, Taste, and Physical Shape
Bibliography
11 From Electricity to Chemistry
11.​1 Electricity as the Final Form of Total Individuality
11.​2 Light and Electricity
11.​3 How Electricity Provides the Enabling Conditions of Chemical Process
11.​4 What Chemical Process Makes Possible:​ Anticipatory Sketch of Hegel’s Threefold
Division of Organic Nature
11.​5 The Chemistry of Nature
11.​6 Is Chemistry a Terrestrial Process?​
11.​7 Formal Non-chemical Process Versus Real Chemical Process
11.​8 The Basic Forms of Chemical Process
11.​9 The Finitude of Chemical Process
11.​10 The Catalyst in Chemical Process
11.​11 Hegel’s Differentiation of Chemical Elements
11.​12 From Chemical Process to Life
Bibliography
Works Cited
Index
© The Author(s) 2017
Richard Dien Winfield, Conceiving Nature after Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-
66281-7_1
1. Introduction
Richard Dien Winfield1
(1) Department of Philosophy, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA

Richard Dien Winfield
Email: [email protected]
The following is an exploration of forbidden delights. We are going to be examining what the
current academy will not allow to be addressed, something considered so inappropriate as not to
qualify for any serious study. Our tabooed subject is the philosophy of nature , which the
reigning orthodoxy has sought to put into oblivion by supplanting it with the philosophy of
science.
Once upon a time the science of nature was the philosophy of nature . For many centuries
there was no distinction between the two, but since early modern times, a science of nature has
set itself apart from philosophy. More recently academia has become dominated by the view that
the philosophy of nature is a meaningless enterprise and that all reason can do with respect to
nature is engage in a philosophy of science, reflecting on the methodology of empirical
investigations of the universe. This substitution of philosophy of science for philosophy of nature
is grounded in the assumption that when it comes to knowledge of determinate objects, reason is
utterly powerless and instead must hand over all efforts to know specific subject matter to
sciences guided by observation. Incapable of knowing nature by reason, all philosophy can do is
reflect on the operations of empirical science.
Reason is here regarded to be merely analytic in character. Allegedly reason is incapable of
generating any new content of its own, let alone of relating conceptual determinations to
anything else. All reason can supposedly do is analyze what is contained within given concepts
and distinguish what is and is not identical with them. Consequently, when philosophers reflect
upon the results of empirical observation they can do nothing more than certify to what degree
scientific theory is coherent and consistently applied to its data. As for reason itself, it is reduced
to a barren scaffold that can be understood in terms of a formal logic, which regards thought as
not having any intrinsic content, as always being about matters which lie outside thought.
Therefore the logic of thinking is formal, a logic of thinking any content whatsoever insofar as
there are no contents intrinsic to thought. On these terms, all thought can know in understanding
itself is its formal identity, that it is at one with itself in whatever content it engages in thinking.
Thought may analyze independently given contents, but thought has no power to generate any
contents of its own, to relate different contents to one another, be they conceptual or non-
conceptual, or to secure any relationship between concepts and what is other than thought.
Such is the prevailing view that rules the philosophical academy. Under its sway, there are no
courses in philosophy of nature ; there are only courses in the philosophy of science.
Nonetheless, this reduction of reason to an empty scaffold, reducing philosophy to an analysis of