COMPETITION: Swine Chain Performance and Efficiency INTRODUCTION

23 Pages·2015·0.42 MB·English

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BORGES, W. J.; SOUZA, J. P.; BANKUTI, S. M. S.

COMPETITION: Swine Chain Performance and Efficiency
William José Borges(1)
Instituto Federal de Santa Catarina/IFSC, Jaraguá do Sul/SC

José Paulo de Souza(2)
Sandra Mara Schiavi Bankuti(3)
Universidade Estadual de Maringá/UEM, Maringá/PR

ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research is to analyze how the performance of agents integrating the pork system in
western Paraná-Brazil is influenced by the presence of strictly coordinated systems. This research considers
the interactions between agents integrating strictly coordinated structures in the swine production system of
Paraná-Brazil. Based on the asymmetry of performance between pork producers and the processing
segment, even under the guidance of the latter, this paper considered two complementary theoretical
frameworks: Transaction Cost Economics and Industrial Organization. Results showed that certain elements
constituting "structure-conduct-performance" paradigm are capable of influencing the survival and growth
of producers. Thus, although different performance levels were obtained, producer performance appears to
be sustainable, based on the diversification of properties and maintenance of links to processors.
Key Words: Strictly coordinated system; Swine industry; Transaction costs.

RESUMO
O objetivo desta pesquisa é analisar como arranjos estritamente coordenados localizados na região Oeste do
Paraná-Brasil, influenciam no desempenho de agentes do segmento produtor de suínos que integram esses
sistemas. Tomando como pressuposto a assimetria de desempenho entre os agentes produtores, a análise do
desempenho se deu por intermédio do estudo complementar de duas correntes teóricas: a Economia dos
Custos de Transação e a Teoria da Organização Industrial. Para isso, utilizou-se de trabalho empírico de
natureza qualitativa e descritiva, que envolveu produtores e processadores de carne suína. Como resultado
identificou-se que os elementos do campo "estrutura-conduta-desempenho" são capazes de influenciar a
sobrevivência e o crescimento de produtores. Assim, embora apresentem níveis diferenciados, o
desempenho do produtor se apresenta sustentável nos últimos cinco anos, pautado na diversificação
produtiva e manutenção do vínculo com o processador.
Palavras-chave: Subsistema Estritamente Coordenado; Produção de suínos; Custos de Transação.

INTRODUCTION such scientific improvement, this research is
directed to the comprehension of
Market interactions involving performance in the pork chain, considering
agrifood chain agents are a complex research the economic analysis of a phenomenon
field, presenting wide possibilities for named performance.
theoretical development. In order to promote

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COMPETITION: SWINE CHAIN PERFORMANCE AND...

According to a report by the considering the firm’s behavior as a function
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and of transactions.
Supply (MAPA), pork meat is considered the Structural changes in the pork chain
world’s main source of animal protein, and their operational and competitive
representing almost half of global meat consequences, as well as the importance of
production and consumption. In Brazil, pork understanding their reflexes on coordination
meat accounted for 15,25% of national meat among agents under IO and TCE approaches,
consumption in 2012 while beef accounted support the following objective: to analyze
for 37,22%, according to data by the Brazilian how the performance of swine producers
Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE, integrating the pork system in western
2012). Paraná state is influenced, considering the
Pork production has undergone presence of strictly coordinated systems.
substantial changes in recent years, including
chain reorganization and professionalization THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
of the production process. Those changes
involve technological advances, increased This article is structured to create a
exports and changes in consumption habits, logical and didactic sequence for
leading producers to invest in handling, understanding the phenomenon, involving
genetics, nutrition and animal health in order Industrial Organization (IO) and New
to improve productivity (ABIPECS, 2011). Institutional Economics (NIE) approaches –
Thus, new arrangements have emerged along the latter comprising TCE. They will be
pork chain, such as strictly coordinated presented and analyzed for a deeper
systems, in order to deal with process understanding of these theories, and the
continuity and integration in the processing discussion will be complemented by
segment. In that case, interdependency brings considerations on the Strictly Coordinated
the need for efficient coordination and Subsystem, a model by which all agents in
governance of production. Hence, the study this study are involved.
of strictly coordinated systems considers the
impact of specific governance structures on INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
producers, binding their actions and limiting
negotiations with buyers. Changes in North American
The aim of this work is to analyze regulatory agencies and antitrust policy in
the functioning of swine producers in Paraná, the earlier 20th century generated a large
considering monopolistic characteristics research agenda for IO (FARINA et al., 1997;
involving strictly coordinated systems. SAES, 2009). Aiginger et al. (1998) stated that
Theories supporting this study include IO was the first to consider the existence of
Industrial Organization (IO) and Transaction product differentiation, economies of scale,
Cost Economics (TCE). IO lends support to large companies transacting in the market,
evaluate relationships among agents, among other aspects that did not concern
considering markets, institutions and microeconomics. The scope of IO, as
processes. TCE, on the other hand, brings a proposed by Scherer and Ross (1990), is to
micro analytical perspective to the study, analyze market processes in order to identify

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BORGES, W. J.; SOUZA, J. P.; BANKUTI, S. M. S.

how they can guide firms’ activities to meet mechanisms, markets, among other issues.
consumer demand and, from that, What differentiates one from the other is the
understand the reasons for failure and meaning used to treat competition –
propose alternative corrections. Farina et al. performance for the former and efficiency for
(1997, p. 20) observe that “the concern about the latter. In this perspective, the traditional
market power consequences and its Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP)
determinants remains the central aim of IO”. paradigm falls in the traditional line of
On the other hand, as pointed out by Industrial Organization. The primary model,
Coase (1991), the real purpose of IO is to according to Tirole (1988), brings a sense of
determine which forces are responsible for gradation in its concept; structure determines
industrial organization, how such forces conduct, which influences performance.
change over time and what changes can be Analyzing that paradigm, Farina et
expected, considering this power in the al. (1997) highlighted that structure
organization. Within the scope of IO, represents the essence of markets and
considering competitive pressures, efficient industries in the economy, identifying their
market settings minimize industry costs. life cycle, structure, patterns of competition
Thus, the theory assumes the survival and consumption characteristics. To those
hypothesis to justify its fundamental authors, conduct refers to individual
assumption, which is to maximize profits behavior to market prices, pricing,
(FARINA et al, 1997). segmentation, differentiation, internal
Bain (1956) was responsible for first growth, among other factors. Lastly,
schematizing a model to discuss firm performance evaluates company prosperity,
performance considering industry or their growth and survival in the market.
characteristics – a model named the Thus, the paradigm follows the
Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm. development of the economy, analyzing
Industrial organization literature has shown market agents, products being sold,
that there is not a simple unidirectional investments influencing performance,
causal relationship comprising market efficiency and profit distribution. Likewise,
structure, conduct and performance of firms Azevedo (1998) states that the model seeks to
in the market. This is because one must assess the extent to which imperfect market
consider that the competitive environment is mechanisms limit the ability of the market
shaped by the interaction between market itself to answer the social demands of society
structure, competition patterns and demand for goods and services.
characteristics (JANK et al, 1999). As pointed out by Scherer and Ross
Kupfer and Hasenclever (2002) (1990, p. 6), “[…] not all influences flow from
argue that there are two currents: the basic conditions to market structure towards
traditional and the alternative approach. Both performance. There are also important
seek answers to common questions related to feedback effects”. The new model, used in
business operation, coordination this study, can be viewed in Figure 1.

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COMPETITION: SWINE CHAIN PERFORMANCE AND...

Figure 1: New approach of the Structure-Conduct-Performance model
Source: Adapted from Scherer and Ross (1990).

From the new approach of the SCP market prices. A wealth of knowledge
model, the research turns towards involving TCE was developed from the
understanding the asymmetric performance studies by Williamson (1985), in which the
of pork producers. To that end, we first need costs related to transactions receive evidence.
to understand how transactions are modeled According to Prado and Souza (2009, p. 20),
and what institutional forces can be based on Coase (1991) and Williamson (1985,
established with regard to the new resources 1991), TCE “seeks to understand the origin of
and markets to which the subsystem is firms and more efficient organizational forms
subjected. of production”. As a priority, the
identification of these costs associated with
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS transactions highlights the need to create
mechanisms (or, in this case, governance
Contributions by Coase (1937) and structures) to promote the reduction of these
North (1991) are identified from the New costs.
Economic Institutions perspective and In TCE, transaction is the central
considering the growing interest in the study unit of analysis, and seeks to identify the
of institutions and its economic impacts. attributes related to these transactions and
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) arises the costs associated with trading practices
from that approach emphasizing governance between principal-agent. It could involve
structures and is especially concerned about marketing, trading or sharing resources
the rules used to form governance structures based on property rights (WILLIAMSON,
supporting transactions, as pointed out by 1981, 1985, 2013). According to Williamson
Williamson (1985), Azevedo (2000) and (1981), analysis of the transaction cost
Zylbersztain (2009). approach within the context of economic
According to Zylbersztajn (2005) and organizations focuses on efficiency. The
Williamson (2013), the study of the firm’s measurement costs associated with these TCE
existence and the costs related to its internal characteristics considers the relationships
organization was developed from the between different dealers, including
insights found in the articles The Nature of The contractual arrangements for the protection
Firm (1937) and The Problem of Social Cost of property rights, organizational
(1960) by Coase. These insights presented the coordination as well as the choice of
conceptual foundations to compose governance structures. These structures could
governance structures as alternatives to

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BORGES, W. J.; SOUZA, J. P.; BANKUTI, S. M. S.

involve market, long-term contracts or in this discussion is the perception of quasi-
vertical integration (SAES, 2009). rent appropriation by the parties involved in
The inclusion of opportunism and a transaction (post-contractual opportunistic
the idea of bounded rationality as essential behavior). The possibility of quasi-rent
for determining the appropriate governance appropriation arises when specialized
structure for firms follows what Williamson investments are made and, given the
(1985) indicates as behavioral assumptions. condition of dependency, real possibilities of
Bounded rationality indicates that opportunistic behavior arise. According to
individuals act in accordance with the Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), the
intention rationally defined but limited to existence of opportunistic behavior is implicit
some extent (WILLIAMSON, 2013). in many situations, observing dependence or
Opportunism is identified as the advantages reciprocal relationship between the agents of
from the effort of others, resulting in part a transaction. Even in conditions that are
from bounded rationality condition in which established contractual relations, the
knowledge of the information is unevenly imperfection of these instruments is often
distributed among economic actors. reflected in opportunistic behavior in the
Bounded rationality can somehow future, generating costs from litigation to
encourage opportunistic behavior, whereas protect the right of ownership.
the composition of contracts and transactions In Transaction Cost Economics
is, in general, broad and complex, and almost approach, the long-term contractual solution
impossible to foresee all future contingencies is indicated as a way to reduce the condition
in negotiations (WILLIAMSON, 1981). of opportunistic behavior (MÉNARD, 2004;
Opportunism in this sense arises from this MARTINO, 2010). The contractual solution
perspective of asymmetric information consists of rules to ensure the
because the agent has 'privileges' from implementation of the transaction under
possessing relevant information, as well as agreements and prevent opportunistic
the exploitation of imperfect contracts to gain initiatives, specifying the implications of hold
an advantage and exploit the counterparty in up. In some situations, a contractual solution
the transaction (KLEIN; CRAWFORD; establishes what Klein, Crawford and
ALCHIAN, 1978). Accordingly, it is possible Alchian (1978) call premium, defined as a
to say that the choice of appropriate value added to the transaction as a form of
governance structure responds to the level of encouragement and assurance that the
investment involved in a specific transaction, contract will be fulfilled in order to minimize
which limits market structure and indicates opportunistic behavior. As variations in the
the need to compose hierarchical or hybrid format of contracts, Ménard (2004) notes that
contracts to protect against losses from hybrid forms can flow in a continuum from
opportunistic behavior. forms with weak levels of integration, on one
The condition of future uncertainty end, as trust and influence, to formal
is another perspective that is closely linked to contracts, on the other end.
the possibility of opportunism by agents. The Thus, from the alignment of the
ability to predict future conditions of the transaction attributes with behavioral
environment in which the negotiation assumptions, governance is designed as a
process is also limited. Another central aspect function of minimizing transaction costs, so it
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is possible to identify the most efficient way institutions and the strategic relationship of
to operate. One of these ways, strictly agents in the formation of contracts. The
coordinated subsystems, is the model by author then proposes in a comprehensive
which the farmers interviewed in this study manner that strictly coordinated subsystems
are involved and will be presented next. "[...] are complex organizational
arrangements, involving many agents
Strictly Coordinated Systems simultaneously."
As a theoretical deployment,
Considering the theories and Zylbersztajn and Farina (2003) proposed that
propositions of the New Economics the governance called strictly coordinated
Institutions (NEI), the entire research effort system is consolidated when a firm adopts
focused on the development of effective certain strategies. However, as much as it
coordination of productive activities. These depends on other firms to lower their
activities are associated with immediate and transaction costs and become efficient,
timely responses needed to maintain strategic choice can be unilateral, depending
competitiveness in the market. Among other on the conditions under which firms are
ways to be competitive, the strictly transacting. For the authors, what
coordinated subsystem search efficiency by characterizes a strictly coordinated
lowering transaction costs. Thus, from the subsystem is the adoption of a differentiation
understanding of the firm as a nexus of strategy for a leading chain. This depends on
contracts, as initially developed by Coase the vertical coordination of the leading
(1937), a theoretical body supporting strategic companies, and emphasizes the relationship
decision making in productive activity was between strategies, attributes of the
shaped. transaction and governance structures. Thus,
From the Contract theory a strictly coordinated subsystem implies the
formulated by Williamson (1985), existence of strong vertical ties to deal with
Zylbersztajn and Farina (1999), Zylbersztajn specific assets and clarify the strategic
(2009) and Zylbersztajn and Caleman (2012) positioning of a leader along these vertical
proposed a new theoretical framework, interactions (ZYLBERSZTAJN; FARINA,
namely strictly coordinated subsystems, 1999)
formatted as a governance mechanism able to Furthermore, the authors stress that
coordinate a food chain. Faulin and Azevedo the concept of competitiveness is enhanced,
(2003) complement this proposal stating that from the micro level (competition between
subsystems coexist inside systems of greater firms) to the competition between different
complexity, being composed of firms that subsystems. From a concept of chain
serve various activities to suit a particular competitiveness, Faulin and Azevedo (2003,
purpose. p. 3) understand the strictly coordinated
Zylbersztajn (2009, p. 61) defines the subsystem as "[...] the chain of transactions
strictly coordinated arrangements keeping that take place to produce a final product, in
the transaction as the unit of analysis, and to which parties and counterparties are
consider the contractual nature of identified and ensure continuity of the
agribusiness systems, the importance of relationship by a particular governance

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BORGES, W. J.; SOUZA, J. P.; BANKUTI, S. M. S.

structure”. Thus, the coordination involving competition becomes possible between
different companies in systems and strictly different subsystems. As discussed above,
coordinated subsystems discloses an aspect closely coordinated systems and subsystems,
for the effectiveness of such an arrangement, given the relationship between the parties
considering the flow of information as well as that compose them and the contractual
the operability of such structure. relationship between them, became a
Considering the basic attributes of structure that expanded the notion of firm
transactions for TCE (frequency, uncertainty (ZYLBERSZTAJN; FARINA, 1999). If, on one
and asset specificity) and the behavioral hand, subsystems monitor and create a
assumptions (bounded rationality and pattern of production to compete in the
opportunism), those structures can demand market, on the other hand one has to consider
strong levels of coordination so that the limits and difficulties that arise from
information flows quickly, covering the those practices (CUNHA; SAES, 2005). For
entire production structure that reason, it is necessary to consider the
(ZYLBERSZTAJN; FARINA, 1999). As the mobility barriers that hinder the input and
authors pointed out, the motivation for firms output of agents in production.
to establish strictly coordinated contracts is In that case, a leading company
determined by transaction characteristics, but adopts a differentiation strategy, which
also by competitive pressures imposed by results depend on the coordination of
other coordinating agents. If, for firms taken vertically related firms, in order to guarantee
individually, forming strategies is effective proper input supply and distribution
only in the medium and long term, for the (ZYLBERSZTAJN; CALEMAN, 2012). This
strictly coordinated subsystems the idea is to arrangement has been called strictly
combine the speed of information flow coordinated system (SCS), emphasizing the
between agents and their adjustment, alignment between strategies, transaction
promoting competitiveness between different attributes and governance structures
subsystems (ZYLBERSZTAJN; CALEMAN, (ZYLBERSZTAJN; FARINA, 1999).
2012).
In that sense, considering Farina METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
(1999), the competitive aspect can be viewed
both horizontally (from firm to firm) and In order to fulfill the proposed goal,
vertically (from firm to industry). In that case, a qualitative and descriptive study was
the competitive aspect is different for adopted. As suggested by Creswell (2007),
different segments in relation to their density the intention is to interpret the phenomenon.
and degree of engagement between firms and This understanding was achieved with the
specific assets. That leads to a variation even use of semi-structured interviews with 26
within the same segments, considering the farmers involved in swine production in
specific involvement and attributes handled western Paraná state and integrated into a
by agents. strictly coordinated subsystem. The
In that sense, strictly coordinated interviews directed to get empirical
subsystems are regarded as individual evidences were conducted in December 2012.
entities. As a separate entity, they may The analysis of reliability is
compete with each other – that is, consolidated from the triangulation of data.
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That is because there was interest in making Moreover, all agents are involved in the
an intersection of multiple points of view production chain and compete with other
through the joint work of several researchers, supply chains simultaneously, thus
multiple informants and multiple data increasing the scope of competitiveness in the
collection instruments. Thus, after industry.
conducting interviews with farmers, As expected by Zylbersztajn (2009)
interviews were conducted with key agents, and Zylbersztajn and Caleman (2012), the
representatives of Paraná Institution of study of transactions is complex and
Technical Assistance and Rural Extension therefore must be assessed in a structured
(Emater) and of Farmers’ Association, way. Among the reasons that hinder analyses
considering their knowledge about the are multiple integrated transactions, but also
producers and contractual arrangements occurring in isolation, and the presence of
between farmers and processors. Thus, multiple agents. In this context, the
primary information obtained from these performance of producers was visualized by
interviews was compared, as proposed by considering their permanence or continuity
MINAYO (2001), to increase the internal in the activity, i.e. their survival, and also for
validity of the study. their growth in terms of increasing
The method chosen for result production, investments and acquisitions of
interpretation was content analysis, due to other matrices.
the need to produce inferences to its social As relationships are guided by an
context, following Bauer and Gaskell (2008). interdependence of agents, the processor
Therefore, content analysis was performed requires constant feedback in order to adjust
with the support of interviews, the interest of buyers to the production
transcriptions, data categorization, search for model and remain competitive in the market.
convergence in the responses (content This competitiveness is desired through
analysis) and comparative analysis of the efficiency that coordination, as Cunha and
information with the relevant literature Saes (2005) proposed, the more efficient
review. chains seek for perfect coordination. Among
other functions, the swine production
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION coordination observed seeks to convey
adequately the information, incentives and
Swine production consists of two absolute control over all agents connected by
major production stages: the first is called integration contract.
initialization (pig farming) and the second, Contracts were used by processors
growing phase (hog farming). Although the due to the interdependence of agents and a
second stage has a larger number of farmers possible need for continuous flow
involved, the first is also important in the production. Thus, from the alignment of the
chain and must be analyzed in conjunction transaction attributes with behavioral
with the second, since the supply chain assumptions, strictly coordinated subsystems
should be analyzed as a nexus of contracts, in were configured as a more efficient form to
an interdependence condition operate governance, thus reducing
(ZYLBERSZTAJN; FARINA, 1999). transaction costs. From the definitions of

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BORGES, W. J.; SOUZA, J. P.; BANKUTI, S. M. S.

Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and waste; transport; death of animals. These
Williamson (1985, 1991) and subsequent uncertainties are related to the lack of clear
expansion by Ménard (2004), Martino (2010) information for farmers. The uncertainty
and Williamson (2013), the governance related to the factors identified above justifies
structure used is a contractual form. Besides the statement by Williamson (1985) that
that, the high level of specific assets could uncertainty in a transaction is associated with
indicate hierarch as most suitable the contract the impossibility of predicting the future,
form can reduce transaction and creating a volatile environment to hide
management costs, and answer the market information and ramifications of the
demand. transaction.
Regarding frequency, it was The institutional regulations that
observed that the tool used by the integrator drive transactions bring a sense of equality in
to ensure the transaction was a contract, relationships, in which there is a supplier and
because it is possible to ensure continuity of a buyer with interests. These interests are
production and also make it impossible for intensified to the extent that the specificity of
their client (producer) to negotiate with the assets increases. Among the specific assets
competition (other processors). However, it devised by Williamson (1985), three were
was realized that the producers did not want identified: human, physical and temporal
to end contract with the processor, and the assets. Management, identified as human
integrator has no interest in ending housing assets, was characterized by a specific asset as
either. it is an activity that varies from producer to
That sets up a position of bilateral producer. This confirms Farina’s (2000)
interests to continue production. Producers position that the presence of skilled labor
give up negotiating with other buyers to increases the incidence of specific assets. In
integrate by contract. The contract, in this addition, the facilities used and the
sense, is an instrument that rules the adjustments that occur throughout the
relationship, preventing inappropriate production chain are considered physical
behavior. Although this interest is on both assets, and increase transaction specificity.
sides of the transaction, the sustainability of The temporal aspect was identified as
these transactions is not guaranteed. There involving the transport and fattening of hogs.
are reports of cancellations of contracts with Thus, the notion of return linked
the farmer by the integrator, and other cases directly to human and physical assets is
in which the termination occurred shared by farmers. The interests and concerns
voluntarily. But in all cases, the reason for the turn to training, production diversification
termination was agent performance. and constant learning, but it is extremely
Considering uncertainty, as important to have a high reinvestment rate
proposed by Williamson (1985), Farina et al. destined to owning property, thereby
(1997) stresses that the emergence of increasing performance. However, the
uncertainty is the fact that the parties existence of specific assets, in turn, is linked
involved in the transaction do not know the directly to the assumption of opportunism by
parameters of evaluation and monitoring of economic agents. Therefore, the choice of
who performs the control. Thus uncertainties strictly coordinated governance is justified,
identified and adopted in the analysis are: since the relationship is composed of specific
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assets (hogs) that are closely linked to the end Like other elements of Transaction
objective of the chain that is to produce pork. Cost Economics, opportunism and bounded
However, we must emphasize that the rationality were also identified in the
animals are specific assets from the point of analysis. The lack of rights and duties
view of the processor, but this position is not entailed by the lack of information serve as
observed when considering the justification for the discontent of farmers who
producer/integrator relationship because the do not understand the methodology of the
swine producer, in this structure, is only a system. Thus, bounded rationality, as Simon
trustee. (1971) proposed, is presented by the lack of
The opportunistic action, confirming information generated due to inability to
the behavioral assumption of Transaction predict the second-order effects of actions
Cost Economics, is observed in the and decisions taken in the subsystem.
relationship involving producers and Just as bounded rationality,
processor. That is because there is a contract opportunism has also emerged in the analysis
underlain negotiating parties. However, there of two strands, producer and processor.
are many agreed aspects, enabling the However, the opportunistic effect caused by
exercise of opportunistic actions. The first processors was higher, generating financial
major complaint regards the measurement of impact on producers. The reason is that,
their production, because there is no clear while producers change handling to achieve
and accurate information about what is more profit, processors set rules that must be
valued. Furthermore, there is no information followed. As producers do not have clear
about the impact of measured aspects for information about their rights, they simply
setting prices, thus configuring the sign contracts and consent. A conceptual
consideration of animals as specific assets in model is thus formed that determines the
production. Coupled to this condition of formation of the governance structure used,
production, and as Williamson (1985) which can be seen in Figure 2.
suggests, one must consider the condition of When considering the market
uncertainty arising from this particular asset. structure, it is observed that this favors the
Conversely, the condition of future formation of this subsystem. The study starts
uncertainty is a perspective that is connected with an acceptance that the agents involved
to opportunistic agents. Thus, the proposition in SAG transact in an imperfect market. This
for contracts by Azevedo (2000) was makes room for considering the relationships
corroborated, since producers are of power between the agents while
participating, albeit unintentionally, in the maintaining focus on the determinants of
construction of governance, signing contracts market influence on their performance. Thus,
with the processor. The asymmetry of through a cross-sectional analysis, but with a
information, therefore, is an inducing agent longitudinal perspective, it was possible to
of opportunism, given the inability of understand the forces present in the market,
information processing by the relevant as well as the institutions and actors that
producers, influenced by the competitive influenced the formation of the industry,
environment. providing enough information for an
understanding of the phenomenon.

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