Philosophical Studies Series Series Editor: Luciano Floridi Catrin Misselhorn E ditor Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artifi cial Systems Explanation, Implementation and Simulation Philosophical Studies Series Volume 122 Editor-in-Chief Luciano Floridi , University of Oxford , Oxford Internet Institute , United Kingdom Executive Editorial Board Patrick Allo, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium Massimo Durante, Università degli Studi di Torino, Italy Phyllis Illari, University College London, United Kingdom Shannon Vallor, Santa Clara University Board of Consulting Editors Lynne Rudder Baker, University of Massachusetts at Amherst Stewart Cohen, Arizona State University, Tempe Radu Bogdan, Tulane University Marian David, University of Notre Dame John M. Fischer, University of California at Riverside Keith Lehrer, University of Arizona, Tucson Denise Meyerson, Macquarie University François Recanati, Institut Jean-Nicod, EHESS, Paris Mark Sainsbury, University of Texas at Austin Barry Smith, State University of New York at Buffalo Nicholas D. Smith, Lewis & Clark College Linda Zagzebski, University of Oklahoma More information about this series at h ttp://www.springer.com/series/6459 Catrin Misselhorn Editor Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artifi cial Systems Explanation, Implementation and Simulation Editor Catrin Misselhorn Institute of Philosophy University of Stuttgart Stuttgart , Germany Philosophical Studies Series ISBN 978-3-319-15514-2 ISBN 978-3-319-15515-9 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15515-9 Library of Congress Control Number: 2015948369 Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015 T his work is subject to copyright. 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Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. Printed on acid-free paper Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www. springer.com) Pref ace H uman-machine interaction (HMI) and human-computer interaction (HCI) became popular in the 1980s parallel to the rise of personal computers. At that point, the approaches that were used for simple technical tools seemed no longer appropriate for complex technical devices like computers. In contrast to simple tools, these complex technical devices confronted their users with a huge amount of information and a lot more affordances for interacting with them. Moreover, it became evident that poorly designed human-machine interfaces can lead to serious trouble. A well- known example in the fi eld is the Three Mile Island accident where, among other factors, failures in human-machine interaction led to an accident in a nuclear power plant. This suggested that a more interactive paradigm of human-machine interac- tion was required. Properties like usability, ergonomy, and transparency were approached from a multidisciplinary point of view involving computer sciences, psychology, and other fi elds of study. Since then, even more complex systems involving humans and machines have arisen. These not only comprise a one-on-one interaction between humans and arti- fi cial agents as is the case with computers or robots but also—as the term “artifi cial systems” indicates—complex dynamical structures such as industrial processes, fi nancial transactions, or transportation networks. These systems create new chal- lenges, because they are more autonomous, intelligent, and dynamical, i.e., human beings are not in full control of them, and they are the subject of uncertainty to a much higher degree. To address these issues, a new research paradigm proved nec- essary: human-machine cooperation (HMC). The premise that was unique to this new paradigm was that humans have to c ooperate with machines in order to cope with these complex and dynamical situations. Although the new paradigm has led to progress in this research area, it has a blind spot. It did not suffi ciently take into account the fact that collective agency involving human and artifi cial agents differs in some important respects from indi- vidual agency. The behavior of these systems cannot be reduced to the behavior and intentions of the individuals that constitute them. This is a central insight of the philosophical debate about the collective agency of humans which has been the subject of intense study over the last few decades. Philosophical analyses range v vi Preface from simple forms of “uniform behavior” or “emergent coordination” to complex forms of collective agency which involve shared intentional attitudes like beliefs, intentions, or emotions. However, a shortcoming of these analyses is that they usu- ally do not take into account hybrid systems involving humans and artifi cial agents. The aim of this volume is to bring these two separate strands of research together in order to understand the nature of collective agency in natural, artifi cial, and hybrid systems better and to improve the design and performance of hybrid systems involving human and artifi cial agents. Problems that arise in the construction of these systems are addressed from a theoretical and practical as well as from an ethical point of view. The book consists of four sections. The fi rst section is dedicated to the different conceptions of agency that can be found in the discussion. It is concerned with the question under which conditions an object can be considered as an agent and at which point cooperation and collective agency arise. The fi rst chapter serves as an introduction to the topic of the volume. It provides a conceptual framework of dif- ferent forms of individual as well as collective agency and cooperation in natural and artifi cial systems in order to help the reader to better understand and situate the goals and arguments of the other contributions. In the second chapter, Fiebich, Schwarzkopf, and Nguyen analyze the notion of cooperation at the intersection of philosophy, psychology, and informatics with the aim of describing different forms of cooperation and collective agency involving humans and robots in a two- dimensional framework. Sabine Thürmel provides a gradual and multidimensional concept of agency that applies to the interaction of human with non-human agents. Her approach combines elements from Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory (ANT), the socio-technical approach to distributed agency of Rammert and colleagues, and Luciano Floridi’s view of artifi cial agents. T he second section of the book turns to human-machine cooperation. Ipke Wachsmuth argues for the view that embodied cooperative systems should not just be seen as tools but have to be treated as partners. He then shows how different levels of intentionality (including emotions) – which are necessary for endowing technical systems with collaborative functionality – have been implemented in the humanoid artifi cial agent Max by his Bielefeld research group. The example of Max might lead to the assumption that artifi cial agents should be as human-like as possible in order to make human-machine cooperation natural and intuitive. Yet, as the so-called hypothesis of the Uncanny Valley suggests, this is not the case. Very human-like artifi cial agents actually produce negative feelings of eeriness in humans. Valentin Schwind tracks in his contribution the cognitive and subconscious mechanisms which are responsible for this phenomenon. He argues that cultural, social, and aesthetic aspects of the phenomenon have so far not received the attention that they deserve. Hauke Behrendt, Markus Funk, and Oliver Korn provide examples of human- machine cooperation in practice—assistive technologies at workplaces—and dis- cuss their ethical implications. How do they change the individual workplaces and the working environment? May handicapped people profi t from these technologies in terms of better inclusion in the world of employment? How do assistive Preface vii t echnologies have to be evaluated regarding justice and the meaning of work for the individual good life? Christian Neuhäuser takes up another ethical issue that is becoming more pressing the more autonomous and cognitively powerful artifi cial systems get. He addresses the question of whether robots can be morally responsi- ble for their doings. His answer to this question is in the negative, but he neverthe- less suggests that artifi cial systems can form part of responsibility networks together with humans. The focus of the third section is the transition from individual to collective agency. Most of the contributions in this part challenge some of the assumptions that more standard views of collective agency have made so far. One of these assumptions is that collective agency involves collective intentionality or the so- called we-intentions. Olle Blomberg, in contrast, describes forms of joint action that do not require genuine collective intentionality or we-intentions, but only agent- neutral goals. Another infl uential view in the collective agency debate is that collective inten- tionality involves the interconnected planning of several agents. Stephen Butterfi ll questions this view in his contribution and tries to show that parallel planning can, in certain cases, already be suffi cient for genuine collective agency. In contrast to interconnected planning, in parallel planning each agent individually forms a plan of his or her own and the other’s actions. Tom Poljansek argues in his chapter that small-scale models (like going for a walk together) which are mostly used as the paradigm of collective agency are mis- leading and that one has to include cases of large-scale collective agency in order to understand the phenomenon properly. Among the aspects that have an impact on large-scale collective agency, the “feeling of belonging to a group” fi gures promi- nently for him. A nna Strasser then turns to the question of which conditions are necessary for artifi cial systems to be part of collective action. She holds that the standard philo- sophical views of collective agency are cognitively much too demanding and that there are simpler forms of collective agency involving humans and artifi cial systems. As Strasser argues by drawing parallels to non-human animals and small children, these forms of collective agency amount to more than mere tool use. Finally, Mog Stapleton and Tom Froese challenge the theoretical framework that underlies many theories of collective agency with the help of the enactivist para- digm in cognitive science. According to them, the fault of the received views is that they abstract away from the biological body as the foundation of cognition and agency. Stapleton and Froese develop a gradual concept of collective agency for biological agents, but remain skeptical when it comes to the possibility of collective agency of computational agents. The fourth and fi nal section concerns social simulations and their relevance for collective agency. The aim of these simulations is to explain and predict the behav- ior of collectively acting systems. Moreover, they may also help to improve our understanding of collective agency in general. Meike Tilebein and Maximilian Happach show how simulations are used to model social interaction processes in management science. Eckhart Arnold uses the example of Axelrod’s famous viii Preface simulations of the evolution of cooperation to argue from a philosophical point of view, that one should not trust social simulations naively. Finally, Joanna Bryson discusses social simulations in the broader framework of the cultural evolution of intelligence, particularly the emergence of altruistic behavior. As these examples show, the project of this book is also highly relevant for research and practice in the area of social simulations. The idea for this book goes back to the conference “Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artifi cial Systems” which we organized in July 2013 at the University of Stuttgart. The talks given at the conference provide the basis for the current collection. I would like to thank the University of Stuttgart and the Cluster of Excellence Simulation Technology (SimTech) for the generous support and funding of this conference. I am, moreover, grateful for the extensive help in organizing the conference and preparing the manuscript of this book provided by Hauke Behrendt, Anja Berninger, Jörg Fingerhut, Wulf Loh, Martin Maga, Christoph Michel, Tom Poljansek, Mog Stapleton, and Tobias Störzinger. Last but not least I would like to thank the contributors to this volume who have each written important and innovative contributions to this evolving fi eld of research. Stuttgart, Germany Catrin Misselhorn Contents Part I Concepts of Agency 1 Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems ............................................................................. 3 Catrin Misselhorn 2 Cooperation with Robots? A Two-Dimensional Approach ................. 25 Anika Fiebich , Nhung Nguyen , and Sarah Schwarzkopf 3 The Participatory Turn: A Multidimensional Gradual Agency Concept for Human and Non-human Actors .......................... 45 Sabine Thürmel Part II Human-Machine Cooperation 4 Embodied Cooperative Systems: From Tool to Partnership .............. 63 Ipke Wachsmuth 5 Historical, Cultural, and Aesthetic Aspects of the Uncanny Valley ............................................................................. 81 Valentin Schwind 6 Ethical Implications Regarding Assistive Technology at Workplaces .......................................................................................... 109 Hauke Behrendt , Markus Funk , and Oliver Korn 7 Some Sceptical Remarks Regarding Robot Responsibility and a Way Forward ....................................................... 131 Christian Neuhäuser ix
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