Cognitive Pluralism

373 Pages·2016·9.519 MB·English

by  Steven Horst

Cognitive Pluralism

Cognitive Pluralism

Steven Horst
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
© 2016 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any
electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information
storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.
This book was set in Stone Serif Std by Toppan Best-set Premedia Limited. Printed
and bound in the United States of America.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available.

ISBN: 978-0-262-03423-4

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For Doretta

Contents

Preface xi

I From the Standard View to Cognitive Pluralism 1

1 Introduction: Beliefs, Concepts, and Mental Models 3

1.1 Overview of the Book 7

2 A Standard Philosophical View of Cognitive Architecture 11

2.1 The Central Role of the Concept of Belief 12

2.2 The Three-Tiered Standard View of Cognitive Architecture 14

2.3 Some Philosophical Issues 15

2 .4 A lternative Proposals regarding Architecture 23

3 Central and Modular Cognition 29

3 .1 T he Mind in Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience 30

3.2 Fodor’s Modularity of Mind 35

3 .3 M otivations, Criticisms, and Alternatives 40

4 Beyond Modularity and Central Cognition 47

4 .1 C ore Systems 49

4 .2 F olk Theories 56

4 .3 S cientific Theories 58

4 .4 I ntuitive Reasoning, Semantic Reasoning, and Knowledge

Representation 61

4 .5 M ental Models 77

4 .6 M oving beyond Central and Modular Cognition 78

5 Cognitive Pluralism 81

5 .1 W hat Is Cognitive Pluralism? 83

5 .2 M odules and Models 84

5 .3 M odels and Representation 85

5 .4 R epresentation 86

5 .5 M odels and Idealization 92
viii Contents
5.6 Two Types of Alethetic Virtue 93

5 .7 T ypes of Error 94

5 .8 K nowledge and Understanding 95

5 .9 L ooking Forward 96

I I M odels and Understanding 97

6 Models 99

6 .1 S cale Models (Target Domains, Idealization, and Aptness) 100

6 .2 M aps 103

6.3 Blueprints 111

6 .4 P rogram Code and Flowcharts 114

6 .5 C omputer Models 116

6 .6 F eatures of Models 117

6 .7 M odels as Cognitive Tools 118

6 .8 F urther Considerations 120

7 M ental Models 121

7 .1 T wo Observations 123

7 .2 B eyond Internalization 124

7 .3 A Mental Model of My House 125

7 .4 C hess 131

7.5 Social Contexts 133

7 .6 M oral Models 135

7 .7 M ental Models and Scientific Understanding 136

7 .8 C ore and Folk Systems 141

7 .9 C onclusion 142

8 R elations between Models 143

8 .1 A bstractness 143

8 .2 V ariants 146

8 .3 M etaphorical Transposition 147

8 .4 T riangulation 149

8 .5 D issonance 160

9 O ther Model-Based Approaches 163

9 .1 M odels in Psychology 164

9 .2 M odels in Philosophy of Science 169

9 .3 M odels in Theoretical Cognitive Science 173

1 0 T he Plausibility of Cognitive Pluralism 179

1 0.1 A Good Design Strategy for Evolving Smarter Animals 180

10.2 Still a Good Design Strategy for Animals That Learn 181

1 0.3 T he Advantages of Model Proliferation 184
Contents ix
11 The Complementarity of Models and Language 193

1 1.1 C ognitive Complementarity 194

1 1.2 L anguage and the Priority of Models 198

1 1.3 T wo Objections 201

1 1.4 W hat Language Adds 205

1 1.5 S ummary 211

I II E pistemology, Semantics, Disunity 213

1 2 D isunities of Knowledge, Science, and Understanding 215

1 2.1 V isions of Unity and the Problems They Face 216

1 2.2 D isunity as a Problem 220

1 2.3 M odel-Based Understanding as a Source of Disunity 222

1 2.4 S cientific Disunity 227

1 2.5 I rreducibility 235

1 2.6 C omprehensiveness and Consistency 239

1 3 M odels and Intuition 245

1 3.1 D iscussions of “Intuition” in Psychology 247

1 3.2 I ntuitive and Counterintuitive Judgments 250

1 3.3 M odel Relativity of Intuitiveness 255

1 3.4 M odels, Intuitions, and Expertise 257

1 3.5 M odels and Dispositional Beliefs 258

1 3.6 M odels, Intuition, and Cognitive Illusion 260

1 4 C ognitive Illusion 261

1 4.1 I llusions of Inapt Application 262

1 4.2 I llusions of Unrestricted Assertion 268

1 4.3 I llusions of Unification 274

1 4.4 P rojective Illusion 278

1 5 C ognitive Pluralism and Epistemology 283

1 5.1 W hat Are Beliefs? 284

1 5.2 M odels as Epistemic Units 289

1 5.3 C ognitive Pluralism and Theories of Knowledge 296

1 5.4 A View of the Status of Accounts of Epistemology 305

16 Cognitive Pluralism and Semantics 307

1 6.1 M odels and Semantic Value 309

1 6.2 C ognitive Pluralism and Other Semantic Theories 310

1 6.3 T he Multiple Lives of Concepts 316

1 6.4 C oncepts without Models 317

1 6.5 C oncepts with Multiple Models 319