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134 Pages·2004·2.24 MB·English

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, ISSUE 14/15
New Evidence on North Korea
Introduction
By Kathryn Weathersby
A
mong the states that played a key role in the Cold
War, none has been, or remains, more enigmatic than
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
To its allies within the communist world, North Korea’s
secretiveness, its cult of Kim Il Sung, and its violent provo-
cations against the South were a source of exasperation,
embarrassment, and unease. Nonetheless, North Korea’s
fraternal allies never permanently withdrew their patronage
from the Pyongyang regime, without which the DPRK could
not survive. As O.B. Rakhmanin, Deputy Head of the Inter-
national Department of the Central Committee of the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union, explained to an East German
party official in February 1973, “in the interest of our common
tasks, we must sometimes overlook their stupidities. None of
us agree with the idolatry of Kim Il Sung.” 1
For the United States and its allies, North Korea’s insis-
tence on maintaining an outsized, forward deployed military
force, its refusal to moderate its hostile rhetoric against Seoul
and Washington, and its unpredictable outbursts of violence
against South Korea, coupled with its extreme secretiveness
and highly idiosyncratic version of communism, created the
longest lasting and one of the most acute security problems
of the Cold War era. With no history of diplomatic relations
with Pyongyang and few sources of information on this un-
usually closed country, it has been, and remains, difficult for
North Korea
North Korea analysts in the non-communist world to assess
the intentions behind the DPRK’s troublesome actions,
whether they are working with or without classified informa- spoke with striking candor about the international and do-
tion. As former CIA officer in Korea and Ambassador to Seoul mestic problems facing his embattled state. Thus, as long as
Donald P. Gregg recently noted, “North Korea remains one of the DPRK’s own archives remain inaccessible, the records of
the longest-running intelligence failures in the history of US its close allies provide the best available view from inside
espionage. North Koreans were difficult to approach and North Korea.
almost impossible to recruit and control.” 2 This special section of the Bulletin presents the results
In an effort to fill part of this significant information gap, of the first two years of the Korea Initiative, during which the
CWIHP has launched a special effort, begun with generous project has focused on the East German and Hungarian
support from the Korea Foundation, to mine the archives of archives, as well as on Chinese sources that are available for
the DPRK’s former allies for insights into North Korean analysis by selected researchers, though not for photocopy-
policymaking. The Korea Initiative is combing East Euro- ing or translation in full.
pean and Russian archives, and to a more limited extent those In part one, the Beijing-based historian Shen Zhihua
of China, to uncover and analyze the documentary record of examines Chinese archival and memoir evidence regarding
North Korea’s relations with its fraternal allies. We have the serious tensions that complicated relations between China
discovered that although Pyongyang’s communist allies also and North Korea during the Korean War. His analysis
suffered from the unusual secretiveness of Kim Il Sung’s reveals that the characteristics of the Kim Il Sung regime that
regime, their extensive dealings with the DPRK nonetheless caused friction with its allies in the postwar period cannot be
provided them with a far more intimate view of North Korea attributed solely to the impact of the devastating war of 1950-
than that enjoyed by persons outside the communist world. 53, since they had, in fact, been prominent as early as 1949-
Moreover, in his communications with his East and Central 50. Shen adds an important new perspective to the debate
European counterparts, such as Erich Honecker, Kim Il Sung over the relative influence of China and the Soviet Union on
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NEW EVIDENCE ON NORTH KOREA
North Korea’s war plans against South Korea. He demon- German Democratic Republic (GDR) based on a large body of
strates that Mao Zedong’s government was quick to offer records available in the archives of the Foreign Ministry and
military support to the DPRK, but the North Korean leader- the Socialist Unity Party, as well as on the published memoir
ship refused to accept Chinese assistance until forced to do of the last GDR ambassador to Pyongyang, Hans Maretzki.
so by the UN advance across the 38th parallel. Shen attributes Viewing North Korea’s history within the context of the his-
Kim’s reluctance to overconfidence in his military judgments tory of other small states within the communist camp, Schäfer
and the long history of Chinese interference in Korean af- pinpoints the distinctive features of the DPRK. After
fairs. Kim’s concerns over national sovereignty also led him Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s cult of personality at
to resist Chinese efforts to create a joint Sino-Korean com- the 20th Party Congress in 1956, GDR officials strongly disap-
In his communications with his East European counterparts,
such as Erich Honecker, Kim Il Sung spoke with striking candor
about the international and domestic problems facing
his embattled state.
mand after Chinese troops entered the war. It was only under proved of the ongoing cult of Kim Il Sung. They were
Soviet pressure that Kim eventually agreed to the militarily shocked by the scale of Korean demands for economic assis-
necessary joint command. He likewise resisted placing North tance and were offended by Pyongyang’s refusal to acknowl-
Korean railroads under Chinese military management, agree- edge the considerable aid it received from its allies. After the
ing to this important step only after he was pressured to do Sino-Soviet split erupted into the open, Pyongyang enjoyed
so by the Soviets—a capitulation that, in Shen’s estimate, the anomalous position of being wooed by both its giant
“left a shadow on the heart of Kim Il Sung.” neighbors. Since the GDR had to remain absolutely faithful
In part two, the Hungarian scholar Balazs Szalontai ana- to the Soviet Union, East German representatives in
lyzes North Korean relations with the Soviet Union during Pyongyang banded together with their Soviet counterparts
the Khrushchev years, drawing on extensive research in the to exchange information and discuss the disturbingly unpre-
Hungarian archives. Although Hungarian leaders did not dictable actions of the North Koreans. East German docu-
develop a special relationship with Kim Il Sung comparable ments therefore provide important insight into Soviet atti-
to that of the East Germans, their diplomats were able to gain tudes toward the Kim Il Sung regime as Moscow attempted
excellent information on the internal workings of the Kim to exert leverage over Pyongyang. Schäfer traces the twists
regime thanks to communications from Koreans who had and turns in the DPRK’s foreign policy as Kim turned back
been trained in Hungary and maintained contacts with Hun- toward Moscow in the wake of Mao’s Cultural Revolution,
garian embassy personnel after returning to the DPRK. Com- and then opened negotiations with Seoul in response to the
paring North Korea to other communist countries, Szalontai Sino-American rapprochement of 1972. The warm personal
singles out the DPRK’s dependence on foreign relations that Kim developed with Erich Honecker following
assistance, despotic political system, and isolationism as its the East German leader’s visit to the DPRK in 1977 led to what
distinguishing characteristics. In addition, Pyongyang’s Schäfer terms “reciprocal byzantinism,” the record of which
continued rivalry with Seoul shaped North Korea’s domestic reveals the autocratic delusions of both leaders. Transla-
and foreign policies in distinctive ways. Attributing tions of selected documents follow the article.
Moscow’s failure to ensure de-Stalinization in the DPRK to Part four presents translations of additional documents
Kim Il Sung’s skill at exploiting events such as the Hungarian from the Hungarian National Archives, provided to the Ko-
Revolution of 1956 and Khrushchev’s purge of 1957, as well rea Initiative by Csaba Békés of the Cold War History Re-
as to Soviet arrogance, Szalontai presents a persuasive and search Center in Budapest, and a letter from Kim Il Sung to
original analysis of the roots of North Korea’s remarkable Wladyslaw Gomulka found in the Modern Records Archive
autonomy. He examines in detail the conflict with Moscow in in Warsaw by KI advisory board member Vojtech Mastny. A
1959-60 over Pyongyang’s unification plans and the sharp meeting with Hungarian Minister Károly Pásztor in March
deterioration in relations following the Sino-Soviet split. 1953, during the final phase of the Korean War, provides a
Szalontai concludes that Kim’s victory over the Soviet and starting point by revealing the warm relations that existed
Yenan factions in 1959 marked a turning point in Soviet-North between the two countries during the war, buttressed by the
Korean relations, after which Pyongyang pursued an increas- material, technical, and educational aid provided by Hun-
ingly independent and despotic course. Translations of gary, and the increased stature Kim Il Sung had gained by the
selected documents follow the article. end of the war, despite his humiliating submission to Chinese
In part three, the German historian Bernd Schäfer pre- military control. A meeting with Hungarian Ambassador Pál
sents a cogent history of North Korea’s relations with the Szarvas in June 1955 suggests the extent to which domestic
6
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, ISSUE 14/15
political affairs of any one state were at that time regarded as Dr. Kathryn Weathersby is a CWIHP Senior Research
the common concern of all states within the Soviet bloc. Such Scholar and the coordinator of CWIHP’s Korea Initiative.
solidarity deteriorated sharply in the wake of Nikita Based on extensive research in Russian archives on the So-
Khrushchev’s denunciations of Stalin at the 20th Party Con- viet role in North Korea, her numerous publications in-
gress in Moscow, as revealed in Kim Il Sung’s meeting in clude: “‘Should We Fear This?’ Stalin and the Danger of
September 1956 with Hungarian Ambassador Károly Práth. War with America,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 39, July
A letter from Kim Il Sung a decade later to Wladyslaw Gomulka, 2002; “Stalin, Mao and the End of the Korean War,” in Odd
First Secretary of the Polish Workers’ Party, rejecting the Arne Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the
Polish proposal to convene a conference of communist par- Sino-Soviet Alliance (Stanford University Press, 1998); “De-
ties to discuss coordination of assistance to North Vietnam ceiving the Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang and
in its war against the United States, reveals how seriously the Allegations of Bacteriological Weapons Use in Korea,”
Kim regarded the disagreements within the communist camp, CWIHP Bulletin 11 (1998); “New Russian Documents on
by then greatly exacerbated by the Sino-Soviet split. The the Korean War: Introduction and Translations,” CWIHP
reports from the Hungarian embassies in Pyongyang and Bulletin 6/7 (1996); “To Attack or Not to Attack? Stalin,
Beijing presented in this section are in some respects even Kim Il Sung and the Prelude to War,” CWIHP Bulletin 5
more revealing than the records of conversations at the high- (1995).
est level, since they provide more detailed discussions of
Pyongyang’s domestic and international policies. The Hun- . . . . . . . .
garian diplomats reported on issues such as North Korea’s
approach to the political conference following the Korean NOTES
War, Kim Il Sung’s cult of personality, DPRK relations with
the Third World, the complexities of North Korea’s unifica- 1 Axen visits CC KPSS from 27 Feb—2 March 1973, East Ger-
tion policy, and the effects of the Sino-Soviet split on the man Socialist Unity Party Archive [SAMPO], DY 30 IV B2/2.028
DPRK. (Buro Norden), File 55. Translated by David Wolff for the confer-
In its third year, the Korea Initiative is examining other ence, “The Sino-American Opening and the Cold War,” held at
George Washington University 8-9 February 2002. I am grateful to
East European archives, exploring the sources available in
David Wolff for drawing my attention to this passage.
Russia, and continuing its research in East German, Hungar-
2 Donald P. Gregg. “A Long Road to Pyongyang” The Korea
ian, and Chinese documents. A second Bulletin section will
Society Quarterly, Volume 3, Number 1 (Spring 2002), p 7.
offer additional new evidence indispensable for understand-
ing the frame of mind that accounts for North Korea’s contin-
ued preeminence as a source of international instability.
CWIHP Working Papers Index
All CWIHP Working Papers are available online at http://cwihp.si.edu
#1 Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China’s Entry into the Korean War”
#2 P.J. Simmons, “Archival Research on the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, Prague and Warsaw”
#3 James Richter, “Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards Germany during the Beria Interregnum”
#4 Vladislav M. Zubok, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War:
The ‘Small’ Committee of Information, 1952-53”
#5 Hope M. Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence on
the Dynamics of Soviet-East
German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-61”
#6 Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-62)”
#7 Mark Bradley and Robert K. Brigham, “Vietnamese Archives and Scholarship on the Cold War Period:
Two Reports”
#8 Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-50:
New Evidence From Russian Archives”
#9 Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, “New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of
the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports”
(continued on p. 8)
7
NEW EVIDENCE ON NORTH KOREA
(continued on from p. 7)
#10 Norman M. Naimark, “‘To Know Everything and To Report Everything Worth Knowing’: Building the
East German Police State, 1945-49”
#11 Christian F. Ostermann, “The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of
Rollback”
#12 Brian Murray, “Stalin, the Cold War, and the Division of China: A Multi-Archival Mystery”
#13 Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Big Three after World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about
Post-War Relations with the United States and Great Britain”
#14 Ruud van Dijk, “The 1952 Stalin Note Debate: Myth or Missed Opportunity for German Unification?”
#15 Natalia I. Yegorova, “The ‘Iran Crisis’ of 1945-46: A View from the Russian Archives”
#16 Csaba Bekes, “The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics”
#17 Leszek W. Gluchowski, “The Soviet-Polish Confrontation of October 1956: The Situation in the Polish
Internal Security Corps”
#18 Qiang Zhai, “Beijing and the Vietnam Peace Talks, 1965-68: New Evidence from Chinese Sources”
#19 Matthew Evangelista, “’Why Keep Such an Army?’” Khrushchev’s Troop Reductions”
#20 Patricia K. Grimsted, “The Russian Archives Seven Years After: ‘Purveyors of Sensations’ or ‘Shadows
Cast to the Past’? ”
#21 Andrzej Paczkowski and Andrzej Werblan, “‘On the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland in 1981’
Two Historians Report to the Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the SEJM of the Republic of
Poland”
#22 Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg, “77
Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-77”
#23 Vojtech Mastny, “The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-81 and the End of the Cold War”
#24 John P. C. Matthews, “Majales: The Abortive Student Revolt in Czechoslovakia in 1956”
#25 Stephen J. Morris, “The Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese Triangle in the 1970’s: The View from Moscow”
#26 Vladimir O. Pechatnov, translated by Vladimir Zubok, “‘The Allies are Pressing on You to Break Your
Will...’ Foreign Policy Correspondence between Stalin and Molotov and Other Politburo Members, September
1945-December 1946"
#27 James G. Hershberg, with the assistance of L.W. Gluchowski, “Who Murdered ‘Marigold’? New
Evidence on the Mysterious Failure of Poland’s Secret Initiative to Start U.S.-North Vietnamese Peace Talks,
1966"
#28 Laszlo G. Borhi, “The Merchants of the Kremlin—The Economic Roots of Soviet Expansion in Hungary”
#29 Rainer Karlsch and Zbynek Zeman, “The End of the Soviet Uranium Gap: The Soviet Uranium
Agreements with Czechoslovakia and East Germany (1945/1953)”
#30 David Wolff, “’One Finger’s Worth of Historical Events’: New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the
Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948-1959”
#31 Eduard Mark, “Revolution by Degrees: Stalin’s National-Front Strategy For Europe, 1941-1947”
#32 Douglas Selvage, “The Warsaw Pact and Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1963-1965”
#33 Ethan Pollock, “Conversations with Stalin on Questions of Political Economy”
#34 Yang Kuisong, “Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude towards the Indochina War, 1949-1973”
#35 Vojtech Mastny, “NATO in the Beholder’s Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949-1956”
#36 Paul Wingrove, “Mao’s Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador, 1953-55”
#37 Vladimir Tismaneanu, “Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers’ Party: From de-Sovietization to the
Emergence of National Communism”
#38 János Rainer, “The New Course in Hungary in 1953”
#39 Kathryn Weathersby, “‘Should We Fear This?’ Stalin and the Danger of War with America”
#40 Vasiliy Mitrokhin, “The KGB in Afghanistan” (English Edition)
#41 Michael Share, “The Soviet Union, Hong Kong, and The Cold War, 1945-1970”
#42 Sergey S. Radchenko, “The Mongolian Dimension of the Sino-Soviet Split”
Special Working Papers Series
#1 Mark Kramer, “Soviet Deliberations during the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981”
8
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, ISSUE 14/15
Sino-North Korean Conflict and its Resolution
during the Korean War
By Shen Zhihua
Translated by Dong Gil Kim and Jeffrey Becker
S
cholarship on intra-alliance relations during the Cold Mao Zedong had always supported the idea of liberating all
War, particularly on the Cold War in Asia, has fo- of Korea. Kim explained that Mao had repeatedly expressed
cused primarily on relations between great powers his view that China would help Korea once it completed its
such as the Soviet Union and China.1 Relatively little research own revolutionary victory, and, if necessary, would provide
has been done on the development of relations between larger military assistance. Kim insisted that his own forces were
and smaller countries within the communist camp.2 The sub- sufficient, however. Stalin nonetheless emphasized that the
ject of this case study, Sino-Korean relations during the Ko- Soviet Union was not prepared to get directly involved itself
rean War, has been characterized as a friendship, forged by in Korea, especially if the United States risked deploying
shared difficulties, that was “as close as lips to teeth.” While troops, and that Kim therefore had to consult with Mao and
this ancient description of relations between China and Ko- obtain his support.5
rea aptly describes some aspects of the wartime alliance, the Accordingly, on 13 May Kim secretly visited Beijing and
simile fails to capture the significant conflict that existed be- informed Mao of his plan to attack the South. Mao was sur-
tween the two countries at the highest levels. This paper, prised by this plan, but after he received a telegram from
which is based on archival documents and the recollections Stalin the following day confirming that the Soviet leader had
of individuals involved in the events, explores the tensions agreed to the campaign, he expressed his support. In a meet-
in Sino-Korean relations at the highest levels during the Ko- ing with Kim on the fifteenth, Mao suggested that the Ko-
rean War and the methods used to mitigate those tensions, rean People’s Army (KPA) should fight a quick, decisive war.
which were shaped by the larger pattern of Cold War rela- It should outflank the larger cities, in order to avoid a pro-
tions in Asia. Space limitations prevent me from making a tracted war, and concentrate instead on destroying the
comprehensive analysis of the cultural and historical causes enemy’s main areas of strength. Mao explained that he had
behind these tensions and their repercussions, which would intended to help North Korea attack the South once Taiwan
shape Sino-Korean relations for the remainder of the Cold was liberated, but since North Korea had decided to attack
War. It is my hope that this paper will serve as a basis for now and this was their common cause, China was prepared
broader future studies on this subject. to provide the necessary aid. Mao promised the North
Koreans that if the Americans intervened in the war, China
China’s Deployment of Troops to North Korea would send troops. He also asked whether it was necessary
Based on research into archival materials that have be- to deploy Chinese forces on the Korean border, and whether
come available in the past several years, scholars have reached they should provide weapons and ammunition. Kim expressed
a near consensus of opinion that the leadership of the PRC— his thanks for this offer, but did not accept it.6 In Kim’s view,
or at least Chairman Mao Zedong—firmly intended to assist since Moscow had already agreed to give all necessary sup-
North Korea even before the Korean War began.3 What has port, his trip to China was undertaken only to satisfy Stalin’s
not become well known, however, is that the North Korean order to secure Mao’s approval to launch the war. Conse-
leadership steadfastly refused to accept Chinese offers of quently, as soon as the meeting with Mao was concluded,
assistance until forced to do so by the UN advance across Kim announced to Soviet Ambassador N.V. Roshchin, in
the 38th parallel. Mao’s presence, that he and Mao were in complete agree-
As Russian archival documents have established, in Janu- ment on the matter.7 It is easy to picture how awkward Mao’s
ary 1950 Soviet leader Joseph Stalin informed his North Ko- position was in front of the smug Kim Il Sung.
rean protege Kim Il Sung that he would support the latter’s The Chinese leadership received no prior notification of
request to mount a military offensive against South Korea the launching of the attack on South Korea on 25 June. They,
and would allow Kim to visit Moscow to discuss the matter.4 in fact, learned of it via foreign news services.8 Some Chinese
In the three meetings between the Soviet and North Korean leaders resented this lack of notification, but they nonethe-
leaders that followed, held 10-25 April, Stalin emphasized two less expressed their support for North Korea once the US
preconditions that had to be met before he would give his became directly involved. In early July, the Chinese govern-
final approval for military action against South Korea: that he ment agreed to send to the KPA two hundred Chinese cadres
could be assured that the US would not interfere, and that of Korean descent who were stationed in China’s Northeast
China would agree to support North Korea. Kim assured Stalin Military Region. At the same time, Chinese Foreign Minister
that since the DPRK had the support of the USSR and the Zhou Enlai informed Ambassador Roshchin that China agreed
PRC, the US would refrain from interfering because it would to the Soviet government’s requests to use the Chinese
not risk a major war. On the second point, Kim stated that Changchun Railroad to transport military supplies and to
9
NEW EVIDENCE ON NORTH KOREA
travel through Chinese air space en route to North Korea.9 on the battlefield situation. However, the Chinese embassy
Chinese leaders also raised the issue of providing mili- soon discovered that the briefings delivered by So Hwi were
tary support to the North Koreans during other conversa- mostly just reports garnered that evening from the North
tions with Soviet representatives. In a meeting with Ambas- Korean Foreign News Service. Moreover, Chai did not have
sador Roshchin on 2 July, Zhou Enlai relayed his government’s regular access to top-level Korean leaders. DPRK leaders
estimate that the US might increase its forces in Korea by also declined to answer the Chinese embassy’s request for
landing in southern ports and proceeding north via railroad. permission to send a vice-attaché to study with the KPA.
He thus recommended that the KPA hasten its southward From his other contacts with North Koreans, Chai formed the
push to occupy those ports. He also presciently recom- opinion that they had been forbidden from sharing any mili-
mended that the KPA strengthen the defenses around the tary intelligence with the Chinese. Although Minister of
western port of Inchon, both to protect Seoul and to prevent Internal Affairs Pak Il-yu had worked in China and often went
the US army from landing there. Zhou complained to the to the Chinese embassy for meals, Chai could never discuss
Soviet ambassador that the North Korean leaders had the internal military situation due to the strict
ignored Mao’s repeated warnings that US military interven- restrictions and discipline imposed by the North Korean gov-
tion was imminent. He emphasized that if US forces crossed ernment.15 At the same time, the Chinese Army’s request to
the 38th parallel, China would organize an expeditionary force send a group of staff officers to North Korea for the purpose
dressed in North Korean uniforms to engage the US army. of understanding the current battlefield situation was re-
Zhou reported that 120,000 troops of the 3rd Army Corps had fused.16
already assembled in the Northeast, and he hoped the Soviet As the KPA’s position worsened, the Chinese leaders
Union would be able to provide air cover for them.10 On 4 felt that they had to prepare for military assistance to North
July, the head of the Chinese intelligence bureau, Zhou Korea. On 11 August, the 13th Army Corp, which had already
Dapeng, even described to Roshchin a plan to transport North assembled in the Northeast on Mao’s order, conducted a
Korean forces to South Korea via a port on the Shandong meeting of cadres from all the attached Army Corps and divi-
Peninsula, as well as to send Chinese military experts to South sions. Gao Gang, head of the Northeast Bureau of the Chi-
Korean battlefields to help the KPA.11 nese Communist Party, thoroughly explained the purpose
Stalin immediately expressed his support of the Chinese and significance of preparing troops to fight abroad, stating
suggestions. “We consider it correct,” the Soviet leader wrote that China had to take the iniative and help liberate the North
to Mao on 5 July, “immediately to concentrate nine Chinese Korean people in order to make Korea an independent, demo-
divisions on the Sino-Korean border for volunteer actions in cratic, and unified country. “Going to Korea will be done in
North Korea in case the enemy crosses the 38th parallel. We the name of the Volunteer Army, [hereafter referred to as the
will try to provide air cover for these units.”12 Since the Chi- Chinese Volunteer Army, or CVA] wearing North Korean uni-
nese ambassador to North Korea, Ni Zhiliang, was still in form and using the North Korean unit numbers, and flying
China recuperating from illness, Stalin also urged Chinese the flag of the Korean People’s Army, and major cadres must
leaders quickly to dispatch representatives to Korea to adopt Korean names.”17
increase contact and to resolve the issues involved in China’s In meetings with Soviet adviser Pavel Yudin on 19 and
intervention.13 In fact, Zhou Enlai had already on 30 June 28 August, Mao stated that if the US army continued to esca-
replaced Ni with Chai Junwu (who would later change his late its troop numbers, the North Koreans would be unable to
name to Chai Chengwen), with the goal of strengthening ties cope and would need direct assistance from China.18 That
with North Korea. Before Chai departed, Zhou instructed was the only way they could defeat the US army and post-
him: pone the outbreak of a third world war. Recent intelligence
had made it clear that the US had decided quickly to increase
Right now, the Korean people are on the front lines of its troop strength in Korea on a grand scale. Chinese leaders
the struggle, and we must express support for our Ko- reminded the North Korean leaders that they needed to pre-
rean comrades. If there is anything else they want us to pare for the worst in the war. Even though they did not
do, tell them to ask and we will do our best. Maintaining directly refer to the issue of the entry of Chinese troops, the
contact between the two parties and armies, and quickly implication was clear. In August and early September, Mao
understanding the changing battlefield situations are met twice with North Korean representative Lee Sang Cho to
currently the most important missions of the embassy.14 discuss the progress of the war. Mao pointed out that the
KPA’s mistake was in not preparing sufficient reserve forces
Chai Chengwen found it difficult, however, to fulfill this while deploying their troops on a broad front, and in con-
mission because North Korean leaders withheld all informa- quering territory rather than destroying the enemy. Mao spe-
tion from the Chinese embassy. According to Chai’s recol- cifically pointed out that the enemy might suddenly attack
lections, Kim Il Sung received him with high protocol as soon the key areas from Inchon to Seoul and from Nampo to
as he arrived on 10 July, telling him “if you need anything Pyongyang, and the Koreans should therefore consider re-
else, just look for me at any time.” He also instructed the treating and redeploying their troops to protect these areas.
Deputy Director of the Chief Political Department of the KPA, CCP Politburo member Liu Shaoqi also pointed out that it
So Hwi, to give the Chinese Military Attaché daily briefings would be necessary to prepare the people for the possibility
10
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, ISSUE 14/15
of a protracted war.19 should play upon western fears that China and the Soviet
The North Korean officals paid no heed to Chinese sug- Union would enter the war and “take steps to show our in-
gestions, even though these recommendations included tentions.” Roshchin agreed to report immediately to Mos-
warnings from Soviet advisers.20 One reason is that their es- cow, and suggested dispatching a cadre to Korea to clarify
timates for the war were overly optimistic. On 4 September, the situation and remove any misconceptions. On the twen-
when Chai told Kim that the war was locked in a stalemate, tieth Moscow responded that for North Korea not to provide
the North Korean leader declared confidently that the Pusan Beijing with military intelligence was “abnormal,” but due to
campaign had already begun and that as soon as the highly inexperience. 24 Moscow also agreed with Beijing’s recom-
Kim preferred to depend on Soviet aid and avoid having
China intervene in the war.
trained strike forces went forward, the KPA would break the mendation that the main force of the People’s Army should
deadlock. When asked about the Americans’ ability to land withdraw north.
troops behind the North Korean frontline, Kim answered “we On 21 September Liu Shaoqi again reported to Roshchin
estimate that presently, a US counterattack is not possible; that the CVA’s morale was high. If necessary, they would be
they do not posses sufficient troop support, and therefore a willing to fight, and they were confident they could defeat
landing in our rear ports would be difficult.”21 the American armed forces. Chinese leaders believed that if
The North Koreans believed in a quick victory and also the US threatened the existence of North Korea, the Chinese
had a tendency towards adventurism. Chai reported that would have to aid their Korean comrades. On the same day
North Korean leaders had initially not planned on US inter- Zhou told Roshchin that except for being told by Kim that
vention and had predicted victory within a month. Even “the Korean people were prepared for a long war,” Beijing
after the US entered the war, they repeated the slogans “solve had received no further information from Pyongyang.25
the problem before 15 August,” and “August is the month of Although Stalin’s personal representative to Pyongyang, Gen-
victory.” We can see from their mobilization of large groups eral Matvei V. Zakharov, had urged Kim to seek Chinese aid,26
of technicians and students for military service and their it was only a week later, on 28 September, that the Politburo of
serious waste of manpower and financial resources that the the Korean Workers Party called an emergency meeting to
North Koreans had decided to “put all their eggs in one bas- discuss the issue. After heated debate, the Politburo unani-
ket.” Chai returned to China on 10 September to deliver his mously decided that once Seoul fell, there would be no way
report, and after his return to Pyongyang, told Kim, on Zhou’s to prevent UN forces from crossing the 38th parallel, and if
order, that he hoped the North Korean army would consider they did so, it would be impossible for the remnants of the
a strategic withdrawal. Unmoved, Kim answered only, “I KPA to offer any effective resistance. Faced with imminent
have never considered retreat.”22 defeat, North Korean leaders unanimously agreed to send
The North Koreans were thus not prepared to invite the formal letters to Stalin and Mao requesting direct military
Chinese to send troops, if for no other reason than the severe assistance from the Soviet Union and China. Despite Stalin’s
disagreements between China and North Korea concerning explicit warnings to Kim in April that he would not send So-
the state of the war and strategic planning. After the suc- viet troops to Korea if the Americans intervened, North Ko-
cessful UN landing at Inchon, however, the situation changed rean leaders nonetheless first turned to Moscow.
completely. The Chinese leaders felt that sending troops to Before sending the letter to Stalin, Kim Il Sung asked
Korea was already unavoidable.23 When Zhou met with So- Soviet Ambassador Shtykov how best to broach the subject
viet Ambassador Roshchin and Moscow’s military attaché of requesting Soviet troops. Shtykov avoided his question,
on 18 September he asked first about the situation in Korea, and a “confused, lost, hopeless, and desperate” Kim Il Sung
complaining that except for what they read in the newspa- and his Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong swallowed their pride
pers and heard from Pyongyang Radio, the Chinese leaders and sent the letter to Moscow. 27 Stalin replied on 1 October
knew nothing about the war situation. Even the Chinese that the best plan was to send the CVA, after first consulting
ambassador to Pyongyang was unable to receive reports with the Chinese.28 With no other choice, Kim urgently sum-
concerning the progress of the war. Zhou also pointed out moned the Chinese ambassador late that night and requested
that he had little contact with North Korean leaders regard- that China send the 13th Army Corps, which had already been
ing military matters and that the Chinese leadership did not deployed along the Yalu River, to support the North Korean
even understand the basic strategies of the KPA. China had war effort.29
once attempted to send a high-level military mission to Two factors led the North Korean leaders initially to
observe the developing situation, but to date, Pyongyang refuse direct military assistance from China. The first was
had not responded. Zhou suggested that if the KPA did not Kim’s excessive confidence in his estimates of the military
have sufficient reserve troops, they should withdraw their situation. The second was the long history of Chinese inter-
main forces north and establish reserve assault forces. They ference in Korean affairs, which gave North Korean leaders
11
NEW EVIDENCE ON NORTH KOREA
cause for alarm. For these two reasons, Kim preferred to de- is all one can see! Military control has been extremely
pend on Soviet aid and avoid having China intervene in the childish. On the nineteenth Pyongyang issued an order
war. Even after Chinese troops entered the war, these two to defend to the death. As a result, 30,000 defenders
issues would continue to strain Sino-Korean relations. could not escape [from advancing UN forces]. The
North Koreans agreed to conduct party and political
Creating a Unified Sino-North Korean Command work in the KPA, but they have not agreed to construct
Due to the difference of opinion between the Chinese a political commission system.
and Soviet leaderships as to whether to send Soviet air force
units to provide cover for Chinese troops, the dispatch of After the Shenyang meeting, Peng Dehuai exclaimed to
Chinese forces to Korea was repeatedly delayed. However, Chai Chengwen, “I have a responsibility to the Chinese and
Mao’s personal commitment to the cause never wavered.30 Korean people, and to the hundreds of thousands of sol-
When Zhou went to the Soviet Union to discuss the issue of diers!”33 In Peng’s view, there was simply no question of
military equipment and air cover, the Chinese and North Ko- giving North Koreans control over Chinese forces. He did
reans were already discussing specific issues concerning not even understand the views the North Koreans advo-
Chinese troop deployment. However, because of the press- cated concerning the command of their own troops. The
ing situation, the two sides had not yet had time to discuss KPA’s main force had already been routed, and new troops
command, communication, re-supply and transportation, were currently organizing and training in China. It was im-
much less arrive at an agreement on these matters. possible for them to participate directly in military maneu-
On 8 October, Mao informed Kim Il Sung that China had vers. This was not the time to point out such facts, however,
decided to send troops, and asked that Pak Il-u meet with so when Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai met for the first time
Gao Gang and CVA Commander Peng Dehuai in Shenyang to on 21 October, neither leader raised the issue of a unified
discuss the various issues involved. At dusk that day, Pak command structure. During their discussions about how to
arrived in Shenyang, and on Kim’s orders, urged the Chinese coordinate the actions of their two armies, Kim agreed to
to send troops immediately to control the areas of Hamhung send Pak Il-u to serve as Peng’s liaison officer.34 On 25 Sep-
and Sinuiju, an intervention necessitated by the continued tember, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
escalation of the American troop presence. He also specified formally appointed Pak as Assistant Commander of the CVA,
that the CVA would use only North Korean currency while in Assistant Political Director and Assistant Secretary of the
the DPRK, for which they would be reimbursed later accord- Party Committee.35
ing to the exchange rate. Their firewood would be purchased With the expansion of the war, the issue of unified con-
by the local North Korean governments, and supplied to the trol of the two armies gradually reappeared on the agenda.
Chinese army according to market price. Pak explained that During the first campaign, Peng repeatedly reported that the
Kim Il Sung was then in Tokchon, and that he was of the lack of coordination between the Chinese and North Kore-
opinion that the CVA command should be established there. ans caused confusion over language, problems with Chinese
The issue of joint command for Chinese and Korean forces unfamiliarity with the terrain, and the obstruction of roads
was thus raised. According to Chai’s from party, government, army, and civilian withdrawal, as a
observations, Kim’s initial thinking was rather simplistic. Con- result of which “the CVA’s ability to fight has been hin-
sidering the urgent circumstances, he believed that since he dered.”36 Of special importance were the many incidents in
had asked China to send troops to help the KPA, the power which the Volunteer Army was mistakenly attacked by North
to command those troops would naturally belong to Korean Korean troops. One such incident occurred on 4 November,
leaders. Only after receiving word that China was preparing when the 39th Volunteer Army encircled the US 24th Division
to send several hundred thousand troops to Korea did he southeast of Pochon. There they were mistakenly attacked
understand the enormity of the situation. He then realized by a KPA tank division that had been ordered to proceed to
that it was not feasible to have Koreans command the CVA, Sunchon, and the US forces were consequently able to es-
and suggested that the two sides merge their command struc- cape. Re-supply and transportation efforts were also ham-
tures.31 pered by a lack of coordination.37
Naturally, Peng saw the situation differently. First, Stalin Because of such problems, Peng asked the Chinese
had clearly stated in his telegram of 1 October that “the CVA embassy in Pyongyang to raise the issue of a coordinated
must naturally be commanded by Chinese leaders.”32 Sec- command structure with Kim Il Sung, hoping that the KPA
ond, their experience in Korea made the Chinese question the would relocate its headquarters closer to the CVA. Since
North Korean command capability. In his report to the Cen- Shtykov supported Peng’s suggestion, Kim on 7 November
tral Military Commission, Peng stated: reluctantly agreed to the Chinese proposal to open new fronts
in the enemy’s rear areas. He accordingly decided to send
The Korean Party’s recruitment situation is extremely the Bang Hosan and Choi Inyang Army Corps behind enemy
serious. All men between the ages of 16 and 45 have lines. However, although Kim continued to send advisers to
been inducted into service. No one is caring for the act as liaison officers and trade intelligence, he did not agree
families of drafted workers, and the masses have noth- to relocate the army’s headquarters or to establish any kind
ing to eat. There are no long-term plans, and adventurism of unified command. Kim disregarded Peng’s personal letter
12
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, ISSUE 14/15
explaining the Chinese policy regarding prisoners of war Peng’s suggestion, reading:
(POW), which was prompted by North Korea’s severe mis-
treatment of prisoners, particularly British and American em- I hope Comrade Kim and Comrade Shtykov will
bassy workers. Kim agreed to allow the CVA to help return remain in the front line, and that Kim, Shtykov, and Peng
Korean deserters to service, but in actuality planned to try will form a three-man group to decide military policy,
them for treason.38 including the establishment of military organization, the
Peng next asked the Central Military Commission to conduct of the war on the front and behind enemy lines,
relay a message to Kim that the KPA’s 6th Division still had and all the working policies related to the war effort. In
With the expansion of the war, the issue of unified control of the
two armies gradually reappeared. [...] Of special importance were
the many incidents in which the Volunteer Army was mistakenly
attacked by North Korean troops.
more than 6,200 soldiers, who had merged with the CVA’s order to reach agreement, which will benefit the war
125th Division. He hoped those men could remain with the effort, we agree with these suggestions and ask for your
Volunteer Amy, but Kim refused. Later, more than 5,000 men instructions. If you agree, please instruct your officers
of the 7th Division merged with the 125th Volunteer Army Divi- to advise comrades Shtykov and Kim appropriately.
sion, and again Peng requested that those men remain. Kim Right now, the most important issue is the unification
did not respond. The North Korean leaders and Soviet mili- of military and government policy of the leaders of the
tary advisors also opposed Peng’s proposal to withdraw sev- three countries of Korea, the Soviet Union, and China.
eral kilometers and prepare ambushes. They proposed in- If the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese Volunteer
stead that the CVA continue to pursue the enemy south along Army can cooperate, coming together according to your
the Chongchon River.39 suggestions (while preserving the institutions of the
At the core of these problems lay the issue of who was Korean People’s Army) then victory is assured.41
in command of the army. In order to solve the problem, Mao
decided to invite the top-level commanders of the two armies On the seventeenth Mao sent a telegram to Peng and
for face-to-face talks, hoping to coordinate the positions of Gao informing them that Stalin had completely endorsed the
the two sides and to gain Moscow’s support. On 15 Novem- plan of the Chinese comrades to establish a joint command
ber, Kim and Shtykov were invited to the CVA headquarters, structure and had sent a telegram to that effect to Kim and
and Gao Gang joined them from Shenyang. As soon as the Shtykov. Mao instructed Peng to observe Kim’s reaction to
meeting began, Peng stated frankly that the command struc- this development.42
tures of the two armies must be unified. Gao explained that Once the Soviet Union made its position clear, Kim
because the Korean peninsula was so narrow, tactics required expressed a desire to go to Beijing for discussions with Mao.
a combined command structure. Shtykov stated clearly that At a subsequent meeting on 3 December, Kim stated that
command should be exercised by the Chinese. He criticized Stalin, in his telegram, had agreed to a Sino-Korean joint
the KPA for losing battles despite using the Soviet Union’s command.43 Kim further stated that because the CVA had
best equipment, and praised the CVA for being able to neu- experience, they should take the lead role while the Korean
tralize large numbers of enemy troops despite having inferior comrades would take supporting roles, which the Politburo
equipment. In his opinion, there was no doubt that the Chi- of the Korean Workers Party had agreed to. After the meet-
nese should command. ing, Zhou Enlai drafted the “Sino-Korean Bilateral Agree-
When it was his turn, however, Kim spoke only of the ment Regarding the Establishment of Sino-Korean Joint Com-
current status of the KPA and did not mention the issue of a mand.”44 The main points of the agreement were that Mao
unified command structure. Given the pressing situation, recommended Peng to serve as Commander and Political
Peng took the initiative and proposed his own plan, accord- Commissioner, while Kim recommended Kim Ung as Vice-
ing to which he, Kim, and Shtykov would form a three-man Commander and Pak Il-u as Vice Political Commissioner. The
group that would consult each other concerning problems KPA and all garrison forces, as well as the CVA, would be
and would exercise power through a unified command struc- jointly directed by the unified command. All orders would be
ture. Kim gave no response at all to this suggestion, and passed through the general headquarters of the KPA and the
Shtykov was not able to respond without instructions from headquarters of the CVA. The unified command was given
Moscow. They therefore decided to defer the issue until the the power to direct all means of transportation related to the
end of the second campaign, at which time they would meet war effort (highways, railroads, ports, airports), as well as
again for discussions.40 wire and wireless telephone and telegram communications,
On 13 November Mao sent a telegram to Stalin relaying grain storage and the mobilization of manpower and resources.
13
NEW EVIDENCE ON NORTH KOREA
The unified command would report and make suggestions to ers Party, the North Korean government, as well as the army
the North Korean government—based on the actual situa- and the people were all in high spirits and looking for a quick
tion and the needs of the war—concerning rear mobilization victory. “The Soviet ambassador has said that the American
work, supplemental training, and the reestablishment of local army has retreated and [he] wanted our army to advance
administration in Korea. The unified command would be quickly. This was not only the attitude of the Soviet ambas-
responsible for clearing all news items concerning the war sador, but also the request of the majority of comrades in the
and distributing them to the Korean news agency, which North Korean Party.” Peng, however, believed “the Korean
would publish them in the name of the general headquarters campaign was still difficult and long-term. Because the
of the KPA. enemy had shifted from an offensive to a defensive strategy
After Kim returned to Korea, he met with Peng again on and the front lines had shortened and narrowed, enemy mili-
7 December in a very friendly atmosphere to discuss specific tary power had become more concentrated, which benefited
matters. The two leaders agreed to set up a unified command the UN forces.” Though enemy morale was lower, they still
structure within several days, and Kim guaranteed that there had approximately 260,000 soldiers and would not retreat from
would be no further interference in the military command. He Korea. Consequently, he urged that the CVA “adopt a plan of
also accepted the Chinese suggestion to abolish the previ- gradual advancement.”48 For political reasons, however, Mao
ously deployed 3rd Army, and ordered them to merge with the overruled these suggestions and ordered the volunteer forces
Volunteer Army 9th Group.45 Peng was satisfied with the situ- immediately to launch the third campaign and cross the 38th
ation and repeatedly pointed out that “the bravery and stub- parallel.49
born spirit of the People’s Army and its strict military com- With regard to tactics, Mao approved Peng’s recom-
mand system are worthy of study.” He ordered the cadres of mendation to advance gradually and agreed that after cross-
the 9th Military Group to study and learn from the situation of ing the 38th parallel, the main army forces (including the KPA)
the Korean 3rd Army Corp, in order to “relay realistically the should withdraw several kilometers to rest and
experience of the Chinese army in political and local work.” regroup.50 Peng’s forecast proved accurate. Although the
But should conflict arise with the established Korean sys- third campaign resulted in the KPA/CVA advance across the
tem, the Chinese army “should not be harsh and unyield- 38th parallel and the capture of Seoul, UN forces managed to
ing.”46 carry out an orderly retreat. Thus, although the Sino-Korean
In early January 1951, Stalin’s envoy to Beijing, Semen army captured some territory, it did not inflict many casual-
Egorovich Zakharov announced that two divisions of the ties on the enemy. On 3 January 1951, Peng informed Kim Il
Soviet air force had recently entered Korea, and were provid- Sung by telegram that the enemy had quickly retreated after
ing two lines of air cover from Jian to Jiang Jie, and from its defenses had been broken, and the victory was therefore
Andong to Anju. In addition, by early April, the Chinese not very meaningful. Only 3,000 troops were captured. If the
planned to send five air force divisions, and three Korean air enemy continued to escape southward, the KPA/CVA would
force divisions were already participating in the war. Conse- pursue them to Suwon and await orders, Peng explained. The
quently, the Chinese expressed a desire to create a unified air third campaign would pause to reorganize and re-supply af-
force command structure. After consultations, a Sino-Ko- ter Seoul, Inchon, Suwon, and Hongchon were taken. If the
rean unified command structure was established based on enemy mounted a heavy defense of Seoul, the CVA would
the coordinated command structure.47 not launch a strong attack, since conditions were not yet
Thus, under pressure from Moscow, China and Korea favorable.51 Mao relayed Peng’s decision to Stalin.52 Because
were able to resolve the issue of joint command of their armed the CVA was exhausted, like an arrow at the end of its flight,
forces. Unlike the joint command of US and UN forces, which and “the enemy is trying to lure us into a trap along the
had been accomplished smoothly, the unified command of Naktong River and lure us into assaulting its fortified posi-
Chinese and Korean forces was only accomplished with great tion,”53 on 8 January Peng ordered the advance to halt. This
difficulty. The Koreans were concerned about national sov- decision left the North Koreans extremely dissatisfied, and
ereignty. Korea’s long-standing relationship with China as a they strongly opposed it. In light of the lessons learned from
subsidiary and tributary state made handing over the com- earlier setbacks during the war, Kim agreed to regroup for
mand of their army very difficult for them to accept. For the two months after crossing the 38th parallel, but in his heart he
Chinese, victory was paramount. Both in military power and still hoped to claim a quick victory. He was diplomatic, how-
in combat experience, the Chinese held a clear advantage. ever, always pushing Pak Hon-yong and the newly appointed
Thus, from a realistic viewpoint, it was essential to place the Soviet ambassador V.N.Razuvaev to the forefront. The day
joint command in the hands of the Volunteer Army. the attack halted, Kim told Chai Chengwen that the process
of regrouping and reorganizing should not last very long,
The Debate Over Advancing South of that one month should be sufficient. If too much time passed,
the 38th Parallel he explained, the rivers and rice paddies would begin to thaw,
After the CVA’s victorious second campaign, which hampering troop movements, while the enemy was attempt-
pushed the front line toward the 38th parallel, Peng Dehuai ing to slow the pace of the war in order to rest their forces and
requested permission for his forces to regroup. He reported re-supply.54
to Beijing that due to the recent victories, the Korean Work- Kim was prepared to meet with Peng to discuss the
14