Calcidius on Fate: His Doctrine and Sources

157 Pages·1970·2.471 MB·English

by  Jan den Boeft

CALCIDIUS ON FATE

CALCIDIUS ON FATE
HIS DOCTRINE AND SOURCES
PROEFSCHRIFT
TER VERKRIJGING VAN DE
GRAAD VAN DOCTOR IN DE LETTEREN
AAN DE RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT TE LEIDEN,
OP GEZAG VAN DE RECTOR MAGNIFICUS DR. J. GOSLIN GS,
HOOGLERAAR IN DE FACULTEIT DER GENEESKUNDE,
TENOVERSTAANVAN EENCOMMISSIE UIT DE SENAAT
TE VERDEDIGEN OP DONDERDAG 25 JUNI 1970
TE KLOKKE 16.15 UUR
DOOR
JAN DEN BOEFT
Geboren te Rotterdam in 1935
LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL
1970
Promotor
Prof. Dr. J. H. WASZINK
Aan mijn ouders
A an mijn vrouw

CONTENTS
Introductory Notes 1
Introduction . . . 7
A. The fund.aments of the Platonic doctrine of fate 8
1. Fate and Providence . . . . 8
2. Fate taken as act . . . . . 20
3. Other notions related to fate 37
B. Refutation of Stoic arguments . 47
1. Four Stoic objections . . . 47
2. Calcidius' answers . . . . . 52
3. A fresh Stoic objection: peruersio 58
4. Calcidius' reaction to the contents of eh. 165-167 65
5. Calcidius' answer to the Stoic argument about divina-
tion . . . . . . 67
6. The problem of evil 72
7. Conclusion . . . . 82
C. Renewed exposition of the Platonic doctrine of fate. 85
1. Fate as part of the metaphysical hierarchy . . . 85
2. Fate rules all things in a different way . . . . . 98
3. Freedom has its seat in the )..oyLaTLx6vo f the soul 106
4. Summary. 118
Epilogue. 125
Conclusion 127
Indices . . 138
Samenvatting . 147

INTRODUCTORY NOTES
unde est haec, inquam, fatis auulsa uoluntas?
(Lucretius, De rerum natura II 257)
The problem of fate and fatality has greatly occupied the minds
of the Ancients, philosophically as well as in other ways. Already
in Homer we find this problem, centered in the µ.o'i:poatb, out whose
puzzling and inescapable power Hector says:
µ.o'i:po8tv'o u 't'LVcIXpY jµm.L:c puyµ.evoiµv. µ.e:vootcLv 8pwv,
OUX otx6vo, u8e:µ .e:via 6Mv, E7t~V't' O1Ct pW't'oYtE V'Yj't('oZt L4.8 8/9)
In this sphere the µ.o'i:phoat s a special relation to the span of life
allotted to man. Pre-Socratic philosophy, too, paid attention to
fate. In Heraclitus' doctrine of the cosmic process fatality certainly
plays an important part: 1tocv-r8oet: y lve:a8otxt oc8'e :lµ.otpµ.evw'Ya)sv w hat
he taught, according to Diogenes Laertius IX 7 (= Diels-Kranz
fr. A 1, pag. 141,10). The ix1tupwmc;,t oo, is regulated by fate:
7tOLe8:e'i::x ott 't'IX~L't'VL Vxoot tt xp6vovw ptaµ.evov-r ijc';t 'OUx 6aµ.ouµ .e:-rot~OA~c;
xot-roc-r tvote :tµ.ocpµ.evo'Ycv)vo cyx'Y(f)rv. A 5, pag. 145, 15-16). In the
combination e:tµ.ocpµ.eovc'YvoJc yxw'Ye) meet a second important term
in this field. According to Empedocles (fr. B n5) the exile of the
soul is due to 'Avocyx'Yan)d Parmenides says about the immutability
of Being:
xpot-re:py~o cp' Avocyx'YJ
1te:Lp0t-rEoVc;8 e:aµ.ofotvix e:L,- r6 µ.tv ocµ.cpEtce; pye:t( fr. B 8, 30-31).
All these doctrines are first and foremost concerned with the
physical world as a whole and with the cosmic order. When by the
Sophists and Socrates man was placed in the centre of philosophy,
the related question of human freedom, which, although hitherto
not neglected, had not been treated thoroughly, came into promi-
nence. Plato, however, did not give an explicit elucidation of the
question. He uses the word e:tµ.0tpµ.eovn1ljy sparingly and at times,
so it seems, not wholeheartedly, cf. e.g. iµ.e:8 e: vuv ~8'YxJo tAe:'ci:p, otll)
&v ocv~p' t'potytx6c;~, e:lµ.otpµ.ev('PYhj aed. II5 a 5) and 7tLG't'E:UGotV't'ot
't'ot'i:ycu; vott~tvlh t ~v e:tµ.otpµ.eVou'Y8j' V& ve :tch; cpuyot. (Gorgias5 12 e 3-4).
A full-scale treatment of the relation of human freedom and fate
can be found in the great myth of Er at the end of the Politeia
2 INTRODUCTORY NOTES
(614 b sqq.), where human responsibility is emphasized in the
famous words othlot e1.oµev01)8•e :oca; .vot(·noc(;6 17 e 4).
Aristotle uses the word e:tµotpµtVvl)e ry rarely. But it is important
that he is a champion of human freedom and responsibility; a very
clear testimony of his standpoint can be found in Ethica Nicomachea
r 5, e.g. ecp'~ µi:v8 eX otl~ a.pe:'Mo),µ o(<uc8; eX otl~ XotX(oEt. Vo !c; yixp ecp'
~µi:v' t'O1 tpixne:LVxo, tl 't'Oµ ~ 1tp!X't"t'Ex:LotVl e,v o!c;' t'Oµ ~. xotl' t'OV otl( III3 b
6-8). Man is responsible for his moral state; even ignorance is no
excuse, if this ignorance results from carelessness. This state of
affairs has its consequences for punishment, blame, reward, law-
giving etc. (cf. I. During, Aristoteles, Heidelberg 1966, pag. 461).
An exhaustive treatment of the problem of fate was, however,
not given by Aristotle; for this the Peripatos had to wait for the
great commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias. He wrote a fine
polemical monograph Ile:pl e:tµotpµtvl)cA;. lexander's own view can
be found in eh. 1-6. His conclusion is as follows: e:lvot-Lr otu-rovd µotp-
µtvl)v -re:X otlc puow.' t'O- re:y ixp e:tµotpµevoXv ot't'IcXp ucnvx otl 't'OX ot't'IcXp uow
e:tµotpµevov( pag. 169. 19-20 Bruns). For the rest Alexander fully
agrees with Aristotle's views on human freedom. We shall have
many occasions to return to Alexander's monograph in the course
of this book.
The Stoa is the first philosophical system of antiquity which
has given an elaborate doctrine of fate. Indeed the Stoics, with a
variation on Quintilian's statement about Roman satire, might
have said doctrina de Jato tota nostraT hees tS. toa tried to free this
doctrine from any notion of fate as a blind and irrational force.
They more or less identified dµotpµtvl) and 1tp6v0Lobt,o th of which
were considered to be aspects of the Logos. "Als die vernunftgemass
gestaltende und erhaltende Kraft ist die Pronoia mit dem Logos
und mit der Physis identisch. Sie ist die Gottheit, von einer bestimm-
ten Seite her gesehen. Unter anderem Gesichtspunkt erscheint
diese als Heimarmene." (Pohlenz, Die Stoap ag. IOI}. The dµotpµtvl)
directs all things, even the smallest details. The truth of this is
proved by divination and astrology. When we also bear in mind
the Stoic doctrine of a periodical repetition of history, the a.1toxot-
-rixcr-rotcrwLhci;c, h extends to all details in the life of each individual,
we can understand that the Stoa got into great difficulties concern-
ing human freedom, both theoretically and logically and with
respect to the ethical consequences. The latter were especially
put in the forefront by the Sceptic philosopher Carneades, who was