By parallel reasoning: the construction and evaluation of analogical arguments PDF
Preview By parallel reasoning: the construction and evaluation of analogical arguments
By Parallel Reasoning This page intentionally left blank By Parallel Reasoning The Construction and Evaluation of Analogical Arguments . . PAUL F A BARTHA 1 2010 3 OxfordUniversityPress,Inc.,publishesworksthatfurther OxfordUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellence inresearch,scholarship,andeducation. Oxford NewYork Auckland CapeTown DaresSalaam HongKong Karachi KualaLumpur Madrid Melbourne MexicoCity Nairobi NewDelhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto Withofficesin Argentina Austria Brazil Chile CzechRepublic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore SouthKorea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Copyright#2010byOxfordUniversityPress,Inc. PublishedbyOxfordUniversityPress,Inc. 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NewYork10016 www.oup.com OxfordisaregisteredtrademarkofOxfordUniversityPress Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced, storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans, electronic,mechanical,photocopying,recording,orotherwise, withoutthepriorpermissionofOxfordUniversityPress. LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Bartha,PaulF.A. Byparallelreasoning:theconstructionandevaluationof analogicalarguments/PaulF.A.Bartha. p. cm. Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN 978-0-19-532553-9 1. Analogy. 2.Reasoning. I.Title. BD190.B372009 169—dc22 2008032836 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica onacid-freepaper Acknowledgments Thisbookhastakenshapeovermanyyears,duringthecourseof whichmanypeoplehavemadesignificantcontributions.JeffHorty, AndrewIrvine,andJamesKelleherreadtheentireworkandoffered manyvaluablesuggestions.Othercolleaguesandgraduatestudents haveprovidedinsightfulcommentsandcriticismorpointedmeto interestingexamples:JohnBeatty,DarrenBradley,RogerClarke, EmmaEsmaili,ChrisHitchcock,RichardJohns,SoniaMemetea, MargaretSchabas,andSteveSavitt.IwouldliketothankKeithHolyoak forencouragementandsomeexcellentsuggestionsrelatingto chapters4and8,andMikeRivers-Bowermanforusefulcriticismof chapter6.IdeeplyappreciatetheencouragementoftheeditoratOxford UniversityPressandtheterrificsuggestionsoftwoanonymous reviewers;thosesuggestionssignificantlyimprovedthebook.Iowea specialdebtofgratitudetoKevinAshley,NuelBelnap,BruceBuchanan, RichardGale,KenManders,andaboveall,WesleySalmonfor inspiringandguidingtheoriginaldissertationprojectfromwhich thisbookemerged.Finally,mydeepestandeverlastinggratitude,for unwaveringpatience,support,andencouragement,goestomy parents,PeterandJeannie,andtomywife,Patricia. This page intentionally left blank Preface In1966,MaryHessepublishedModelsandAnalogiesinScience.Inaset offiveessays,sheraisedfundamentalquestionsabouttheimportance ofanalogiesinscientificthought.Areanalogiesneededto understandtheoreticalconcepts,andaretheyindispensableto theadvancementofscience?Whatcriteriaseparategoodanalogical argumentsfrombadones?Whatphilosophicaljustificationcanbe providedforreasoningbyanalogy?WhatdoesAristotlehavetotell usabouttheroleofanalogiesinpredication?Isthereaconnection betweenmetaphorandscientificexplanation?Inofferinganswersto thesequestions,Hesseadvancedourunderstandingoftwoaspects ofthetraditional“problemofanalogy”:theinferentialaspect,which concernsanalogicalarguments;andthesemanticaspect,whichhas todowiththeroleofanalogy(andmetaphor)inthedevelopmentof concepts.Previousthinkershadconsideredbothissues,butHesse wasthefirsttoworkoutdetailedargumentsthattheywerelinked. During the past twenty-five years or so, research on analogy hasbeentransformedbytheeffortsandinterestsofAIresearchers, psychologists,andcognitivescientists.Therearenowalargenumberof computationaltheoriesofanalogy,implementedincomputerprograms thatperformanalogicalreasoningandrelatedtasks.Theintroduction toTheAnalogicalMind,arecentanthologyof“state-of-the-art”essays (Gentner,Holyoak,andKokinov2001),givesagoodideaofhow cognitivescientistsnowunderstandthecentralissuesconcerning analogy.Theseissuesarestructuredaroundawidelyaccepteddecom- positionofthe“processofanalogicalthinking”intofoursteps:1 1. SeealsoHolyoakandThagard(1989),whichlaysoutasimilardecomposition. viii PREFACE • Retrievaloraccessofarelevant“source”analog • Mappingthatsetsupsystematiccorrespondencesbetweentheelementsof thesourceand“target”analogs • Analogicalinferenceortransferofinformationfromsourcetotarget • Learningofnewcategoriesorschemasintheaftermathofanalogical reasoning Many researchers hope to offer a psychologically realistic model of one or moreofthesestagesthatis,atleastinprinciple,capableofbeingtranslatedintoa computerprogram.Thelargerobjectiveistounderstandwhatpeopledoateach ofthesestageswhentheyuseanalogiesandhowtheydoit.Subsidiaryobjectives include the exploration of technical difficulties in implementing these ideas in computer programs, the application of analogy to tasks besides reasoning and problem-solving,andunderstandinghowanalogyisintegratedintolargerscale cognitiveprocesses(Forbus2001). Inshort,thepredominantconcernincurrentresearchistomodelanalogyas a cognitive process. This has led to a climate in which there is little room for Hesse’s second and third questions—those concerned with the nature and justification of analogical reasoning. While there are now many models of analogicalreasoning,therearefewmodelsforthecriticalevaluationofanalogi- calreasoning.Tobesure,cognitivescientistsstresstheneedforevaluationatthe analogical transfer stage, but that often amounts to checking that the models produceplausibilityjudgmentsthatarepsychologicallyrealistic.Thelegitimacy oftheseplausibilityjudgmentsisnotquestionedfurther. Yetwe surely need tothinkabout Hesse’squestions.Substantivecomputa- tional models of analogical reasoning obviously embody normative principles, and those principles should be subjected to criticism.2 A computer program mightbeeerilysuccessful induplicatinghumanreasoning, yetproduceflawed analogicalarguments—justashumansdo.Oritmightproduceexcellentresults, in which case we would want to understand the underlying ideas and their philosophicalbasis.Bywayofcomparison,supposethatwewanttounderstand the psychological processes people employ to come up with mathematical proofs. We write a computer program that breaks these processes into stages andduplicateshumanreasoningateachstage.Thatisasignificantaccomplish- ment. But we still demand a logic that discriminates between good proofs and badones.Somehow,whenweturntotheliteratureonanalogicalreasoning,we find that this demand has all but disappeared. That is surprising, in light of empirical evidence that shows how easily people can be misled by analogical arguments.3 Onereasonforthefadingurgencyofthetraditionalquestionsisthegrowing conviction that much of what takes place under the heading “analogical 2. Chapter3examinesaselectionofcomputationalmodels,withaviewtoisolatingandevaluatingthetacit normativetheories.Inparticular,thatchapterexaminestheprincipleofsystematicityemployedbymostcurrent computationalmodels. 3. SeeForbus,Gentner,andLaw(1995)andGickandHolyoak(1980,1983)forevidencethatpeopleregularly focusonsuperficialsimilaritieswhenevaluatinganalogies. PREFACE ix reasoning” is not really inference but rather something akin to perception. The Analogical Mind (Gentner, Holyoak, and Kokinov 2001) includes essays on analogicalthinkinginyoungchildrenandnonhumanprimates.Inanepilogue tothebook,Hofstadterwritesthatreasoningandproblem-solvinglie“farindeed fromthecoreofhumanthought,”andcomments: Ifanalogyweremerelyaspecialvarietyofsomething[reasoning]thatin itselflieswayoutontheperipheries,thenitwouldbebutanitty-bitty blipinthebroadblueskyofcognition.Tome,however,analogyis anythingbutabittyblip—rather,it’stheverybluethatfillsthewholesky ofcognition—analogyiseverything,orverynearlyso,inmyview. (Gentner,Holyoak,andKokinov2001,499) Thesesentiments,andthemorespecificthesisthatanalogy-makingisaprocess much like perception, are defended in Hofstadter’s (1995) book, Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies. While I am sympathetic to much of what he says, I nevertheless believe in the importance of distinguishing between the process ofrecognizingorcreatingananalogyanditscriticalassessment. Analogies play a vast and mysterious part in human thought. We rely on them when we identify complex patterns, bring past experience to bear on a problem, or strive to attain a perspective that unifies different areas of inquiry. Thereareplentyofbigquestions,manyofthemopenedupbyrecentresearch. Howdohumansconstructanalogies?Dononhumananimalsuseanalogiesina similar way to humans? What role does analogy have in defining and under- standingconcepts?Whatistherelationshipbetweenanalogiesandmetaphors? What prospect do computational models of analogy have for illuminating how humansreason(oroughttoreason)byanalogy?Aretheanalogiesemployedin scientificreasoningdifferentfromthosewefindinotherkindsofinquiry? In this book, I focus on a single thesis: good analogical arguments are an important means of establishing the plausibility of scientific hypotheses. I concentrate on two questions: (1) what criteria should we use to evaluate the analogicalargumentsusedinscience,and(2)howcanweprovideaphilosophical justification for those criteria? These questions relate to only one stage in the reasoning process and aredirectedtoward thespecializedanalogiesthat wefind inscience. Yetcanwereallyhopetoanswersuchquestionsinisolationfromabroader theory of analogy-making? The theory of conceptual metaphor, presented in George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By (1980), suggests a negative answer. According to the theory of conceptual metaphor, the source domain in any metaphor (or analogy) must always be some element of “direct physical experience” that can be grasped nonmetaphorically because it comes from our everyday activities as embodied human beings living in a particular culture. Typical examples include journeys (“Life is a journey”), spatial orienta- tion(“He’satthepeakofhiscareer”),andwar(“Heattackedeveryweakpointin myargument”).InarecentapplicationofLakoffandJohnson’stheorytometa- phorsinscience,TheodoreBrown(2003)embracestheirviewthatallmetaphors
The list of books you might like
