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British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency PDF

278 Pages·2009·6.4 MB·English
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British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency Army Code 71876 October 2009 Copyright This work is Crown copyright and the intellectual property rights for this publication belong exclusively to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). No material or information contained in this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form outside MOD establishments except as authorised by both the sponsor and the MOD where appropriate. Security This document is issued for the information of such persons who need to know its contents in the course of their official duties. Any person finding this document should hand it into a British Forces unit or to a British police station for its safe return to the Ministry of Defence, D MOD Sy, LONDON, SW1A 2HB, with particulars of how and where found. THE UNAUTHORIZED RETENTION OR DESTRUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT COULD BE AN OFFENCE UNDER THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS OF 1911-1989. Authority This publication is issued under the overall direction of the Chief of the General Staff. It is an MOD Approved Code of Practice (ACOP). Where issues of health and safety are concerned it takes into account the provisions of the Health & Safety at Work Act 1974. Status The contents provide clear military information concerning the most up to date experience and best practice available for commanders and troops to use in their operations and training. If you are prosecuted for a breach of health and safety law, and it is proved that you have not followed the relevant provisions of the ACOP, a court may find you criminally liable unless you can show that you have complied with the requirements of health and safety legislation since it is a breach of this legislation which renders a person criminally liable. Breaches or omissions of the ACOP could result in disciplinary action under the provisions of the Army Act. Amendment Amendment No Date Amendment No Date Distribution As directed by Colonel Warfare Development, sponsor of this publication. Development Suggestions for change should be sent to the SO1 Tac Doc Pubs, WARDEV, LWC, Imber Road, Warminster BA12 0DJ. T his is an electronic version of the Field Manual. In order to make it easily distributable by e lectronic means and to allow for efficient printing on standard office equipment the photographs have been removed and many of the diagrams simplified. i FOREWORD It is over eight years since the Army last published counterinsurgency doctrine. Much has changed since then. This manual is a short guide to insurgency, and the principles and approaches needed to counter it. It has been written to complement allied and joint doctrine and the authors have been careful to ensure that the principles and framework that are explained in Part A are entirely coherent with those in UK joint doctrine and that of our principal allies, in particular USA, Canada and Australia. For maximum effect Part A should be read as a single continuous narrative while Part B can be read in its constituent chapters. AFM Countering Insurgency describes how the British Army plans and conducts counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level. It explains that efforts must be focused on securing the local population and gaining and maintaining popular support. This is a task for the host nation, its security forces, British forces and our allies, in concert with our partners across government. The doctrine explains why this is not simply a military undertaking but a battle of political wills with a number of lines of operation acting in concert. It is axiomatic that security forces of all types lead in providing an environment sufficiently stable to allow the other instruments of governance can be brought to bear to improve the lives of the local population. Providing effective security is a complex, dangerous, and bloody business; it takes time and resources and it tests the resolve of all involved. These are enduring characteristics of counterinsurgency. Doctrine is ‘what is taught’, and to be effective it needs to be read and understood. Pragmatism is needed, however, in its application. Every counterinsurgency campaign is different from the last, but history and experience show that a thorough knowledge of the doctrine and a clear understanding of the operational environment are two essential prerequisites. Doctrine provides commanders at the tactical level with the basis on which to build this understanding, and requires them to use their experience and judgement to develop the right approach to the particular circumstances in which they find themselves. As such it is focussed at the brigade level and below and educationally for the ICSC(L) student. While the authors of this publication have consulted widely with experienced practitioners and academic experts and endeavoured to include a broad range of ideas, it is not a comprehensive textbook on insurgency or counterinsurgency. Nor is it specific to a particular theatre of operation or a particular insurgent group. It provides the key themes which have emerged in recent years and thus reflects the contemporary situation. Given insurgency’s constant adaptation, things will change and this publication will have to adjust accordingly. The authors will track developments in order to keep it relevant and take account of emerging views. In this respect your views and insights are important. Comments on this publication are encouraged and should be sent to LWC- [email protected]. CONTENTS Page i Foreword Part A – The Fundamentals Chapter 1 – Introduction 1-1 Section 1 The Basics Section 2 Definitions 1-5 Section 3 Operating Within A Sovereign Nation 1-6 Section 4 The Psychological Dimension 1-7 Section 5 Enduring Characteristics 1-8 Section 6 Building Host Nation Capacity and Capabilities 1-9 Section 7 Countering Insurgency 1-12 Section 8 The Importance of Time 1-15 CASE STUDY 1 : The Development of Doctrine for Countering Insurgency; the British Experience Chapter 2 – Insurgency Section 1 Introduction and Definitions 2-1 Section 2 Causes, Aims and Elements 2-3 Causes 2-3 Aims 2-4 Mechanism for Motivation 2-5 Elements of an Insurgency 2-5 Section 3 Insurgent Vulnerabilities 2-7 Annex A The Categorisation of Insurgency 2-A-1 CASE STUDY 2: The Growth of Religious Extremism Chapter 3 - The Principles of Counterinsurgency Section 1 Introduction and Principles 3-1 Primacy of Political Purpose 3-2 Unity of Effort 3-3 Understand the Human Terrain 3-5 Secure the Population 3-8 Neutralise the Insurgent 3-9 Gain and Maintain Popular Support 3-11 Operate in Accordance with the Law 3-15 Integrate Intelligence 3-15 Prepare for the Long Term 3-17 Learn and Adapt 3-18 Section 2 Paradoxes 3-22 Chapter 4 - A Framework for the Conduct of Counterinsurgency Operations Section 1 Introduction 4-1 The Joint, Operational Level Approach 4-2 Section 2 A Framework for Operations 4-3 Section 3 Shape-Secure-Develop 4-5 Shape 4-5 Secure 4-7 Develop 4-10 Section 4 Transition: The Transfer Of Security Sector 4-11 Section 5 Clear-Hold-Build 4-14 Section 6 Contesting Outlying Areas 4-21 Section 7 Best Practices in Counterinsurgency 4-21 ii CASE STUDY 3: A Successful Campaign: Oman (Dhofar) 1965-1975 PART - B Chapter 5 – Intelligence Section 1 Introduction 5-1 Section 2 The Insurgent 5-2 Section 3 Intelligence Preparation of the Environment 5-4 Section 4 The Intelligence/Operations Cycle (F3EA) 5-6 Section 5 The Intelligence Staff 5-11 Section 6 Constraints 5-13 Section 7 Counter Intelligence And Security Intelligence 5-14 Chapter 6 – Influence Activity Section 1 Introduction 6-1 Section 2 Influence Activities 6-2 Section 3 Manning, Staff Processes & Planning Considerations 6-8 Section 4 Delivering Influence At Formation/Unit Level 6-11 Section 5 Counter Influence 6-14 Annex A Influence Considerations for the Tactical Estimate 6-A-1 Annex B Illustrative Manning For Influence Activity Staff At 6-B-1 Divisional Level Annex C Illustrative Staff Structure for Influence Activity At 6-C-1 Brigade Level Annex D Influence Activity Coordination Boards at the 6-D-1 Brigade and Battlegroup Level Annex E Operational Terminology 6-E-1 Chapter 7 - Planning Considerations For Counterinsurgency Section 1 Introduction 7-1 Section 2 The Importance of Operational Design 7-2 Section 3 Operational Level Approaches at the Tactical Level 7-6 Section 4 Campaign and Tactical Plans 7-9 Section 5 Logistics 7-11 Annex A Command and control Structures 7-A-1 Annex B Measures of Effectiveness 7-B-1 CASE STUDY 4: An Unsuccessful Campaign; South Arabia and Aden, 1963-1967 Chapter 8 – Execution Section 1 Introduction 8-1 Section 2 Shape 8-2 Reconciliation 8-3 Money on the Battlefield 8-3 Section 3 Secure 8-6 Section 4 Develop 8-8 Annex A – Key Leader Engagement 8-A-1 Annex B – Counterinsurgency Strike Operations 8-B-1 Annex C – Detention Operations 8-C-1 CASE STUDY 5: A Classic Campaign; Malaya, 1948-1960 Chapter 9 - The Special Forces, Air and Maritime Contributions Section 1 Special Forces 9-1 Section 2 Airpower in Counterinsurgency 9-4 Section 3 The Maritime Contribution To Countering Insurgency 9-11 iii Chapter 10 - Military Capacity Building Section 1 Fundamentals 10-1 Principles 10-2 Section 2 Preparing for the Task 10-5 Planning 10-5 Selection of Personnel 10-6 Training 10-7 Section 3 Recruitment of Forces 10-9 Section 4 Training 10-10 Planning 10-10 Transition to Self Reliance 10-12 Section 5 Operations 10-13 Transition to Operations 10-13 Partnering 10-13 Transition to Self Reliance 10-15 Annex A Nomenclature 10-A-1 Annex B Overwatch 10-B-1 Chapter 11 – Learning and Adapting Section 1 Introduction 11-1 Section 2 Approach to Training and Education 11-4 Section 3 Pre-Deployment Training 11-5 Section 4 Individual and Specialist Training 11-7 Section 5 Cultural Understanding 11-0 Chapter 12 – Legal Aspects of Countering Insurgency 12-1 Definitions 12-1 Legal Framework 12-2 Use of Force 12-5 Rules of Engagement 12-7 Detention Operations 12-8 Rule of the Legal advisor 12-10 CASE STUDY 6: A Complicated Campaign – Mozambique 1976-1992 CASE STUDY 7: A Potential Campaign – 2009 Onwards GLOSSARY iv CHAPTER 1 THE FUNDAMENTALS SECTION 1 – BASICS 1-1. Counterinsurgency is Warfare. Contents Page Until recently, the word counterinsurgency appeared to be Section 1 – Basics 1-1 synonymous with low-intensity Section 2 – Definitions 1-5 operations, or operations other than war. Section 3 - Operating Within A 1-6 It conjured up images of British soldiers Sovereign Nation in the Malayan jungle, or on the streets Section 4 – The Psychological 1-7 of Northern Ireland. The U.S. military’s Dimension – Influence Activity experience in Iraq 2003-2008, and the Section 5 – Enduring 1-8 British campaign in Helmand Province in Characteristics Afghanistan since 2006 have Section 6 – Building Host 1-9 demonstrated that military operations Nation Capacity against irregular insurgents can be as Section 7 – Countering 1-12 intense as combat in conventional Insurgency warfare. The intensity of operations is Section 8 – The Importance of 1-15 not the issue at stake. Insurgency and Time counterinsurgency are two sides of a very complex form of warfare, where a group or groups resort to violence and take up arms to achieve political objectives. Typical objectives are replacing an existing government, securing the status quo and challenging a nascent or emerging state. Today’s hybrid threats – any adversaries that simultaneously and adaptively employ a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behaviour in the same battlespace to obtain their political objectives – are constantly seeking to exploit what they perceive to be the vulnerabilities of regular forces. They do this by using terrorism and subversion, by blending into the population amongst which security forces operate, and by exploiting their most effective weapon which is the influence that they can extend through the media. Counterinsurgency is warfare; it is distinctly political, not primarily military; and it involves the people, the government, and the military. The strength of the relationship between these three groups generally determines the outcome of the campaign. 1-2. Principles. The ten principles for counterinsurgency, explained in Chapter 3, are: 1. Primacy of political purpose. 2. Unity of effort. 3. Understand the human terrain. 4. Secure the population. 5. Neutralise the insurgent. 6. Gain and maintain popular support. 7. Operate in accordance with the law. 8. Integrate intelligence. 9. Prepare for the long term. 10. Learn and adapt. 1 - 1 1-3. Security. The principal security task is to secure the population from violence. By securing the population and by stabilising the situation, governance can be re-established for the benefit of the population. A stable, sustainable security situation is a pre-requisite for improving both governance and the population’s prospects. Securing the population has several essential elements. While it may be possible to take some risk with each of them, experience shows that delay is dangerous. The essential security elements of counterinsurgency are: • Security for the Population. The success or failure of an insurgency is largely dependent on the attitude of the population. Insurgents use force to bring parts of the population under consensual or involuntary control; the host government’s task is to secure the population from such influence. This requires active security measures, which include controlling movement, imposing curfews in times when the threat is high, conducting a census to establish who the people are, introducing positive identification methods such as identity cards and biometric measurement, and building security infrastructure such as gated • Presence. In counterinsurgency, presence matters. The population has to be secured where it lives, and it must be secured on a permanent basis. This means that the military commander must establish and maintain a continuous and effective presence on the ground. The accepted rule of thumb is 20 security personnel (soldiers, police, para-militaries and auxiliaries) for every 1000 people in the area of operation. If insufficient security personnel are available, commanders may have to devise plans to reduce areas of operation to provide the optimum force ratio. Experience shows that it is easier to deal with insurgents when the security forces live amongst the population than when they have to deploy to an area on a temporary basis. • Continuity. The population is the one constant in the equation and so continuity of approach to the population is essential. Continuity helps to avoid mistakes being repeated, it allows relationships between the population and the security forces to be developed and maintained, and acknowledging the need for continuity addresses in part the fact that the long term solution to an insurgency rests with the host nation, its government and its people. Continuity also helps build confidence with allies. The use of purpose-designed standing HQs manned on a trickle basis, together with individual officer and soldier tours of as long duration as is acceptable will promote continuity. • Intelligence. Intelligence is essential in any operation but especially so in counterinsurgency. It ensures that the insurgents are correctly targeted and neutralised by whatever means is most appropriate. Good intelligence also helps avoid civilian casualties or infrastructure damage. Intelligence depends as much on the tactical level pattern of life in each area of operations as it does on the top- down feed of intelligence from operational and strategic levels. Intelligence has to be integrated at every level of command and across and between agencies engaged in counterinsurgency. • ISTAR. Effective counterinsurgency depends on efficient and persistent ISTAR coverage. Airborne surveillance offers considerable advantages both in terms of the situational awareness that it provides to ground forces in their task of securing the population, and in the deterrent effect on the insurgents. Airborne platforms give the commander a distinct advantage over the insurgent; for that reason, they are crucial in counterinsurgency. 1 - 2 • Embedded Training Teams. Host nation forces invariably require training and development. Where British training teams are deployed, experience proves that they are at their most effective when they are embedded with the unit or formation that they are training, and when they bring with them the enabling capabilities of ISTAR, joint fires, command and control, and CSS, particularly medical and logistics. Training the host nation’s security forces and partnering and mentoring them on operations is an essential part of achieving long-term security which the host nation can sustain. Those selected to train host nation security forces themselves require to be trained in cultural awareness and theatre specifics so that they can fit in with their charges from the outset. • Influence. Counterinsurgency is about gaining and securing the support of the people both in the theatre of operations and at home. Influence activity therefore underpins everything which British forces undertake because counterinsurgency is as much about the battle of perceptions as it is about military operations targeted against insurgents. • Education. Those who have to put counterinsurgency doctrine into practice have to know what the doctrine says. This requirement is not limited to UK doctrine; commanders must also be versed in the doctrine of other nations with which they are likely to operate. They need to have the knowledge and confidence to adapt doctrine to meet the challenges that they face. Without flexibility and pragmatism in its application, doctrine becomes dogma, “...to be seized upon by mental emasculates who lack virility of judgment, and who are only too grateful to rest assured that their actions, however inept, find justification in a book, which, if they think at all, is in their opinion, written in order to exonerate them from doing so.”1 Counterinsurgency warfare is complex and is not at all suited to learning the basics in the heat of the campaign. That is the time to adapt the approach to meet the demands of the situation based on a clear understanding of the doctrine, approaches, and best practice. This places a clear onus on the Army and Defence to provide comprehensive education for counterinsurgency. 1-4. A Framework for Counterinsurgency. A number of conceptual frameworks have been developed which provide a way of thinking about the principal themes or tasks in counterinsurgency. The framework adopted in this manual is a general model of Shape-Secure-Develop, which groups together the main tasks which forces may be called upon to carry out during the campaign under each of its three headings. The emphasis will shift between the three dependent on the security situation and campaign progress. For example, if the threat is high, ‘secure’ operations may dominate. If the situation is more stable, ‘develop’ activity may be the focus. It is important to note that Shape-Secure-Develop is a general model; operational commanders may well develop an approach which reflects the specifics of their campaign or the doctrine of a non-UK superior commander. 1-5. The Continuum of Operations. The campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere have shown that as the host nation builds up its own security capacity, UK armed forces are required to operate effectively across the continuum of operations. Combating insurgents can be, at times, as fierce, demanding, chaotic and violent as warfighting. While this form of combat is undesirable, particularly if it takes place among the population that the security forces are in place to protect, all forces should 1 J.F.C. Fuller, Reformation of War, London: Hutchinson 1923, p. 254. 1 - 3 be prepared for periods of intense fighting. No counterinsurgency exists at just one point on the continuum of operations. Its intensity will vary in time and place. At any one point in the campaign there might be a humanitarian crisis in one district, and a violent outbreak by insurgents in another. At any one place in the theatre of operations, in one week there might be an operation to clear, secure and hold a village, and a development task to restore electricity and water supplies the week after. 1-6. Stabilisation and Counterinsurgency. JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation – the Military Contribution describes the relationship between stabilisation and counterinsurgency. JDP 3-40 uses Figure 1.1 to illustrate the likely relationship between stabilisation and counterinsurgency. It shows how a counterinsurgency operation sits within the three major sectors of a stabilisation campaign: Governance, Security, and Development. Although the provision of security contributes to all three sectors, it will inevitably be the main effort, particularly in the initial stages of a campaign. The size of the ‘COIN bubble’ will depend on the scale of the insurgency and it will vary as the campaign develops. How it changes will depend on the capacity of other government departments and intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations. These depend, in turn, on the contribution that security forces can make to developmental and governance activities. A key aspect of all stabilisation tasks will be to prepare the host nation to take responsibility for its own security, development and governance. Within this sector, the security forces will inevitably have a significant role to play in training and mentoring, through embedded partnering, the host nation’s security forces to provide security. Figure 1.1 Stabilisation and Counterinsurgency 1-7. JDP 3-40 describes the military contribution to security and stabilisation, set in the context of wider cross government efforts. The military contribution is in four areas: 1 - 4

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British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency Army Code 71876 October 2009
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