Bracing for Armageddon?: The Science and Politics of Bioterrorism in America

224 Pages·2008·1 MB·English

by  William R. Clark

B R A C I N G

FOR
A R M A G E D D O N ?
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B R A C I N G

FOR
A R M A G E D D O N ?
The Science and Politics
of Bioterrorism in America
William R. Clark
1
2008
3
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Clark, William R., 1938–
Bracing for armageddon? : the science and politics of bioterrorism
in America / William R. Clark.
p. cm.
Includes index.
ISBN 978-0-19-533621-4
1. Bioterrorism—United States. 2. Bioterrorism—United States—Prevention.
3. Biological weapons. I. Title.
HV6433.35.C53 2008
363.325’30973—dc22 2007040445
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
Acknowledgments
I would like to extend my profound thanks to a number of
individuals who shared their time and expertise with me dur-
ing the preparation of this book: Dr. Milton Leitenberg, Center
for International and Security Studies, School of Public Policy,
University of Maryland; Dr. Jeanne Guillemin, Boston College
and Senior Fellow, MIT Security Studies Program; Dr. Alan
Pearson, Biological and Chemical Weapons Program, Center
for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; Dr. Laurene Mascola,
Chief, Bioterrorism Preparedness Unit, Los Angeles County; Mr.
Frank Simione, Vice President of Management and Compliance
Services, American Type Culture Collection; Dr. Ray Zilinskas,
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for
International Studies; Dr. Seth Carus, Deputy Director, Center
for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense
University; Dr. James G. Hodge, Jr., Executive Director, Center
for Law and the Public’s Health, Johns Hopkins University; Dr.
Amy Smithson, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
Institute of International Studies (Washington, D.C.); Dr. Bryan
McDonald, Center for Unconventional Security Affairs, University
of California, Irvine; Dr. Susan Wright, History of Science and
International Relations, University of Michigan.
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Preface
Over the past two decades, an enormous effort has been mounted
by numerous federal and state agencies to prepare America to
defend against the possibility of a bioterrorist attack. This effort
jumped ahead at warp speed following the horrendous World
Trade Center and Pentagon attacks of September 11, 2001, fol-
lowed by the postal anthrax scares just a few weeks later. Five
people died in these latter incidents, considered by some to be
the opening salvos in a new form of terrorism brought to our
shores. By the end of 2008, the United States will have spent
nearly fi fty billion dollars upgrading almost every conceivable
aspect of our ability to respond defensively to a catastrophic
bioterrorism attack.
Concerns about bioterrorism in America, while certainly justi-
fi ed in many respects, have at times and in some quarters risen
almost to the level of hysteria. Part of the reason for this is doubt-
less the confl ation of bioterrorism with a larger “war on terror.”
Declaring war on something is a time-honored way in American
politics to raise an issue to a level of unquestionable urgency.
Another part of the terror of bioterrorism is that, unlike terror-
ism using other weapons—bombs, chemicals, nuclear devices—
bioterrorism is based on things we cannot see and few of us
understand. We rely on scientifi c experts to explain them to us,
adding yet another layer of uncertainty, both for the public and
for our political leaders. Science is not always objective, and sci-
entifi c experts themselves have differing points of view—political
viii • PREFACE
points of view—about bioterrorism, just as they have differing
points of view about global warming, or stem cell research, or the
beginnings of life.
America in fact faces bioterrorism from not just one but two
sources: from other humans who would use deadly biological
weapons to attack us for political or ideological reasons, and
from nature, which periodically unleashes biological pathogens
on us for reasons that have nothing to do with human affairs,
but that terrorize us nonetheless. We remain prey to infectious
disease pandemics like the 1918 infl uenza outbreak, which killed
perhaps a hundred million people worldwide, and the yet unre-
solved threats posed by the viruses causing SARS and H5N1
avian fl u.
Both of these biological threats to our security and well-being,
the political and the natural, are real. History makes clear that
natural bioterrorism—pandemics—will, like earthquakes, tsu-
namis, and hurricanes, absolutely recur periodically, with the
potential for catastrophic physical, social, and economic damage.
What has been lacking in our approach to the threat of political
bioterrorism to date is an assessment of exactly how real it is.
How likely is it that America will experience a bioterrorist attack
that could bring this country to its knees? What would it take
to mount such an attack? Who could do it, and what weapons
would they use? How would bioterrorism compare with the dam-
age America would suffer from other forms of terrorism, or from
a natural pandemic like that of 1918? How much of our resources
as a nation should we spend preparing for each? How do we know
when we are safe, or at least as safe as we can realistically expect
to be, from these threats? These are hard questions.
Given the numerous instances of outright terrorism over
the last two decades of the twentieth century and on through
September 11, 2001, it may not be surprising that our percep-
tion of the threat of bioterrorism has at times verged on the
hysterical. Fear is not necessarily a bad thing; hysteria is almost
always counterproductive. Fear is a response dictated by nature
to ensure survival, and as we will see in the chapters that follow,
we have responded vigorously to nature’s command. Not always
rationally, but certainly vigorously.
PREFACE • ix
But it is time now to move toward a more mature view of bio-
terrorism, to tone down the rhetoric and see it for what it actu-
ally is: one of many diffi cult and potentially dangerous situations
America—and the world—face in the decades ahead. What have
we actually gotten for the tens of billions of dollars we have spent
so far on bioterrorism defense? Was this money well spent? No
nation has infi nite resources, and we must accept that we will
never be able to make ourselves completely safe from every threat
we face. We will have to make rational assessments of those threats
we can identify, and apportion our resources as intelligently and
effectively as we can to deal with them. In this book we look at the
scientifi c, political, legal, and social facets of bioterrorism that
can guide us as we attempt to bring this particular threat into a
more realistic perspective for the twenty-fi rst century.