Sports Economics, Management and Policy Series Editor: Dennis Coates Ngiste Abebe Mary Trina Bolton Maggie Pavelka Morgan Pierstorff Bidding for Development How the Olympic Bid Process Can Accelerate Transportation Development Sports Economics, Management and Policy For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/8343 Ngiste Abebe (cid:129) Mary Trina Bolton Maggie Pavelka (cid:129) M organ Pierstorff Bidding for Development How the Olympic Bid Process Can Accelerate Transportation Development Ngiste Abebe Mary Trina Bolton Washington , DC , USA Washington, DC, USA Maggie Pavelka Morgan Pierstorff Washington, DC, USA Louisville , KY , USA ISSN 2191-298X ISSN 2191-2998 (electronic) ISBN 978-1-4614-8911-5 ISBN 978-1-4614-8912-2 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-8912-2 Springer New York Heidelberg Dordrecht London Library of Congress Control Number: 2013952912 © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 This work is subject to copyright. 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They do not represent the views of the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, the Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, any other entity of the U.S. Government, or Deloitte LLP and its subsidiaries. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com) Foreword This volume of the Sports Economics, Management, and Policy series marks the fi rst foray for the series into the explicitly policy realm. It is also the fi rst in the series not to be written by academics. While their work in this fi eld grew out of their experience in academia at Carnegie Mellon University, the four authors are not researchers. The authors, instead, work in policymaking and implementation capac- ities in public and private sectors, in both international and domestic realms. Ngiste R. Abebe, Maggie M. Pavelka, Morgan L. Pierstorff, and Mary “Trina” Bolton began this project as a master’s level capstone project in the Master’s of Public Policy and Management program at Carnegie Mellon University’s Heinz College in Washington, D.C. In lieu of a thesis, students in the program complete a “Systems Synthesis” project in which teams work with a faculty adviser to analyze a policy issue. The students also must develop a solution or provide recommenda- tions for addressing the policy problem and sometimes are involved in implement- ing those recommendations. Working with four additional students at Heinz College on their capstone proj- ect, the group identifi ed the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) bid process as a mechanism for fostering transportation development. Their topic selection refl ected a desire to focus on timely policy topics—globalism and transportation issues—that are also of relevance to policymakers, scholars, and citizens of many countries. The group recognized that the allure of the Olympics and the universal appeal of hosting this prestigious mega sporting event often confl icted with the realities of the Games, including potential negative aftereffects. They wanted to address this discrepancy as well as highlight how the Olympics can also have posi- tive impacts—especially in urban development. The authors wanted to fi nd a way for the prestige and prominence of the Games to enhance the prospects for long- term development in cities. If channeled strategically, the energy and efforts to host the Games could and would serve as the means of improving global and local policy and improving the welfare of societies in developed and developing nations alike. The group identifi ed the urban development and transportation projects that benefi t the host city and country residents and perpetuate positive changes as the most likely means of meeting this goal. v vi Foreword The authors and their colleagues approached me, as well as a few other professors and economists, to assist them in developing their capstone project. We had several phone conversations about issues that they ought to consider for the project. We discussed specifi c literature to read and the methodology to follow. The entire group, students and advisers, interacted through videoconferences at specifi c milestones in the project, with the students giving a brief presentation and taking questions from the advisers. The students also used this time to ask questions about specifi c aspects of the project where they felt they needed further guidance. One aspect of the capstone project is to develop a plan for disseminating the fi nd- ings. The students developed a website and Ngiste, Trina, Maggie, and Morgan presented work at a conference in London prior to the 2012 Olympic Games. During the last videoconference session in which the students presented the fi nal project, I suggested that the project could be revised for the Sports Economics, Management, and Policy series. Happily for me, Ngiste, Maggie, Morgan, and Trina enthusiasti- cally accepted the challenge of making their project into a book. The authors brought a variety of working experiences to this project having done extensive professional work in economic and international development with a col- lective focus on transportation policy. They wrote this book with international gov- ernment offi cials and their partners in mind. The ultimate goal of this work is to provide guidance to those individuals who seek to leverage hosting a mega event, such as the Olympics, into a well-planned, well-fi nanced, valuable expansion and modernization of a city’s local transportation infrastructure. The authors hope that by following their suggestions, cities will avoid costly “white elephants” and will, preferably, draw from their Olympic bid(s)/hosting experience a great legacy of reduced traffi c congestion and pollution, more rapid and affordable transportation for people and goods, and increased access to the city, country, and world for their citizens. While the book is focused on bidding to host the Olympics, the recommenda- tions the authors make apply to all international sporting organizations, bidding organizations, and to the citizens of bidding communities. For the International Olympic Committee, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), and the other international sport-governing bodies, the recommendations are as follows: 1. Require cities to demonstrate that Olympic-specifi c transportation plans within the bid align with preexisting city transportation plans . 2. Require proof of citizen engagement and support for the bid’s urban planning agenda to ensure support for the Games and a positive Olympic Legacy . Recommendations to the bid leadership in communities are as follows: 1. Utilize every available resource, IOC and otherwise, to strengthen the intersec- tion of Olympic plans and local plans to lay the groundwork for a positive legacy from the conception of the bid . 2. Maximize public and private sector support for proposed transportation projects. Foreword vii 3. Actively and continuously engage with local citizens to ensure Olympic plans are responsive to local needs and mitigate risk of protest. 4. Be prepared to drop out of the bid process. Finally, citizens of the bidding city or country are recommended to: 1. Proactively infl uence Olympic bid plans to ensure community interests are refl ected in bid documentation. The importance of the lessons and recommendations of this analysis has recently been brought to world attention. In the spring of 2013, demonstrations rocked Brazil during the FIFA Confederations Cup tournament. While these actions were responses to an increase in public transit fares, discontent about poor services cou- pled with billions of reales of spending to refurbish and construct stadiums for the 2014 World Cup soon became an important part of the story. For context, Brazil was awarded the honor of hosting the 2014 World Cup in October 2007, 6 months after the only other applicant, Colombia, withdrew from consideration. At the time, Brazil expected to spend $5 billion to host the event. The 2010 Ministry of Sport economic impact report [1] projected transportation infra- structure spending of 17 billion reales (US $10.18 billion on December 31, 2010), with another 5.6 billion reales for stadiums. Among the transportation projects were upgrades to 13 airports and 47 urban transportation ventures, including rail links from the airports into the cities, trams, dedicated bus lanes, and new roads and high- ways. Twelve stadiums were also to be built or modernized. Three years after Brazil was awarded the Games, the planned spending on infra- structure reached 22.6 billion reales ($13.29 billion, using the October 20, 2010, exchange rate), a 165 % increase over the expected cost of hosting the event indicated in press reports just 3 years earlier. In a July 2011 teleconference with international news organizations, Minister of Sport Orlando Silva, Jr., explained that the planning efforts for the World Cup were divided into three phases, with the fi rst phase having begun in 2009. This phase included planning for the infrastructure investment described above, which Minister Silva reported would cost 24 billion reales ($15 bil- lion), yet another increase. Describing the planning process, Jose Roberto Bernasconi, head of a trade association of local engineering and construction fi rms, is quoted by Andrew Downie in a report for Reuters [2]: “We won the right to host the World Cup in October 2007 but we didn’t decide what needed to be done until January 2010… In 2008 and 2009 we did little or nothing. You can call it lack of money, or will, or competence but there was defi nitely a lack of something.”1 Bernasconi’s comment highlights precisely the point the authors of this book wish to make—countries bid- ding to host a mega event will be more successful, and have a positive lasting legacy, if they start with a bid strategy grounded in a carefully and explicitly specifi ed long- term plan that must include funding sources and citizen participation. 1 One could also call it a problem of graft, since Minister of Sport Silva resigned offi ce in October 2011, under a cloud of suspicion of padding contracts and receiving kickbacks. viii Foreword Downie’s story reported on the problems with Brazil’s transportation plans including failure to complete rail links to the domestic and international airports serving Sao Paulo; a stoppage of work on the tram line connecting the Brasilia air- port to the city; no start to the construction of 20 km of monorail and 21 km of bus lanes in Manaus; no start to construction of 7 km of highways, tunnels, and over- passes in Fortaleza; no construction of the roads or rail or metro links in Salvador that were to be built in time for the Games. Indeed, so many of the transportation projects are being delayed or canceled that, according to Downie, there is discussion of declaring a national holiday and closing schools during the event to reduce traffi c congestion. Some of these transportation plans are, in fact, part of Rio de Janeiro’s winning bid to host the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. For example, according to the Brazilian Ministry of Sports website, Rio 2016 proposed a capital budget of $14.4 billion [4], half of which is allotted for transport infrastructure. Among the transport infrastructure project costs in the bid were $400 million to extend and upgrade the Rio International Airport, $600 million for a Rio bypass and other road projects in the area where most Games venues and the Olympic Village will be, $1.31 billion for extension and capacity improvements for suburban rail and metro, $1.23 billion for the development of three Bus Rapid Transit lines connecting the four Olympic “zones” within Rio, and $1.35 billion for train and metro cars and buses [5]. Rio 2016 also highlights “green” projects in its bid, including low-emission transport vehicles. The IOC evaluation report highlighted “a feature of Rio’s plans as the cleaning and regeneration of Rio’s waterways and lakes through government projects for major new water treatment and sewerage works.” I draw attention to this claim because a July 18, 2013, N ew York Times story addressed water issues in and around Rio [6]. Juliana Barbassa reports that more than 20 years after the United Nations conference on the environment held in Rio, and after nearly $1.2 billion of spending, none of the four sewage treatment plants is fully operational. The culprit, according to Barbassa, is “gross mismanagement and corruption.” There are plans for another $1.3 billion of spending on water collection and treatment facilities, but Barbassa is not hopeful about the success of these projects as “[j]ust recently, one shopping mall, four gated communities and one water-front hotel were discovered to be illegally disposing of their sewage in rainwater mains that fl ow into nearby beaches or lakes.” In other words, plans for public infrastructure improvements will fail if the citizenry does not try to infl uence Games organizers regardless of how competent and uncorrupt their local government might be. During the same time frame in 2013, protests in Turkey raised questions about the suitability of Istanbul as host for the 2020 Olympic Games [7]. The authors’ focus on Istanbul as a case study in the book makes these demonstrations of added relevance—even in the context of urban development. While Maggie, Morgan, Trina, and Ngiste did not yet know the IOC’s decision for the host city of the 2020 Games at the time of writing of the book, the newfound knowledge that Istanbul was not selected reiterates the authors’ discourse on Istanbul as a case study. Aligning with the book’s recommendations, Istanbul may continue to take what it has gained over the course of its “failed” bid track record, reprioritize further improvements for Foreword ix civil society, and understand that winning the Games is not the “end all and be all.” Regardless of this bid loss, the city may move forward with its plans to improve transportation infrastructure for its residents. These critiques, combined with the 2013 civil unrest in Brazil, illustrate the rel- evance of this book. The need for informed and transparent bid development— especially in transportation projects of long-term relevance and benefi t to citizens—is a critical component of any city and country hoping to host a global mega sporting event. Even as a repeat bidder for the Olympics, Rio may still not be ready to host its fast-approaching mega events. The negative impacts and backlash in Brazil bring to light the added signifi cance of engaging in pre-, mid-, and post-bid planning and implementation thoroughly and with informed public participation. Entering the process without a solid foundation of planning, fi nance, and consent can bring unwanted publicity, as the attention the unrest in Brazil and Turkey have demon- strated, just as surely as a successful stint as host can bring positive publicity. If they work together, the cities that engage in the bid process and the sport- governing bodies that select event hosts can avoid the pitfalls of hosting the Games. To do so is challenging, but following the recommendations set forth by Ngiste, Maggie, Morgan, and Trina is a good step toward doing so. And by following these urban development–focused recommendations of thorough due diligence by bid- ders and bid evaluators alike, careful planning, proper implementation, and citizen involvement, a positive legacy is achievable. References 1. Ministerio do Esporte (2010) Impactos economicos da realizacao da Copa 2014 no Brasil, Brasilia. http://www.esporte.gov.br/arquivos/futebolDireitosTorcedor/copa2014/estudoSobre- ImpactosEconomicosCopaMundo2014.pdf . Accessed 12 Aug 2013 2. Downie A (2013) Soccer-as Brazil World Cup nears, public transport worries mount. h ttp:// uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/05/soccer-world-brazil-idUKL1N0BW1DL20130305 . Accessed 12 Aug 2013 3. (2009) Jogos Olímpicos e Paraolímpicos de 2016 no Rio deixarão legados socioeconômicos de grandes proporções. http://www.esporte.gov.br/snear/rio2016/noticiaRioDetalhe.jsp?idnoticia= 5754 . Accessed 12 Aug 2013 4. International Olympic Committee (2009) Report of the 2016 IOC evaluation commission, games of the XXXI Olympiad. h ttp://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en_report_ 1469.pdf . Accessed 12 Aug 2013 5. Barbassa J (2013) A river runs over with it. h ttp://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/a- river-runs-over-with-it/?src=xps . Accessed 12 Aug 2013 6. Duff A, Kayakiran F (2013) Turkish protests put Istanbul’s 2020 Olympic bid on back foot. h ttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-30/turkish-protests-put-istanbul-s-2020-olympic- bid-on-back-foot.html . Accessed 20 Aug 2013
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