Table Of ContentBEYOND SCEPTICISM AND REALISM
BEYOND SCEPTICISM AND
REALISM
A Constructive Exploration of Husserlian
and W hiteheadian Methods of Inquiry
by
ERVIN LASZLO
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B. V. 1966
ISBN 978-94-017-6473-5 ISBN 978-94-017-6617-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-6617-3
Copyright I966 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any fo·rm
Originally published by M artinus N ijhoff, T he H ague, .Vetherlands in 1966
Softcover reprint oft he hardcover 1st edition 1966
PREFACE
I have written this work to make a point. To make it, I was compelled
to put forward views regardless of whether they corresponded to my per
sonal convictions or not. I am neither as sceptical as my 'argument from
consciousness' suggests, nor as realist as my 'argument from being'
would lead one to believe. These are prototypes for the arguments that
would be advanced by an uncompromising methodical sceptic and a
consistent and systematic realist; their purpose is not to affirm the
principles of scepticism and realism, but to demonstrate them by ex
emplification. However, I can say with Wittgenstein that, once the
significance of these models has been grasped, they can be discarded
as ladders one has already scaled, for they show that truly consistent
scepticism and realism are not contradictory, and therefore they negate
their own basic assumptions.
Since I mantain that a proposition which satisfies the sceptic as well
as the realist may be construed as an instance of meaningful meta
physics, I hope that, with these constructive analyses of the sceptical
method of Husserl and the realist method of Whitehead, I may have
contributed towards the rehabilitation of metaphysics in contemporary
philosophy.
Fribourg, Switzerland, October 1964- E. L.
CONTENTS
Preface v
PART I. SCEPTICISM AND REALISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE METHOD
Basic Assumptions and Predetermined Arguments 3
Fallacies of Reductionism 14
The Phenomenological, Ontological and Linguistic Methods 27
The Criteria of Proof 59
PART II. SCEPTICISM: THE ARGUMENT FROM CONSCIOUSNESS
Root-Axiom: "Consciousness" 65
Heuristic Principle: "Intentionality" 85
Deductions: Private Knowledge from Intentional Consciousness no
Conclusions: The Principles of Sceptical Knowledge ug
PART III. REALISM: THE ARGUMENT FROM BEING
Root-Axiom: "Being" 127
Heuristic Principle: "Process" 140
Deductions: Public Knowledge from Ontic Process 169
Conclusions: The Principles of Realistic Knowledge 189
PART IV. VERIFICATION
Principle of Verification 195
Correlation of the Categories of Sceptical and Realistic Knowledge 219
Fundamental Analogies 2II
Verification of the Analogous Propositions 215
PART V. REFLECTIONS ON FURTHER IMPLICATIONS AND SUMMARY
Other Minds, Social Reality and Memory 221
Basic Concepts and Conditions of Meaningful Metaphysics 230
Index 234
PART I
SCEPTICISM AND REALISM:
THE PROBLEM AND THE METHOD
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND
PREDETERMINED ARGUMENTS
I
Of the many modes of thought which underlie the history of philosophy
there are two which are fundamental to all meaningful discourse
concerning the nature of reality. Of these two ways of seeing the world
one is based on the importance of acquiring insight into the facts funda
mental to our explanation of the remarkable fact of there being a world,
and the other on the importance of the unique possibilities of proof
offered by re-examining our beliefs concerning the world from the
viewpoint of our consciousness. The former position is basically realistic
and places trust in the development of a scientific, controlled mode of
grasping the world that surrounds the individual. The latter is funda
mentally sceptical and searches for sound premisses among the multi
tude of sensations which furnish our most immediate contact with
reality. The realistic conception (which could also be called 'natu
ralism' or 'objectivism') places the individual and his consciousness
within a world, promising to explain his own nature in the course of
its primary business of explaining the order of the world. The sceptical
position {which can also be denoted 'sensationalism', 'phenomenalism'
or 'subjectivism') considers the world as it is presented in immediate
experiences, and promises to clarify the nature of the world in the
course of explaining the constitutive activity of consciousness.!
Consciousness is one aspect of the natural world for the realist; the
natural world is one aspect of consciousness for the sceptic. Not
withstanding mutual accusations of untenable premisses and fallacious
reasoning between proponents of these conflicting world-views, both
positions have proven to be equally tenable and capable of providing
1 While "scepticism" is used in a variety of senses, I shall use it exclusively in the above,
primarily methodological one.
4 THE PROBLEM AND THE METHOD
the ground for consistent as well as significant conclusions. The
question of their truth and value is anterior to the adoption of the
basic assumptions which underlie each of these positions; no analysis
of conclusions can decide the question of the ultimate validity of
sceptical and realist modes of thought.
The situation is rendered difficult in view of the fact that both the
sceptic and the realist may claim (quite correctly, in fact) a pure form of
empiricism. It is said, for example, that physics (and natural science
in general) is rigorously empirical, being based on observation for its
protocol statements and again for their verification. Nothing, it is
held, is postulated in physics which would contradict, or not be implied
by, observational evidence. Contrarily to this contention, the sceptic
claims that physics, and natural science in general, is based on implicit
realist premisses which have to be acknowledged before the validity
of the conclusions could be established. Much misunderstanding is
usually involved in such arguments, and, since the subject of this
inquiry is precisely the contrast between sceptical and realist modes
of reasoning, the basic issue at stake, namely the meaning of 'em
piricism' in the two contrasting and apparently contradictory uses,
should be defined before going any further.
There is a kind of dichotomy in empirical philosophical construction
from the earliest Hellenic philosophers to our day which, in my opinion,
stems from the effective presence of seldom analyzed, axiomatically
adopted basic assumptions. They can be one of two kinds: either they
are to the effect that the experiencing agent is in the world; or to the
effect that the world is in the experiencing agent. This is surely a crude
statement of the issue, but it does connote the reason why 'empiricism'
can be claimed in equal measure by sceptics and realists. Both sides
assert - quite justifiably in the light of their basic assumptions -- the
principle of 'empiricism', claiming a strict adherence to empirical
evidence. But the difference between them, though reducible to fine
shadings in the formulation of the problem, is by no means negligible.
Empiricism, in the sense of an inquiry based on the assumption that
the subject is in the world, can infer the world from experience inde
pendently of the subject, and, when the subject is also inferred, it is
inferred as part of the world through an already determined conception
of it. On the other hand, an investigation of experience under the
assumption that the world is given in the experience of the subject,
must decide about the nature of the subject before it could legitimately
determine the nature of the world. The subject is determined for the
THE PROBLEM AND THE METHOD 5
realist by the nature of the world of which he is a component or particu
lar aspect - for the sceptic the world is determined by the subject
of whose consciousness it is a component and a particular aspect.
Empiricism is shared by both, in the sense that the contention of pro
ceeding on the basis of an analysis of experience is justified in both
cases. But under what intrinsic presuppositions the experiential data
is evaluated is not specified in the claim, and this implicit differentiation
can be responsible for much of the misunderstandings between scepti
cally and realistically oriented thinkers. The natural scientist tends to
reject rigid ontological categories and concepts and believes to hold
himself strictly to empirical evidence. He might claim, for example,
that he is presuppositionless in his procedure and that although the
sceptic can be as sceptical as he likes concerning the existence of the
world, he would come to the same results as scientists do, if he would
comprehend modern scientific procedure. But the sceptic can counter
by pointing to the 'naive acceptance' of the 'naturalistic standpoint'
and to the 'physicalist realism' of the natural scientist who is not
concerned to prove the existence of the events he is talking about,
but presumes to go right on to determine their functions and regulative
principles. The sceptic's objection is even stronger to the endeavour
of the ontologist and metaphysician who also postulate 'substance'
and 'reality' and sometimes have even had the audacity to claim that
their notions are derived from an analysis of experience.
In an impartial assessment of the issue I believe that we shall come
to the conclusion that both scepticism and realism are justified in the
light of their own basic presuppositions. If we assume that the experient
exists, and that whatever exists besides must be inferred from his
experiences, the world is taken, methodologically at least, as being
given in experiences. This sceptical manner of reasoning is something
like this, "I think (i.e. I experience), therefore I exist; therefore, if
I am to find out what else exists, I must explore my experiences. In
so doing I can note what events I experience and in which sequence I
experience them. Thus I can come to conclusions concerning the things
I experience through the regularities which these things manifest."
The realist manner of reasoning, in contradistinction to the above,
may be something like the following, "I am born into a world which
has existed before me and which will exist when I am gone. I experience
this world, and my experiences are the occasions which render
knowledge of the world possible. If I am to come to reliable conclusions
concerning this world, I must explore my experiences. In so doing
