Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind

172 Pages·2021·0.879 MB·English

by  Eric Marcus

OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,24/7/2021,SPi
Belief, Inference, and the
Self-Conscious Mind
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,24/7/2021,SPi
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,24/7/2021,SPi
Belief, Inference, and the
Self-Conscious Mind
ERIC MARCUS
1
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,24/7/2021,SPi
3
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OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,24/7/2021,SPi
Formydaughters,LolaandBea.
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,24/7/2021,SPi
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,24/7/2021,SPi
Contents
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1
1. Belief and Judgment 9
I. BeliefandTruth 11
II. JudgmentandtheLimitsofIrrationality 22
III. Objections 30
2. The Self-Consciousness of Belief 39
I. BeliefandHonestAssertion 42
II. HonestAssertionandBeliefAvowal 46
III. BeliefAvowalandDoxasticSelf-Knowledge 50
IV. ExplainingtheSelf-ConsciousnessofBelief 55
3. Making Nonsense of Moore’s Paradox 62
I. WhatisMoore’sParadox? 63
II. Neo-Expressivism 69
III. WhatAvowalsExpress 76
4. The Challenge for an Account of Inference 84
I. TheTakingCondition 85
II. TheCausalTheory 86
III. DispositionstotheRescue? 90
IV. Broome’sRule-FollowingAccount 92
V. TheConstitutionTheory 95
VI. InferenceasanEvaluative,Causation-ConstitutingAct 99
5. Inference without Regress 104
I. TwoRegresses 104
II. WhatICan’tBelieve 107
III. WhatIMustBelieve 109
IV. TakingasUnderstanding(andNotIntuition) 112
V. FurtherIssues 116
VI. Summary 120
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,24/7/2021,SPi
viii 
6. The Unity of the Rational Mind 123
I. TheSelf-ConsciousnessofInference 123
II. Self-ConsciousnessastheSourceofMentalTogetherness 130
III. BeliefandJudgmentRedux 139
Conclusion: Philosophical Judgment 143
Bibliography 153
Index 159
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,24/7/2021,SPi
Acknowledgments
Thisbookwouldhavebeenfarworseandmightneverhavebeenatallwithout
the help of many friends and colleagues. For fruitful conversations, email
exchanges, and/or comments on drafts, thanks to Dorit Bar-On, Matt Boyle,
Jason Bridges, Jim Conant, Keren Gorodeisky, Matthias Haase, Adrian
Haddock, Arata Hamawaki, Jonas Held, Ulf Hlobil, David Horst, David
Hunter, Andrea Kern, Christian Kietzmann, Irad Kimhi, Nicholas Koziolek,
Ram Neta, Alexandra Newton, Gilly Nir, John Phillips, Sebastian Rödl, Guy
Rohrbaugh, John Schwenkler, James Shaw, Will Small, Chris Blake-Turner,
and Markos Valaris. Peter Momtchiloff and two anonymous referees at
Oxford University Press also provided valuable feedback and advice. I am
grateful to Ryan Simonelli for compiling the index. And thanks to Wiley for
permission to use bits and pieces of “To Believe is to Know You Believe,”
dialectica 70 (3): 375–405, and “Inference as Consciousness of Necessity,”
AnalyticPhilosophy61(4):304-322.
My greatest debt is to Lydia Marcus, without whom I would never have
found the happiness and peace of mind that enables me to write philosophy.
Shehasmydeepestgratitudeandloveforthis,asforeverythingelse.