Atlantic Community in Crisis. A Redefinition of the Transatlantic Relationship

379 Pages·1979·5.056 MB·English

by  Walter F. Hahn and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff (Eds.)

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1 PERGAMON
POLICY
STUDIES
Atlantic Community
in Crisis/A Redefinition of
the Transatlantic Relationship
Edited by
Walter F. Hahn
Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
An Institute tor Foreign Policy Analysis Book
Pergamon Press
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Copyright © 1979 Pergamon Press Inc.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
Atlantic community in crisis.
(Pergamon policy studies)
"An Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis book."
Includes index.
1. Europe-Relations (general) with the Uhited States.
2. United States-Relations (general) with Europe.
3. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 4. Europe-
Relations (general) with Russia. 5. Russia-Relations
(general) with Europe. I. Hahn, Walter F. II. Pfaltz-
graff, Robert L.
D1065.U5A896 1978 301.29'73'04 78-17026
ISBN 0-08-023003-2
All Rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means:
electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise, without permission in writing from the
publishers.
Printed in the United States of America
Preface
This book represents the findings of a project, completed by the Institute
for Foreign Policy Analysis under an original grant from the Fritz-Thyssen-
Stiftung, Cologne, the Federal Republic of Germany.
The rationale behind the project can be simply described as follows. In
recent years, a variety of strains have loosened the bonds of the Atlantic
Community, which emerged in the aftermath of World War II as an
association of kindred Western societies and as a military concert in the face
of new global dangers. The problems of the Community have been the subject
of numerous analyses undertaken in governmental and private sectors on both
sides of the Atlantic. These examinations, however, have tended to be
selective, directed at immediate and conspicuous problem areas and generally
lacking a more comprehensive perspective of the complex interaction of
trends affecting the Community. Moreover, this selectivity, although result-
ing in ample identification of the outstanding problems facing the Communi-
ty, has left a dearth of broad avenues of proffered solutions.
What seemed to be called for was an analysis in breadth as well as in
depth - a searching examination of the evolution of these transatlantic
relationships, of the major problems that have asserted themselves, as well as
the quest for integrated or, at least, compatible answers to these problems.
In this quest, the authors of this volume benefited immeasurably from the
insights and counsel of experts both here and abroad. A listing of those to
whom we are indebted would stretch this Preface into an inordinate size; and
cannot be acknowledged because of their official positions in the various
governments and Atlantic institutions. This applies in particular to the
chapters dealing with NATO problems, which reflect the input and review of
scores of experts in Washington and other capitals and command centers of
the Alliance. Nevertheless, several consultants must receive special mention.
The military section of the volume owes much to the conceptual guidance of
General Andrew J. Goodpaster, former Supreme Commander, Allied Com-
mand Europe. Similarly, the analyses of problems of trade, monetary affairs
and resources leaned .heavily on the input of experts whose broad knowledge
in this complex area has been conditioned not only by academic knowledge
vii
viii PREFACE
but by the leavening of practical policy experience. Particular thanks in this
regard is extended to the Honorable J. Robert Schaetzel, former United
States Ambassador to the European Economic Community.
All of these contributions, however, would have been to little avail in the
absence of the demanding architectural task of placing them into a coherent
structure. Robert C. Herber, Associate Director for Publications of the
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, gave unstintingly of his editorial
talents. The equally demanding assignment of translating ideas into
typescript was shared by Heidi Anderson, Emily Becker, Marie Burke, Karol
Kelliher, Jo Ellen Milkovits and Deborah Roe.
Walter F. Hahn
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
viii
ll"he
Atlantic Community—
A Conceptual History
Diane K. Pfaltzgraff
The idea of an Atlantic Community is deeply rooted in the historic
relationships among the peoples of the North Atlantic region. It dates from
the first European explorations and the establishment of settlements in the
New World. It is based upon those shared values of Western civilization
founded in humanistic and religious traditions which have placed great
emphasis on freedom of speech, opinion, conscience and association. The
Atlantic Community idea is indebted to the heritage of Hellenism, the Judeo-
Christian religions, Roman law, and the spirit of scientific inquiry - of
rational science and toleration of pluralism and diversity.
Western civilization has provided the basis for representative government
and for the dual principle of individual liberty and the common good. It has
been a civilisation de dialogue - with a continuing exchange of ideas across
the Atlantic. The founding fathers of the United States drew heavily upon
European political philosophy - principally the tenets of Locke and Montes-
quieu - in the development of the American Constitution. In turn, the
American political experience deeply influenced the shaping of European
governmental structures from the French Revolution to the twentieth
century.
The Atlantic has hosted the linkage not only of peoples and ideas, but also
of commerce. From the founding of the New World settlements in the
seventeenth century until the present time, trade across the Atlantic has
been vital to the economies of peoples in Europe and North America. The
achievement of high levels of industrialization, which distinguishes the North
Atlantic area from most of the rest of the world, has heightened the
economic interdependence and enhanced the sense of community, or
interrelatedness, among Atlantic peoples.
The challenges to Western civilization in the twentieth century have
generated efforts to give institutional form to the Atlantic Community. The
rise of totalitarianism in the interwar period, a devastating conflict, and the
emergence of a new and massive danger in the aftermath of the war spurred
the search for strengthened links between the United States and Europe - a
search that was rewarded by the postwar evolution of Atlantic political
3
4 ATLANTIC COMMUNITY IN CRISIS
institutions and, within the Atlantic Community, of institutions for West
European integration. At both the Atlantic and European levels, several
comparable concepts have been developed. They include a federal structure -
patterned to some degree on the political model first developed in the United
States - as well as more loose-knit organizations providing for collaboration
in specific areas of common interest such as economics and trade.
Within the Atlantic Community there have been proponents of a unified
Western Europe that could stand as a roughly equal partner of the United
States. Advocates of this concept have assigned primacy to the unity of
Western Europe as the essential precondition for greater transatlantic unity.
Juxtaposed to this has been a concept of Atlanticism, whose underlying
assumptions include, the likely continued dependence of Western Europe, and
the notion of the unity of the Atlantic peoples as the prerequisite for their
common and effective involvement in the world-at-large. Europeanism, in
contrast, holds that the unification of Western Europe has precedence both in
time and importance over the achievement of greater political cohesion
within the Atlantic Community as a whole.
Both Atlanticism and Europeanism have given rise to a variety of concepts
of institutionalization. Briefly, these may be summarized under three major
headings: federal union, confederation, and partnership.(l) This chapter
examines the conceptual history of Atlanticism. Its focus is not the
institutions of the Atlantic Community, but rather the major concepts that
have been proposed for the more effective organization of Atlantic peoples to
achieve common purposes.
FEDERAL UNION
Clarence Streit first proposed the idea of a federal union of Western
democracies in his book, Union Now, published in 1939. According to Streit,
both the United States - under the Articles of Confederation - and the
League of Nations had failed because they lacked a strong central authority
to act on behalf of member states. In contrast, Streit held, federalism as
evolved in the American political system was worthy of emulation by the
Atlantic Community. Admiring the courage of the American Founding
Fathers, who created a new union at a perilous time, Streit urged a
comparable act of will by the Atlantic nations - specifically Britain, France,
and the United States - at the beginning of World War II.
For the postwar period, Streit elaborates his proposal. A union of Atlantic
nations was to be established by a constituent assembly of representatives of
the members of the Atlantic Alliance.
Federal Union would start by crossing the political Rubicon and
constituting an Atlantic federal government . . . since the political,
military, economic, and monetary affairs of Atlantica form an
f
organic whole which should be tacked together by taking first the
political decision to set up a multination' federal government - one in
which all the existing nations of NATO would be directly represented
- to handle common affairs in all our fields, and whose first tasks
would be to work out the gradual but simultaneous transition to a
common Atlantic defense force, market and currency.(2)
D.K. PFALTZGRAFF 5
Streit urged adoption at the Atlantic level of the Connecticut Compro-
mise formula of 1787, which allowed states of varying sizes to join together
via the creation of a bicameral legislature. Representation in one house would
be based on population, as in the United States House of Representatives, and
in the other on equal representation for the individual state members, as in
the United States Senate. Already, in Streit's time, the question of how to
achieve a fair representational system among unequal members reflected the
magnitude of the problem of inequality between individual West European
states and the United States.
A recurrent theme of those who remain skeptical of the wisdom of
creating an Atlantic federation has been the concern that in such an
undertaking Europe would be in danger of losing its independence and perhaps
even its identity. Thus, Hendrik Brugmans, a prominent proponent of
European federalism, suggested that West European states would not wish to
enter a federation in which one member, i.e., the United States, would be
dominant. Such a federation would serve only to grant formal recognition to
U.S. hegemony. The problem of physical disparities as well as the historical
differences which Brugmans perceived between the United States and Europe
led him to support a European federation with sufficient internal autonomy to
ensure European pluralism. In this view, a United States of the Atlantic must
comprise a United Europe and America.(3)
Although the idea of Atlantic federal union failed to attract widespread
popular support either in Europe or in North America, it has elicited sporadic
endorsements in the United States Congress. In 1949, Senator Estes Kefauver
introduced a resolution calling for the creation of an Atlantic Union.(^)
Similar resolutions were introduced subsequently in both houses, but none was
adopted. Explaining the consistent refusal of the United States to underwrite
the idea of Atlantic Union, one State Department official commented:
The Department of State shares the goal . .. of attaining an
increasingly closer relationship among the Atlantic nations. The
reservations which we have about the resolutions (on Atlantic Union)
under consideration are not reservations regarding their general
philosophy. Rather, our reservations center upon how best to attain
the objectives of the resolution and of the specific goal envisaged. . .
The simple, but decisive, fact is that our Atlantic allies do not now
wish to move toward any type of federal political relationship with
the United States, even as an objective. Until there is an interest on
the part of the other states concerned, we cannot do a great deal.
The fundamental reason why there is little European interest in
federal union with us at this time is, I think, evident. It is that Europe
fears that it would be swallowed by a more powerful United
States. . . .
If Europe is hesitant about federation with us because of the
inequality between a United States and a divided Europe, we can hope
that Europe would be more confident in its relations with us once it
6 ATLANTIC COMMUNITY IN CRISIS
had attained something approaching equality of power. This hope has
been one of the most compelling reasons for our support for European
unification. We believe that this is a virtual requirement before
political ties with North America of an organic sort can be seriously
considered.(5)
Yet, without official American sponsorship, the Atlantic union concept had
little chance of being embraced by other Western nations. Even with official
U.S. support, it would have faced formidable, perhaps insurmountable,
obstacles.
It is unlikely that, without a radical transformation of prevailing attitudes
on both sides of the Atlantic, an Atlantic framework could be created along
the lines suggested by Streit, that is, by an act of political will. Instead, as
many writers have suggested, political institutions result from a complex
process of consensus formation. In the case of transatlantic relations, Elliot
Goodman notes:
. . .if there is a dialectical pattern of supranational integration, one
must do everything possible to keep the antagonisms between the
American thesis and the European antithesis within reasonable
bounds. . .. If, as seems likely, it will not be possible to federate the
existing individual nations in one step into an Atlantic federal union,
neither should one encourage the formation of a European union that
will break all Atlantic ties. Whenever, in special circumstances, it
may be possible to skip over the intermediate level and create
Atlantic institutions directly, this would be highly desirable. In most
cases, where this will not be possible, Atlantic ties should serve to
reinforce those already created on lower levels even though the
Atlantic relations would at first be less well integrated and less
supranational than those bonds established among the state units on
either side of the Atlantic.(6)
ATLANTIC CONFEDERATION
The idea of Atlantic confederation provides for cooperation in limited
fields. Preferring not to be tied to a single blueprint for the future, the
strategy of the advocates of an Atlantic confederation has been to urge
governments to accept the principle of gradually pooling sovereignty with
respect to matters of mutual interest. The federalist and confederalist
approaches also differ regarding the ultimate membership of the communities
they seek to create. Atlantic union, for the most part, would restrict
membership to NATO participants; the proponents of an Atlantic confedera-
tion, however, envisage the possibility of a wider community, including not
only NATO members but possibly also the nations belonging to the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) - i.e., a
confederation of the industrialized democracies of the North Atlantic area.
NATO represents the oldest existing organization of North Atlantic
nations that gives institutional expression to the idea of an Atlantic
Community. Although NATO was formed as a defensive alliance against the
D.K. PFALTZGRAFF 7
threat of Soviet attack, there have been sporadic efforts to transform the
Alliance into an institutional framework for the achievement of common
political purposes transcending defense, as recognized by the framers of
NATO in Article II:
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of
peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their
free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the
principles upon which these institutions are founded and by prompting
conditions of stability and well-being.
In a report to the NATO Council in December 1956, a committee
consisting of the foreign ministers of Canada, Belgium, and Norway concluded
that the strengthening of NATO depended upon
the development of an Atlantic Community whose roots are deeper
even than the necessity for common defense. This implies nothing less
than the permanent association of the free Atlantic peoples for the
promotion of their greater unity and the protection and the
advancement of the interests which, as free democracies, they have
in common.(7)
The Committee did not recommend significant changes in the structure of
NATO. Rather, the desired political cooperation was to be pursued through
more intensive consultation within the existing framework. In particular,
member governments were urged to inform the NATO Council of any matter
significantly affecting the Alliance. This was conceived as a preliminary step
toward effective consultation. Although these recommendations were adopted
unanimously by the NATO Council, member governments in succeeding years
have not always honored their commitment to the principle of prior
consultation.
Notwithstanding the lack of formal progress toward the goals implicit in
Article II, NATO members were able, during the 1950s and 1960s, to create
mechanisms for enhancing communication among them. In particular, the
NATO Parliamentarians, founded in 1955, brought members of the national
legislatures together to discuss Alliance problems. A group of private citizens
assembled in London in June 1959 and formulated a document attempting to
define the fundamental values of the Atlantic Community.(8) The NATO
Parliamentarians Conference helped to organize the Atlantic Convention of
NATO Nations held in Paris in January 1962.(9) From this meeting came an
appeal for "the creation of a true Atlantic community . . . which must extend
to the political, military, moral and cultural fields." The Conference also
called for a better definition of the principles for which the Western nations
stand and proposed the creation of a Special Commission by the respective
governments within two years to study the future organization and means to
further the idea of an Atlantic Community.
The 1962 Declaration of Paris was of special significance in the history of
the Atlantic Community concept because of its specificity concerning the
possible institutionalization of the Atlantic relationship. First, it called for
the creation "as an indispensable feature of a true Atlantic Community, of a