Artistic Judgement: A Framework for Philosophical Aesthetics

209 Pages·2011·1.36 MB·English

by  Graham McFee (auth.)

Artistic Judgement
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES
VOLUME115
FoundedbyWilfridS.SellarsandKeithLehrer
Editor
StephenHetherington,TheUniversityofNewSouthWales,Sydney,Australia
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KeithLehrer,UniversityofArizona,Tucson,AZ,U.S.A.
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LynneRudderBaker,UniversityofMassachusetts,Amherst,MAU.S.A.
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JohnM.Fischer,UniversityofCalifornia,Riverside,CA,U.S.A.
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LindaZagzebski,UniversityofOklahoma,Norman,OK,U.S.A.
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Graham McFee
Artistic Judgement
A Framework for Philosophical Aesthetics
123
GrahamMcFee
VicarageRoad19
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UnitedKingdom
[email protected]
ISBN978-94-007-0030-7
DOI10.1007/978-94-007-0031-4
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Preface
Preamble
Asked by a colleague, some time ago, to set out my account of philosophical aes-
thetics(and,associatedly,ofart),myfirstresponsewasthatIhadnosuchaccount:
that any of my views was also held by someone else! But my colleague insisted
that,onthecontrary,myviewsbothofaestheticsandofthenatureofartweredis-
tinctive.Sodidthatdistinctivenessresideinthecombinationoftheseviewsonthe
varioustopics,ratherthaninanyparticularviewofmine?Tounderstand,Iidentified
andexploredeachofthese‘distinctivenesses’inturn.Thisexercise,first,prompted
small-scale elaborations of specific issues: how did my institutional theory differ
fromthosestandardlyoffered?Diditsuccumbtothesameobjections?Andsoon.
Second,itproducedlarger-scaleexplorationsoftheextenttowhichthisaccountof
philosophical aesthetics was illuminating (and perhaps even accurate). Issues here
included the nature of truth, of rationality or of philosophy as much as aesthetic
matters.SoIplannedabooktotakeallthesetopicsfurther.And,dearreader,you
arenowlookingattheoutcome.
Thistextpresentsapositionbothdistinctiveandpowerful.Atitsheart,theperva-
sivenessoftheartistic/aestheticcontrastcombineswithmy‘take’onit.Inthisway,
a framework for philosophical aesthetics is offered: that is, one for making sense
of our appreciation and judgement of artworks of all kinds, and our appreciation
and judgement of other objects inwhich wetake an interestexpressed intermsof
grace,orline,orbeauty—ortheiropposites.Thisisaframeworkpartlyinoffering
afairlyabstractpicture,whichwouldneedapplicationto,say,one’sconcernswith
the aesthetics of dance (a special favourite of mine). Further, illustrative examples
areofferedwheretheyseemtooccurnaturally.
This picture of philosophical aesthetics rests on five main concerns, roughly
reflectedbythechaptershere:
(a) it insists on the importance of contrasting our judgement and appreciation of
artworkswithallourotheraestheticjudgements;
(b) itrecognizestheconnectionofartisticvaluetohumanlife,andexplainswhyno
comprehensiveabstractaccountispossibleonthistopic;
v
vi Preface
(c) itgivesanaccountofartwhichpermitscriticalcommentaryonartworkstobe
true,partlybegivingdueweighttotheintentionsofartists;
(d) ittreatsthosetruthsasmutableunderforcesinhistoryingeneralandespecially
inthehistoryofart(whatIcall“thehistoricalcharacterofart”);
(e) it stresses the role of practices of recognizing and appreciating art within a
wider community and of presenting artworks to that community, as well as
otherassociatedpracticessuchastherestoringofart:thatis,itoffersabroadly
institutionalaccountofart.
Inaddition,itdrawsonacontext-sensitiveaccountofunderstandingandmeaning:
although this is sketched in broad terms in Chapter 2, its impact is felt through-
outthetext.Evenfurtherback,adistinctiveviewofthenatureofthephilosophical
enterpriseisbothexemplified and (occasionally) discussedhere:thatviewhasthe
writings of Wittgenstein as its remote source and those of Gordon Baker as its
proximateone.
Readersmayhavethreemisplacedreactionstothistext,eachofwhichisnever-
theless not without justification. Since they lead to ‘taking one’s eye off the ball’,
theseobjectionsshouldbeforestalledhere.Thefirstisthatthisisallratherfamil-
iar, just lining-up ‘the usual suspects’. This objection derives from the fact (noted
above)that,inoneway,myviewiscompoundedoutofpositionssharedwithothers.
Butthatfailstorecognizeitsfundamentaldistinctiveness(es).Centralamongthese
is my radical version of the artistic/aesthetic contrast which, I insist, is (or should
be)fundamentaltothinkinginphilosophicalaesthetics.
Second,andrelated,theclaimthatthisisjustacollectionofviews—thatis,not
asinglepositionbutamélange—warrantsthesamereply.Formyviewisrootedin
theartistic/aestheticcontrast(and,ifmoreisneeded,intheconceptionofmeaning
and understanding that sustains it); and, correspondingly, in my views of both the
historicalcharacterandinstitutionalnatureofart.
Third, some chapters might seem to bicker, having a structure based on “X
said, Y said” (or, worse, “X said, I said”). Again, this objection cannot be
fundamental here, not least because my focus involves addressing perplexities,
meeting objections. Of course, there is some contrasting of views (and especially
of my view with others) and some responding to what might seem like obvious
objections—especiallywherethesewereexplicitlyraised.Yetthisisneversimply
thecontrapositionofviews:whatsustainsthepresentationisthatitmovesthedis-
cussionforwardbymeetingfundamentalobjections—again,thisprojectshouldbe
obviousintherelevantpassages.
Inoneway,thistextisaproductofmythinkingonaestheticsingeneralfromthe
timeIenteredtheprofession(ifnotbefore).SinceIhavebeen thinkingaboutthis
topic, in different ways, for the past 35 years, not all I would want to say is here;
but,wherepossible,Ihaveofferedcross-referencestootherworks—oftenworksof
mine—wherethepictureiselaborated.
Further, I have refrained from proliferating examples, preferring instead to see
howasmallishnumberofexamplesfareinthedifferentcontextsconstitutedbythe
variousdiscussionsinthistext.Havingthissmallsetofcasesattheargumentative
Preface vii
heartoftheworkisanadvantage,aslongasitisrecognizedthat—farfromrepre-
senting“anunbalanceddiet”,inwhich“onenourishesone’sthinkingwithonlyone
kind of example” (PI §593)—the thinking derives for a generous consideration of
cases,withany(apparent)narrownessconcerningclarityofpresentationonly.
The selection of examples poses an further difficulty. For instance, I take the
Alexandria Quartet to be one of the greatest books ever written in English (and,
actually, one of the greatest punkt). And reference to Durrell occurs in my other
works(forinstance,UD:182–183;189–190)aswellashere.Moreover,pointsare
clearertomewhenIbelieveintheexamples.ButmyjudgementoftheAlexandria
Quartet,say,cancloudthediscussion:myconsiderationsinphilosophicalaesthet-
ics cannot depend on my being right about particular artworks. Of course, that
discussion always needs exemplification with concrete cases: hence, conclusions
concerning particular artworks must inevitably occur. One strategy, used to good
effect in McFee, 1992a (UD), involves relying for exemplifications on the judge-
mentofcritics.Anotherstrategy(fromthelastchapterofMcFee,1978)iswriting
asacriticoneself.Butthenmyown‘take’ontheartworkscanseemeitherunder-
ratedorover-ratedrespectively.Yetnothingturnsontheexamplesassuch,atleastif
readerswhodisputethemcan(nevertheless)supplyexamplesoftheirowntomake
similarpoints.
Finally, it is a commitment of this work that its assertions answer perplexities
(questions),andthatadifferentperplexity(question)canberaisedinthesameform
of words (see Section 2.4). So no author can hope to address all the possible per-
plexities in an area in all the detail the ‘perplexed’ might require. Hence, I have
donemybest,focusingonthosequestionsraisedintheliteratureorindiscussion;
andIhaveofferedsomethingtothosedifferently‘perplexed’,occasionallyinclud-
ingreferencetootherworks(especiallyotherworksofmine)whereeitherasimilar
position put in a different way might be found or a fuller version in roughly the
sameway.
Thisworkisself-contained,althoughdrawingonargumentssketchedelsewhere,
and operating at a level of considerable generality in (typically) talking globally
aboutthearts—whilerecognizingdifferencesamongthearts.But,inmythinking,
this is also the first volume of a two-volume project, which (following the good
advice of my wife Myrene) I call The Muscular Aesthetic. The second volume,
should it appear, will be more concrete and—consonant with my interests—will
haveaclearerfocusontheperformingarts,andespeciallydance.
This, then, is the culmination of much of my thinking both in philosophical
aesthetics and in philosophy more generally. In that sense, it is the PhD thesis I
should have written, if I had seen matters that clearly then! Some of the ideas
here were central to my actual PhD thesis, others were prefigured in early publi-
cationsor(unpublished)presentationstoconferences.Inparticular,myadmiration
forJohnWisdom’sversionof(broadly)Wittgensteinianthoughtmademeadvocate
a case-by-case answer to very many difficulties, especially those in philosophical
aesthetics.ItisconsolingtofindotherswhoseworkIadmire(forexample,Danto,
2000:132–133)nowrespondinginthisway.Butitmakesmewishthatsomeofthe
detailsofmyideashadbecomemorewidelyknownatthetimeIformulatedthem.
viii Preface
SomeareinMcFee(1978):others,whichIhavebeenassertingfor20years,have
noobviousanddefinitivepublishedhome.
TextualAcknowledgements
Much of the material here had an ‘earlier life’ in conference presentations and
articles: I welcome the opportunity to integrate these materials, not all previously
published(and,ifso,fullyrevised).Themajorpublishedpiecesare:
• 1985:“WollheimandtheInstitutionalTheoryofArt”,PhilosophicalQuarterly,
35,139:179–185(mainlyinChapter6)
• 1989: “The Logic of Appreciation in the Republic of Art”, British Journal of
Aesthetics,29:230–238(inChapter6)
• 1992b: “The Historical Character of Art: A Re-Appraisal” British Journal of
Aesthetics,32,4:307–319(mainlyinChapter5)
• 1995:“BacktotheFuture:AReplytoSharpe”BritishJournalofAesthetics,35,
3:278–283(inChapter5)
• 2001a: “Wittgenstein, Performing Art and Action” in R. Allen & M. Turvey
(eds.) Wittgenstein, Theory and the Arts. London: Routledge: 92–117 (mainly
inChapter2)
• 2004c:“WittgensteinandtheArts:UnderstandingandPerforming”,inP.Lewis
(ed.) Wittgenstein, Aesthetics and Philosophy, Aldershot: Ashgate: 109–136 (in
Chapters2and4)
• 2005b:“Art,UnderstandingandHistoricalCharacter:AContributiontoAnalytic
Aesthetics” in K. Mey (ed.) Art in the Making: Aesthetics, Historicity and
Practice.NewYork:PeterLang:71–93(inChapter5)
• 2005a: “The Artistic and the Aesthetic” British Journal of Aesthetics, 45: 368–
387 (Chapter 1 is a revised and expanded version, incorporating, in particular,
materialpresentedatOxfordUniversity,May2005)
• 2008:“The FriendsofJones’Paintings:ACaseofExplanation intheRepublic
ofArt”ContemporaryAesthetics,6(inChapter6)
Further,Chapter2minesmaterialfromSRV:47–52.
OtherAcknowledgements
Therearetoomanydebts(overtoolongatime)tomentioneveryonewho,through
discussionorcorrespondence,hascontributedtomythinkinghere:tostandforall
therest(herebythanked),Iwillmentionthefollowingspecialcontributions:
• amongaestheticians,TerryDiffeyandNickMcAdoo,bothofwhomcommented
indetailonanearlierdraft,aswellasthelateRichardWollheim(whosupervised
thePhDthesisIdidwrite);
Preface ix
• among philosophers more generally, the late Gordon Baker, David Best,
Katherine Morris, Charles Travis, the late John Wisdom; and also Brian Smart,
whotaughtmefirst;
• my wife, Myrene: who fulfils for me all the tasks Lawrence Durrell also
requiredofawoman(“lover,intellectualcompanion,nurse,mother,cook,host-
ess, manager, critic, typist, proofreader ...”: MacNiven, 1998: 555) and many
more.
IshouldalsoacknowledgetheUniversityofBrighton,forgivingmetimetowritea
substantialfirstdraftoftheseideas(particularlytoPaulMcNaught-DavisandAlan
Tomlinson);andespeciallytothosecolleaguesintheChelseaSchoolwhocovered
myteachingandadministration.Further,Iwouldmentionthelesstangiblebutstill
fundamentalsupportofmycolleaguesatCaliforniaStateUniversityFullerton.And,
onceagain,thevillageofJoncelets,France.
Abbreviations
(a) formyownworks:
McFee(1992a—“UD”)
McFee(2000—“FW”)
McFee(2004a—“SRV”)
McFee([1994],2004b—“CDE”)
McFee(2010a—“EKT”)
(b) standardabbreviationsfortheworksofWittgenstein:
Wittgenstein(1953—“PI”)
Wittgenstein(1958—“BB”)
Wittgenstein(1967—“Z”)
Wittgenstein(1975—“PR”)
Wittgenstein(1979—“WWK”)(basedontheGermantitle)
Wittgenstein(1980—“CV”)
Wittgenstein(1993—“PO”)
Wittgenstein(2005—“BT”)
[Other references to Wittgenstein use the standard enumeration of items from the
Nachlass:seePO:480–510]
Permissions
ThankstoHenryHoltandCompanyLLCforpermissiontoincludethepoem“Fire
and Ice” by Robert Frost, which appears in Chapter 4, from The Poetry of Rober
FrosteditedbyEdwardConneryLatham.PublishedbyHenryHoltandCompany,
LLC.1969.