Aristotle’s Theory of the Syllogism: A Logico-Philological Study of Book A of the Prior Analytics

231 Pages·1968·11.48 MB·English

by  Günther Patzig (auth.)

ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF THE SYLLOGISM
SYNTHESE LIBRARY
MONOGRAPHS ON EPISTEMOLOGY,
LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE,
SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE AND OF KNOWLEDGE,
AND ON THE MATHEMATICAL METHODS OF
SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
Editors:
DONALD DAVIDSON, Princeton University
JAAKKO HINTIKKA, University of Helsinki and Stanford University
GABRIEL NUCHELMANS, University of Leyden
WESLEY C. SALMON, Indiana University
GtJNTHER PATZIG
ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF
THE SYLLOGISM
A LOGICO-PHILOLOGICAL STUDY OF BOOK A
OF THE PRIOR ANALYTICS
Translated/rom the German by Jonathan Barnes
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
DIE ARISTOTELISCHE SYLLOGISTIK
Published by Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
Gottingen, 1963 (2nd Edition)
ISBN 978-90-481-8322-7 ISBN 978-94-017-0787-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-0787-9
© 1968. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
OriginaUy published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland in 1968
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint,
microfilm, or any other means, without permission from the publisher
TO THE MEMORY OF
JAN LUKASIEWICZ
(1878-1956)
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE
I thank Professor J. L. Ackrill for his constant interest, Martin Holt for
a felicitous suggestion, and my wife, whose work as much as mine this
translation is.
J.B.
PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION
The present book is the English version of a monograph 'Die aristotelische
Syllogistik', which first appeared ten years ago in the series of Abhand
lungen edited by the Academy of Sciences in Gottingen.1
In the preface to the English edition, I would first like to express my
indebtedness to Mr. J. Barnes, now fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. He
not only translated what must have been a difficult text with exemplary
precision and ingenuity, but followed critically every argument and check
ed every reference. While translating it, he has improved the book. Of
those changes which I have made on Mr. Barnes' suggestion I note only
the more important ones on pages 4, 12, 24sq, 32, 39, 6lsq, and 158.
Since the second edition of the German text appeared in 1963 some
further reviews have been published, or come to my notice, which I have
been able to make use of in improving the text of this new edition. 2 I
must mention here especially the detailed critical discussions of my results
and arguments published by Professor W. Wieland in the Philosophische
Rundschau 14 (1966), 1-27 and by Professor E. Scheibe in Gnomon 39
(1967), 454-64. Both scholars, while agreeing with the main drift and
method of my interpretation, criticise some of my results and disagree
with some of my arguments. It would not be possible to discuss these
technical matters here with the necessary thoroughness. I shall do this
elsewhere and refer the reader in the meantime to these reviews which
deserve close study. Especially important are, I think, Scheibe's new
explanation of the exclusion of singular terms in A 1-7 (I.c. 457) and
Wieland's new account of the proofs by ecthesis (l.c. p. 25). Both reviewers
have also, by private communication, given me useful hints for corrections
and additions, which I gratefully acknowledge. One point of importance,
however, raised by Wieland in his review, should not be passed over in
silence: Wieland is generally less ready than I to suppose that Aristotle
"knew" some law of logic which he makes use of in his reasoning. I
agree with Wieland that in some cases I have been somewhat overconfi
dent. However, the matter is probably less clear-cut than he assumes.
VII
ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF THE SYLLOGISM
"Using" a law of logic and "knowing" it are not, it seems to me, related
as "use" and "mention" of names are. Between mere use and clear know
ledge of a law there may be some intermediate state - we may be half
aware of it. One may reason according to some law of logic without
realising that there is such a law or that it is a logical law. One may also
be sure one's reasoning is a matter of logic, without being able to for
mulate the law or give an account of its validity. So, while accepting
Wieland's maxim (l.c. p. 2 sq., 22 sqq.), I suggest that its practical applica
tion is difficult and must leave room for debate in most cases.
In appendix A the reader will find, as a supplement, the text of a short
article that appeared in Mind 68, 1959. I thank the editor of Mind,
Professor G. Ryle, for his kind permission to reprint it here. I also wish
to express my thanks to Dr. Dorothea Frede for her assistance in the
proof-reading of the translation.
That this book is now available in an English edition must be especially
welcome to the author in view of the fact that the two most important
works on its subject matter to appear in our time, Sir David Ross'
commentary (l949) and the monograph of Jan Lukasiewicz (1951), were
published in English too. It will be evident to the reader how much the
author has profited from the study of both these works, however much he
disagrees on occasion with both authors. Perhaps it is too much to hope
that this book will deserve a place beside these two classics. It will be
enough if it helps some readers to understand Aristotle's logical texts
better and if it contributes to the recognition of the fundamental fact -
so often neglected - that the history of philosophy requires a judicious
balance between hermeneutic methods and skill in dealing with the
philosophical problems which the texts are trying to settle. Since Lukasie
wicz has been my example in trying to reach this balance since I began my
studies in the history of logic, I wish to dedicate the English version of
my book to the memory of this great Polish logician.
G. PATZIG
Giittingen, October 1968
VIII
PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION
NOTES
1. A third edition of the German text and a translation into Rumanian, produced under
the auspices of the Rumanian Academy of Sciences in Bucharest, are to appear at
the same time as this translation.
2. P. S. Popov, Voprosy filosofii, 1961, 178-179;
D. Campanale, Rass. Sci. filos. 14 (1961), 364-365;
Luciano Montoneri, Sophia 30,3-4, July-Dec. 1962;
K. Ennen, S.J., Scholastik 40 (1965), 408-11;
Czeslaw Lejewski, Journal of Symbolic Logic 31 (1966), 103-104;
W. Wieland, Philosophische Rundschau 14 (1966),1-27; and
E. Scheibe, Gnomon 39 (1967), 454-464.
IX
CONTENTS
PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION VII
FROM THE PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION XIII
FROM THE PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION XV
CHAPTER I. WHAT IS AN ARISTOTELIAN SYLLOGISM? 1
§ 1. The traditional form of the syllogism I
§ 2. Propositions and rules of inference 3
§ 3. Singular terms 4
§ 4. Formulation of the premisses 8
§ 5. The Aristotelian form of the syllogism 12
CHAPTER II. LOGICAL NECESSITY 16
§ 6. avuYKT\, E~ avuYKT\~, Ev8txecrOm and related terms 16
§ 7. Logical objections to Aristotle's distinction between two
types of necessity 21
§ 8. Some possible criticisms 29
§ 9. The identity of Aristotle's two types of necessity 33
§ 10. Subject and predicate 37
§ 11. Maier on 'relative' necessity 39
CHAPTER III. PERFECTION 43
§ 12. 'Perfect' and 'imperfect' syllogisms 43
§ 13. Perfection and evidence 46
XI