Aristotle Notes - Metaphysics

80 Pages·2013·0.95 MB·English

by  Dave Yount

ARISTOTLE
NOTES ON METAPHYSICS
By Dr. Dave Yount
Mesa Community College
May 2013

Contents

Introduction
 .....................................................................................................................................................................
 7

BOOK
 I
 (A,
 or
 Alpha):
 ....................................................................................................................................................
 7

1.
 Knowledge,
 Experience,
 Art,
 Master-­‐Workers,
 and
 Wisdom
 (979b-­‐982a)
 ..............................................................
 7

2.
 Wisdom,
 Knowledge
 for
 Its
 Own
 Sake,
 Theoretical
 Knowledge,
 Theology,
 God
 (982a-­‐983a)
 ..........................
 8

3.
 Four
 Causes,
 Pre-­‐Socratics
 (983a-­‐984b)
 .............................................................................................................................
 8

4.
 Hesiod,
 Empedocles,
 Anaxagoras,
 Democritus,
 Only
 Two
 of
 the
 Four
 Causes
 (984b-­‐985b)
 ..............................
 9

5.
 Pythagoreans,
 Parmenides,
 Xenophanes
 (985b-­‐987a)
 ..................................................................................................
 9

6.
 Plato,
 Pythagoreans,
 Criticism
 of
 Plato’s
 Forms
 and
 Causes
 (987a-­‐988a)
 ............................................................
 10

7.
 Review
 and
 Summary
 of
 Philosophers;
 We’ve
 only
 Discussed
 Two
 Causes,
 Leaving
 Final
 Cause
 Out,
 but

All
 Philosophers
 Show
 There
 are
 Four
 Causes
 (988a-­‐988b)
 ....................................................................................
 10

8.
 Criticism
 of
 Pre-­‐Socratics
 (988b-­‐990a)
 ............................................................................................................................
 11

9.
 Criticisms
 of
 Plato
 (990a-­‐993a)
 ...........................................................................................................................................
 11

10.
 Summary
 (993a)
 .....................................................................................................................................................................
 12

BOOK
 II
 (a,
 or
 small
 alpha):
 ......................................................................................................................................
 12

1.
 Investigation
 of
 the
 Truth;
 Everyone
 Contributes
 to
 Truth;
 No
 One
 has
 the
 Whole
 Truth;
 Philosophy
 is

Knowledge
 of
 the
 Truth;
 the
 Highest
 Quality
 Example
 of
 Something
 Causes
 Everything
 Of
 That
 Kind;
 and

the
 more
 Being
 Something
 has,
 the
 More
 True
 it
 is
 (993a-­‐993b)
 ...........................................................................
 12

2.
 The
 First
 Principle
 and
 Causes;
 None
 of
 the
 Four
 Causes
 can
 go
 on
 Ad
 Infinitum;
 The
 First
 Cause
 Must
 be

Eternal
 and
 Cannot
 be
 Destroyed,
 Final,
 Formal,
 Material
 Causes,
 Infinite
 does
 Not
 Exist
 (994a-­‐994b)
 ..
 13

3.
 Methods
 of
 Speaking
 and
 its
 Effects
 on
 Listeners;
 Mathematical
 Accuracy
 Not
 Demanded;
 We
 must

Investigate
 Nature
 and
 the
 Purpose
 of
 Natural
 Sciences
 (995a-­‐995b)
 .................................................................
 14

BOOK
 III
 (B,
 or
 Beta):
 ..................................................................................................................................................
 14

1.
 We
 need
 to
 Know
 the
 Subjects
 to
 be
 Discussed
 and
 the
 Difficulties
 involved
 First;
 One
 or
 More
 Science
 to

Study
 Causes?
 Are
 Unity
 and
 Being
 Attributes
 of
 Substances,
 or
 Substances
 Themselves?
 (995b-­‐996a)
 ..
 14

2.
 Options
 for
 the
 Questions
 just
 Posed:

 One
 or
 More
 Sciences
 to
 Study
 All
 Causes?
 One
 or
 More
 Sciences
 of

the
 Starting
 Points
 of
 Demonstrations,
 or
 of
 Substances,
 or
 of
 Their
 Attributes?
 Do
 Only
 Sensible

Substances
 Exist?
 More
 Criticisms
 of
 Plato’s
 Forms
 and
 Intermediates
 (996a-­‐998a)
 .......................................
 15

3.
 Are
 Genera
 (the
 Kinds
 of
 Thing)
 or
 the
 Species,
 or
 the
 Primary
 Constituents/Elements
 of
 a
 Thing
 to
 be

Taken
 as
 Elements
 and
 Principles?
 Arguments
 Against
 All
 of
 These
 Options
 (998a-­‐999a)
 ............................
 16

4.
 How
 Do
 We
 Gain
 Knowledge
 if
 There
 is
 Nothing
 Apart
 from
 Individual
 Things?
 The
 Necessity
 of
 Eternal

Things.
 Are
 First
 Principles
 One
 in
 Kind
 or
 Different,
 (Im)Perishable?
 Are
 Being
 and
 Unity
 the
 Substances

of
 Things,
 or
 Something
 Else?
 Problems
 Whether
 Being-­‐Itself
 and
 Unity-­‐Itself
 Exist
 or
 Not.
 (999a-­‐1001b)

 ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................
 17

5.
 Are
 Numbers,
 Bodies,
 Planes,
 and
 Points
 Substances
 or
 Not?
 (1001b-­‐1002b)
 ....................................................
 18

6.
 Why
 posit
 Forms?
 Problems
 if
 One
 Does
 So.
 Do
 Elements
 Exist
 Potentially
 or
 in
 Some
 Other
 Way

(Problems
 Either
 Way)?
 Are
 the
 First
 Principles
 Universal
 or
 Individuals
 (Universals
 Implied)?
 Suches
 v.

Thises.
 (1002b-­‐1003a)
 ............................................................................................................................................................
 18

BOOK
 IV
 (G,
 or
 Gamma):
 ............................................................................................................................................
 19

1.The
 Science
 of
 Being
 (1003a)
 ..............................................................................................................................................
 19

2.
 Focal
 Meaning
 of
 “Being”;
 One
 Science
 that
 Studies
 Being
 as
 Being
 and
 Unity
 as
 Unity,
 Dialecticians
 v.

Sophists
 v.
 Philosophers
 (1003a-­‐1005a)
 .........................................................................................................................
 19
2

3.
 Philosophers
 will
 Inquire
 into
 Mathematical
 Axioms;
 Natural
 Philosophers
 are
 Not
 Ultimate

Philosophers,
 the
 Principle
 of
 Non-­‐Contradiction
 (PNC)
 is
 the
 Most
 Certain
 and
 Non-­‐Hypothetical

Principle
 (1005a-­‐b)
 .................................................................................................................................................................
 20

4.
 Some
 State
 PNC
 is
 Possible,
 but
 We
 can
 Prove
 Them
 Wrong;
 it’s
 Self-­‐Refuting
 and
 Meaningless
 to
 Deny

PNC;
 There
 is
 Still
 More
 or
 Less
 in
 the
 Nature
 of
 Things
 (1005b-­‐1009a)
 .............................................................
 21

5
 Protagoras
 Denies
 PNC
 so
 his
 Doctrine
 is
 Wrong;
 Some
 Hold
 Appearances
 are
 Always
 True;
 Others
 Say

There
 is
 No
 Truth
 of
 the
 Matter;
 but
 Both
 are
 Wrong;
 There
 is
 Both
 Relativity
 and
 Objectivity,
 and
 Truth

and
 Falsity
 in
 Appearances
 (1009a-­‐1011a)
 ....................................................................................................................
 22

6
 My
 Opponents
 Demand
 a
 Reason
 Where
 None
 is
 Possible;
 Refuting
 Protagorean
 Relativism
 (1011a-­‐
1011b)
 .........................................................................................................................................................................................
 24

7
 No
 Intermediates
 of
 Contradictories;
 One
 Subject
 Must
 Possess
 nor
 Not
 Possess
 a
 Predicate;

Truth/Falsity
 Defined;
 Tri-­‐Valence
 Logic?
 Endorsing
 a
 Platonic
 View?
 Refuting
 Heraclitus
 and

Anaxagoras
 (1011b-­‐1012a)
 .................................................................................................................................................
 24

8
 Everything
 Can’t
 Be
 Always
 True
 and
 False
 Simultaneously;
 It
 is
 Self-­‐Refuting,
 Even
 to
 Deny
 Truth
 to

Others
 While
 Only
 Affirming
 it
 of
 One’s
 Own
 Statements;
 It
 is
 Not
 True
 That
 All
 Things
 Are
 in
 Motion
 or

That
 All
 Things
 Are
 at
 Rest;
 First
 Mover
 Mentioned
 (1012a-­‐b)
 ...............................................................................
 25

BOOK
 V
 (D,
 or
 Delta)
 ...................................................................................................................................................
 25

1
 Definitions
 of
 Origin(1012b-­‐1013a)
 ..............................................................................................................................
 25

2
 Definitions
 of
 Cause
 (4,
 then
 9
 causes,
 but
 other
 numbers
 of
 causes
 stated
 and
 implied!)
 (1013a-­‐
1014a)
 ........................................................................................................................................................................................
 26

3
 Definition
 of
 Element
 (1014a-­‐b)
 ......................................................................................................................................
 27

4
 Definitions
 of
 Nature
 (1014b-­‐1015a)
 ............................................................................................................................
 27

5
 Definitions
 of
 Necessary
 (1015-­‐b)
 ..................................................................................................................................
 27

6
 Definitions
 of
 One
 (1015b-­‐1017a)
 ..................................................................................................................................
 28

7
 Definitions
 of
 Accidental
 Being
 v.
 Being
 by
 Nature
 v.
 Being
 in
 Statements
 v.
 Potential/Actual
 Being

(1017a-­‐b)
 ..................................................................................................................................................................................
 28

8
 Definitions
 of
 Substance
 (1017b)
 ....................................................................................................................................
 29

9
 Definitions
 of
 Same,
 Different,
 and
 Like
 (1017b-­‐1018a)
 ........................................................................................
 29

10
 Definitions
 of
 Contraries
 (and
 related
 terms)
 (1018a-­‐b)
 .....................................................................................
 29

11
 Definitions
 of
 Prior
 and
 Posterior
 (1018b-­‐1019a)
 .................................................................................................
 29

12
 Definitions
 of
 (In)Capacity
 [Potency/Dunamis]
 (1019a-­‐1020a)
 ........................................................................
 30

13
 Definition
 of
 Quantity
 (1020a)
 ......................................................................................................................................
 30

14
 Definitions
 of
 Quality
 (1020a-­‐b)
 ...................................................................................................................................
 30

15
 Definitions
 of
 Relative
 (1020b-­‐1021b)
 .......................................................................................................................
 30

16
 Definitions
 of
 Complete
 (1021b-­‐1022a)
 .....................................................................................................................
 31

17
 Definition
 of
 Limit
 (1022a)
 .............................................................................................................................................
 31

18
 Definitions
 of
 “That
 in
 Virtue
 of
 Which”
 and
 “In
 Virtue
 of
 Itself”
 (1022a)
 ......................................................
 31

19
 Definition
 of
 Disposition
 [Hexis]
 (1022b)
 ..................................................................................................................
 31

20
 Definitions
 of
 Having
 (1022b)
 .......................................................................................................................................
 31

21
 Definitions
 of
 Affection
 (1022b)
 ...................................................................................................................................
 31

22
 Definitions
 of
 Privation
 (1022b-­‐1023a)
 .....................................................................................................................
 31

23
 Definitions
 of
 “To
 Have”
 (1023a-­‐b)
 ..............................................................................................................................
 31

24
 Definitions
 of
 “To
 Come
 from
 Something”
 (1023a-­‐b)
 ............................................................................................
 32

25
 Definitions
 of
 Part
 (1023b)
 .............................................................................................................................................
 32

26
 Definitions
 of
 Whole
 (1023b-­‐1024a)
 ...........................................................................................................................
 32

27
 Criteria
 of
 Mutilate-­‐able
 Quantitative
 Things
 (1024a)
 .........................................................................................
 32

28
 Definition
 of
 Kind
 (1024a)
 ..............................................................................................................................................
 32

29
 Definitions
 of
 False
 (1024b-­‐1025a)
 .............................................................................................................................
 32

30
 Definition
 of
 Accident
 (1025a)
 ......................................................................................................................................
 33

BOOK
 VI
 [E,
 or
 Epsilon]
 ..............................................................................................................................................
 33

1
 Principles/Causes
 of
 Being
 As
 Being;
 Natural
 Science,
 Math,
 and
 Theology
 are
 Theoretical;
 First

Philosophy
 (1025b-­‐1026a)
 ...............................................................................................................................................
 33

2
 There
 is
 No
 Science
 of
 Accidents
 (Non-­‐Essential
 Properties)
 (1025b-­‐1027a)
 .................................................
 33
3

3
 Generable
 and
 Destructible
 Principles/Causes
 (1027a-­‐b)
 .....................................................................................
 34

4
 Let
 us
 Ignore
 That
 Which
 Is
 (the
 True)
 or
 Is
 Not
 (the
 False),
 in
 Combination
 and
 Separation,
 and

Accidents,
 and
 Seek
 the
 Principles/Causes
 of
 Being
 As
 Being
 (1027b-­‐1028a)
 ...............................................
 34

BOOK
 VII
 [Z,
 or
 Zeta]
 ...................................................................................................................................................
 34

1
 Primary
 Being
 =
 Substance,
 Upon
 Which
 All
 Other
 Categories
 of
 Being
 is
 Based
 (1028a-­‐b)
 ......................
 34

2
 Substances
 are
 bodies;
 Are
 There
 Non-­‐Sensible
 Substances?
 Plato
 &
 Speussipus’
 Views,
 and
 Further

Questions
 (1028b)
 ...............................................................................................................................................................
 35

3
 Substance
 Defined;
 Four
 Senses
 Thereof;
 Substance
 As
 Substratum
 Most
 Important;
 Unformed
 Matter,

Matter,
 and
 Form-­‐Matter
 Compound
 Are
 Rejected
 as
 Being
 Substance;
 Substance
 as
 Form
 (1028b-­‐
1029b)
 ......................................................................................................................................................................................
 35

4
 Substance
 as
 Essence;
 Essence
 Defined,
 Formulae
 of
 Non-­‐Substance
 Categories
 and
 Combinations

Thereof,
 Definition
 Defined;
 Primary
 v.
 Secondary
 Essences;
 “Medical”
 Analogy
 to
 “Being”
 (1029b-­‐
1030b)
 ......................................................................................................................................................................................
 35

5
 Formula
 and
 Definition;
 Snub/Concave
 Nose;
 Definition
 is
 the
 Formula
 of
 the
 Essence,
 which
 Belongs

to
 Substances
 (1030b-­‐1031a)
 ..........................................................................................................................................
 36

6
 Is
 a
 Thing
 Identical
 to
 Its
 Essence?
 Not
 in
 Things
 with
 Accidents
 but
 Yes,
 in
 Self-­‐Subsistent
 Things

(Ideas,
 if
 they
 existed),
 Necessarily
 (1031a-­‐1032a)
 .................................................................................................
 37

7
 How
 Things
 Come
 To
 Be
 (Nature,
 Art,
 Spontaneously);
 Productions
 (Art,
 Capacity,
 or
 Thought);
 Art

comes
 from
 the
 Form
 in
 the
 Soul;
 Productions
 are
 Of
 their
 Matter
 (1032a-­‐1033a)
 .....................................
 37

8
 Productions
 (Bronze
 Sphere);
 We
 do
 Not
 Make
 Forms
 or
 Essences;
 Matter
 and
 Form;
 Criticism
 of

Plato’s
 Forms
 as
 Causes
 (1033a-­‐1034a)
 .......................................................................................................................
 38

9
 Spontaneous
 Productions;
 Substance
 is
 the
 Starting-­‐Point
 of
 Art
 and
 Natural
 Things;
 The
 Other
 Nine

Categories
 Do
 Not
 Come
 To
 Be
 (1034a-­‐b)
 ....................................................................................................................
 38

10
 Definitions,
 Formulae,
 and
 Their
 Parts;
 Priority
 and
 Posteriority
 of
 Parts
 and
 Wholes
 of
 Formulae
 and

Substances;
 Sensible
 and
 Intelligible
 Matter
 (1034b-­‐1036a)
 ...............................................................................
 39

11
 What
 Parts
 Belong
 to
 the
 Form
 and
 Which
 Not?
 Matter
 in
 Formulae
 (or
 Not);
 Natural
 Science
 is

Second
 Philosophy;
 Primary
 Substance
 defined
 (1036a-­‐1037b)
 ........................................................................
 40

12
 Definitions
 that
 Arise
 Out
 of
 Divisions,
 and
 Substance
 (1037b-­‐1038a)
 ..........................................................
 41

13
 Substance
 is
 the
 Substrate,
 Essence,
 Compound
 and
 the
 Universal;
 The
 Universal
 is
 not
 Substance
 as

the
 Essence
 is;
 it
 is
 a
 “Such”
 and
 not
 a
 “This”;
 A
 Difficulty
 if
 No
 Substance
 can
 consist
 of
 Universals

(1038b-­‐1039a)
 ......................................................................................................................................................................
 41

14
 Criticisms
 of
 Forms/Ideas
 involving
 Genera,
 Differentiae,
 and
 Substance
 (1039a-­‐b)
 ...............................
 42

15
 Substances
 Capable
 of
 Generation/Destruction;
 Formulae
 are
 Not;
 No
 Definition
 or
 Demonstration
 of

Sensible
 Individuals,
 though
 Formulae
 are
 Stable;
 Criticism
 of
 Plato’s
 Ideas
 (1039b-­‐1040b)
 .................
 42

16
 Substances
 as
 Potentialities;
 Unity/Being
 are
 not
 Substances;
 Criticisms
 of
 Plato’s
 Forms
 (1040b-­‐
1041a)
 ......................................................................................................................................................................................
 43

17
 Substance,
 “Why”
 Questions;
 The
 Cause/Form
 that
 Makes
 Matter
 a
 Definite
 Thing
 is
 the
 Substance
 of

that
 Thing;
 Compounded
 Elements
 (e.g.
 Syllables)
 are
 More
 than
 their
 Elements
 (1041a-­‐b)
 ..................
 44

BOOK
 VIII
 [n,
 or
 Eta]
 ....................................................................................................................................................
 44

1
 Summary
 of
 Book
 VII;
 Sensible
 Substances
 have
 Matter;
 Matter/Form/Form-­‐Matter;
 Matter
 is

Substance
 (1042a-­‐b)
 ...........................................................................................................................................................
 44

2
 Substance
 as
 Actuality;
 Formulae
 of
 Form/Actuality
 v.
 Matter
 v.
 Both
 (1042b-­‐1043a)
 ...............................
 45

3
 Names
 are
 of
 Composite
 Substances
 and
 of
 Form;
 An
 Eternal,
 Indestructible
 Cause
 of
 a
 Thing’s
 Being;

Substances
 as
 Numbers
 (1043a-­‐1044a)
 .......................................................................................................................
 45

4
 Matter
 and
 Moving/Efficient
 Causes;
 Mentioning
 All
 Causes,
 Including
 Proximate
 Causes;
 Natural
 But

Eternal
 Substances;
 Natural
 Things
 that
 Aren’t
 Substances
 (1044a-­‐b)
 .............................................................
 46

5
 Contraries
 Cannot
 Come
 from
 Another;
 Matter
 and
 Contraries
 (1044b-­‐1045a)
 ............................................
 46

6
 Cause
 of
 Unity
 of
 Definitions
 and
 Numbers;
 Definition
 of
 Definition;
 Matter
 and
 Form
 Elements
 of
 a

Formula
 Solve
 Difficulties;
 Proximate
 Matter
 and
 Form;
 Matter-­‐Less
 Things
 are
 Essentially
 Unities

(1045a-­‐b)
 ................................................................................................................................................................................
 46

BOOK
 IX
 [Th,
 or
 Theta]
 ...............................................................................................................................................
 47

1
 Potentiality;
 Different
 Kinds
 Thereof;
 Acting
 v.
 Being
 Acted
 on
 are
 One
 and
 Different;
 Privation
 (1045b-­‐
1046a)
 ......................................................................................................................................................................................
 47
4

2
 Non-­‐Rational
 and
 Rational
 Potentiality;
 (1046a-­‐b)
 ..................................................................................................
 47

3
 The
 Megaric
 View
 is
 Absurd;
 Potentiality
 is
 Possible;
 Actuality
 is
 Movement
 (1046b-­‐1047b)
 .................
 48

4
 There
 is
 Nothing
 Incapable
 of
 Being;
 False
 v.
 Impossible;
 If
 A
 Necessarily
 Implies
 B,
 then
 if
 A
 is
 Possible,

B
 is
 Possible
 (1047b)
 ..........................................................................................................................................................
 48

5
 Rational
 Potentialities
 Must
 Be
 in
 a
 Thing;

 (1047b-­‐1048a)
 ..................................................................................
 48

6
 Actuality;
 Infinite/Void
 is
 Potential;
 Movement
 v.
 Actuality
 (1048a-­‐b)
 ............................................................
 49

7
 When
 a
 Thing
 is
 Potentially;
 Internal-­‐
 v.
 External
 Causes
 of
 Potentiality;
 Definition
 of
 Prime
 Matter;

Ultimate
 Subject
 is
 Matter
 Sometimes
 (1048b-­‐1049b)
 ...........................................................................................
 49

8
 Actuality
 is
 Prior
 to
 Potentiality
 in
 Formula,
 Substance,
 and
 Time;
 Action
 as
 the
 End
 v.
 Done
 for
 an
 End;

Actuality
 in
 Eternal
 Things
 (1049b-­‐1051a)
 ................................................................................................................
 50

9
 Good
 Actuality
 is
 Better/More
 Valuable
 than
 Good
 Potentiality;
 Nothing
 Bad
 in
 Eternal
 Things;

Geometrical
 Relations
 Discovered
 by
 Actualization
 (1051a)
 ...............................................................................
 51

10
 Being
 (Truth)
 and
 Non-­‐Being
 (Falsity);
 Truth
 and
 Falsity
 in
 Incomposites,
 Subjects/Attributes,
 and

Unchangeable
 Things;

 (1051a-­‐1052a)
 .........................................................................................................................
 51

BOOK
 X
 [I,
 or
 Iota]
 ........................................................................................................................................................
 52

1
 Four
 Primary
 Senses
 of
 “One”;
 What
 Things
 Are
 One
 v.
 What
 it
 Is
 to
 be
 One;
 The
 One
 is
 the
 Measure
 of

All
 Things;
 Measure
 is
 not
 Always
 in
 Number;
 Measure
 is
 Homogeneous
 with
 the
 Measured;

Knowledge
 and
 Perception
 are
 the
 Measure
 of
 Things;
 Criticism
 of
 Protagoras
 (1052a-­‐1053b)
 ............
 52

2
 The
 One
 (as
 Universal/Predicate)
 is
 Not
 One;
 There
 is
 a
 One
 of
 Each
 of
 the
 Ten
 Categories;
 In

Substance,
 the
 One
 Itself
 is
 Substance
 (1053b-­‐1054a)
 ...........................................................................................
 52

3
 The
 Indivisible
 One
 is
 Opposed
 to
 the
 Divisible
 Many;
 The
 Same,
 Like,
 Other/Unlike,
 Difference

Defined;
 (1054a-­‐1055a)
 .....................................................................................................................................................
 53

4
 Contrariety;
 Contrariety
 is
 Complete
 Difference,
 between
 State
 and
 Privation;
 One
 Thing
 can
 only
 have

One
 Contrary
 (1055a-­‐b)
 .....................................................................................................................................................
 53

5
 How
 the
 Equal
 is
 Opposed
 to
 the
 Great
 and
 the
 Small
 (1055b-­‐1056b)
 ..............................................................
 54

6
 The
 Many
 Cannot
 Be
 Absolutely
 Opposed
 to
 the
 One;
 Many
 is
 Applied
 to
 Divisibles;
 One
 is
 Opposed
 to

Many
 in
 Numbers
 (1056b-­‐1057a)
 ..................................................................................................................................
 54

7
 Intermediates
 must
 be
 Composed
 of
 Contraries,
 in
 the
 Same
 Genus,
 and
 Stand
 between
 Opposites

(1057a-­‐b)
 ................................................................................................................................................................................
 54

8
 Contraries
 within
 a
 Species
 are
 within
 one
 Genus
 and
 Indivisible
 (1057b-­‐1058a)
 ......................................
 55

9
 Why
 Woman
 does
 not
 Differ
 from
 Man
 in
 Species;
 they
 Differ
 in
 Matter
 (1058a-­‐b)
 .....................................
 55

10
 The
 (Im)Perishable
 are
 Contraries
 and
 Different
 in
 Kind;
 Criticism
 of
 Plato’s
 Forms
 (1058b-­‐1059a)
 55

BOOK
 XI
 [K,
 or
 Kappa]
 ................................................................................................................................................
 56

1
 Questions
 concerning
 Wisdom
 (One
 Science
 or
 Many?
 Examines
 All
 Substances
 …
 Accidents
 …

Imperceptible
 Substances
 (Forms)
 …
 Mathematics
 …
 or
 Elements?)
 It
 does
 deal
 with
 Mathematics

(1059a-­‐1060a)
 ......................................................................................................................................................................
 56

2
 Further
 Questions
 about
 Wisdom’s
 Object(s):
 Something
 apart
 from
 individual
 things?
 Non-­‐Sensible

Substance?
 Is
 it
 Being
 and
 Unity?
 Knowledge
 of
 First
 Principles
 since
 those
 are
 Thises,
 but
 Knowledge

is
 of
 Suches?
 (1060a-­‐b)
 .......................................................................................................................................................
 56

3
 Wisdom/Philosophy
 is
 One
 Science
 of
 Being
 As
 Being,
 just
 as
 Medical
 and
 Health,
 and
 Geometry
 have

One
 Common
 Nature;
 Philosophy
 Studies
 Attributes
 and
 Contraries
 of
 Being
 As
 Being
 (1060b-­‐1061b)

 ....................................................................................................................................................................................................
 57

4
 First
 Philosophy
 Studies
 Math;
 Natural
 Science
 and
 Math
 are
 parts
 of
 Wisdom

 (1061b)
 ..........................
 57

5
 The
 Principle
 of
 Non-­‐Contradition
 (PNC)
 is
 in
 Things
 and
 Must
 be
 Recognized
 as
 True;
 The
 Necessary

Must
 Be;
 My
 Opponents
 Utterly
 Destroy
 Rational
 Discourse
 (1061b-­‐1062b)
 ................................................
 58

6
 Protagoras
 is
 Wrong;
 One
 Appearance
 Must
 be
 Mistaken;
 Start
 with
 Unchangeable
 Things
 (Heavenly

Bodies);
 Explaining
 contrary
 Movements;
 Those
 Positing
 Difficulties
 with
 Reason;
 Heraclitus
 and

Anaxagoras
 are
 Wrong
 (1062b-­‐1063b)
 ........................................................................................................................
 58

7
 There
 is
 No
 Demonstration
 of
 the
 Substance/What;
 Natural
 Science
 is
 Not
 Practical
 or
 Productive
 but
 is

Theoretical;
 Theology
 is
 the
 Best
 Science
 Because
 it
 Deals
 with
 Separable
 and
 Immovable
 Substance

(this
 substance
 is
 to
 be
 proven
 latter);
 Theology
 is
 a
 Universal
 Science

 (1063b-­‐1064b)
 ..........................
 58
5

8
 Being
 by
 Accident;
 Sophistic
 Considers
 Being
 by
 Accident;
 There
 is
 No
 Science
 of
 the
 Accidental;

Accidental
 Causes
 are
 Unordered
 and
 Indefinite;
 Reason
 and
 Nature
 are
 Prior
 to
 Chance
 Causes

(1064b-­‐1065b)
 ......................................................................................................................................................................
 59

9
 Actuality
 of
 the
 Potential
 is
 a
 Movement;
 It
 is
 Hard
 to
 Grasp
 What
 Movement
 Is;
 Movement
 is
 in
 the

Movable;
 Actuality
 of
 the
 Mover
 and
 Moved
 is
 One
 (1065b-­‐1066a)
 ...................................................................
 60

10
 Definitions
 of
 Infinite;
 Infinite
 is
 invisible,
 indivisible,
 and
 an
 Accident
 of
 Subjects;
 Infinite
 is
 not
 a

Sensible
 Thing;
 There
 is
 not
 an
 Infinite
 Body;
 The
 Infinite
 is
 not
 the
 Same
 (1066a-­‐1067a)
 .....................
 60

11
 Change;
 Accidental
 v.
 Essential
 Change;
 Accidental
 v.
 Essential
 Movement;
 Three
 Changes;
 Only
 the

Change
 from
 Subject
 to
 Subject
 is
 Movement
 (1067b-­‐1068a)
 ..............................................................................
 61

12
 There
 is
 Only
 Movement
 in
 Quality,
 Quantity,
 and
 Place
 (not
 Substance,
 Relation,
 Agent/Patient,

Mover/Moved;
 Definitions
 of
 Unmovable;
 Definitions
 of
 Together,
 Apart,
 Touch,
 Contrary
 in
 Place,

Continuous,
 Successive,
 and
 a
 Point
 v.
 a
 Unit
 (1068a-­‐1069a)
 ...............................................................................
 61

BOOK
 XII
 [L,
 or
 Lambda]
 ............................................................................................................................................
 62

1
 Three
 Kinds
 of
 Substance:
 Sensible
 (Changeable),
 Immovable,
 and
 Unnamed
 (1069a-­‐b)
 .........................
 62

2
 Matter
 Exists
 Besides
 the
 Contraries
 [Four
 Changes];
 Change
 is
 from
 One
 Contrary
 to
 its
 Opposite;

Anaxagoras
 is
 more
 Correct
 on
 Potentiality;
 Changeable
 Things
 Have
 Matter;
 Some
 Eternal
 Things

Have
 Matter
 for
 Motion;
 Three
 Causes/Principles
 (1069b)
 ..................................................................................
 62

3
 Matter
 is
 Changed
 by
 a
 Prime
 Mover
 into
 Form;
 Three
 kinds
 of
 Substance;
 Efficient
 Causes
 Precede

Their
 Effects;
 Formal
 Causes
 are
 Simultaneous
 with
 Their
 Effects
 (1069b-­‐1070a)
 .....................................
 62

4
 Causes/Principles
 in
 a
 Sense
 Different
 and
 the
 Same;
 All
 Things
 have
 and
 do
 not
 have
 the
 Same

Elements;
 Moving/External
 Causes;

 First
 Mover
 (1070a-­‐b)
 .................................................................................
 63

5
 Substance
 can
 Exist
 Apart
 and
 Non-­‐Substances
 Cannot;
 Analogically
 Identical
 Things
 are
 Principles;

Individual
 is
 the
 Source
 of
 Individuals;
 Causes
 are
 Analogically
 the
 Same;
 the
 First
 Cause
 of
 All
 Things

(1070b-­‐1071b)
 ......................................................................................................................................................................
 63

6
 Immovable
 Substance
 is
 Necessarily
 Eternal,
 Without
 Matter,
 and
 an
 Actuality;
 Criticisms
 of
 Plato
 and

Leucippus;
 Actuality
 is
 Prior
 to
 Potentiality;
 Aristotle’s
 View
 of
 Creation
 (of
 Eternality
 and
 Generation

and
 Destruction)
 (1071b-­‐1072a)
 ...................................................................................................................................
 64

7
 The
 Heavens
 are
 Eternal;
 The
 First
 Mover
 Necessarily
 Exists,
 is
 Good
 and
 a
 First
 Principle
 that
 Causes

Nature
 and
 the
 Heavens;
 Thought
 Thinking
 Itself;
 God’s
 Existence
 and
 Many
 Qualities
 (1072a-­‐1073a)

 ....................................................................................................................................................................................................
 64

8
 The
 Number
 of
 Eternal
 Unmovable
 Separate
 Substances;
 Astronomy
 Studies
 Perceptible
 but
 Eternal

Substance;
 55
 Planetary
 Movements/Spheres;
 All
 Movement
 is
 for
 the
 Sake
 of
 the
 Stars;
 There
 is
 but

One
 Heaven;
 The
 Stars
 are
 Gods
 (1073a-­‐1074b)
 ......................................................................................................
 65

9
 What
 makes
 Divine
 Thought
 Divine;
 The
 Divine
 must
 Think
 about
 the
 Divine/Precious/
 Immutable;
 It

is
 a
 Thinking
 on
 Thinking;
 Thinking
 and
 the
 Object
 of
 Thought
 are
 Identical
 for
 the
 Divine
 (1074b-­‐
1075a).
 .....................................................................................................................................................................................
 66

10
 The
 Universe
 Contains
 the
 Highest
 Good
 as
 Separate
 by
 Itself
 and
 as
 the
 Order
 of
 its
 Parts;
 OBJs

against
 Opponents
 (1075a-­‐1076a)
 ................................................................................................................................
 66

BOOK
 XIII
 [M,
 or
 Mu]
 ...................................................................................................................................................
 67

1
 How
 are
 the
 Objects
 of
 Math
 Substances?
 Are
 Ideas
 Substances?
 (1076a)
 .......................................................
 67

2
 Mathematical
 Objects
 cannot
 Exist
 in
 Sensible
 Things;
 but
 they
 cannot
 Exist
 Separately;
 the
 Same
 Goes

for
 Numbers;
 Modes
 of
 Generation
 of
 Mathematical
 Objects;
 Are
 Lines
 Substances?
 Mathematical

Objects
 are
 Prior
 in
 Formula
 (1076a-­‐1077b)
 .............................................................................................................
 67

3
 Formulae/Demonstrations
 of
 Sensible
 Magnitudes;
 Mathematical
 Objects
 Exist
 Without
 Qualification;

Attributes
 Belong
 to
 Things
 as
 Lengths
 and
 Planes;
 Mathematics
 deals
 with
 the
 Beautiful
 and
 the
 Good

(1077b1078b)
 .......................................................................................................................................................................
 68

4
 History
 and
 Criticisms
 of
 Plato’s
 Ideas/Forms
 (1078b1079b)
 .............................................................................
 68

5
 Further
 Criticisms
 of
 Forms
 (1079b-­‐1080a)
 ...............................................................................................................
 69

6
 Numbers
 as
 Separable
 Substances
 and
 First
 Causes;
 Mathematical
 v.
 Ideal
 Number
 Counting;

Pythagoreans,
 and
 Forms
 of
 Numbers
 (1080a-­‐b)
 .....................................................................................................
 70

7
 Comparable
 v.
 Non-­‐Comparable
 Units;
 We
 cannot
 Differentiate
 the
 Units
 in
 Any
 Way
 (1080b-­‐1082b)
 71
6

8
 Differentia
 of
 a
 Number
 and
 Unit;
 Units
 do
 not
 Differ
 in
 Quality
 or
 Quantity;
 Number
 cannot
 Exist

Separately;
 Ideal
 Number
 is
 Not
 Mathematical
 Number;
 Pythagorean
 view;
 Units
 and
 the
 Great
 and

Small;
 Number
 is
 not
 Infinite
 or
 Finite(?);
 Is
 the
 Ideal
 1
 without
 Position?
 (1083b-­‐1085a)
 ......................
 72

9
 Do
 the
 Units
 of
 2
 and
 3
 Succeed
 the
 Ideal
 1?
 Is
 2
 or
 the
 Units
 in
 2
 Prior?
 Difficulties
 for
 Many
 Views
 of

Universals,
 Numbers
 consisting
 of
 the
 One
 and
 Plurality,
 Etc.;
 Numbers
 consist
 of
 Indivisibles
 –

Magnitudes
 do
 Not;
 Numbers
 and
 Magnitudes
 Cannot
 Exist
 Apart
 from
 Things;
 Separation
 of
 the

Universal/Form
 is
 the
 Main
 Problem
 with
 Plato’s
 View
 (1085a-­‐1086b)
 ..........................................................
 73

10
 Difficulty
 if
 We
 Posit
 Separate
 Substances
 or
 if
 We
 Do
 Not;
 Difficulty
 with
 Individual
 and
 Universal

Separate
 Substance;
 Knowledge
 is
 Universal
 Potentially
 (as
 Matter)
 and
 Actually
 (as
 a
 “This”)
 (1086b-­‐
1087a)
 ......................................................................................................................................................................................
 75

BOOK
 XIV
 [N
 or
 Nu]
 .....................................................................................................................................................
 75

1
 No
 Contrary
 is
 the
 First
 Principle;
 Many
 Thinkers
 are
 Wrong
 about
 Generating
 Numbers
 from
 the

Dyad,
 Unequal
 or
 Plurality,
 or
 the
 Substance
 of
 the
 One;
 One
 is
 Measure
 and
 Not
 a
 Number;
 The

Unequal
 is
 not
 One
 Thing,
 and
 the
 Dyad
 an
 Indefinite
 Compound
 (1087a-­‐1088b)
 ......................................
 75

2
 Eternal
 Things
 Cannot
 Consist
 of
 Elements;
 Refuting
 Parmenides;
 How
 is
 Being
 As
 Substance,
 Many?

Why
 Other
 Thinkers
 are
 Wrong
 on
 “Many
 Substances”
 “Solutions”;.
 Why
 Should
 We
 Think
 that

Numbers
 Exist?
 Ideas
 as
 Numbers
 (1088b-­‐1090a)
 ..................................................................................................
 76

3
 Those
 Who
 Believe
 that
 Ideas
 are
 Numbers
 are
 Wrong;
 Pythagoreans
 are
 Wrong;
 Number/Objects
 of

Mathematics
 Contribute
 Nothing
 to
 One
 Another;
 Those
 Who
 Posit
 Forms
 and
 Objects
 of
 Mathematics

as
 Numbers
 are
 Wrong;
 It
 is
 Impossible
 to
 Attribute
 Generation
 to
 Eternal
 Things
 (1090a-­‐1091a)
 .....
 77

4
 Generation
 of
 Even/Odd
 Numbers;
 How
 are
 Elements/Principles
 Relatd
 to
 the
 Good/Beautiful?

Objections
 Against
 Ideas
 as
 Numbers,
 Including
 that
 Bad
 Itself
 Must
 Exist

 (1091a-­‐1092a)
 ....................
 78

5
 The
 Good
 Must
 be
 Among
 the
 First
 Principles
 Somehow;
 Place
 and
 Mathematical
 Solids;
 Number

Cannot
 Come
 from
 its
 Elements
 by
 Intermixture
 or
 Juxtaposition;
 Numbers
 are
 Not
 the
 Causes
 of

Substances
 or
 Being;
 Number
 is
 None
 of
 the
 Four
 Causes
 (1092a-­‐b)
 .................................................................
 79

6
 Things
 do
 not
 Get
 Goodness
 Due
 to
 Numbers;
 All
 Things
 Cannot
 Share
 in
 Number;
 Numbers,
 Contraries,

and
 Mathematical
 Relations
 are
 not
 Causes
 of
 Nature;
 Ideal
 Numbers
 do
 not
 Help
 Explain
 Music

(1092b-­‐1093b)
 ......................................................................................................................................................................
 80
7

Introduction

The following are detailed notes of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which were part of a Summer Project Grant,
approved by the Maricopa County Community College District. I would like to thank them for allowing me to
spend time and effort on this research.
Please be aware that in what follows, these are actual sentences of Aristotle’s text in some cases, but this
is not the whole text. More importantly, I have deleted many unnecessary words, phrases, sentences, and/or
examples (when 3 would suffice), and added chapter headings (that should be very helpful), numbers, underlining,
italicizing, and so on, to make the text easier to understand. I have also added any notes or objections I may
have thought about along the way, which are underlined and highlighted in blue. I have also moved his
examples nearer to when he describes a principle (sometimes he says, e.g., “X is Y and not-Y” and then gives an
example of not-Y for several sentences, until finally getting to an example of Y; I moved the example to make it
more easily accessible).
In addition, these notes are in no way to be thought of as being a substitute for reading all of the
Metaphysics for oneself; these notes are merely what I thought was most important, and put into a form that I
could more easily understand.
Lastly, despite all these disclaimers, I do sincerely hope that these notes are of some value to the reader.

BOOK I (A, or Alpha):

1. Knowledge, Experience, Art, Master-Workers, and Wisdom (979b-982a). All men by nature
desire to know, because we delight in our senses. Even apart from the senses’ usefulness, they are loved for
themselves; above all others the sense of sight, since we prefer it to almost everything else. Sight makes us know
and brings many differences between things to light. Some animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and
some have memory; the latter are more intelligent and apt at learning. (E.g., the bee cannot be taught because it
doesn’t have memory.) Humans live by appearances, memories, and also art and reasonings. From memory,
experiences produced in man; for many memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single
experience. Experience seems to be very similar to science and art, but really science and art come to men
through experience (for experience made art but inexperience luck, says Polus). [DY: Compare Aristotle’s
“Demonstrative Knowledge” reading in Cottingham’s Western Philosophy: An Anthology, 2/e, pp. 19-21.] And
art arises, when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgment about similar objects is
produced. For to have a judgment that when Callias was ill of this disease this did him good, and similarly in the
case of Socrates and in many individual cases, as a matter of experience; but to judge that it has done good to all
persons of a certain constitution, marked off in one class, when they were ill of this disease, this is a matter of art.
Experience is knowledge of individuals, art of universals, and actions and productions are all concerned with the
individual; for the physician does not cure a man, except an incidental way, but Callias or Socrates, who
happens to be a man. If then, a man has theory without experience, and knows the universal but does not know
the individual included in this, he will often fail to cure; for it is the individual that is to be cured. Knowledge
and understanding belong to art rather than to experience; artists are wiser than men of experience, which
implies that wisdom depends in all cases rather on knowledge, because artists know the cause and men of
experience do not. For men of experience note that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the others know
why and the cause.
Hence we think that the master workers in each craft are more honorable and know in a true sense and
are wiser than the manual workers, because they know the causes of the things that are done. We think the
manual workers are like certain lifeless things which act indeed, but act without knowing what they do, as fire
burns - they perform their actions through habit. So master workers are wiser not in virtue of being able to act,
but of having the theory for themselves and knowing the causes. It is a sign of the man who knows, that he can
teach, and therefore we think that art is more truly knowledge than experience is; for artists can teach, and men
of mere experience cannot.
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None of the senses are wisdom, but these give the most authoritative knowledge of particulars. But they
do not tell us of the “why” of anything; e.g., why fire is hot; they only say that it is hot. As arts developed, some
aimed at utility or the necessities of life, while others aimed at recreation. The latter artists were regarded as
wiser. The mathematical arts were founded in Egypt because the priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure.
All men suppose that wisdom deals with the first causes and the principles of things. This is why the man
of experience is thought to be wiser than the possessors of any perception whatever. The artist wiser than the
man of experience, the master worker than the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of
the nature of wisdom than the productive. Clearly then wisdom is knowledge about certain causes and
principles.

2. Wisdom, Knowledge for Its Own Sake, Theoretical Knowledge, Theology, God (982a-983a).
The wise man knows all things, as far as possible, although he has not knowledge of each of them individually;
moreover, he who can learn things that are difficult, and not easy for men to know, is wise (sense perception is
common to all and therefore easy and no mark of wisdom); again, he who is more exact and more capable of
teaching the causes is wiser, in every branch of knowledge; and of the sciences, that which is desirable on its own
account and for the sake of knowing it is more of the nature of wisdom than that which is desirable on account
of its results, and the superior science is more of the nature of wisdom than the ancillary; for the wise man must
not be ordered but must order, and he must not obey another, but the less wise must obey him.
Knowing all things must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge; for he knows
in a sense all the subordinate objects. For the most universal things are on the whole the hardest for men to
know; they are furthest from the senses. And the most exact of the sciences are those which deal most with first
principles (those which deal with fewer principles are more exact than those which deal with additional
principles - arithmetic than geometry). Understanding and knowledge pursued for their own sake are found
most in the knowledge of that which is the most knowable; the first principles and causes are most knowable; for
by reason of these, and from these, all other things are known, but these are not known by means of the things
subordinate to them. And the science which knows to what end each thing must be done is the most
authoritative of the sciences, and more authoritative than any ancillary science; and this and is the good in each
class, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. So there must be a science that investigates the
first principle and causes; for the good, that is, that for the sake of which, is one of the causes.
This is not a science of production as is clear from early philosophy. For it is owing to their wonder that
men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties [DY:
compare Plato’s similar statement in the Theaetetus], then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the
greater matters (e.g. about the phenomena of the moon, the sun, and the stars, and the origin of the universe).
Since they philosophized in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to
know, and not for any utilitarian end. For when almost all the necessities of life and comfort and recreation were
present, such knowledge began to be sought. So we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for
itself.
Hence the possession of it might be justly regarded as beyond human power, because it is unfitting that
man should not be content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him. Divine power cannot be jealous, nor
should any science bethought more honorable than one of this sort. For the most divine science is also most
honorable the science which it would be best for God to have is a divine science, and so is any science that deals
with divine objects; and this science alone has both these qualities; for God is thought to be among the causes of
all things and to be a first principle, and either God alone can have this science, or God above all others. All the
sciences are more necessary than theology, but none is better.
So this is the nature of the science we are searching for, and the mark which our search and our whole
investigation must reach.

3. Four Causes, Pre-Socratics (983a-984b). We have to acquire knowledge of the original causes, and
causes are spoken of in four senses. First, we mean the substance; that is, the essence, or the why as a cause and
principle (formal cause); second, the matter or substratum (material cause); third, the source of the change
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(efficient cause); and fourth, the cause opposed to this, that for the sake of which and the good; for this is the
end of all generation and change (final cause).
Now let's review what other philosophers of said about principles and causes: of the first philosophers,
most thought the principles which were of the nature of matter were the only principles of all things; that of
which all things that are consist, and from which they first come to be, and into which they are finally resolved
(the substance remaining, but changing in its modifications).
But they do not all agree as to the number in the nature of these principles. Thales says the principle is
water. Anaximenes and Diogenes make air prior to water; Hippasus and Heraclitus make fire prior; Empedocles
says earth, air, fire and water are the fundamental elements. Anaxagoras says the principles are infinite in
number.
Thus, one might think that the only cause is the material cause; but as men advanced, the very facts
showed them the way enjoined in forcing them to investigate the subject. For what causes change? For example,
neither the woods nor the bronze causes the change of either of them nor does the wood manufacture a bed in
the bronze a statue, but something else is the cause of the change. And to seek this is to seek a second cause, as
we should say, that from which comes the beginning of movement (efficient cause).

4. Hesiod, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Only Two of the Four Causes (984b-985b).
Perhaps Hesiod was the first to look for such a thing, since he says "first of all things was chaos made, and then
broad-breasted earth, and love that foremost is among all the immortals," which implies that among existing
things there must be a cause which will move things and bring them together.
Empedocles in a sense both mentions, and is the first to mention, the bad and the good as principles,
since the cause of all goods is the good itself. These thinkers evidently got up to a certain point of two of the four
causes we hold: the material and efficient causes; but they speak vaguely and with no clearness, and do not seem
to know what they say; for it is evident that, as a rule, they make no use of their causes except to a small extent.
For instance, Anaxagoras uses reason as a deus ex machina for the making of the world, and when he is at a loss as
to what causes what, then he drags reason in, but in all other cases he ascribes events to anything other than
reason. And Empedocles, though he uses the causes to a greater extent than this, neither does so sufficiently nor
attains consistency in their use. He was the first to speak of for material elements, but treats them as to only; he
treats fire by itself, and its opposites (earth, air, and water) as one kind of thing. Leucippus and Democritus say
that the full in the empty are the elements, calling the one being in the other nonbeing, and they make these the
material causes of things. Thus, the early philosophers focused on two causes.

5. Pythagoreans, Parmenides, Xenophanes (985b-987a). Pythagoreans devoted themselves to
mathematics; they were the first to advance the study and thought its principles were the principles of all things.
Since of these principles numbers are by nature the first, and in numbers that they seemed to see many
resemblances to the things that exist and come into being – more than in fire and earth and water (a certain
modification of numbers being justice, another being soul and reason, etc.) – and similarly almost all other
things being numerically expressible (e.g. the attributes and ratios of the musical scales), they suppose the
elements of numbers to be the elements of all things, and the whole heaven to be a musical scale and a number.
For instance, as the number 10 is thought to be perfect and to comprise the whole nature of numbers, the bodies
which move through the heavens are 10, but as the visible bodies are only nine, they invent a tenth: the
“counter-earth.” Moreover, they stated that the even is unlimited while the odd is limited. Others say there is a
column of two opposite principles: limit and unlimited to, odd and even, one and many, right and left, male and
female, resting and moving, straight and curved, light and darkness, good and bad, square and oblong. They
have not stated clearly and articulately, however, how these principles can be brought together under the causes
we have named. They seem to arrange the elements under the head of matter out of which they say substances
composed and molded. Parmenides focuses on that which is one in formula, Melissus on that which is one in
matter, and Xenophanes gives no clear statement on this, but contemplates the whole heaven and says that the
One is God. Xenophanes and Melissus are naïve; Parmenides has more insight, because he claims that, besides
the existent nothing nonexistent exists, he thinks that the existent is of necessity one and that nothing else exists,
but being forced to follow the phenomena, and supposing that what is is one in formula but many according to
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perception, he now posits to causes and two principles, calling them hot and cold (fire and Earth); and of
these he ranges the hot with the existent, and the other with the nonexistent. [The rest of this chapter is a
review.]

6. Plato, Pythagoreans, Criticism of Plato’s Forms and Causes (987a-988a). In his youth, Plato
became familiar with Cratylus and Heraclitus (i.e., their view that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux
and there is no knowledge about them), and agreed with these views even in his later years. Socrates, however,
was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the
universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions. Plato accepted his teaching,
but held that the problem applied not to any sensible thing but to entities of another kind, because the common
definition could not be a definition of any sensible thing, since these were always changing. Things of this other
sort he called Ideas, and sensible things were apart from these, and were all called after these; for the multitude
of things which have the same name as the Form exist by participation in it. Only the name "participation" was
new; for the Pythagoreans save it things exist by imitation of numbers, and Plato says they exist by participation,
changing the name. But what the participation or the imitation of the Forms could be they left an open
question.
Besides sensible things and Forms he says there are objects of mathematics, which occupy in an
intermediate position, differing from sensible things and being eternal and unchangeable, and from Forms in
that there are many alike, while the Form itself is in each case unique.
Since the Forms are the causes of all other things, he thought their elements were the elements of all
things. As matter, the great and the small were principles; as substance, the one; for from the great and the
small, by participation in the One, come the numbers.
He agreed with the Pythagoreans and saying that the One is substance and not a predicate of something
else, and that the numbers are the causes of the substance of other things. But unlike the Pythagoreans, Plato
posited a dyad and constructed the infinite out of great and small, instead of treating the infinite as one, and that
numbers exist apart from sensible things. Plato made the other entity besides the One a dyad because he
believed that the numbers, except those which were prime, could be neatly produced out of the dyad as out of a
plastic material.
His theory is not reasonable, because he makes many things out of the matter, in the form generates only
once, but what we observe is that one table, for instance, is made from one matter, while the man who applies
the form, though he is one, makes many tables. In the relation of the male to the female is similar; for the latter
is impregnated by one calculation but the male impregnate its many females; yet these are imitations of those
first principles.
Plato used only two causes: the efficient cause (for the Forms are the cause of the essence of all other
things, and the One is the cause of the essence of the Forms) and the material cause (it is evident what the
underlying matter is, of which the Forms are predicated in the case of sensible things, and that One in the case
of Forms, namely, that this is a dyad, the great and the small.

7. Review and Summary of Philosophers; We’ve only Discussed Two Causes, Leaving Final
Cause Out, but All Philosophers Show There are Four Causes (988a-988b). We've learned from all
of these philosophers that none of them has mentioned any principle except material and efficient causes, but all
evidently have some inkling of them, though only vaguely. Some speak of the first principle as matter (either one
or many, or physical or incorporeal). These thinkers grasped this cause only; but certain others have mentioned
the source of movement, for example, those who make friendship and strife (Empedocles), or reason
(Anaxagoras), or love (Hesiod, Parmenides), a principle.
The essence, that is, the substance of things, no one has expressed distinctly. It is mentioned chiefly by
those who believe in the Forms; for they do not suppose either that the Forms are the matter of sensible things,
and the One the matter of the Forms, or that they are the source of movement (for they say these are causes
rather of immobility and of being at rest), but they furnish the Forms as the essence of every other thing, and the
One as the essence of the Forms.