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Aristotle Notes - Metaphysics PDF

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ARISTOTLE NOTES ON METAPHYSICS By Dr. Dave Yount Mesa Community College May 2013 Contents   Introduction  .....................................................................................................................................................................  7   BOOK  I  (A,  or  Alpha):  ....................................................................................................................................................  7   1.  Knowledge,  Experience,  Art,  Master-­‐Workers,  and  Wisdom  (979b-­‐982a)  ..............................................................  7   2.  Wisdom,  Knowledge  for  Its  Own  Sake,  Theoretical  Knowledge,  Theology,  God  (982a-­‐983a)  ..........................  8   3.  Four  Causes,  Pre-­‐Socratics  (983a-­‐984b)  .............................................................................................................................  8   4.  Hesiod,  Empedocles,  Anaxagoras,  Democritus,  Only  Two  of  the  Four  Causes  (984b-­‐985b)  ..............................  9   5.  Pythagoreans,  Parmenides,  Xenophanes  (985b-­‐987a)  ..................................................................................................  9   6.  Plato,  Pythagoreans,  Criticism  of  Plato’s  Forms  and  Causes  (987a-­‐988a)  ............................................................  10   7.  Review  and  Summary  of  Philosophers;  We’ve  only  Discussed  Two  Causes,  Leaving  Final  Cause  Out,  but   All  Philosophers  Show  There  are  Four  Causes  (988a-­‐988b)  ....................................................................................  10   8.  Criticism  of  Pre-­‐Socratics  (988b-­‐990a)  ............................................................................................................................  11   9.  Criticisms  of  Plato  (990a-­‐993a)  ...........................................................................................................................................  11   10.  Summary  (993a)  .....................................................................................................................................................................  12   BOOK  II  (a,  or  small  alpha):  ......................................................................................................................................  12   1.  Investigation  of  the  Truth;  Everyone  Contributes  to  Truth;  No  One  has  the  Whole  Truth;  Philosophy  is   Knowledge  of  the  Truth;  the  Highest  Quality  Example  of  Something  Causes  Everything  Of  That  Kind;  and   the  more  Being  Something  has,  the  More  True  it  is  (993a-­‐993b)  ...........................................................................  12   2.  The  First  Principle  and  Causes;  None  of  the  Four  Causes  can  go  on  Ad  Infinitum;  The  First  Cause  Must  be   Eternal  and  Cannot  be  Destroyed,  Final,  Formal,  Material  Causes,  Infinite  does  Not  Exist  (994a-­‐994b)  ..  13   3.  Methods  of  Speaking  and  its  Effects  on  Listeners;  Mathematical  Accuracy  Not  Demanded;  We  must   Investigate  Nature  and  the  Purpose  of  Natural  Sciences  (995a-­‐995b)  .................................................................  14   BOOK  III  (B,  or  Beta):  ..................................................................................................................................................  14   1.  We  need  to  Know  the  Subjects  to  be  Discussed  and  the  Difficulties  involved  First;  One  or  More  Science  to   Study  Causes?  Are  Unity  and  Being  Attributes  of  Substances,  or  Substances  Themselves?  (995b-­‐996a)  ..  14   2.  Options  for  the  Questions  just  Posed:    One  or  More  Sciences  to  Study  All  Causes?  One  or  More  Sciences  of   the  Starting  Points  of  Demonstrations,  or  of  Substances,  or  of  Their  Attributes?  Do  Only  Sensible   Substances  Exist?  More  Criticisms  of  Plato’s  Forms  and  Intermediates  (996a-­‐998a)  .......................................  15   3.  Are  Genera  (the  Kinds  of  Thing)  or  the  Species,  or  the  Primary  Constituents/Elements  of  a  Thing  to  be   Taken  as  Elements  and  Principles?  Arguments  Against  All  of  These  Options  (998a-­‐999a)  ............................  16   4.  How  Do  We  Gain  Knowledge  if  There  is  Nothing  Apart  from  Individual  Things?  The  Necessity  of  Eternal   Things.  Are  First  Principles  One  in  Kind  or  Different,  (Im)Perishable?  Are  Being  and  Unity  the  Substances   of  Things,  or  Something  Else?  Problems  Whether  Being-­‐Itself  and  Unity-­‐Itself  Exist  or  Not.  (999a-­‐1001b)  ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................  17   5.  Are  Numbers,  Bodies,  Planes,  and  Points  Substances  or  Not?  (1001b-­‐1002b)  ....................................................  18   6.  Why  posit  Forms?  Problems  if  One  Does  So.  Do  Elements  Exist  Potentially  or  in  Some  Other  Way   (Problems  Either  Way)?  Are  the  First  Principles  Universal  or  Individuals  (Universals  Implied)?  Suches  v.   Thises.  (1002b-­‐1003a)  ............................................................................................................................................................  18   BOOK  IV  (G,  or  Gamma):  ............................................................................................................................................  19   1.The  Science  of  Being  (1003a)  ..............................................................................................................................................  19   2.  Focal  Meaning  of  “Being”;  One  Science  that  Studies  Being  as  Being  and  Unity  as  Unity,  Dialecticians  v.   Sophists  v.  Philosophers  (1003a-­‐1005a)  .........................................................................................................................  19 2   3.  Philosophers  will  Inquire  into  Mathematical  Axioms;  Natural  Philosophers  are  Not  Ultimate   Philosophers,  the  Principle  of  Non-­‐Contradiction  (PNC)  is  the  Most  Certain  and  Non-­‐Hypothetical   Principle  (1005a-­‐b)  .................................................................................................................................................................  20   4.  Some  State  PNC  is  Possible,  but  We  can  Prove  Them  Wrong;  it’s  Self-­‐Refuting  and  Meaningless  to  Deny   PNC;  There  is  Still  More  or  Less  in  the  Nature  of  Things  (1005b-­‐1009a)  .............................................................  21   5  Protagoras  Denies  PNC  so  his  Doctrine  is  Wrong;  Some  Hold  Appearances  are  Always  True;  Others  Say   There  is  No  Truth  of  the  Matter;  but  Both  are  Wrong;  There  is  Both  Relativity  and  Objectivity,  and  Truth   and  Falsity  in  Appearances  (1009a-­‐1011a)  ....................................................................................................................  22   6  My  Opponents  Demand  a  Reason  Where  None  is  Possible;  Refuting  Protagorean  Relativism  (1011a-­‐ 1011b)  .........................................................................................................................................................................................  24   7  No  Intermediates  of  Contradictories;  One  Subject  Must  Possess  nor  Not  Possess  a  Predicate;   Truth/Falsity  Defined;  Tri-­‐Valence  Logic?  Endorsing  a  Platonic  View?  Refuting  Heraclitus  and   Anaxagoras  (1011b-­‐1012a)  .................................................................................................................................................  24   8  Everything  Can’t  Be  Always  True  and  False  Simultaneously;  It  is  Self-­‐Refuting,  Even  to  Deny  Truth  to   Others  While  Only  Affirming  it  of  One’s  Own  Statements;  It  is  Not  True  That  All  Things  Are  in  Motion  or   That  All  Things  Are  at  Rest;  First  Mover  Mentioned  (1012a-­‐b)  ...............................................................................  25   BOOK  V  (D,  or  Delta)  ...................................................................................................................................................  25   1  Definitions  of  Origin(1012b-­‐1013a)  ..............................................................................................................................  25   2  Definitions  of  Cause  (4,  then  9  causes,  but  other  numbers  of  causes  stated  and  implied!)  (1013a-­‐ 1014a)  ........................................................................................................................................................................................  26   3  Definition  of  Element  (1014a-­‐b)  ......................................................................................................................................  27   4  Definitions  of  Nature  (1014b-­‐1015a)  ............................................................................................................................  27   5  Definitions  of  Necessary  (1015-­‐b)  ..................................................................................................................................  27   6  Definitions  of  One  (1015b-­‐1017a)  ..................................................................................................................................  28   7  Definitions  of  Accidental  Being  v.  Being  by  Nature  v.  Being  in  Statements  v.  Potential/Actual  Being   (1017a-­‐b)  ..................................................................................................................................................................................  28   8  Definitions  of  Substance  (1017b)  ....................................................................................................................................  29   9  Definitions  of  Same,  Different,  and  Like  (1017b-­‐1018a)  ........................................................................................  29   10  Definitions  of  Contraries  (and  related  terms)  (1018a-­‐b)  .....................................................................................  29   11  Definitions  of  Prior  and  Posterior  (1018b-­‐1019a)  .................................................................................................  29   12  Definitions  of  (In)Capacity  [Potency/Dunamis]  (1019a-­‐1020a)  ........................................................................  30   13  Definition  of  Quantity  (1020a)  ......................................................................................................................................  30   14  Definitions  of  Quality  (1020a-­‐b)  ...................................................................................................................................  30   15  Definitions  of  Relative  (1020b-­‐1021b)  .......................................................................................................................  30   16  Definitions  of  Complete  (1021b-­‐1022a)  .....................................................................................................................  31   17  Definition  of  Limit  (1022a)  .............................................................................................................................................  31   18  Definitions  of  “That  in  Virtue  of  Which”  and  “In  Virtue  of  Itself”  (1022a)  ......................................................  31   19  Definition  of  Disposition  [Hexis]  (1022b)  ..................................................................................................................  31   20  Definitions  of  Having  (1022b)  .......................................................................................................................................  31   21  Definitions  of  Affection  (1022b)  ...................................................................................................................................  31   22  Definitions  of  Privation  (1022b-­‐1023a)  .....................................................................................................................  31   23  Definitions  of  “To  Have”  (1023a-­‐b)  ..............................................................................................................................  31   24  Definitions  of  “To  Come  from  Something”  (1023a-­‐b)  ............................................................................................  32   25  Definitions  of  Part  (1023b)  .............................................................................................................................................  32   26  Definitions  of  Whole  (1023b-­‐1024a)  ...........................................................................................................................  32   27  Criteria  of  Mutilate-­‐able  Quantitative  Things  (1024a)  .........................................................................................  32   28  Definition  of  Kind  (1024a)  ..............................................................................................................................................  32   29  Definitions  of  False  (1024b-­‐1025a)  .............................................................................................................................  32   30  Definition  of  Accident  (1025a)  ......................................................................................................................................  33   BOOK  VI  [E,  or  Epsilon]  ..............................................................................................................................................  33   1  Principles/Causes  of  Being  As  Being;  Natural  Science,  Math,  and  Theology  are  Theoretical;  First   Philosophy  (1025b-­‐1026a)  ...............................................................................................................................................  33   2  There  is  No  Science  of  Accidents  (Non-­‐Essential  Properties)  (1025b-­‐1027a)  .................................................  33 3   3  Generable  and  Destructible  Principles/Causes  (1027a-­‐b)  .....................................................................................  34   4  Let  us  Ignore  That  Which  Is  (the  True)  or  Is  Not  (the  False),  in  Combination  and  Separation,  and   Accidents,  and  Seek  the  Principles/Causes  of  Being  As  Being  (1027b-­‐1028a)  ...............................................  34   BOOK  VII  [Z,  or  Zeta]  ...................................................................................................................................................  34   1  Primary  Being  =  Substance,  Upon  Which  All  Other  Categories  of  Being  is  Based  (1028a-­‐b)  ......................  34   2  Substances  are  bodies;  Are  There  Non-­‐Sensible  Substances?  Plato  &  Speussipus’  Views,  and  Further   Questions  (1028b)  ...............................................................................................................................................................  35   3  Substance  Defined;  Four  Senses  Thereof;  Substance  As  Substratum  Most  Important;  Unformed  Matter,   Matter,  and  Form-­‐Matter  Compound  Are  Rejected  as  Being  Substance;  Substance  as  Form  (1028b-­‐ 1029b)  ......................................................................................................................................................................................  35   4  Substance  as  Essence;  Essence  Defined,  Formulae  of  Non-­‐Substance  Categories  and  Combinations   Thereof,  Definition  Defined;  Primary  v.  Secondary  Essences;  “Medical”  Analogy  to  “Being”  (1029b-­‐ 1030b)  ......................................................................................................................................................................................  35   5  Formula  and  Definition;  Snub/Concave  Nose;  Definition  is  the  Formula  of  the  Essence,  which  Belongs   to  Substances  (1030b-­‐1031a)  ..........................................................................................................................................  36   6  Is  a  Thing  Identical  to  Its  Essence?  Not  in  Things  with  Accidents  but  Yes,  in  Self-­‐Subsistent  Things   (Ideas,  if  they  existed),  Necessarily  (1031a-­‐1032a)  .................................................................................................  37   7  How  Things  Come  To  Be  (Nature,  Art,  Spontaneously);  Productions  (Art,  Capacity,  or  Thought);  Art   comes  from  the  Form  in  the  Soul;  Productions  are  Of  their  Matter  (1032a-­‐1033a)  .....................................  37   8  Productions  (Bronze  Sphere);  We  do  Not  Make  Forms  or  Essences;  Matter  and  Form;  Criticism  of   Plato’s  Forms  as  Causes  (1033a-­‐1034a)  .......................................................................................................................  38   9  Spontaneous  Productions;  Substance  is  the  Starting-­‐Point  of  Art  and  Natural  Things;  The  Other  Nine   Categories  Do  Not  Come  To  Be  (1034a-­‐b)  ....................................................................................................................  38   10  Definitions,  Formulae,  and  Their  Parts;  Priority  and  Posteriority  of  Parts  and  Wholes  of  Formulae  and   Substances;  Sensible  and  Intelligible  Matter  (1034b-­‐1036a)  ...............................................................................  39   11  What  Parts  Belong  to  the  Form  and  Which  Not?  Matter  in  Formulae  (or  Not);  Natural  Science  is   Second  Philosophy;  Primary  Substance  defined  (1036a-­‐1037b)  ........................................................................  40   12  Definitions  that  Arise  Out  of  Divisions,  and  Substance  (1037b-­‐1038a)  ..........................................................  41   13  Substance  is  the  Substrate,  Essence,  Compound  and  the  Universal;  The  Universal  is  not  Substance  as   the  Essence  is;  it  is  a  “Such”  and  not  a  “This”;  A  Difficulty  if  No  Substance  can  consist  of  Universals   (1038b-­‐1039a)  ......................................................................................................................................................................  41   14  Criticisms  of  Forms/Ideas  involving  Genera,  Differentiae,  and  Substance  (1039a-­‐b)  ...............................  42   15  Substances  Capable  of  Generation/Destruction;  Formulae  are  Not;  No  Definition  or  Demonstration  of   Sensible  Individuals,  though  Formulae  are  Stable;  Criticism  of  Plato’s  Ideas  (1039b-­‐1040b)  .................  42   16  Substances  as  Potentialities;  Unity/Being  are  not  Substances;  Criticisms  of  Plato’s  Forms  (1040b-­‐ 1041a)  ......................................................................................................................................................................................  43   17  Substance,  “Why”  Questions;  The  Cause/Form  that  Makes  Matter  a  Definite  Thing  is  the  Substance  of   that  Thing;  Compounded  Elements  (e.g.  Syllables)  are  More  than  their  Elements  (1041a-­‐b)  ..................  44   BOOK  VIII  [n,  or  Eta]  ....................................................................................................................................................  44   1  Summary  of  Book  VII;  Sensible  Substances  have  Matter;  Matter/Form/Form-­‐Matter;  Matter  is   Substance  (1042a-­‐b)  ...........................................................................................................................................................  44   2  Substance  as  Actuality;  Formulae  of  Form/Actuality  v.  Matter  v.  Both  (1042b-­‐1043a)  ...............................  45   3  Names  are  of  Composite  Substances  and  of  Form;  An  Eternal,  Indestructible  Cause  of  a  Thing’s  Being;   Substances  as  Numbers  (1043a-­‐1044a)  .......................................................................................................................  45   4  Matter  and  Moving/Efficient  Causes;  Mentioning  All  Causes,  Including  Proximate  Causes;  Natural  But   Eternal  Substances;  Natural  Things  that  Aren’t  Substances  (1044a-­‐b)  .............................................................  46   5  Contraries  Cannot  Come  from  Another;  Matter  and  Contraries  (1044b-­‐1045a)  ............................................  46   6  Cause  of  Unity  of  Definitions  and  Numbers;  Definition  of  Definition;  Matter  and  Form  Elements  of  a   Formula  Solve  Difficulties;  Proximate  Matter  and  Form;  Matter-­‐Less  Things  are  Essentially  Unities   (1045a-­‐b)  ................................................................................................................................................................................  46   BOOK  IX  [Th,  or  Theta]  ...............................................................................................................................................  47   1  Potentiality;  Different  Kinds  Thereof;  Acting  v.  Being  Acted  on  are  One  and  Different;  Privation  (1045b-­‐ 1046a)  ......................................................................................................................................................................................  47 4   2  Non-­‐Rational  and  Rational  Potentiality;  (1046a-­‐b)  ..................................................................................................  47   3  The  Megaric  View  is  Absurd;  Potentiality  is  Possible;  Actuality  is  Movement  (1046b-­‐1047b)  .................  48   4  There  is  Nothing  Incapable  of  Being;  False  v.  Impossible;  If  A  Necessarily  Implies  B,  then  if  A  is  Possible,   B  is  Possible  (1047b)  ..........................................................................................................................................................  48   5  Rational  Potentialities  Must  Be  in  a  Thing;    (1047b-­‐1048a)  ..................................................................................  48   6  Actuality;  Infinite/Void  is  Potential;  Movement  v.  Actuality  (1048a-­‐b)  ............................................................  49   7  When  a  Thing  is  Potentially;  Internal-­‐  v.  External  Causes  of  Potentiality;  Definition  of  Prime  Matter;   Ultimate  Subject  is  Matter  Sometimes  (1048b-­‐1049b)  ...........................................................................................  49   8  Actuality  is  Prior  to  Potentiality  in  Formula,  Substance,  and  Time;  Action  as  the  End  v.  Done  for  an  End;   Actuality  in  Eternal  Things  (1049b-­‐1051a)  ................................................................................................................  50   9  Good  Actuality  is  Better/More  Valuable  than  Good  Potentiality;  Nothing  Bad  in  Eternal  Things;   Geometrical  Relations  Discovered  by  Actualization  (1051a)  ...............................................................................  51   10  Being  (Truth)  and  Non-­‐Being  (Falsity);  Truth  and  Falsity  in  Incomposites,  Subjects/Attributes,  and   Unchangeable  Things;    (1051a-­‐1052a)  .........................................................................................................................  51   BOOK  X  [I,  or  Iota]  ........................................................................................................................................................  52   1  Four  Primary  Senses  of  “One”;  What  Things  Are  One  v.  What  it  Is  to  be  One;  The  One  is  the  Measure  of   All  Things;  Measure  is  not  Always  in  Number;  Measure  is  Homogeneous  with  the  Measured;   Knowledge  and  Perception  are  the  Measure  of  Things;  Criticism  of  Protagoras  (1052a-­‐1053b)  ............  52   2  The  One  (as  Universal/Predicate)  is  Not  One;  There  is  a  One  of  Each  of  the  Ten  Categories;  In   Substance,  the  One  Itself  is  Substance  (1053b-­‐1054a)  ...........................................................................................  52   3  The  Indivisible  One  is  Opposed  to  the  Divisible  Many;  The  Same,  Like,  Other/Unlike,  Difference   Defined;  (1054a-­‐1055a)  .....................................................................................................................................................  53   4  Contrariety;  Contrariety  is  Complete  Difference,  between  State  and  Privation;  One  Thing  can  only  have   One  Contrary  (1055a-­‐b)  .....................................................................................................................................................  53   5  How  the  Equal  is  Opposed  to  the  Great  and  the  Small  (1055b-­‐1056b)  ..............................................................  54   6  The  Many  Cannot  Be  Absolutely  Opposed  to  the  One;  Many  is  Applied  to  Divisibles;  One  is  Opposed  to   Many  in  Numbers  (1056b-­‐1057a)  ..................................................................................................................................  54   7  Intermediates  must  be  Composed  of  Contraries,  in  the  Same  Genus,  and  Stand  between  Opposites   (1057a-­‐b)  ................................................................................................................................................................................  54   8  Contraries  within  a  Species  are  within  one  Genus  and  Indivisible  (1057b-­‐1058a)  ......................................  55   9  Why  Woman  does  not  Differ  from  Man  in  Species;  they  Differ  in  Matter  (1058a-­‐b)  .....................................  55   10  The  (Im)Perishable  are  Contraries  and  Different  in  Kind;  Criticism  of  Plato’s  Forms  (1058b-­‐1059a)  55   BOOK  XI  [K,  or  Kappa]  ................................................................................................................................................  56   1  Questions  concerning  Wisdom  (One  Science  or  Many?  Examines  All  Substances  …  Accidents  …   Imperceptible  Substances  (Forms)  …  Mathematics  …  or  Elements?)  It  does  deal  with  Mathematics   (1059a-­‐1060a)  ......................................................................................................................................................................  56   2  Further  Questions  about  Wisdom’s  Object(s):  Something  apart  from  individual  things?  Non-­‐Sensible   Substance?  Is  it  Being  and  Unity?  Knowledge  of  First  Principles  since  those  are  Thises,  but  Knowledge   is  of  Suches?  (1060a-­‐b)  .......................................................................................................................................................  56   3  Wisdom/Philosophy  is  One  Science  of  Being  As  Being,  just  as  Medical  and  Health,  and  Geometry  have   One  Common  Nature;  Philosophy  Studies  Attributes  and  Contraries  of  Being  As  Being  (1060b-­‐1061b)  ....................................................................................................................................................................................................  57   4  First  Philosophy  Studies  Math;  Natural  Science  and  Math  are  parts  of  Wisdom    (1061b)  ..........................  57   5  The  Principle  of  Non-­‐Contradition  (PNC)  is  in  Things  and  Must  be  Recognized  as  True;  The  Necessary   Must  Be;  My  Opponents  Utterly  Destroy  Rational  Discourse  (1061b-­‐1062b)  ................................................  58   6  Protagoras  is  Wrong;  One  Appearance  Must  be  Mistaken;  Start  with  Unchangeable  Things  (Heavenly   Bodies);  Explaining  contrary  Movements;  Those  Positing  Difficulties  with  Reason;  Heraclitus  and   Anaxagoras  are  Wrong  (1062b-­‐1063b)  ........................................................................................................................  58   7  There  is  No  Demonstration  of  the  Substance/What;  Natural  Science  is  Not  Practical  or  Productive  but  is   Theoretical;  Theology  is  the  Best  Science  Because  it  Deals  with  Separable  and  Immovable  Substance   (this  substance  is  to  be  proven  latter);  Theology  is  a  Universal  Science    (1063b-­‐1064b)  ..........................  58 5   8  Being  by  Accident;  Sophistic  Considers  Being  by  Accident;  There  is  No  Science  of  the  Accidental;   Accidental  Causes  are  Unordered  and  Indefinite;  Reason  and  Nature  are  Prior  to  Chance  Causes   (1064b-­‐1065b)  ......................................................................................................................................................................  59   9  Actuality  of  the  Potential  is  a  Movement;  It  is  Hard  to  Grasp  What  Movement  Is;  Movement  is  in  the   Movable;  Actuality  of  the  Mover  and  Moved  is  One  (1065b-­‐1066a)  ...................................................................  60   10  Definitions  of  Infinite;  Infinite  is  invisible,  indivisible,  and  an  Accident  of  Subjects;  Infinite  is  not  a   Sensible  Thing;  There  is  not  an  Infinite  Body;  The  Infinite  is  not  the  Same  (1066a-­‐1067a)  .....................  60   11  Change;  Accidental  v.  Essential  Change;  Accidental  v.  Essential  Movement;  Three  Changes;  Only  the   Change  from  Subject  to  Subject  is  Movement  (1067b-­‐1068a)  ..............................................................................  61   12  There  is  Only  Movement  in  Quality,  Quantity,  and  Place  (not  Substance,  Relation,  Agent/Patient,   Mover/Moved;  Definitions  of  Unmovable;  Definitions  of  Together,  Apart,  Touch,  Contrary  in  Place,   Continuous,  Successive,  and  a  Point  v.  a  Unit  (1068a-­‐1069a)  ...............................................................................  61   BOOK  XII  [L,  or  Lambda]  ............................................................................................................................................  62   1  Three  Kinds  of  Substance:  Sensible  (Changeable),  Immovable,  and  Unnamed  (1069a-­‐b)  .........................  62   2  Matter  Exists  Besides  the  Contraries  [Four  Changes];  Change  is  from  One  Contrary  to  its  Opposite;   Anaxagoras  is  more  Correct  on  Potentiality;  Changeable  Things  Have  Matter;  Some  Eternal  Things   Have  Matter  for  Motion;  Three  Causes/Principles  (1069b)  ..................................................................................  62   3  Matter  is  Changed  by  a  Prime  Mover  into  Form;  Three  kinds  of  Substance;  Efficient  Causes  Precede   Their  Effects;  Formal  Causes  are  Simultaneous  with  Their  Effects  (1069b-­‐1070a)  .....................................  62   4  Causes/Principles  in  a  Sense  Different  and  the  Same;  All  Things  have  and  do  not  have  the  Same   Elements;  Moving/External  Causes;    First  Mover  (1070a-­‐b)  .................................................................................  63   5  Substance  can  Exist  Apart  and  Non-­‐Substances  Cannot;  Analogically  Identical  Things  are  Principles;   Individual  is  the  Source  of  Individuals;  Causes  are  Analogically  the  Same;  the  First  Cause  of  All  Things   (1070b-­‐1071b)  ......................................................................................................................................................................  63   6  Immovable  Substance  is  Necessarily  Eternal,  Without  Matter,  and  an  Actuality;  Criticisms  of  Plato  and   Leucippus;  Actuality  is  Prior  to  Potentiality;  Aristotle’s  View  of  Creation  (of  Eternality  and  Generation   and  Destruction)  (1071b-­‐1072a)  ...................................................................................................................................  64   7  The  Heavens  are  Eternal;  The  First  Mover  Necessarily  Exists,  is  Good  and  a  First  Principle  that  Causes   Nature  and  the  Heavens;  Thought  Thinking  Itself;  God’s  Existence  and  Many  Qualities  (1072a-­‐1073a)  ....................................................................................................................................................................................................  64   8  The  Number  of  Eternal  Unmovable  Separate  Substances;  Astronomy  Studies  Perceptible  but  Eternal   Substance;  55  Planetary  Movements/Spheres;  All  Movement  is  for  the  Sake  of  the  Stars;  There  is  but   One  Heaven;  The  Stars  are  Gods  (1073a-­‐1074b)  ......................................................................................................  65   9  What  makes  Divine  Thought  Divine;  The  Divine  must  Think  about  the  Divine/Precious/  Immutable;  It   is  a  Thinking  on  Thinking;  Thinking  and  the  Object  of  Thought  are  Identical  for  the  Divine  (1074b-­‐ 1075a).  .....................................................................................................................................................................................  66   10  The  Universe  Contains  the  Highest  Good  as  Separate  by  Itself  and  as  the  Order  of  its  Parts;  OBJs   against  Opponents  (1075a-­‐1076a)  ................................................................................................................................  66   BOOK  XIII  [M,  or  Mu]  ...................................................................................................................................................  67   1  How  are  the  Objects  of  Math  Substances?  Are  Ideas  Substances?  (1076a)  .......................................................  67   2  Mathematical  Objects  cannot  Exist  in  Sensible  Things;  but  they  cannot  Exist  Separately;  the  Same  Goes   for  Numbers;  Modes  of  Generation  of  Mathematical  Objects;  Are  Lines  Substances?  Mathematical   Objects  are  Prior  in  Formula  (1076a-­‐1077b)  .............................................................................................................  67   3  Formulae/Demonstrations  of  Sensible  Magnitudes;  Mathematical  Objects  Exist  Without  Qualification;   Attributes  Belong  to  Things  as  Lengths  and  Planes;  Mathematics  deals  with  the  Beautiful  and  the  Good   (1077b1078b)  .......................................................................................................................................................................  68   4  History  and  Criticisms  of  Plato’s  Ideas/Forms  (1078b1079b)  .............................................................................  68   5  Further  Criticisms  of  Forms  (1079b-­‐1080a)  ...............................................................................................................  69   6  Numbers  as  Separable  Substances  and  First  Causes;  Mathematical  v.  Ideal  Number  Counting;   Pythagoreans,  and  Forms  of  Numbers  (1080a-­‐b)  .....................................................................................................  70   7  Comparable  v.  Non-­‐Comparable  Units;  We  cannot  Differentiate  the  Units  in  Any  Way  (1080b-­‐1082b)  71 6   8  Differentia  of  a  Number  and  Unit;  Units  do  not  Differ  in  Quality  or  Quantity;  Number  cannot  Exist   Separately;  Ideal  Number  is  Not  Mathematical  Number;  Pythagorean  view;  Units  and  the  Great  and   Small;  Number  is  not  Infinite  or  Finite(?);  Is  the  Ideal  1  without  Position?  (1083b-­‐1085a)  ......................  72   9  Do  the  Units  of  2  and  3  Succeed  the  Ideal  1?  Is  2  or  the  Units  in  2  Prior?  Difficulties  for  Many  Views  of   Universals,  Numbers  consisting  of  the  One  and  Plurality,  Etc.;  Numbers  consist  of  Indivisibles  –   Magnitudes  do  Not;  Numbers  and  Magnitudes  Cannot  Exist  Apart  from  Things;  Separation  of  the   Universal/Form  is  the  Main  Problem  with  Plato’s  View  (1085a-­‐1086b)  ..........................................................  73   10  Difficulty  if  We  Posit  Separate  Substances  or  if  We  Do  Not;  Difficulty  with  Individual  and  Universal   Separate  Substance;  Knowledge  is  Universal  Potentially  (as  Matter)  and  Actually  (as  a  “This”)  (1086b-­‐ 1087a)  ......................................................................................................................................................................................  75   BOOK  XIV  [N  or  Nu]  .....................................................................................................................................................  75   1  No  Contrary  is  the  First  Principle;  Many  Thinkers  are  Wrong  about  Generating  Numbers  from  the   Dyad,  Unequal  or  Plurality,  or  the  Substance  of  the  One;  One  is  Measure  and  Not  a  Number;  The   Unequal  is  not  One  Thing,  and  the  Dyad  an  Indefinite  Compound  (1087a-­‐1088b)  ......................................  75   2  Eternal  Things  Cannot  Consist  of  Elements;  Refuting  Parmenides;  How  is  Being  As  Substance,  Many?   Why  Other  Thinkers  are  Wrong  on  “Many  Substances”  “Solutions”;.  Why  Should  We  Think  that   Numbers  Exist?  Ideas  as  Numbers  (1088b-­‐1090a)  ..................................................................................................  76   3  Those  Who  Believe  that  Ideas  are  Numbers  are  Wrong;  Pythagoreans  are  Wrong;  Number/Objects  of   Mathematics  Contribute  Nothing  to  One  Another;  Those  Who  Posit  Forms  and  Objects  of  Mathematics   as  Numbers  are  Wrong;  It  is  Impossible  to  Attribute  Generation  to  Eternal  Things  (1090a-­‐1091a)  .....  77   4  Generation  of  Even/Odd  Numbers;  How  are  Elements/Principles  Relatd  to  the  Good/Beautiful?   Objections  Against  Ideas  as  Numbers,  Including  that  Bad  Itself  Must  Exist      (1091a-­‐1092a)  ....................  78   5  The  Good  Must  be  Among  the  First  Principles  Somehow;  Place  and  Mathematical  Solids;  Number   Cannot  Come  from  its  Elements  by  Intermixture  or  Juxtaposition;  Numbers  are  Not  the  Causes  of   Substances  or  Being;  Number  is  None  of  the  Four  Causes  (1092a-­‐b)  .................................................................  79   6  Things  do  not  Get  Goodness  Due  to  Numbers;  All  Things  Cannot  Share  in  Number;  Numbers,  Contraries,   and  Mathematical  Relations  are  not  Causes  of  Nature;  Ideal  Numbers  do  not  Help  Explain  Music   (1092b-­‐1093b)  ......................................................................................................................................................................  80 7   Introduction The following are detailed notes of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which were part of a Summer Project Grant, approved by the Maricopa County Community College District. I would like to thank them for allowing me to spend time and effort on this research. Please be aware that in what follows, these are actual sentences of Aristotle’s text in some cases, but this is not the whole text. More importantly, I have deleted many unnecessary words, phrases, sentences, and/or examples (when 3 would suffice), and added chapter headings (that should be very helpful), numbers, underlining, italicizing, and so on, to make the text easier to understand. I have also added any notes or objections I may have thought about along the way, which are underlined and highlighted in blue. I have also moved his examples nearer to when he describes a principle (sometimes he says, e.g., “X is Y and not-Y” and then gives an example of not-Y for several sentences, until finally getting to an example of Y; I moved the example to make it more easily accessible). In addition, these notes are in no way to be thought of as being a substitute for reading all of the Metaphysics for oneself; these notes are merely what I thought was most important, and put into a form that I could more easily understand. Lastly, despite all these disclaimers, I do sincerely hope that these notes are of some value to the reader. BOOK I (A, or Alpha): 1. Knowledge, Experience, Art, Master-Workers, and Wisdom (979b-982a). All men by nature desire to know, because we delight in our senses. Even apart from the senses’ usefulness, they are loved for themselves; above all others the sense of sight, since we prefer it to almost everything else. Sight makes us know and brings many differences between things to light. Some animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and some have memory; the latter are more intelligent and apt at learning. (E.g., the bee cannot be taught because it doesn’t have memory.) Humans live by appearances, memories, and also art and reasonings. From memory, experiences produced in man; for many memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience. Experience seems to be very similar to science and art, but really science and art come to men through experience (for experience made art but inexperience luck, says Polus). [DY: Compare Aristotle’s “Demonstrative Knowledge” reading in Cottingham’s Western Philosophy: An Anthology, 2/e, pp. 19-21.] And art arises, when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgment about similar objects is produced. For to have a judgment that when Callias was ill of this disease this did him good, and similarly in the case of Socrates and in many individual cases, as a matter of experience; but to judge that it has done good to all persons of a certain constitution, marked off in one class, when they were ill of this disease, this is a matter of art. Experience is knowledge of individuals, art of universals, and actions and productions are all concerned with the individual; for the physician does not cure a man, except an incidental way, but Callias or Socrates, who happens to be a man. If then, a man has theory without experience, and knows the universal but does not know the individual included in this, he will often fail to cure; for it is the individual that is to be cured. Knowledge and understanding belong to art rather than to experience; artists are wiser than men of experience, which implies that wisdom depends in all cases rather on knowledge, because artists know the cause and men of experience do not. For men of experience note that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the others know why and the cause. Hence we think that the master workers in each craft are more honorable and know in a true sense and are wiser than the manual workers, because they know the causes of the things that are done. We think the manual workers are like certain lifeless things which act indeed, but act without knowing what they do, as fire burns - they perform their actions through habit. So master workers are wiser not in virtue of being able to act, but of having the theory for themselves and knowing the causes. It is a sign of the man who knows, that he can teach, and therefore we think that art is more truly knowledge than experience is; for artists can teach, and men of mere experience cannot. 8   None of the senses are wisdom, but these give the most authoritative knowledge of particulars. But they do not tell us of the “why” of anything; e.g., why fire is hot; they only say that it is hot. As arts developed, some aimed at utility or the necessities of life, while others aimed at recreation. The latter artists were regarded as wiser. The mathematical arts were founded in Egypt because the priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure. All men suppose that wisdom deals with the first causes and the principles of things. This is why the man of experience is thought to be wiser than the possessors of any perception whatever. The artist wiser than the man of experience, the master worker than the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of wisdom than the productive. Clearly then wisdom is knowledge about certain causes and principles. 2. Wisdom, Knowledge for Its Own Sake, Theoretical Knowledge, Theology, God (982a-983a). The wise man knows all things, as far as possible, although he has not knowledge of each of them individually; moreover, he who can learn things that are difficult, and not easy for men to know, is wise (sense perception is common to all and therefore easy and no mark of wisdom); again, he who is more exact and more capable of teaching the causes is wiser, in every branch of knowledge; and of the sciences, that which is desirable on its own account and for the sake of knowing it is more of the nature of wisdom than that which is desirable on account of its results, and the superior science is more of the nature of wisdom than the ancillary; for the wise man must not be ordered but must order, and he must not obey another, but the less wise must obey him. Knowing all things must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge; for he knows in a sense all the subordinate objects. For the most universal things are on the whole the hardest for men to know; they are furthest from the senses. And the most exact of the sciences are those which deal most with first principles (those which deal with fewer principles are more exact than those which deal with additional principles - arithmetic than geometry). Understanding and knowledge pursued for their own sake are found most in the knowledge of that which is the most knowable; the first principles and causes are most knowable; for by reason of these, and from these, all other things are known, but these are not known by means of the things subordinate to them. And the science which knows to what end each thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences, and more authoritative than any ancillary science; and this and is the good in each class, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. So there must be a science that investigates the first principle and causes; for the good, that is, that for the sake of which, is one of the causes. This is not a science of production as is clear from early philosophy. For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties [DY: compare Plato’s similar statement in the Theaetetus], then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters (e.g. about the phenomena of the moon, the sun, and the stars, and the origin of the universe). Since they philosophized in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end. For when almost all the necessities of life and comfort and recreation were present, such knowledge began to be sought. So we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for itself. Hence the possession of it might be justly regarded as beyond human power, because it is unfitting that man should not be content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him. Divine power cannot be jealous, nor should any science bethought more honorable than one of this sort. For the most divine science is also most honorable the science which it would be best for God to have is a divine science, and so is any science that deals with divine objects; and this science alone has both these qualities; for God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle, and either God alone can have this science, or God above all others. All the sciences are more necessary than theology, but none is better. So this is the nature of the science we are searching for, and the mark which our search and our whole investigation must reach. 3. Four Causes, Pre-Socratics (983a-984b). We have to acquire knowledge of the original causes, and causes are spoken of in four senses. First, we mean the substance; that is, the essence, or the why as a cause and principle (formal cause); second, the matter or substratum (material cause); third, the source of the change 9   (efficient cause); and fourth, the cause opposed to this, that for the sake of which and the good; for this is the end of all generation and change (final cause). Now let's review what other philosophers of said about principles and causes: of the first philosophers, most thought the principles which were of the nature of matter were the only principles of all things; that of which all things that are consist, and from which they first come to be, and into which they are finally resolved (the substance remaining, but changing in its modifications). But they do not all agree as to the number in the nature of these principles. Thales says the principle is water. Anaximenes and Diogenes make air prior to water; Hippasus and Heraclitus make fire prior; Empedocles says earth, air, fire and water are the fundamental elements. Anaxagoras says the principles are infinite in number. Thus, one might think that the only cause is the material cause; but as men advanced, the very facts showed them the way enjoined in forcing them to investigate the subject. For what causes change? For example, neither the woods nor the bronze causes the change of either of them nor does the wood manufacture a bed in the bronze a statue, but something else is the cause of the change. And to seek this is to seek a second cause, as we should say, that from which comes the beginning of movement (efficient cause). 4. Hesiod, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Only Two of the Four Causes (984b-985b). Perhaps Hesiod was the first to look for such a thing, since he says "first of all things was chaos made, and then broad-breasted earth, and love that foremost is among all the immortals," which implies that among existing things there must be a cause which will move things and bring them together. Empedocles in a sense both mentions, and is the first to mention, the bad and the good as principles, since the cause of all goods is the good itself. These thinkers evidently got up to a certain point of two of the four causes we hold: the material and efficient causes; but they speak vaguely and with no clearness, and do not seem to know what they say; for it is evident that, as a rule, they make no use of their causes except to a small extent. For instance, Anaxagoras uses reason as a deus ex machina for the making of the world, and when he is at a loss as to what causes what, then he drags reason in, but in all other cases he ascribes events to anything other than reason. And Empedocles, though he uses the causes to a greater extent than this, neither does so sufficiently nor attains consistency in their use. He was the first to speak of for material elements, but treats them as to only; he treats fire by itself, and its opposites (earth, air, and water) as one kind of thing. Leucippus and Democritus say that the full in the empty are the elements, calling the one being in the other nonbeing, and they make these the material causes of things. Thus, the early philosophers focused on two causes. 5. Pythagoreans, Parmenides, Xenophanes (985b-987a). Pythagoreans devoted themselves to mathematics; they were the first to advance the study and thought its principles were the principles of all things. Since of these principles numbers are by nature the first, and in numbers that they seemed to see many resemblances to the things that exist and come into being – more than in fire and earth and water (a certain modification of numbers being justice, another being soul and reason, etc.) – and similarly almost all other things being numerically expressible (e.g. the attributes and ratios of the musical scales), they suppose the elements of numbers to be the elements of all things, and the whole heaven to be a musical scale and a number. For instance, as the number 10 is thought to be perfect and to comprise the whole nature of numbers, the bodies which move through the heavens are 10, but as the visible bodies are only nine, they invent a tenth: the “counter-earth.” Moreover, they stated that the even is unlimited while the odd is limited. Others say there is a column of two opposite principles: limit and unlimited to, odd and even, one and many, right and left, male and female, resting and moving, straight and curved, light and darkness, good and bad, square and oblong. They have not stated clearly and articulately, however, how these principles can be brought together under the causes we have named. They seem to arrange the elements under the head of matter out of which they say substances composed and molded. Parmenides focuses on that which is one in formula, Melissus on that which is one in matter, and Xenophanes gives no clear statement on this, but contemplates the whole heaven and says that the One is God. Xenophanes and Melissus are naïve; Parmenides has more insight, because he claims that, besides the existent nothing nonexistent exists, he thinks that the existent is of necessity one and that nothing else exists, but being forced to follow the phenomena, and supposing that what is is one in formula but many according to 10   perception, he now posits to causes and two principles, calling them hot and cold (fire and Earth); and of these he ranges the hot with the existent, and the other with the nonexistent. [The rest of this chapter is a review.] 6. Plato, Pythagoreans, Criticism of Plato’s Forms and Causes (987a-988a). In his youth, Plato became familiar with Cratylus and Heraclitus (i.e., their view that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about them), and agreed with these views even in his later years. Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions. Plato accepted his teaching, but held that the problem applied not to any sensible thing but to entities of another kind, because the common definition could not be a definition of any sensible thing, since these were always changing. Things of this other sort he called Ideas, and sensible things were apart from these, and were all called after these; for the multitude of things which have the same name as the Form exist by participation in it. Only the name "participation" was new; for the Pythagoreans save it things exist by imitation of numbers, and Plato says they exist by participation, changing the name. But what the participation or the imitation of the Forms could be they left an open question. Besides sensible things and Forms he says there are objects of mathematics, which occupy in an intermediate position, differing from sensible things and being eternal and unchangeable, and from Forms in that there are many alike, while the Form itself is in each case unique. Since the Forms are the causes of all other things, he thought their elements were the elements of all things. As matter, the great and the small were principles; as substance, the one; for from the great and the small, by participation in the One, come the numbers. He agreed with the Pythagoreans and saying that the One is substance and not a predicate of something else, and that the numbers are the causes of the substance of other things. But unlike the Pythagoreans, Plato posited a dyad and constructed the infinite out of great and small, instead of treating the infinite as one, and that numbers exist apart from sensible things. Plato made the other entity besides the One a dyad because he believed that the numbers, except those which were prime, could be neatly produced out of the dyad as out of a plastic material. His theory is not reasonable, because he makes many things out of the matter, in the form generates only once, but what we observe is that one table, for instance, is made from one matter, while the man who applies the form, though he is one, makes many tables. In the relation of the male to the female is similar; for the latter is impregnated by one calculation but the male impregnate its many females; yet these are imitations of those first principles. Plato used only two causes: the efficient cause (for the Forms are the cause of the essence of all other things, and the One is the cause of the essence of the Forms) and the material cause (it is evident what the underlying matter is, of which the Forms are predicated in the case of sensible things, and that One in the case of Forms, namely, that this is a dyad, the great and the small. 7. Review and Summary of Philosophers; We’ve only Discussed Two Causes, Leaving Final Cause Out, but All Philosophers Show There are Four Causes (988a-988b). We've learned from all of these philosophers that none of them has mentioned any principle except material and efficient causes, but all evidently have some inkling of them, though only vaguely. Some speak of the first principle as matter (either one or many, or physical or incorporeal). These thinkers grasped this cause only; but certain others have mentioned the source of movement, for example, those who make friendship and strife (Empedocles), or reason (Anaxagoras), or love (Hesiod, Parmenides), a principle. The essence, that is, the substance of things, no one has expressed distinctly. It is mentioned chiefly by those who believe in the Forms; for they do not suppose either that the Forms are the matter of sensible things, and the One the matter of the Forms, or that they are the source of movement (for they say these are causes rather of immobility and of being at rest), but they furnish the Forms as the essence of every other thing, and the One as the essence of the Forms.

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ARISTOTLE NOTES ON METAPHYSICS By Dr. Dave Yount Mesa Community College May 2013 Contents’ Introduction
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