aquinas on attachment, envy, and hatred in the summa theologica

27 Pages·2007·0.24 MB·English

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AQUINAS ON ATTACHMENT, ENVY, AND
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HATRED IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
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Keith Green
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7
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9
10 ABSTRACT
11 ThisessayexaminesAquinas’sdiscussionsofhatredinSummaTheologica
12 I-II,Q.29andII-II,Q.34,inordertoretrieveanaccountofwhatcontempo-
13 rarytheoristsoftheemotionscallitscognitivecontents.InAquinas’sview,
14 hatredisconstitutedasapassionbyanarrativepatternthatincludesits
15 intentionalobject,beliefs,perceptionsofchangesinbodilystates,andmoti-
16 vateddesires.ThisessayendorsesAquinas’sbroadly“cognitivist”account
of passional hatred, in line with his way of treating passions in general.
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I suggest that Aquinas’s account of hatred’s arising out of attachment is
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compelling.However,IalsoarguethatifAquinas’streatmentofhatredis
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tohelpusunderstandthephenomenonofhate,whereclassesofpeopleare
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abominatedforanidentitytheybear,andtoavoidequatinganoppressor’s
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hatredwiththatoftheoppressedfortheoppressor,thecognitivepathway
22 tohatredmustbebroaderthanthroughenvy.
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KEY WORDS: Attachment, envy, hatred, bigotry, passions, emotion, love,
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Aquinas
25
26 1. Introduction
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28 Evenwiththerevivalofphilosophicalinterestinemotionsandvirtues,
29 there are few philosophical discussions of hatred as such. A search of
30 the Philosophical Index turns up two articles in the last twenty-five
31 years, and only one book in which hatred or its relation to hate is a
32 significant theme.1 Although there is growing philosophical literature
33 on different forms of “hate” in civil discourse, these discussions of such
34 issues as racism, misogyny, and homophobia have not examined their
35 relationship to hatred as an emotion.2 We might well begin to address
36
37 1Thetwoarticlesinthelasttwodecadesofotherwiseprodigiousphilosophicalliterature
38 ontheemotionsareBen-Zeev1992andKolnai1998.ThebookisbyMurphyandHampton
39 1988.Thenatureandjustificationofretributivehatredanditsrelationshiptoforgiveness
isanissueaddressedbyMurphyinotherwritings,andbyotherauthorsrespondingto
40
hisviews.However,thisconversationoccursinworkprimarilyfocusedonforgivenessand
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punishmentandnotonthecharacterofhatredasapassionorvice.
42 2In current political speech and civil discourse, “hate” broadly refers to prejudicial
43 beliefs and actions that defame bearers of an abominated identity. I will use the term
44 “hatred,”bycontrast,todesignateanemotionalresponsethatabominatesitsobject,and
generatesadesiretoharmorextirpatethatwhichcannotbeassuagedinanyotherway.Itis
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JRE35.3:403–428.!C 2007JournalofReligiousEthics,Inc.
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1 404 JournalofReligiousEthics
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3 this deficit by taking an inventory of resources in our philosophical
4 traditions.
5 Inthisessay,Iproposetocontributetothisinventorybyreexamining
6 aspectsofthediscussionsofhatredinAquinas’sSummaTheologicaI-II,
7 Q.29andII-II,Q.34.3Hisviewofhatredismultilayered,andattheon-
8 tologicallevel,itnamestherepulsionthateveryfinitebeinghasforthat
9 whichharmsordestroysit.Inthissense,loveandhatreddonotreferto
10 “mentalevents”or“tokensofconsciousness”;theyrefertothetendency,
11 forexample,ofplantstogrownearwaterorindampsoil,orofanyanimal
12 tofleeitspredator.Iwillfocus,however,onAquinas’smoralpsychology
13 ofhatredasapassion,sinceonemightfindhis“phenomenology”ofpas-
14 sionalhatred—andhismoralappraisalofvicioushatred—compellingin
15 itsownrightasa“folkpsychology”ofhatred.4 Aquinas’sunderstanding
16 ofthehatredthatrisestothelevelof(human)experiencemustbeunder-
17 stoodintermsofhisoverallaccountofthepassions,shapedasitisbyhis
18 reading of Aristotle’s De Anima III.4, 10–13, and Rhetoric ii.2–12. The
19 theologicaldiscussionofhatredofpersonsasaviceinSTII-II,Q.34also
20 contributescriticaldetailstohisaccountofhatredasapassion,having
21 its etiology in attachment and envy. From these details we may derive
22 anintuitive,ifincomplete,sketchofwhatcontemporarytheoristsofthe
23 emotionswouldcallthecognitivecontentsofhatred.Myaimhereissim-
24 plytodelineatethissketch,asabeginningpointforbroaderdiscussion
25 of philosophical issues about hatred and its relation to hate. As such,
26 my aim is not Aquinas’s; I am not yet taking up moral and theological
27 questions,whicharehisprincipalconcerninSTII-II,Q.34.
28 I will argue that Aquinas’s grounding of hatred of persons in envy is
29 toonarrowasanaccountofthecognitivecontentsofhatredfelttoward
30
31
32 safetosaythatinpoliticalandcivildiscourse,andinsomepsychologicaldiscussions,hate
33 issimplytreatedessentiallyasanexpressionorextensionofhatred.Notableexamples
include Robert J. Sternberg 2003 and the influential work of Gordon W. Allport (1954,
34
1979).
35 3AllcitationsofThomasAquinas’sSummaTheologicaarefromthecompleteEnglish
36 translationbytheFathersoftheEnglishDominicanProvince(1981).
37 4Boththeterms“phenomenology”and“folkpsychology”demandcomment,lestmyuse
38 ofthemsuggeststhatIthinkweshouldfindAquinas’sviewofhatredmerelyofantiquarian
value.Iuse“phenomenology”torefertotheessentiallydescriptiveenterpriseoflocating
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generalfeaturesoftheexperienceswhichhumans,aslanguage-usingsubjectsandagents,
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describeinparticularlinguisticterms.Itanswersthequestion,askedforaspecificgroup
41 ofpersons(assubjects)definedbysharingalanguageofself-description,“whatiscalled
42 ‘hatred?’” Such an account is also “folk psychology” to the degree that it articulates a
43 “taxonomyofemotiontypesbasedonthemeaningascribedbythesubjecttothestimulus
situation.”ThisdefinitionisthatofPaulE.Griffiths2003,11.Assuch,itisacriticalstepin
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anytheoryofemotion,psychologicalorphilosophical,thoughnotalltheoristsagreeabout
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thenatureofitssignificanceandvalue,andinparticular,whetheremotiontypescanonly
46 bedefinedintermsofsubjects’meanings.
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1 AquinasonAttachment,Envy,andHatred 405
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3 persons. However, I also show that he entertains a broader account of
4 thecognitivefeaturesofhatredofpersons.Boththetheologicalcontext
5 of his discussion and the cognitive parameters of passional hatred as
6 he delineates them suggest a much richer account. This account is not
7 in itself a critique of what Aquinas does say. Aquinas does not discuss
8 hatred of persons perceived to bear an abominated identity that seems
9 tojustifytreatingtheminwaysnotregardedasmorallypermissiblefor
10 persons in general.5 If passional hatred is a common constituent of all
11 formsofhate,orifwearetounderstandtheprimarymoralriskofhate
12 asthatitpredisposesagentstofeelandactuponhatredindiscriminately
13 forwholeclassesofpersons,thena“folkpsychology”ofhatredmusttake
14 accountofmuchbroaderpatternsofmeaning“ascribedbythesubjects”
15 of hatred to its “stimulus situations” (Griffiths 2003, 39). However, the
16 accountthatAquinasgivesofthesourcesofhatredinattachmentshows
17 that any meaningful psychological theory of hatred as an emotion—or
18 anyaccountofhatredasavice—requires,ifnotentails,anevaluationof
19 thelovesinvirtueofwhichthesubjectsofhatredhate.Itisthisfeatureof
20 Aquinas’streatmentthatpointsbeyondfolkpsychologytoameaningful
21 accountofhatredasamoralchallenge—anissuetobetakenupinfuture
22 workanddiscussions.
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2. Hatred and Love: Aquinas’s Moral Psychology
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of Hatred as a Passion
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27 STI-II,Q.29addressestheontologyandmoralpsychologyofhatred
28 withinthecontextofasectionoftheSummaTheologicafundamentally
29 concerned with theological anthropology, and specifically with the pas-
30 sionsanddispositions.Hatredisanalyzedhereintermsofitsontological
31 andpsychologicalplacewithinnaturalhumanagencyandends.Itisalso
32 in this Question that Aquinas accounts for two critical senses in which
33 hatred is the “opposite” of love. This analysis immediately follows, and Q1
34 presupposes,histreatmentofloveasa“movementofthesenseappetite”
35 or as a “passion.” The model for Aquinas’s treatment of the passions in
36 general, and of love and hatred in particular, is that of Aristotle’s De
37 Anima III.9–13, and more generally of De Anima I.1, Rhetoric ii.3, and
38 NicomacheanEthicsII.5,III.6–7(seeJordan1986).Aquinasdefinesnat- Q2
39 uralloveandhatredintermsofthemovementofappetiteasfollows:
40
41 Now with regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as each
42 thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which is suitable to it,
43 wherein consists natural love; so it has a natural dissonance from that
44
45 5MyremarksreflectthedefinitionsofracismsandracialprejudiceinKwameAnthony
46 Appiah’s“Racisms”(Goldberg1990).
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3 whichopposesanddestroysit;andthisisnaturalhatred.Sotherefore,in
4 the animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, love is a certain har-
5 mony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as suitable; while
6 hatred is dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as
repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, as such, bears
7
theaspectofthegood;sowhateverisrepugnant,assuch,bearstheaspect
8
ofevil.Andtherefore,justasgoodistheobjectoflove,soevilistheobject
9
ofhatred[STI-II,Q.29,A.1,responsio].
10
11 Itispartoftheorderofcreation,theorderofeternallaw,thateveryfinite
12 being “tends” to that which is conducive to its survival and flourishing,
13 and repels or avoids those things that harm or are inimical to its flour-
14 ishing. At the most basic level, the appetites are the form in animate
15 creaturesofthisbasicontologicalaffinitythatanythinghastowardthat
16 which sustains it as the kind of thing it is, and a repulsion toward that
17 whichharmsit.Invirtueofappetitus,whichincludesboth“beingmoved
18 toward” and “being averted from” objects that either are conducive or
19 inimicaltothesubject’sgood,subjectsareacteduponbyobjectsoutside
20 of them in accord with eternal law.6 Appetites in animals, furthermore,
21 consist partly of a “passive, sensible” component (complacentia) that is
22 “naturallymovedbythethingapprehended.”Ananimalappetiteis“pas-
23 sive”inthatitmustbe“moved”orbeanobjectperceivedbythesubject.
24 However,anappetitealsoincludesasacomponentanactive“movement,”
25 whichisaconsequentdesirethatmovesthecreaturewithrespecttowhat
26 itperceives(seeCrowe1959).Aquinasthenemploysfundamentaltech-
27 nicalnotionsofnaturaland“animal”appetiteandacriticaldistinction,
28 which he discusses in ST I, Q. 80 A.2, between “sensible” and “intellec-
29 tual”appetitetoaccountfortheessentialnatureandcomplementarityof
30 loveandhatred.ThroughoutSTI,Q.81,Aquinasspeaksofthefunction
31 ofappetitesasamovement,andexplainswhythisissoinSTI,Q.81,A.
32 2.Insensingandinformingbeliefsandsubsequentdesiresaboutwhat
33 oneperceives,thesubjectismovedtowardobjectsofdesireandaverted
34 fromobjectsperceivedasanevil.7
35 In rational creatures with a capacity for the formation of beliefs and
36 for deliberation, however, the natural animal appetite also includes a
37 “superior inclination” that involves a further element of judgment and
38 intention. Though the movement of appetites that is characteristic of
39 all animals is also present in rational animals, the appetites of ratio-
40 nal animals are moved by objects that are apprehended as the inten-
41 tional objects of perception and belief. Passions in rational animals are
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43
6See Harak 1993 for his especially helpful treatment of appetitus and of the self as
44
“movedmover”(96–98),aswellashisdiscussionofthecausesofpassions(81–84).
45 7ForaclearandbasictreatmentofSTI,Q.80–81ontheappetites,seeBaker1941,
46 Harak1993.
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3 “cognitive” in the sense that they are “mental events”: this is what it
4 means to say that objects of passion are “apprehended.”8 In contempo-
5 rary philosophical language, a “passion” as Aquinas understands it is
6 a complex mental event or “extended mental episode” that necessarily
7 involvestheformationofbeliefsaboutaperceivedobjectandanensuing
8 pattern of affect or bodily change and motivated desire. Two words of
9 caution are in order here. First, “passion” or “a passion” cannot be re-
10 duced to any one of these elements and is not to be flatly assimilated
11 to a modern notion of “emotion” or “an emotion.”9 Second, the desires
12 thatariseinpassionarenottobeassociatedwith“will”assuch.Noting
13 that passion is often “felt” but not acted upon, Aquinas’s way of mak-
14 ing sense of this feature of passion is to associate “will” with “choice”
15 (electio).Thus,infeelinghatred,onemay“feel”themotivation,orhave
16 the desire, to attack and destroy another, but may choose not to do so.
17 If one unself-consciously acts upon the desires motivated by a passion,
18 then(perhapsthroughpoorhabituation),one’s“reason”issimplymoved
19 bypassion:thiswouldbeaninstanceofintemperance.Yetonemay“self-
20 consciously”eitherchooseorchoosenottoactuponthedesiresthatmay
21 quiteinvoluntarilyariseinsofarasoneisthesubjectofpassion.10 Ifone
22
23
8Jordan (1986, 88) helpfully comments on the distinction between intellectual and
24
sensitiveappetite(withspecificreferencetoSTI,Q.81,A.1,sedcontraandresponsio)
25
that“oneislikerest,theotherlikemotion”and,“Asthephysicalanalogiesmakeclear,
26 thisdistinctionoughtnottobereifiedasadistinctionbetweentwofaculties,muchless
27 twoentities.”
28 9In ST I-II, Q. 24, A. 2, responsio, Aquinas refuses the Stoic view that passions are
“interruptions”ofreason’scontrolinconsciousexperience,andtherebytoberegardedas
29
“diseases” of the soul. He sides with the Aristotelian-Peripatetic that passion is an in-
30
terruptionofreason’scontrolonlyifitisbadlyhabituated.Alsonotehisendorsementof
31 Augustine’srefusalofCicero’scalling“whattheGreekscallpathe”“disturbances”inST
32 I-II,Q.22,A.2,sedcontra.Histreatmentofspecificpassions,furthermore,identifiesthem
33 withtheformationofspecificsortsofbeliefsaboutcertainkindsorcategoriesofobjects:
hencethebeliefthatsomeonehas“slightedone’sexcellence”isnotonlya“constantlycon-
34
joined”preconditionofanger,butpartofit,asisthedesirethatitmotivatestoinflictpain
35
orharmuponitsobjectinproportiontothestandardsofretributivejustice.Onthedistinc-
36 tionbetween“passion”and“emotion,”andtheevolutionofmodernnotionsof“emotion”
37 fromearliernotionsofpassion,seeAme´lieO.Rorty1982and1993,andspecificallyher Q3
38 claimthatsentimentsarethedescendentsofstoicepithumeiaiandemotions,especially
astheyaredefinedinthetraditionoftheorizingemotionsassociatedwithHumeandthe
39
James-Langeschool,thedescendentsofthekatalepticimpression.OntheStoicnotionof
40
passionsaskatalepsis,seeNussbaum1990,263–67,esp.265,n.7.SeealsoAquinas’sclaim
41 thatpassionsare“properlytobefound”inthesensitiveasopposedtotheintellectualap-
42 petite because they involve “corporeal transmutation” in ST I-II, Q. 22, A. 3, responsio.
43 Nonetheless,thepassionisnotmerelythisfeltbodilychange.
10Amorefruitfulwaytounderstand“will”inAquinas’sthoughtwouldbetoequate
44
it, in modern moral psychology, with the capacity to form what Harry Frankfurt calls
45
“second-ordervolitions.”SeeFrankfurt’s“Freedomofthewillandtheconceptofaperson”
46 and“Identificationandexternality”(1988),especiallyhiscommentsontheverb,“towant”
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3 choosestoactonpassion-motivateddesiresbeyondthecounselsofpru-
4 dence,thenthiswouldbeaninstanceofincontinenceormalice.11
5 In Aquinas’s refinement of a basic Aristotelian psychology of the
6 sensible appetite, he identifies two “powers” (ST I-I, Q. 80, A. 3, sed
7 contra and responsio): a “concupiscible” power wherein “corruptible
8 things” need and have an inclination to acquire what is required for
9 survivalandflourishing,“accordingtothesenses,andasitsnaturepre-
10 disposesit”;andan“irascible”onewheretheyresistthatwhichinflicts
11 harm and hinders acquisition of what is needed (“suitable”). In ST I-II,
12 Q.23,A.1,2,Aquinasdiscusseshowitisthatintherationalpsycheof
13 humans,passionslikeallformsofloveandhatred,desire,sexualdesire,
14 hunger,andthirstareformsofthefirstpower—beingmovedtoattach-
15 ment. Anger, courage, shame, grief, and other psychologically natural
16 and fundamental emotions are, however, forms of the second power—
17 beingmovedtoresistimpedimentstoattachment.Specificpassions,fur-
18 thermore,are(accordingtoSTI-II,Q.23,A.4,responsio)differentiated
19 “inaccordancewiththeiractivecauses,whichinthecasesofthepassions
20 ofthesoul,aretheirobjects,”andnotby“howtheyfeel”tothesubject.12
21 According to Aquinas, any token experience of any specific passion is
22 what contemporary philosophers of mind would call a “complex mental
23 episode.” Any such experience involves a three-stage movement: (i) an
24 “aptitude to tend” toward or away from the mover or intentional object
25 (love and hatred); (ii) depending upon whether the loved or hated ob-
26 jectisnotyetpossessedorextirpated,amovementtowardorawayfrom
27 the object (desire or aversion); and (iii) the stage when the subject be-
28 lieves either that the object is possessed (or the subject “rests” in it) or
29 thatshewillneverpossessit(joyorsorrow).13Hatredatthislevelmoves
30
31
32 (13–14),hisdefinitionsof“second-ordervolition”(16),andhisdiscussionofwhena“pas-
33 sion” may be said to be “external” to “self ” or “internal” to the degree that an agent
“identifies” with it through the formation of a second-order volition to “endorse” or fail
34
to“endorse”apassionvolitionally(62–63).Theonesense,however,inwhichFrankfurt’s
35
viewmustnotbeassimilatedtoAquinas’sisthatthephenomenaFrankfurtdescribeshe
36 takesasanegotiationoftheboundariesofthe“self,”whereforAquinas,itdescribesthe
37 dynamicinterrelationshipoftwodimensionsof“self”—passionandwill.SeealsoBowlin’s
Q4 38 discussionofspeciesofinconstancyinAquinas(1999,42–46)
11Bowlin’sdiscussionofthedifferentformsofincontinence,thevirtues,and“steadfast-
39
ness”isextremelyhelpfulhere(1999,28,45).SeealsoYearley’sremarksaboutreason’s
40
controlofthevirtuesas“political”(1990,82–83).Onmalice,seeYearley1990,86–87,but
41 alsoBowlin1999,49n.33.
42 12ST I-II, Q. 23, A. 4, responsio: Different passions “differ in accordance with their
43 activecauses,whichinthecaseofthepassionsofthesoul,aretheirobjects.”Thispassage
andoneother(STI-II,Q.60,A.5,responsio)identifywhatindividuatesspecificpassions
44
ofthesoul—activecausesandobjects.
45 13The movement of the irascible passions presupposes their objects already being
46 “found”goodorevil(beinglovedorhated).The“aptitude”to“seekgood”or“shunevil,”
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3 beyondbeingmerelyanaturalrepulsionfromthatwhichharmstobeing
4 a passion that presupposes beliefs about the relation of certain objects
5 ofconsciousnesstoagoodalreadyloved.14
6 In rationally willful animals, the concupiscible and irascible powers
7 “obey” reason both in its “estimative” and calculating (means to ends)
8 function (Yearley 1990, 75). The sensible appetite does not apprehend
9 “the universal”; it does not in itself encounter objects as particular ex-
10 amplesofkindsorclassesofobjectsthatmayhavearelativelyconsistent
11 relationtofulfillingorimpedingdesireandneed,ortocausingpleasure
12 andpain.Thoughthesensibleappetiteapprehendsobjectsasdesirable
13 or undesirable, and as painful or pleasurable, having beliefs about the
14 goodness or evil of anything represents a further abstract function of
15 reasonbeyondthesensitiveappetite.Aquinassaysthatitisthroughthe
16 intellectual appetite, “through which the animal is able to desire what
17 it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural
18 form”(STI-I,Q.80,A.1,2,sedcontraandresponsioofboth).“Havinga
19 feeling”aboutsomethingpresupposesimplicitlyseeingitasaninstance
20 of a particular kind of thing; and this “seeing as” is reason functioning
21 inwhatAquinascallsreason’s“estimative”role.
22
23
wheretheobjectisnotyetenjoyedorextirpated,motivateshopeordespair(iftheobject
24
isloved),fearordaring(iftheobjectishatedorregardedwithaversion),oranger(ifpos-
25
session or enjoyment of a good already possessed is disregarded and threatened by the
26 intentionalactionsofanagent).SeeSTI-II,Q.23,A.4,responsio.Thisthree-stagetax-
27 onomyofthepassionsAquinastakesfromAugustine’sCityofGodXIV.7.Goodintuitive
28 discussionsofthedistinctionbetweentheconcupiscentandresistive(irascible)passions,
andassociatedvirtuesarefoundinBowlin1999,33–35andHarak1993,75,76.
29
14ItremainsanopenquestionwhetherAquinasregardsallformsofloveandhatred
30
aspassions.OneanonymousreaderarguesthatAquinasadmitsinSTI-II,Q.26,A.2,
31 3thatnotallformsorinstancesoflove(and,therefore,ofhatred)areformsofpassion.
32 Idonotfindthisreadingconvincing.ThisreadingmayrefertoAquinas’sclaim(Q.26,
33 A.2,endofresponsio)that“loveisapassion,properlysocalled,accordingasitisinthe
concupisciblefaculty;inawiderandextendedsenseasitisinthewill.”This“widerand
34
extendedsense”isevidentlythatcapturedinthenotionof“dilection”(diligere),which(in
35
Q.26,A.3,responsio)Aquinassays“implies,inadditiontolove,achoice(electionem)made
36 beforehand,astheveryworddenotes:andthereforeisnotintheconcupisciblepowerbut
37 inthewill,andonlyintherationalnature.”Yetintherepliestoobjections3and4(Q.26,
38 A.3),hestatesthatloveisintheconcupisciblepassionandthatit“denotesapassion.”In
repliestoobjections1,2,and3,itisbecausedilection(regard)involveschoiceandisin
39
theintellectualappetite,thatloveanddilectionare“thesame”intheintellectualappetite.
40
Aquinas’sownlanguageheresuggests,however,thatlovecanrefertoastateofthewill
41 becausethewillchoosespassion’sobject,orviceversa.Ineithercase,theconcupiscible
42 facultyis“moved,”andmaybe“endorsed”bythewillwithoutits“overpowering”thewill.
43 See ST I-II, Q. 10, responsio. To insist that because “diligere” is a form of love and is
notinthesensitiveappetite,itisaspeciesoflovethatisnotpassional,however,reifies
44
thedistinctionbetweensensitiveandintellectualappetiteintotwofacultiesinawaythat
45
conflictswiththekindsofmetaphors(restandmotion)thatsuggestAquinasregardsthese
46 astwo“moments”ofasingle“power.”SeeJordan1986,88.
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3 Hatred,likeloveasdesire,issubsequentlyshapedbythefunctioning
4 of reason in its apprehension of the “universal,” as it grasps abstract
5 properties that give classes of objects a more or less consistent rela-
6 tionship over time to human desires and interests. So, beyond and out
7 of the spontaneous aversive responses of “natural hatred” arise a vari-
8 etyofgeneralizedhatreds.Theseformsofhatredpresupposearational
9 “estimate”ofwholeclassesandcategoriesofobjects,relativetotheways
10 inwhichtheytendtoeffectpain,pleasure,thefulfillmentofdesire,and,
11 more generally, to effect realization of human interests. Hatred in this
12 senseisthecontraryofloveasamor,orasdesireforwhatisapprehended
13 aspleasurableandultimatelybelievedinsomesensetobe“good.”Fur-
14 thermore, the hating and loving response becomes predispositional as
15 agents form more or less settled conceptions of what is good or evil,
16 and affective response becomes attuned through habituation to objects
17 encounteredunderreason’sapprehension.Overtime,agentscometore-
18 spondwithmoreorlessspontaneoushatred(orlove,oranger,orshame,
19 orfear,orgrief,andthelike)toobjectsasinstancesofclassesandkinds
20 about which they have already formed beliefs. Habituation also shapes
21 theabilityofagentstoexercisevoluntaryendorsementorrestraint(will)
22 with respect to desire motivated by passion. Habituated and intersub-
23 jective ways of perceiving (seeing as) are reflected in the formation of
24 more or less settled evaluative beliefs about what is good and evil; and
25 thestrengthorweaknessofwillandhabituatedcapacitytochoosewith
26 respect to desires motivated by passion determine the degree to which,
27 andwaysinwhich,passionisreflectedinaction.15
28 Aquinas’s remarks about hatred in ST I-II, Q. 29, A. 2 foreground
29 five critical implications of his overarching, Aristotelian psychology of
30 the appetites and passions. (1) “Natural hatred” is a prereflective, and
31 evenpreconscious“naturaldissonance.”Itsimplynamesthefundamen-
32 talaversionorrepellingmovementofanythingawayfromthatwhichis
33 inimicaltoitsgood.Atthisontologicallevel,hatredandlovearesymmet-
34 ricalopposites;thoughwewillseethatthisdoesnotimplyany“higher”
35 symmetry of value or etiology between them. (2) For all animals, in-
36 cluding rational animals, natural hatred takes the form of a primitive,
37 prerational feature of the psyche, and is an ingredient in all specific,
38 sensible appetites that avert from that which is inimical to its good.
39 (3) In rational animals, “passional hatred” is intentional and cognitive.
40 Itisaboutanintentionalobjectpresentintheconsciousnessofthesub-
41 ject who feels hatred. To feel it is necessarily to be in a cognitive state
42 involvingbothperceptionandbeliefformation.(4)Inanimals,rationalor
43 otherwise,hatredisaformofconcupiscence.Insomefundamentalsense,
44
45 15I am indebted here, and commend the reader to, the discussion of habituation in
46 Nelson1992,72–73.
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1 AquinasonAttachment,Envy,andHatred 411
2
3 itisthesamekindofthingthatloveis,andislogicallyandphenomeno-
4 logicallyanecessaryconcomitantofloveatthelevelofamorordesire.At
5 this level, it follows natural hatred in that it is a directionally opposite
6 concupiscent “movement” from love as such. (5) Its presence precedes,
7 andisanecessaryconditionfor,theformationofconceptionsofgoodand
8 evil,aswellasallhabitsthatpredisposeaffect,andthedegreetowhich
9 it is acted upon. For humans, immediate and nonreflective aversions
10 are shaped through experience and reflection into phenomenologically
11 diverseformsofpassionalhatred.
12 Inamorecontemporaryphilosophicalidiom,Aquinasbroadlyunder-
13 standshatred,likeotherpassionssuchasanger,fear,shame,grief,and
14 the like to presuppose intentionality and cognition as necessary condi-
15 tions for “feeling” passion. The identity of any passion to which one is
16 subjectisaninstanceofatypeidentifiedbyaprototypicallinkingofspe-
17 cificbeliefsaboutaspecificobjecthavingcertainpropertiesinvirtueof
18 whichcertainmotivateddesiresoccur.Aquinas’saccountofhatred,and
19 ofpassioningeneral,however,isnotapurelycognitivetheory.16Passions
20 are not merely cognitions; that is to say, they are not fundamentally to
21 beequatedwiththeevaluativejudgmentstheypresupposeasnecessary
22 conditionsanddefinitivecomponents.Theyarecognitivelydefinedand
23 directed forms of deeper ontological and psychic “drives.” We may ex-
24 trapolate from Aquinas’s remarks about emotions such as anger, fear,
25 and love among others, that “feeling” may characterize the subjective
26 experienceofsomeemotions,andthatitcanonlybedischargedandas-
27 suagedthroughspecificcoursesofaction,achievingspecificintentional
28 ends.17 Hatred is identified in the experience of subjects phenomeno-
29 logically, and defined logically, by what Ronald de Sousa calls a formal
30 object and by an immanent teleology.18 Feeling a specific passion im-
31 plicitly attributes some property to its objective target, and motivates
32 aconsistentlyidentifiablearrayofdesires.Thoughthesedesiresdonot
33 have to be acted upon, as will typically be the case with nonrational
34
35 16Cognitive theories of the emotions consider emotions to be a certain kind of judg-
36 mentwithpropositionalcontent,andnotmerelytobedifferentiatedinexperiencebythat
37 content.Solomon1976andNussbaum2001arenotableexamplesofsuchviews.Seespecif-
38 icallyNussbaum’sargumentthatemotionsessentiallyare“judgmentsofvalue.”
17ForindirectevidencethatAquinasregardsakindofsubjective,experiencedinternal
39
sensation as at least a defining characteristic of some passions in experience, note his
40
remarkabouthatredbeing“morekeenlyfelt”thanloveinSTI-II,Q.29,A.3,sedcontra
41 andhisremarkinSTI-II,Q.46,A.6(“OnAnger,”andspecifically,“WhetherAngerisMore
42 GrievousthanHatred”)that,“Astotheintensityofthedesire,angerexcludesmercymore
43 thanhatreddoes;becausethemovementofangerismoreimpetuous,throughtheheating
ofthebile.”
44
18RonalddeSousa1987,TheRationalityofEmotion.Seeforbrevity’ssaketheappendix
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oflabeledsentencesandprinciples,335–37.IamalsotakingforgranteddeSousa’stypology
46 ofphilosophicaltheoriesoftheemotions,36–46.
BL063/JORE jore˙313 June10,2007 16:42
1 412 JournalofReligiousEthics
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3 animals(andare,therefore,no“partof”thepassion),actingsuccessfully
4 upon them typically “discharges” and assuages the feeling as a bodily
5 condition.
6 Hatred’s target also has to be perceived as having some property in
7 orderforthefeelingofhatredtoariseasaresponse,andforthefeeling
8 response to be identified as hatred. That response will have to be one
9 thatcanonlybeassuagedbythedestructionorannihilationofthetarget
10 towardwhichonefeelsit.Aquinas’stheoryofhatredrequires,therefore,
11 a further account of its defining formal objects. What kinds of things
12 are hated? What beliefs about those things lead one to feel hatred for
13 them? How is feeling hatred different in experience from feeling anger
14 or jealousy, which also motivates one to cause harm to another? When,
15 ifever,isonejustifiedinfeelinghatred,orinbeingpredisposedtofeelit
16 spontaneously? Answers to each of these questions are presupposed in
17 Aquinas’ssubsequentaccountofwhathatredisvicious,andhowvicious
18 itis(orisnot).
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20
3. Passional Hatred
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22 Four entailments of Aquinas’s placing of natural hatred in ontology
23 andmoralpsychologywillhaveparticularforceinhisaccountofhatred
24 ofpersonsanditsmoralstatus.AfirstcriticalaspectofAquinas’sviewis
25 thathatredassuchis“natural”andcannotbeintrinsicallyevil.Indeed,
26 it is a necessary condition for survival and flourishing in the lives and
27 experienceoffinitecreatureswhoarevulnerabletopotentialharmfrom
28 wholeclassesofthings.However,whetherhatredperformsthisnatural
29 function will depend upon how prereflective aversions are attuned and
30 proportionedtoappropriatecircumstancesbyhabituationandlearning.
31 AsecondcriticalaspectofAquinas’smoralpsychologyofhatredisthe
32 locationofhatredwithintheconcupiscibleratherthantheirascibleside
33 of sensible appetite. Since anger is a form of the latter, hatred, even as
34 a more complexly developed part of character, is not a form of anger.
35 Here,AquinassideswithAristotleandhisperipateticheirsagainstthe
36 impressionoftheStoicsandtheirmodernheirsthathatredismerelya
37 developedfinalstageandformofanger.
38 InSTI-II,Q.29,A.6,AquinasendorsesAristotle’sview(Rhetoricii.4)
39 that anger is always directed to “something singular” whereas hatred
40 can be directed to a thing in general. The context of this endorsement
41 suggests that Aquinas thinks that anger is felt toward specific actions
42 ofspecificagents—actionsencounteredasslightingsofone’sexcellence.
43 However,preciselybecausewholeclassesofobjectsandpersonscanhave
44 aconsistentrelationshiptospecificwantsandinterests,hatred,bycon-
45 trast, may have whole classes or general kinds as its object. Aquinas’s
46 example is the enmity felt by sheep for wolves. In ST II-II, Q. 34, A. 6,