Table Of Content

Half-title Page: i Title page Page: iii Copyright information Page: iv Dedication Page: v Contents Page: vii Preface to the Second Edition Page: ix 1 Knowledge, Truth, and Justification Page: 1 Three Senses of ''Knows'' Page: 2 Propositional Knowledge and Justified True Belief Page: 5 Belief Page: 7 Truth Page: 9 Epistemic Justification Page: 13 Justification, Evidence, and Defeat Page: 17 2 The Traditional Analysis and the Gettier Problem Page: 22 The Gettier Problem Page: 22 The No False Grounds Approach Page: 27 The Defeasibility Approach Page: 31 The Causal Approach Page: 36 Could Knowledge Be Unanalyzable? Page: 40 Concluding Comments Page: 44 3 Foundationalism Page: 46 Foundationalism and Justified Basic Beliefs Page: 46 Classical Foundationalism Page: 52 Modest Foundationalism Page: 57 What Justifies Basic Beliefs? Page: 58 Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of the Speckled Hen Page: 63 4 The Coherence Theory of Justification Page: 70 Coherence and Two Simple Coherence Theories Page: 70 Coherence vs. Foundations: Objections to Foundationalism Page: 77 Coherence vs. Foundations: Objections to Coherentism Page: 85 5 Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology Page: 91 Reliabilism Page: 91 Three Objections to Reliabilism Page: 96 Virtue Epistemology Page: 104 6 Internalism and Externalism about Justification Page: 115 Two Forms of Internalism Page: 115 The Argument from Epistemic Responsibility Page: 120 The Argument from Reasonable Belief Page: 122 The Subject's Perspective Argument Page: 127 7 Epistemic Circularity Page: 134 The Problem of Epistemic Circularity Page: 134 Alston on Epistemic Circularity Page: 136 Sosa on Epistemic Circularity Page: 141 The Problem of Roxanne Page: 143 8 Skepticism Page: 151 Certainty, Infallibility, and Error Page: 153 The Argument from Ignorance Page: 159 The Moorean Response Page: 163 The Relevant Alternatives Response Page: 166 The Contextualist Response Page: 168 The ''Inference to the Best Explanation'' Response Page: 172 9 The Problem of the Criterion Page: 177 Chisholm and the Problem of the Criterion Page: 177 What's Wrong with Methodism? Page: 181 The Objection from Supervenience Page: 185 Does Particularism Stifle Epistemic Inquiry? Page: 188 Moser's Objections to Common-Sense Particularism Page: 189 Is Common-Sense Particularism Dogmatic? Page: 196 10 The A Priori Page: 198 A Priori Justification Page: 198 Strong and Modest A Priori Justification Page: 206 The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Page: 212 11 Naturalized Epistemology Page: 219 Quine and the Replacement Thesis Page: 219 Kornblith and the Darwinian Argument Page: 221 A Posteriori Epistemology Page: 225 Epistemic Values and Natural Facts Page: 230 Limited Naturalism Page: 233 12 Testimony and Disagreement Page: 237 Testimony and Testimonial Knowledge Page: 238 Reductionism and Non-Reductionism about Testimony Page: 244 Disagreement and Reasonable Belief Page: 249 Select Bibliography Page: 261 Index Page: 273

Description:

Now revised and containing three new chapters, this book provides a clear and accessible introduction to epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. It discusses some of the main theories of justification, including foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. Other topics include the Gettier problem, internalism and externalism, skepticism, the problem of epistemic circularity, a priori knowledge, naturalized epistemology, and the epistemic significance of testimony and disagreement. Intended primarily for students taking their first classes in epistemology, this lucid and well-written text will provide an excellent introduction to anyone interested in knowing more about this important area of philosophy.