An Introduction to Ethics

384 Pages·1357·9.195 MB·English

by  William Lillie

AN INTRODUCTION
TO ETHICS
by
WILLIAM LILLIE
~
~
METHUEN & CO. LTD. LONDON
36 Essex Street, Strand, W.C.2
First publi.shed Sep1m1ber 2nd 1948
Su:ond edition 1951
Third edition 1955
Reprinted 1957
..
,
CATALOGUE NO. 5031/U
Prinled and bound iD Great Britain by Buller & Tanner Ltd., Frome and London
PREFACE
This book makes no claim to originality of thought, for its
purpose is only to introduce beginners to what the great
moralists have thought in the past and are thinking to-day
about ethical matters. It differs from other elementary
text-books in giving a larger place to the work of living writers
on ethics, and to do so seems advisable even in an introductory
text-book, because of the rich contributions made by twentieth
century moralists both to the interpretation of their predeces
sors and to original ethical speculation. Most teachers to-day
feel that the older introductions, the best of which were
written in the now unfamiliar language of late nineteenth
century Idealism, are out of date, and the conviction that
a more modern introduction in simple language is needed
by undergraduates during their first year's study of ethics has
been my chief reason for writing this book.
It is fitting that I should thank all those whose teachings
and writings have been used in this book; the frequency with
which the names of some moralists occur in the text or foot
notc!'s indicates those to whom I owe most. The arrangement
of topics has been largely determined by their order in the
syllabus for the first year's course in ethics, prescribed by the
University of the Panjab, in which I have been privileged to
be a teacher, and my own presentation of the subject has
probably been influenced more than I realise by a long use of
Mackenzie's Ma11ual of Ethics, the text-book prescribed for
that course.
I am especially grateful to my wife who, after carefully
reading my script, has pointed out many passages which in
their original form were likely to be misunderstood by begin
ners, and has helped me to amend them, and to my sisters,
Misses Isobel and Mary Lillie, who have undertaken the
wearisome task of correcting proofs.
An Introduction to Ethics
In this third edition, I have added a chapter on ' The
Language of Ethics', which has occupied a large place in
ethical discussions in the last few years. I wish to express
my gratitude to my colleague, Dr. R. W. Hepburn, of
the Department of Moral Philosophy in this University, who
read the chapter in manuscript, and made several most
helpful suggestions.
King's College,
Aberdeen.
March, 1955.
CONTENTS
PAGE
Chapter I. THE NATURE OF ETHICS
I. A Provisional Definition. 2. Moral Sciences. 3.
The Data and Method, of Ethics. 4. The Uses of
Ethics.
Chapter II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL ACTION 22
I. Psychology as Explaining Conduct. 2. The Nature
of Desire. 3. Motive and Intention. 4. The Process
of Willing. 5. PsycholoRical Hedonism. 6. Reason
as Motive to Action. 7. The Freedom of the Will.
Chapter III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY 56
1. Levels of Development. 2. The Level of Instinct.
3. The Level of Custom. 4. The Level of Conscience.
5. A Comparison of the Level of Custom and the Level
of Conscience. 6. The Historical Development of
Morality.
Chapter IV. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE MORAL JUDGE•
• MENT 80
1. Conscience---the Subject of the Moral Judgement.
2. Theories of Conscience. 3. The Nature of the Moral
Judgement. 4. The Object of the Moral Judgement.
Chapter V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICAL THEORY 102
1. The History of Ethics. 2. Greek Ethics. 3. Medieval
Ethics. 4. Modern Ethics. 5. Classification of Theories
of the Moral Standard.
Chapter VI. RELATIVE, SUBJECTIVE AND NATURALISTIC
THEORIES OF THE MORAL STANDARD I 13
t. Absolute and Relative Ethics. 2. The Standard as
Subjective. 3. Non-subjective Naturalism. 4. The
Naturalistic Fallacy. 5. Conclusion.
A11 /11/roduction to Ethics
PACE
Chapter VII. THE STANDARD AS GIVEN BY INTUITION 131
1. The Nature and Objects oflntuition. 2. The Moral
Sense School. 3. The Theory of Butler. 4. Individual
Intuitions. 5. General lntuition9, 6. Universal In
tuitions. 7. Conclusion.
Chapter VIII. THE STANDARD AS LAW q.g
1. The Meaning of Law. 2. The Moral Law as a
Political Law. 3. The Moral Law as a Law of Nature.
4. The Moral Law as a Law of Reason. 5. The Theory
of Kant. 6. Conclusion.
/Chapter IX. THE STANDARD AS PLEASURE I 77
I. The Nature of Pleasure. 2. Ethical H~donism.
3. Egoistic Ethical Hedonism. 4. Utilitarianism. 5. The
Theory of John Stuart Mill. 6. The Theory of Sidgwick.
7. The End as the Pleasure of Others.
Chapter X. THE STANDARD AS DETERMINED nY F.vou1-
TION 201
1. The Concept of Evolution. 2. The Theory of
Herbert Spencer. 3. Evolution without Teleology.
4. Natural Selection in Ethics. 5. Modern Theories
of Evolution. 6. Creative Morality.
Chapter XI. THE STANDARD AS PERFECTION 218
1. Self-Realization. 2. Spiritual Evolution. 3. The
Theory ofT. H. Green. 4. My Station and its Duties.
5. Eudaemonism. 6. Conclusion. '
Chapter XII. THE STANDARD AS VALUE 230
1. The Concept of Value. 2. Intrinsic Value. 3.
Intrinsically Good Things as the Aim of Moral Action.
4. Good Character as the Moral End. 5. Right
Actions as Intrinsically Good.
Chapter XIII. THEORY AND PRACTICE 249
, 1. The Purpose of Ethical Study. 2. Casuistry. 3.
The Influence of Ethical Theory on Practice-the Evi
dence of Experience. 4. The Authority of the Moral
Standard. 5. The Various Ethical Theories in their
Relation to Practice. 6. A comparison of Ethics and
Logic. 7. Conclusion.
Con/mis
PAGE
Chapter XIV. TUE INDIVIDUAL AND soGIETY 2GG
1. Society as the Background of the !\!oral Life. 2.
The Individual and the State. 3. Egoism, Vni\'crsal~
ism and Altruism. 4. Theories of Punishment.
Chapter XV. RIGHTS .,ND DUTIES 288
1. The Nature of Rights. 2. The Rights of Man. 3.
Rights and Duties. 4. The Determination of Duties.
5. Dut}' and Virtue. G. Duty as Moral Obligation.
'C:lrnpter XVI. VTRTt;F.
or
1. The f\.,{caning Virtue. 2. Plato'~ Treatment of
the Virtues. 3. The Cardinal Virtues. 4. Aristotle'•
Conception of Virtue.
Chapter XVII. ETHIC'S, METAPHYSICS AND RELIGION 323
1. The Relation of Ethics to Metaphysics. e. The
Postulate, of Ethics. 3. The Universe Regarded as
Possessing Moral Relations. 4. Religion and Morali1y.
Cl!apter XVIII. THE LANGUAGE OF ETHICS 343
1. The Use of Language. 2. The Language used in
Ethics. 3. Evaluative Language in Ethics. 4. Emotive
Language in Ethics. 5. Prescriptive Language in Ethics.
6. Descriptive Language in Ethics.
APl'ENDIX 365
INDEX 373

Chapter I
THE NATURE OF ETHICS
§ r. A Provisional Definition
In ordinary conyersation we often hear such statements as:
'He ought not to have done this', 'It is a good thing to help
one's neighbours', 'He is a thoroughly good man', 'His
character is bad', 'He was only doing his duty', or 'It is
always right to speak the truth.' When such statements arc
made they arc frequently contradicted by someone hearing
them, and this by itself suggests that they are not as simple as
at first sight they appear to be. If a friend disagrees with my
statement that Smith is a thoroughly good man, he may do so
for one of two reasons. (a) He may know facts about Smith's
behaviour which are unkno"n to me; and if he tells me these
facts and convinces me that they are true, I shall then be
ready to admit that Smith is in some respects not a good man.
(b) It may be the case, however, that my friend and I both
know the same facts about Smith, and yet I continue to hold
that Smith is thoroughly good, while my friend considers him
to bC bad. Now we are using the words 'good' and 'bad'
with different meanings, and, until we come to some agree
ment as to their meanings, we are not likely to agree in our
opinion of Smith. This is just the kind of question with which
ethics deals-what is the true meaning of such words as 'good'
and 'right" and 'ought' which are used so commonly in
everyday conversation. When we come to an agreement as
to the meaning of such words, other questions will arise.
\-Ve may ask whether it is possible for us to know whether
Smith is good or bad; we may ask on what grounds Smith
should give up those activities which we have agreed to call
bad, and should engage in those which we have agreed to call
good. All these and many other similar questions are within
,the scope of ethics.
An Introduction lo Ethics
Vic may define ethics as the normative science of the con
duct of human beings living in societies-a science which
judges this conduct to be right or wrong, to be good or bad,
or in some similar way. This definition says, first of all, that
ethics is a science, and a science may be defined as a systematic
and more or less complete body of knowledge about a par
ticular set of related events or objects. In this account of
science, the important word is systematic; scientific knowledge
differs from the ordinary, haphazard knowledge of unedu
cated people in being arranged in a definite cohere~t system.
A science also aims at providing as complete a knowledge of
its subject-matter as it can, although, in the present slate of
knowledge, no science is perfect in this respect. At the same
time, the scientist may leave out details that he knows, in
order to give a simpler and clearer presentation of the im
portant connexions of the facts which he studies. It is
generally agreed that a piece of knowledge cann::-t be re
garded as 'scientific' until it is accepted by those who arc
learned in the particular science concerned : in medicine, for
example, the new cures which arc so convincingly advertised
cannot be regarded as scientific until they have been recog
nized as effective by capable doctors. Finally, the sphere of
a science is limited to one set of facts or objects; no science
deals with all the facts known about the universe; to deal
with the universe as a whole is the work of metaphysics or
philosophy, which is nor a science. Each science has its own
particular sphere; botany deals with plants, psycholog)' with
minds, and ethics with certain judgements that we make about
human conduct.
The sciences which arc studied in the laboratories of our
universities are clescriptivc or positive sciences. Positive
sciences describe objects or phenomena as we observe them
with our eyes and other sense-organs, or in the case of mental
processes like desiring and willing as we observe them by
introspection or looking inside our minds. ('Phenomenon'
is just the technical term for anything that can be observed in
this way.) There is in a positive science no question of judg
ing its objects in any way. If the botanist judges a certain
plant to be good or bad, or even to be beautiful or ugly, he
is no longer doing the work of a botanist, whose business it is