Amartya Sen's Capability Approach to Education

17 Pages·2003·0.1 MB·English

Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2003
Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach to
Education: A Critical Exploration
MADOKA SAITO
This article examines the underexplored relationship between
AmartyaSen’s‘capabilityapproach’tohumanwell-beingand
education. Two roles which education might play in relation
to the development of capacities are given particular
attention: (i) the enhancement of capacities and opportunities
and (ii) the development of judgement in relation to the
appropriate exercise of capacities.
This article offers a critical examination of the educational significance of
Amartya Sen’s capability approach to human well-being.1 Sen, winner of
the 1998 Nobel Prize for Economic Science, has made a number of
noteworthy contributions to central fields of this discipline by combining
tools from economics and philosophy. At the heart of his contributions is
the notion of ‘capabilities’. According to Sen, the notion of capability
relates centrally to ‘freedom—the range of options a person has in
deciding what kind of life to lead’ (Dre`ze and Sen, 1995, p. 10).
There seems to be a potentially strong and mutually enhancing
relationship between Sen’s capability approach and education. However,
despite the fact that Sen’s capability approach has received substantial
attention from philosophers, ethicists, economists and other social
scientists, it has not yet been critically examined from an educational
perspective. Issues therefore remain to be explored concerning the
relationship between the capability approach and education. In this article
I aim to examine a number of central aspects of this relationship.
Amartya Sen is not an educationalist but an economist and a
philosopher and he has therefore not directly explored the notion of
education in his theories. However, Sen’s capability approach is clearly
apt for exploration from an educational point of view. Sen has insisted
upon the need for a broad and rounded perspective on the issues with
which he deals. He has emphasised, for example, the importance
of considering the significance of humanity in economics, a significance
that has often been underestimated in this field.2 Such a breadth of
consideration should surely include an educational perspective.
This article has three parts. Part I describes Sen’s capability approach
and seeks to illuminate why Sen considers the notion of capability to be
the most comprehensive framework within which human well-being
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18 M. Saito
can be conceptualised. In order to understand the key concepts in
the capability approach, the incompleteness of alternative approa-
ches (the commodity approach, the welfare (utility) approach and
the approach of Rawls) will be analysed. Parts II and III seek to explore
the relationship between the capability approach and education. In Part II,
two aspects of the contribution of the capability approach to education
will be examined. One aspect relates to how the Human Development
Index—the HDI, a composite of educational attainment, life expectancy
at birth, and real gross domestic product per capita (GDP/N)—
has emphasised the importance of education. The other aspect concerns
how the concept of human capabilities brings into focus the fact that
education involves both instrumental and intrinsic values. The first half of
Part III will discuss whether the capability approach is applicable to
children. In the second half of Part III I will try to analyse what roles
education should play in the capability approach. One role involves the
expansion of capabilities and the other relates to teaching values in the
exercise of capabilities.
Despite the fact that the issues I explore are particularly important, Sen
does not seem to have explored them in his work . However, I was able
to interview Sen and was able to discover from him that he agrees in
broad terms with my interpretation of the educational implications of his
views.
If the preliminary examination of the educational significance of Sen’s
capability approach to human well-being attempted in this article
encourages educationalists to give more attention to the approach I shall
begratified.Istronglybelievethatencouragingeducationaliststoarriveat
a clear understanding of the relationship between the capability approach
and education will benefit both education and the capability approach
itself in significant ways.
I SEN’S CAPABILITY APPROACH
The evolution of Sen’s capability approach to human well-being
The capability approach to human well-being is a ‘concentration
on freedom to achieve in general and the capabilities to function in
particular’, and the core concepts of this approach are ‘functionings and
capabilities’ (Sen, 1995, p. 266). ‘A functioning is an achievement,
whereas a capability is the ability to achieve’ (Sen, 1987, p. 36). Before
discussing what the capability approach is in more detail, it would be
useful to understand how Sen came to develop this approach.
From the 1970s, Sen and his associates started to build a critique of
mainstream welfare economics and utilitarianism, and extended and
amended a framework traditionally used in microeconomics, describing
how individuals obtain income and well-being. In Amartya Sen’s paper
‘EqualityofWhat?’(1980),heintroducedtheconceptofcapabilityforthe
firsttime.Hecriticisedtheargumentthattheevaluationofequalityshould
merely be based on information about people’s sense of happiness or
desirefulfilment,orontheircommandofprimarygoods(seeGore,1997).
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Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach to Education 19
In Sen’s earliest challenges to utilitarian economics, he adopted the
‘basic needs’ perspective. This approach emphasises the notion that
people have to meet fundamental needs to achieve well-being. For
instance, they need food not to starve, and shelter and clothing to lead a
recognisably human life. This approach emphasised the point that per
capita income is not an adequate measure of a person’s well-being, since
raising incomes alone will not always increase well-being. Moreover, it
claims that everyone should have access to the goods and services that
satisfy their basic needs. This approach induced Sen to focus more on
peopleandlessoncommodities.3Inotherwords,hepaidattentiontowhat
people were able to do, rather than to what people could buy with their
income. Therefore, Sen came to focus on what is of intrinsic value in life,
rather than on the goods that provide instrumental value or utility
(Pressman and Summerfield, 2000, p. 9). Capabilities comprise what a
person is able to do or be: ‘the ability to be well nourished, to avoid
escapable morbidity or mortality, to read, write and communicate, to take
partinthelifeofthecommunity,toappearinpublicwithoutshame’(Sen,
1990, p. 126).
Beyond traditional well-being approaches
In order to understand Sen’s capability approach, which provides in my
view the most comprehensive framework for conceptualising well-being,
it is essential to examine how he analyses the incompleteness of the
traditionalconceptsofwell-being:thecommodityorincomeapproachand
theutilityapproach.Inadditiontoconsideringthesetraditionalwell-being
approaches, I will examine how Sen sees the incompleteness of Rawls’
theory of justice as an account of well-being.
It has been common to consider economic growth and the expansion of
goods and services as constituting the process of economic development,
as does the commodity or income approach.4 In fact, Sen acknowledges
the importance of the mutually enhancing relationship between income or
commodity and capabilities. While he sees the importance of income or
commodity as means to enhance capabilities, at the same time he pays
great attention to the fact that ‘enhancing capabilities in leading a life
would tend, typically, to expand a person’s ability to be more productive
and earn higher income. We would expect a connection going from
capability improvement to greater earning power and not only the
other way around’ (Sen, 1999, p. 90). However, although income and
commodity can be crucially important, Sen criticises the way of
measuring a person’s well-being in terms of the amount of income or
commodities the person owns for the following reasons (See Clark, 1999,
pp. 33–37). First, Sen argues that, ‘A person’s well-being is not really a
matterofhowrichheorsheisyCommoditycommandisameanstothe
end of well-being, but can scarcely be the end itself’ (Sen, 1985, p. 28).
Commodities are merely objects which a person might use. Second,
individuals have different commodity requirements (see, for example,
Sen, 1992).Third, differingcommodityrequirements can also befoundin
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20 M. Saito
different cultures and societies (see Clark, 1999). Lastly, as Nussbaum
argues, ‘more is not, in fact, always better, where wealth and income are
concerned’. Too many goods can encourage ‘excessive competitiveness’
andmakepeopleinsolentandarrogant,causingthemtohave‘amercenary
attitude towards other things’ (See Nussbaum, 1990, p. 211 and p. 245,
n. 20).
Next, the utility approach proposes considering well-being in terms of
utility, both in utilitarianism’s classical form as expressed particularly by
Jeremy Bentham, and in more modern forms of utilitarianism. Sen has
criticised both types of utilitarianism by arguing that neither pleasure or
happiness in the classical form, nor the fulfilment of desire in the modern
form, is appropriate as a representation of one’s well-being. First, Sen
argues that utilitarianism has no interest in the distribution of utilities,
since the concentration is entirely on the total utility of everyone taken
together (Sen, 1999, p. 57). Second, with regard to desires, whereas Sen
thinks that some functionings are intrinsically valuable, on the desire-
basedutilitarianismaccountafunctioninghasvalueonlytotheextentthat
it is desired by the person concerned. This claim can be critically
important because the process of constructing our desire is complex: ‘A
poor, undernourished person, brought up in penury, may have learned to
come to terms with a half-empty stomach, seizing joy in small comforts
and desiring ‘no more than what seems ‘‘realistic’’’ (Sen, 1987, p. 20).
‘The deprivations are suppressed and muffled in the scale of utilities
(reflected by desire-fulfilment and happiness) by the necessity of
endurance in uneventful survival’ (p. 15). What Sen emphasises here is
thatsincewelearnnottodesirewhatweknowtobeunattainable,onemay
sufferextremedeprivationwithouthavingastrongdesireforchange(Sen,
1992, pp. 54–55, and in Sugden, 1993, p. 1955). Therefore, it seems
problematic to conceive of one’s well-being in terms of the utility
approach.
Lastly, Sen indicates the incompleteness of Rawls’ theory of ‘justice as
fairness’ as an approach to well-being. In fact, Sen recognises and
welcomesthefactthatRawls,‘bybasinghistheoryofjusticeonresources
rather than on utility, has shifted the focus of attention in the direction of
freedom’ (in Sugden, 1993, p. 1956). Sen seems to see Rawls’ theory,
based on the concept of primary goods, as the most credible alternative to
his capability approach, since primary goods include ‘rights, liberties, and
opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect’
(Sen, 1999, p. 72). However, Sen argues that his capability approach to
justice is to be preferred to Rawls’ in terms of discussing a person’s well-
being.5SentakesthisviewbecauseheseesRawls’theoryasincompletein
its claim that individuals have equal opportunities if they have equal
command over resources, and in its concentration ‘on means to freedom,
rather than on the extent of the freedom that a person actually has’ (Sen,
1992,p.81,andinSugden,1993,p.1956).Sen’sargumentisthatbecause
individuals differ in their ability to convert resources into functionings,
providing an equal command over resources does not always mean giving
equal opportunities.6 Since resources do not have intrinsic value, and we
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Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach to Education 21
value resources for the opportunities that the resources create, Sen argues
that it is more appropriate to value opportunities in the way that his
capability approach does. It should be noted, however, that this whole
argument does not imply a neglect of the concept of ‘opportunities’ in the
Rawlsian sense. In fact, both theories share a commitment to equality in
opportunities.ThedifferencebetweenRawlsandSenonthismatteristhat
Rawls focuses on resources in order to achieve equal opportunities, an
indirect strategy, whereas Sen tries to achieve opportunities directly
(Sugden,1993,p.1956).Therefore,itseemsinappropriatesimplytoargue
that Rawls’ theory is in conflict with the capability approach.
Functionings and capabilities
Sen acknowledges that his philosophical position in searching for a true
answer to the question: ‘What makes a good life?’ might be characterised
as Aristotelian (Sen, 1992, p. 39). According to Sen, ‘the ‘‘capability’’ of
a person is a concept that has distinctly Aristotelian roots. ‘‘Capability’’
referstothealternativecombinationsoffunctioningsfromwhichaperson
can choose. Thus, the notion of capability is essentially one of freedom—
the range of options a person has in deciding what kind of a life to lead’
(Dre`ze and Sen, 1995, p. 10).
The capability approach is a ‘concentration on freedom to achieve in
general and the capabilities to function in particular’ (Sen, 1995, p. 266).
A functioning is an achievement, whereas a capability is the ability to
achieve. Functionings are, in a sense, more directly related to living
conditions, since they are different aspects of living conditions.
Capabilities, in contrast, are notions of freedom, in the positive sense:
what real opportunities you have regarding the life you may lead (Sen,
1987, p. 36).
What Sen claims is that a person’s well-being must be evaluated in the
light of a form of assessment of the functionings achieved by that person
(Sen, 1992, p. 39). This capability to achieve functionings reflects the
person’s real opportunities or freedom of choice between possible
lifestyles (Sen, 1993). The sense of ‘freedom’ used here should be
understoodin thepositive rather thanthe negativesense—that is,interms
of‘freedomto’,ratherthan‘freedomfrom’.Senwrites:‘Positivefreedom
is a good in its own right: being free to choose how to live one’s own life
isoneofthegoodthingsoflife.Thusfreedomisoneofthedimensionsof
well-being’ (in Sugden, 1993, p. 1952).
II SEN’S CAPABILITY APPROACH AND EDUCATION: EXISTING
CONTRIBUTIONS
Despite the fact that Sen has not explored educational thought in itself
deeply, his capability approach seems to be significantly related to
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22 M. Saito
education in many ways. In order to understand this relationship, in this
Part, I am going to examine the contributions to education the capability
approach has made from two aspects. The first aspect is through the
Human Development Index (HDI), which seems to have caught the
public’seyeintermsoftheimportanceofeducationinternationally.Since
this index is a composite of adult literacy and school enrolment, life
expectancy at birth, and real gross domestic product per capita (GDP/N),
people are encouraged to pay attention to the widespread and equitable
provision of education for well-being.
Emphasising the importance of education through the HDI
Many people have argued that it is difficult to make the capability
approach operational. For instance, Roemer criticises Sen for not
providing an index of functionings.7 However, there are some ways in
which the capability approach can be made operational.8 The HDI is
considered to be one of the ways in which Sen’s capability approach can
beoperational,despitethefactthattherearemanycriticismsoftheindex,
which are discussed below. The construction and refinement of the HDI
has attempted to analyse the comparative status of socio-economic
development based upon key capabilities in different countries.9 The HDI
measuresrelative,notabsolute,levelsofhumandevelopmentanditsfocus
is on ends of development, rather than the means (as with per capita GDP
alone) (Todaro, 1999, p. 73). Ends of development specify three goals;
longevityasmeasuredbylifeexpectancyatbirth,knowledgeasmeasured
by a weighted average of adult literacy (two-thirds) and mean years of
schooling (one-third), and standard of living as measured by real per
capita incomeadjusted forthe differingpurchasing power parity(ppp) of
eachcountry’scurrencytoreflectcostoflivingandfortheassumptionof
rapidly diminishing marginal utility of income above average world
income levels (ibid.).
The HDI, published by the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), has been greatly influenced by Sen’s thinking, since he was a
consultant to the UN in creating the HDI.10 The HDI first appeared in
1990 in UNDP’s annual Human Development Report (Pressman and
Summerfield, 2000, p. 101). According to the UNDP, ‘it emphasises the
development of human choices and returns to the centrality of people and
it is reflected in measuring development not as the expansion of
commodities and wealth but as the widening of human choices’ (UNDP,
1990, p. 1).
However,itshouldbenotedherethattherehavebeencriticismsthatthe
HDI does not articulate Sen’s capability approach appropriately, since the
HDI uses just a few functionings, namely educational attainment, life
expectancy, and per capita GDP. Moreover, there is a doubt over whether
such components of the HDI are appropriate in measuring human
development or not. This is what UNDP itself admits: ‘human
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Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach to Education 23
developmentgoesbeyondthechoicesthattheHDIcaptures’.Therefore,it
is arguable whether the HDI sufficiently reflects the concept of Sen’s
capability approach. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether literacy and
schoolenrolmentcapturethestateofeducationinacountryadequately;in
other words, the choice of indicators in the HDI may need to be re-
examined.11 Therefore,in view of all of these criticisms, itis importantto
handle the HDI with care and further research is needed to make the HDI
more effective.12
Having taken all the above into account, we should now examine how
theconceptionoftheHDIinrelationtohumandevelopmentcontributesto
education. When countries focus only on income and income growth,
promoting only economic growth will be the top priority and issues other
than income growth tend to be neglected. Therefore, as Pressman and
Summerfield argue, ‘distributional issues become irrelevant; education is
likely to get short changed; the environment is likely to be ignored; and
long-run growth may be sacrificed’ (Pressman and Summerfield, 2000,
p.102).Senarguesthatwearriveatverydifferentconclusionsifwethink
of development in terms of real income rather than selected function-
ings.13 However, introducing the concept of the HDI draws attention to
issues that promote human well-being: ‘The HDI leads governments to
direct their policy efforts toward different ends-providing health and
education for all citizens, and supporting a sustainable environment and a
sustainable living standard’ (ibid.). This is particularly important in
countries where education has received little attention. Sen indicates that
in India the promotion of education has received little attention from
social and political leaders in the post-independence period.14 This is due
to a common attitude of political parties, trade unions, revolutionary
organisations and other social movements.15 Therefore, in eradicating
educational deprivation in such a country, a strong commitment to the
widespread and equitable provision of basic education is the first
requirement to achieve rapid progress (Dre`ze and Sen, 1995, pp. 110–
111). The HDI can play an important role in calling the government’s
attentiontothewidespreadandequitableprovisionofeducationinmaking
policies.
Moreover, longevity as measured by life expectancy at birth, one of the
indicators of the HDI, is also highly influenced by education. I would like
to emphasise the impact of the education that mothers receive on child
survival.Thisimpactisaninfluentialfactorforlifeexpectancy,especially
in developing countries. Maternal education influences child survival
throughvariouspathways:enhancedsocio-economic status,greaterhealth
choice for children, including interaction with medical personnel,
cleanliness, emphasis on child quality in terms of fewer children, and
greater food and capital investments.16
In addition to this, female autonomy plays an important role in child
health. Female autonomy includes a dedication to education, an open
political system, and a largely civilian society without a rigid class
structure, a history of egalitarianism and radicalism, and of national
consensusarisingfrompoliticalcontestwithmarkedelementsofpopulism
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24 M. Saito
(see Caldwell, 1986). This autonomy can be achieved through education,
and undoubtedly this autonomy also helps females to enhance their own
capabilities (see Nussbaum, 1998, 2000). Consequently, female education
and autonomy are the factors that contribute to child survival. This is
closely linked to one of the indicators in the HDI, life expectancy.
This whole argument, therefore, clearly articulates the fact that the
HDI has contributed by directing people’s attention to the importance of
education, even though the concept of the HDI is only a start in
illuminating and recognising the importance of promoting human well-
being and needs to be improved. In particular, since the educational
attainments comprised in the HDI are only adult literacy and school
enrolment,furtherresearchisneededinordertodeterminetheappropriate
functionings that best articulate the educational attainment for one’s well-
being. These will go beyond adult literacy and school enrolment.
Illuminating education as involving both intrinsic and instrumental value
The second contribution that Sen’s capability approach has made is to
illuminate the concept that education involves both intrinsic and
instrumental values.
Sen discusses the relationship between human capital and human
capability as an expression of freedom. Both seem to place humanity at
the centre of attention, and to be closely related to each other. However,
the former ‘tends to concentrate on the agency of human beings in
augmenting production possibilities’ (Sen, 1993, p. 293). On the other
hand, the latter ‘focuses on the ability—the substantive freedom—of
people to lead the lives they have reason to value and to enhance the
real choices they have’ (ibid.).17 In order to clarify the relationship
between human capital and human capability, Sen articulates the role of
human capabilities in three ways:
(1) their direct relevance to the well-being and freedom of people;
(2) their indirect role through influencing social change; and
(3) their indirect role through influencing economic production (Sen,
1999, pp. 296–297).
While human capital is considered to fit into the third category, the
concept of human capability incorporates all categories.18 All categories
relating to the role of human capabilities are composed of intrinsic value
and instrumental value.
How does education come into this argument? The human capital
received from education can be conceived in terms of commodity
production. However, Sen argues that education plays a role not only in
accumulating human capital but also in broadening human capability.19
This can be through a person benefiting from education ‘in reading,
communicating,arguing,in beingableto chooseina moreinformedway,
in being taken more seriously by others and so on’ (Sen, 1995, p. 294).
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Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach to Education 25
Inshort,ontheonehand,educationisanimportantfactorinbroadening
human capabilities, which include human capacities. On the other
hand, human capabilities play a role in influencing both intrinsic and
instrumental values. Therefore, it seems appropriate to say that education
playsaroleininfluencingbothintrinsicandinstrumentalvalues.Whatthe
concept of human capabilities has contributed to this discussion is to
clarifytheprocessofinfluencingintrinsicandinstrumentalvaluesthrough
education. Clarifying this process helps to show education as concerned
with both intrinsic and instrumental value.
III AN EXPLORATION OF SEN’S CAPABILITY APPROACH TO
EDUCATION: QUESTIONS AND POSSIBILITIES
Is the capability approach applicable to children?
This question comesfrom the notion that lies at the core of the concept of
the capability approach: the notion of capability as ‘freedom — the range
ofoptionsapersonhasindecidingwhatkindoflifetolead’,thequotation
withwhich thispaperbegan.Can wediscussthe well-beingofchildrenas
well as of adults in terms of capabilities?20 Few would deny that children
need support from parents, teachers or societies in choosing what is best
for their lives.21 When it comes to education also, the same argument can
be made. Despite the fact that neither parents nor the State have a right to
complete authority over the education of children, as Gutmann argues, it
seems appropriate to say that a child remains in the care of others in the
choice of what to learn, so that the child’s interests can be facilitated.22
Therefore, although I agree that functionings, the set of things that a
person can do in life in Sen’s sense, are of course important for children,
when it comes to capabilities in children, the matter appears complicated
and problematic. To the question I posed, ‘How can we apply the
capability approach to children, since children are not mature enough to
make decisions by themselves?’, Sen answered by showing this
applicability in two respects.23
First,heemphasisesthe importancenotof the freedoma childhasnow,
but of the freedom the child will have in the future:
Ifthechilddoesnotwanttobeinoculated,andyouneverthelessthinkitis
a good idea for him/her to be inoculated, then the argument may be
connected with the freedom that this person will have in the future by
havingthemeaslesshotnow.Thechildwhenitgrowsupmusthavemore
freedom. So when you are considering a child, you have to consider not
onlythechild’sfreedomnow,butalsothechild’sfreedominthefuture.24
ThisiswellarticulatedinwhatJohnWhitearguesinrelationtoeducation.
He claims that adopting an extreme libertarian position vis-a`-vis the child
is irrational. In other words, making no effort to teach a child anything,
since we do not know what is good or bad for the child, does not lead the
child to improve his/her well-being: ‘Letting children learn what they
wanted in this way might well restrict the range of possible things which
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26 M. Saito
they might choose for their own sake: they might fail to learn about other
things which might also have been included’ (White, 1973, p. 22). Giving
temporary freedom to a child does not always mean that the child will
havefreedominfuture,andsimilarly,restrictingthetemporaryfreedomof
a child may well expand the freedom that the child will have in future.
We, therefore, have to consider the freedom for a child in a lifelong
perspective. For educational guidelines, White proposes that the least
harmful course we can follow is to let a child determine what the Good
shall be for him or her as far as possible. He claims that as long as we
ensure ‘(a) that he knows about as many activities or ways of life as
possible which he may want to choose for their own sake, and (b) that he
is able to reflect on priorities among them from the point of view not only
of the present moment but as far as possible of his life as a whole,’ it is
right to restrict a child’s liberty now so as to give him as much autonomy
as possible in future (ibid.).
Second, although some may argue that freedom is less important for a
childthananadultsincethecontemporarywell-beingofthechildisbetter
judgedbyparentsorotheradultpersons,Senpointsoutthatthecapability
approach is still applicable to children. As we have already discussed in
Part I, the capability approach makes two assertions:
(1) thattherightperspectivefromwhichtojudgeaperson’swell-being
isfunctionings,andnotnecessarilymentalattitudessuchasutilities;
(2) that, in judging from the perspective of functionings, we should not
merelylookatwhetherapersonisenjoyingthepreferredalternative
but whether a person actually has the choice of an alternative:
freedom to choose.
According to Sen:
Itisthesecondaspect(2)thatisweakforthechildbutthefirst(1)isnot.
Thefunctioningspace(1)isstillappropriatetothinkabout,eventhewell-
being of the child. The freedom aspect (2) is affected, but even the
freedom aspect may be important for a child because: A) a child makes
some decisions, like whether he or she is being unhappy, wants milk and
so on; and B) a child’s future involves the time when the child will
actually exercise some freedom.25
In this sense, when dealing with children, it is the freedom they will have
in the future rather than the present that should be considered. Therefore,
as long as we consider a person’s capabilities in terms of their life-span,
the capability approach seems to be applicable to children.26 The fact that
children need to have support from parents, society or others in terms of
choosing which capabilities to exercise will lead us to consider what role
education can play in the capability approach.
Two issues will be examined in order to understand what the role of
educationshouldbeinthecapabilityapproachandwhatkindofeducation
best implements this approach.
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