Action, Decision, and Intention: Studies in the Foundation of Action Theory as an Approach to Understanding Rationality and Decision PDF
Preview Action, Decision, and Intention: Studies in the Foundation of Action Theory as an Approach to Understanding Rationality and Decision
ACTION, DECISION, AND INTENTION ACTION, DECISION, AND INTENTION Studies in the Foundations of Action Theory as an Approach to Understanding Rationality and Decision Edited by ROBERT AUDI University of Nebraska, Lincoln Reprinted from Theory and Decision, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1986) D. Reidel Publishing Company / Dordrecht / Boston Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data CIP-data appear on separate card ISBN-13: 978-94-010-8588-5 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-4696-5 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-4696-5 Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17, 3300AADordrecht, Holland. Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada by Kluwer Academic Publishers, 190 Old Derby Street, Hingham, MA02043, U.S.A. In all other countries, sold and distributed by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, Holland. All Rights Reserved © 1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1986 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner ACTION, DECISION, AND INTENTION Studies in the Foundations of Action Theory as an Approach to Understanding Rationality and Decision Edited by ROBERT AUD! ROBERT AUD! / Preface 205 ROBERT AUD! / Action Theory as a Resource for Decision Theory 207 CARL GINET / Voluntary Exertion of the Body: A Volitional Account 223 HUGH J. MCCANN / Intrinsic Intentionality 247 WILLIAM P. ALSTON / An Action-Plan Interpretation of Purposive Explanations of Actions 275 BRUCE AUNE / Formal Logic and Practical Reasoning 301 JOHN G. BENNETT / Leading a Rational Life 321 Announcements 334, 335 PREFACE Most of the papers in this collection are contributions to action theory intended to be of some relevance to one or another concern of decision theory, particularly to its application to concrete human behavior. Some of the papers touch only indirectly on problems of interest to decision theorists, but taken together they should be of use to both decision theorists and philosophers of action. Robert Audi's paper indicates how a number of questions in action theory might bear on problems in decision theory, and it suggests how some action-theoretic results may help in the construction or interpretation of theories of decision, both normative and empirical. Carl Ginet's essay lays foundations for the conception of action. His volitional framework roots actions internally and conceives them as irreducibly connected with intentionality. Hugh McCann's essay is also foundational, but stresses intention more than volition and lays some of the groundwork for assessing the rationality of intention and intentional action. In William Alston's paper, the notion of a plan as underlying (intentional) action is central, and we are given both a con ception of the structure of intentional action and a set of implicit goals and beliefs - those whose content is represented in the plan - which form an indispensable part of the basis on which the rationality of the action is to be judged. Bruce Aune's paper explicity presents a conception of practical reasoning as a process underlying rational action; and on the view he proposes, we need not approach rational action in terms of a framework radically different from that appropriate to theoretical reasoning. In John G. Bennet's essay, the most global of all the papers in its treatment of rationality, conduct is viewed in relation to the agent's life plans. This essay suggests the urgency of some problems that are often neglected, concerning the determination and weighting of the various elements crucial for judging the rationality of an action. ROBERT AUD! Theory and Decision 20 (1986) 205. ROBERT AUDI ACTION THEOR Y AS A RESOURCE FOR DECISION THEORY Many problems in decision theory intersect problems in action theory. But although this is widely realized, the connections between the two fields have rarely been systematically discussed in the literature. This essay will attempt to articulate some of those connections and a number. of important problems they raise. The general topic is large, and I shall have to work with simple decision-theoretic models and to restrict my attention chiefly to normative decision theory as applied to individual decision. Some implications for group decision theory, and for empirical issues concerning decision, should be apparent; but my main focus will be on individual cases, particularly in relation to standards of rationality. Let us begin with an elementary decision-theoretic model which, whatever difficulties it may raise, represents a major normative ideal. On this model, an action is rational if and only if it maximizes the agent's expected utility, and a decision is rational if and only if the action which it is a decision to perform maximizes the agent's expected utility. Now while we cannot explore many interpretations of this model, there are some useful questions suggested by approaching it from an action-theo retic point of view. One question is how to characterize the alternatives among which the agent, S, decides. Still another concerns what causal conditions the model imposes; and a third concerns how the psychological sources of utilities and probabilities are to be construed. This section will take these questions up in turn. From an action-theoretic point of view, we should distinguish be havioral choice and decision from psychological choice and decision. S behaviorally decides between alternative actions A and B provided (roughly speaking) that he simply performs one with a sense of the other Theory and Decision 20 (1986) 207-221. © 1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company. 208 ROBERT AUDI as also possible for him. Here deciding is roughly equivalent to a kind of doing. It thus represents an action-token, which has a definite time and place and is presumably some kind of particular. On the other hand, S psychologically decides between A and B provided (roughly speaking) that he makes up his mind to perform one, with a sense of the other as also possible for him. Here the deciding is a mental event (though not necessarily in a sense inconsistent with materialism), and making a decision in this sense does not even require that either A or B is possible: one can decide· to A, even rationally decide to A, so long as one takes A to be possible for one. In both cases, the object of decision is an action-type, e.g. accepting an invitation; but while behavioral decision entails the tokening of the relevant type, that is not so for psychological decision. Action-types are properties, since, unlike action-tokens, they may be instantiated by different agents and at different times; and they may be objects of a decision without being realized by it. How might the distinction between behavioral and psychological de cision be reflected in the formulation of the maximization of expected utility model? Both sorts of decision should be accounted for, since, in guiding our future behavior, we need criteria for what it is rational to decide to do, while in assessing past or present behavior we need criteria for rationally doing something. Perhaps one could start with a formu lation like this: An action-type, A, is rational, for S, if and only if his performing it has at least as much expected utility as his performing any alternative S believes he has; i.e., if we add the products of the values, for S, of each outcome of A which he takes to be possible, times the probability he assigns to that outcome given his A-ing, we get at least as high a sum as the same method yields for any alternative he believes he has in the situation of decision. As used here, 'outcome' applies to what is entailed by, or directly involved in, A-ing, as well as what is caused by it, since we surely want to account for any intrinsic value S may take A -ing to have. If we adopt this formulation, however, we are committed to holding that an action-type might be rational for S even if it is not possible for him, indeed, even if it is not possible for anyone. A natural restriction here is to require that A range over actions possible for S. Even then there may be actions possible for S such that (a) he does not believe they are possible for him, yet (b) his performing them would in fact conduce more to what he values than any action possible for him which he believes he ACTION THEORY AS A RESOURCE FOR DECISION THEORY 209 can perform. Such an action might be called objectively more rational for S. But I prefer to say that, while it may be objectively better, it need not be more rational, e.g. because relative to what S can be expected to believe, he takes account of all the possible actions one could reasonably expect him to consider. Supposing we do relativize rational action to those actions that are both possible for S and so regarded by him, how would the· resulting model apply to behavioral decision (as a special case of action)? The view which comes most readily to mind is that an action-token, including decisions as a special case, is rational for S if and only if the token represents a type which is rational for S in the sense of maximizing expected utility as just described. This thesis, or views roughly equivalent to it, seems to be commonly held, at least as an idealization. But even qualified versions of the thesis may be criticizable because they do not require an appro priate connection between the action-token in question and the psychol ogical elements in the agent - above all his values and beliefs - that are the source of the expected utility. I have elsewhere argued that unless such psychological elements can explain an action-token, then it is not rational in the light of them: specifically, both for actions and for propositional attitudes, rationality in the light of a reason - such as the action's maximizing expected utility - apparently requires its explainability in terms of that reason.1 For instance, one's accepting a conference invi tation is rational in virtue of one's assigning it higher expected utility than any alternative one supposes one has (e.g. declining), only if one's values underlying that assignment are a reason why (an explanatory reason) one accepts it. Otherwise, the assignment simply provides a rationalization for accepting; and if the action is rational, it must be so on another basis, e.g. because it is explained by a desire to see one's children on the same trip. If the view of rational action (tokens) that I am proposing is correct, what is the appropriate response from the point of view of incorporating the relevant action-theoretic result into at least some decision-theoretic models? The maximization of expected utility model is not usually stated with an explanatory condition (broadly, a causal condition) requiring that the agent's reasons for the action - the psychological sources of its expected utility - explain it. This is perhaps because the main focus in discussions of normative decision theory has been prospective: on what it is rational 210 ROBERT AUDI for 8 to decide, where the decision has not occurred. What I suggest is that we distinguish two versions of the model. We may then say that the model without the causal condition provides a criterion for an action's being rationalfor 8 to perform, and hence a rational object of choice (or decision), whereas with the causal condition it provides a criterion for 8's having rationally acted. In the action-theoretic terminology we are using, one might say that the former criterion applies to action-types, and tells us when a type of action, say accepting a conference invitation, is rational for 8; whereas the latter criterion applies to action-tokens, and tells when an action actually carried out, such as Jane's accepting a particular invitation, is rationally performed. The latter criterion, moreover, is more relevant to empirical decision theory; for if a theory of decision is to help us understand people's actual decision-making, surely the factors in terms of which it evaluates a decision should have at least some significant explanatory role in relation to the action. On both interpretations of the maximization model, the basis of assessment is standardly taken to consist of two sorts of variables: subjective probabilities and subjective utilities. This leads to an important question about how to interpret the psychological foundations of decision theory. Are these variables identical with, or at least functions of, the sorts of common-sense explanatory concepts which are a main concern of action theory? Since my chief aim here is to connect decision theory with action theory, I shall simplify matters by discussing only two of the major common-sense explanatory concepts central in action theory, believing and wanting. My main question here is simply whether those concepts are useful for decision theory or are instead eliminable in favor of some available alternatives. Let us start with subjective probabilities. One can ascertain these in a number of ways, including asking a suitably informed subject to assign probabilities to outcomes. But plainly when 8 does that (sincerely) he is expressing a belief. At the very least, then, the relevant SUbjective proba bilities seem to be determined by 8's beliefs, even if subjective probability is not itself a kind of belief. If beliefs are what (at least mainly) determines subjective probabilities, then the concept of belief is important for at least elementary decision theory. Is there a better substitute among cognitive concepts? I doubt that there is at present, though recent developments in cognitive psychology suggest that alternatives may be forthcoming.2 ACTION THEORY AS A RESOURCE FOR DECISION THEORY 211 Action theory is one major source of clarification of the concept of belief; epistemology is another, and in both areas some of the literature might bear on developing the psychological foundations of decision theory. 3 Assuming, then, that the concept of belief is important, and possibly at present essential, for decision theory, what about the concept(s) crucIal for understanding subjective value? A natural move is t.o use a kind of belief, such as evaluative belief, for this task, and thereby simplify decision theory by employing only one basic psychological concept. Thus, the subjective value of something might appear to be a function of how good the person in question believes it to be. There is no doubt a sense of 'subjective value' for which this is true, though my own position is that such beliefs express a valuation S places on the thing in question, as opposed to how much he values it. In any case, I suspect that if such beliefs can serve the purposes of decision theory, it is only because they imply wanting. I have two main reasons for saying this. First, if S believes an outcome to be good, but (as seems jointly possible) in no sense wants it, it is by no means clear that acting to bring it about is rational for him, though it is to be sure not plausibly said to be irrational either: if, as I do, we consider 'rational' and 'irrational' contraries, then (as I would view it) it simply is not rational. His wanting to bring it about might still be rational; but unless rationality is un derstood narrowly, say, as what is required by moral standards, it is implausible to suppose even that it must be rational for him to want to bring it about. In any event, this is not what we must suppose on the basis of the strong association between rational self-interest and decision theoretic rationality. My second point is that unless we take evaluative belief to imply some degree of wanting, we seem unwarranted in assuming an explanatory connection between (a) the elements in terms of which, on the evaluative belief interpretation of the maximization model, an action is rational, and (b) the occurrence of the action (a connection which Hempel, 1965, 463-487, and others, have been at pains to preserve). Without this connection, decision-theoretic rationality implies nothing definite about how a rational action is to be explained, and is consistent with its being explained in a way that would undermine its rationality: e.g., as wholly a result of a posthypnotic suggestion which (1) just happens to dictate the same action that maximizes expected utility, such as submitting a paper,
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