A Three-Dimensional Voting System in Hong Kong

0.16 MB·

by  Wai-Shun Cheung

A Three-Dimensional Voting System in Hong Kong
Wai-Shun Cheunga andTuen-Wai Ngb,
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a,bDepartmentofMathematics,
TheUniversityof HongKong,
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Pokfulam,HongKong.
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E-mailaddress: [e-mail], [e-mail]

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Abstract
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The voting system in the Legislative Council of Hong Kong (Legco)

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is sometimes unicameral and sometimes bicameral, depending on whether
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. the bill is proposed by the Hong Kong government. Therefore, although
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without any representative within Legco, the Hong Kong government has
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1 certain degree of legislative power — as if there is a virtual representative
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5 of the Hong Kong government within the Legco. By introducing such a
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7 virtualrepresentative oftheHongKonggovernment, weshowthatLegcois
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. athree-dimensional voting system. Wealso calculate two power indices of
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theHongKonggovernment through thisvirtual representative andconsider
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theC-dimensionandtheW-dimensionofLegco. Finally,someimplications
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i ofthis Legcomodel to thecurrent constitutional reform inHong Kongwill
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r begiven.
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*Correspondingauthor. Departmentof Mathematics, TheUniversityofHongKong, Pokfulam,
HongKong. Tel:[phone];fax[phone]. E-mailaddress: [e-mail](T.W.
Ng).
Keywordsandphrases: (A)Gametheory;Realvotingsystem;Dimension;Powerindices.
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1 Introduction
The voting system used in the Hong Kong LegislativeCouncil (Legco) is unique
within the current, global range of electoral systems because it is sometimes uni-
cameral and sometimes bicameral, depending on whether the bill is proposed by
thegovernmentoftheHong KongSpecial AdministrativeRegion (HKSAR). Be-
cause of this special feature, it would be interesting to study this voting system
from the mathematical point of view. In this article, we shall construct a mathe-
maticalmodelofthisvotingsystemandconductadetailedmathematicalanalysis
of it. For example, we shall measure the complexity of the voting mechanism of
Legcoby computingitsdimension.
ItwasproposedinTaylor(1995)thatdifferentvotingsystemscanbeclassified
by their dimensions. We shall state the precise definition of the dimension of a
voting system in the next section but it is easier to grasp the idea by considering
some examples. The usual unicameral system in which the bills will be passed
by a simple majority vote of the members is a one dimensional voting system.
Bicameral legislatures require a concurrent majority to pass legislation are two
dimensionalvotingsystems. In 1995,Alan D. TaylormentionedinTaylor(1995)
that he did not know any real-world voting system of dimension 3 or higher and
thispointwas reiterated in page255ofthesecond editionofTaylor(1995). Such
a real-world voting system of dimension 3 was first provided by Josep Freixas in
2004. He showed in Freixas (2004) that the dimension of the European Union
Council under the Nice rules (since 2000) is 3. In this article, we shall show that
the voting system of Legco (since 1998) is also of dimension 3. So we have two
verydifferent real votingsystemsofdimension3.
2
By 2014, Legco consists of two groups of legislators: one group comprising
35membersselectedinthefunctionalconstituenciesandtheothergroupcompris-
ing the remaining 35 members elected by universal suffrage in the geographical
constituencies. Abouthalfofthe35functionalconstituenciesseatsgotobusiness
sectors, about one-third belongs to sectors for professionals and the rest are for
representativesofsocial organizationsordistrictcouncils. Fora detailed analysis
ofthefunctionalconstituencies,seeLohet al. (2006)and Ma(2009).
SincethehandoverofHongKongin1997,inordertostrengthentheexecutive
dominanceoverthelegislature,theBasicLaw(theconstitutionaldocumentforthe
HKSAR)requiresthepassageofmotions,billoramendmentstogovernmentbills
introduced by legislators to pass by the concurrent majorities of two groups. On
the other hand, motions, amendments to motions, bills and amendments to bill
raised by the Hong Kong government only need a simple majority vote of the
memberspresent topass.
Therefore,Legcoissometimesunicameralandsometimesbicameral,depend-
ing on whether the bill is proposed by the Hong Kong government. This unique
feature of Legco makes the computation of the dimension of it a non-trivial task.
For example, given a coalition of 35 members from the geographical constituen-
cies and 2 members from the functional constituencies, there is no way to tell if
it is a winning coalition or a losing coalition (unless you know if the bill is pro-
posed by the Hong Kong government). To overcome this difficulty, we introduce
avirtualrepresentativeoftheHongKonggovernment,whichwillvoteforabillif
itisproposedbythegovernmentbutagainstabillotherwise. Tobemoreprecise,
the 35 members from geographical constituencies are numbered 1,...,35, the 35
members from functional constituencies are numbered 36,...,70, and the virtual
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member(thegovernment)isnumbered71. Then,acoalitionorsubsetS oftheset
1,2,...,70,71 isawinningcoalitionifand onlyif
{ }
(a) 71 S and S 1,...,70 36, or
∈ | ∩{ }| ≥
(b)71 < S, S 1,...,35 > 18 and S 36,...,70 > 18.
| ∩{ }| | ∩{ }|
whereV U istheintersectionofthetwocoalitionsV andU and U isthenumber
∩ | |
ofmembersinthecoalitionU.
With thismathematical modelof Legco, thevotingsystem ofLegco becomes
a simple game (see the definition in the next section) and it is now possible to
computethedimensionofLegco whichwillturn outtobe3 (seesection3).
Although there is no representative of the government of HKSAR in Legco,
this voting system has given the Hong Kong government a certain degree of leg-
islative power. With the introduction of member 71, the virtual representative of
the government, we can then calculate various power indices of the Hong Kong
governmentwithinLegcoandcompareitspowerwiththatofanyindividualLegco
member. This will be done in section 4. Finally, in section 5, we shall discuss
some implications of our mathematical analysis of Legco to the current constitu-
tionalreform inHongKong.
2 Dimension of a simple game
Definition1. A(monotonic)simplegameoravotingsystemisapair(N,v)where
N = 1,...,n is the set of players and v : 2N 0,1 is the characteristic
{ } → { }
functiondefined on thepowerset 2N of N, which satisfies v(φ) = 0, v(N) = 1 and
v(S) v(T)wheneverS T. AcoalitionofplayersS N iswinningifv(S) = 1
≤ ⊆ ⊆
and losingifv(S) = 0.
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Aweightedmajoritygameisasimplegamewhichcanberealizedbyavector
(w ,...,w )togetherwithathresholdqwhichmakestherepresentation[q;w ,...,w ]
1 n 1 n
insuch away thatS isawinningcoalitionifand onlyif w q.
j S j
∈ ≥
P
A weighted m-majority game is a simple game which can be expressed by m
realizations[qi;wi,...,wi],1 i m,insuchawaythatS isawinningcoalition
1 n ≤ ≤
if and only if wi qi for all 1 i m. So a weighted m-majority gamecan
j∈S j ≥ ≤ ≤
P
be considered as an intersection of m weighted majority games and we can also
represent itby an amalgamatedmatrix
q1; w1 w1
1 ··· n
 . . 
qm.. ; wm1 ··· w..mn.
Everyweightedmajoritygameisobviouslya(monotonic)simplegame. How-
ever, the converse is in general not true and we shall see in the next section that
thevotingsystemofLegcoisnotaweightedmajoritygame. Toshowthatcertain
voting system cannot be realized as a weighted majority game, it would be use-
ful to know that any weighted majority game must be swap robust, namely, for
any two winning coalitions S and S in a weighted voting system, if we make a
′
one-for-one exchange of players, then at least one of the two resulting coalitions
must still be a winning coalition (see Taylor (1995)). Here one of the players in
theswap mustbelongtoS butnotS , andtheothermustbelongto S but notS.
′ ′
Eventhoughnotany simplegameis aweightedmajoritygame,itwas proved
inTaylor(1995)thateverysimplegamecanberealizedasaweightedm-majority
game. Thesmallestsuch possiblem iscalled thedimensionofthegame.
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The computation of the dimension of a simple game has been proved to be a
hard computational problem (see Deineko and Woeginger (2006)), thus our cal-
culationisacomplextaskwhichwillbedonebycombinatorialargumentsforthe
particularvotingsystemathand. Thedimensionofothercomplexvotingsystems
using combinatorial arguments were studied quite recently in Freixas and Puente
(2008).
However,eveniftwogamesareofthesamedimension,theymaynotbeequiv-
alent. In the literature, different types of dimensions have been introduced (see
Freixas and Marciniak (2009)). Before giving their definitions, we need to intro-
duce two orderings related to the power of individual members in a game (see
Carreras and Freixas (2008)).
For any i, j N, we say that i j if for any U N such that i, j < U, we
D
∈ ≤ ⊂
haveU j isawinningcoalitionwheneverU i is. Agameiscompleteif
D
∪{ } ∪{ } ≤
istotal. It isknownthatagameis completeifand onlyifit isswap robust.
An i N is crucial in a winning coalition U if U i is no longer winning.
∈ \ { }
Wesaythati jifthenumberofwinningcoalitionsofsizekcontainingiwithi
d
≤
crucial is smallerthan or equal to the numberof thosecontaining j with j crucial
forall1 k n. A gameis weaklycompleteif istotal.
d
≤ ≤ ≤
Every simple game can be realized as an interaction of a finite number of
complete games, the smallest possible number is called the C-dimension of the
game. Likewise, every simple game can be realized as an interaction of a finite
numberofweakly completegames,thesmallestpossiblenumberiscalled theW-
dimensionofthegame. Foradetailedanalysisofvarioustypesofdimensions,we
refer thereaders toFreixas and Marciniak (2009).
Every weighted game is complete and every complete game is weakly com-
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plete(see Carreras and Freixas (2008)). Hence,
1. W-dimension(v) C-dimension(v) dimension(v)forall simplegamev;
≤ ≤
2. if the simple game v is weighted, then dimension(v) is 1 and hence both
W-dimension(v)andC-dimension(v)are equalto 1;
3. if the simple game v is complete, then C-dimension(v) is equal to 1 and
thereforeW-dimension(v)is alsoequal to1.
3 Hong Kong Legco System
Recall that the Legco members are divided into two groups: half of the mem-
bers are returned by geographical constituenciesthrough direct elections, and the
otherhalfbyfunctionalconstituencies. On thewritingofthisarticle, thereare 70
members in thecurrent fifth term Legco (2012-2016). The compositionof Legco
beyond the third term is not specified in the Basic Law (the constitutional docu-
ment for the Hong Kong Special AdministrativeRegion). However, article 68 of
theBasic Lawrequires that
“ThemethodforformingtheLegislativeCouncilshallbespecifiedinthelight
of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in
accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimateaim
istheelectionofallthemembersoftheLegislativeCouncilbyuniversalsuffrage.”
While the Basic Law now no longer expressly dictates the formation of the
fifth term Legco of HKSAR in the year 2012, in December 2007, the Standing
CommitteeofNationalPeople’s Congress (SCNPC) decidedthat
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“The ratio of functional constituency members to geographical constituency
membersshallnotbechangedandtheproceduresforvotingonbillsandmotions
intheLegislativeCouncilshallremain unchanged.”
The details of the decisions of SCNPC in December 2007 can be found in
http://www.legco.hk(theofficial websiteofHongKongLegislativeCouncil).
In view of the aboveconstraints on the pace of constitutionalreform in Hong
Kong, it makes sense to assume that Legco has 2n legislative members, say rep-
resented by 1,...,2n, with n an arbitrary positive integer. We further assume that
among the 2n Legco members, the first n members are returned by geographi-
cal constituencies through direct elections, while the remaining n members are
returned byfunctionalconstituencies.
Wealso assumethatabillwillbepassed if
(a) the bill is proposed by the Hong Kong governmentand it is supported by a
simplemajorityinLegco;or
(b) the bill is proposed by a Legco member and it is supported by a simple
majorityin each ofthetwogroups.
Finally, we again introduce a virtual representative of the Hong Kong gov-
ernment (denoted by 2n + 1), which will vote for a bill if it is proposed by the
governmentbutagainstabillotherwise. NowwecanreformulateLegcoasasim-
plegameofsize2n+1.
Definition 2. Legco of size 2n is a (monotonic) simple game of 2n + 1 players
1,...,2n+1, such thatS is awinningcoalitionifoneofthefollowingholds:
(a) 2n+1 S and S 1,...,2n n+1
∈ | ∩{ }| ≥
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(b) 2n+1 < S and S 1,...,n > n and S n+1,...,2n > n.
| ∩{ }| 2 | ∩{ }| 2
Ourfirst resultisa comparisonofpowersamong individuals.
Proposition1.
(a) j = k forany1 j,k n orn+1 j,k 2n.
D
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
(b) 1 = n+1 but1 andn+1are not D-comparable.
d
(c) When nis even, j < 2n+1 forany1 j 2n.
D
≤ ≤
(d) Ifn is oddand n > 4, then j and 2n+1 are notd-comparableforany1 j
≤ ≤
2n.
Proof. (a)and (b)are trivial.
For (c) and (d), we assume j = 1. Consider U = n + 1,...,2n . Obviously
{ }
(P): U 2n+1 iswinningbut U 1 isnot.
∪{ } ∪{ }
(c) Supposen iseven. IfS 1 is winningforsomecoalitionS = 1, then
∪{ }
S 1,...,n n and S n+1,...,2n 1 n +1.
| ∩{ }| ≥ 2 | ∩{ − }| ≥ 2
Thus S n + 1 and hence S 2n + 1 is a winning coalition. Therefore
| | ≥ ∪ { }
1 2n+1.
D
≤
Togetherwith(P), wehave1 < 2n+1.
D
(d)Supposenisodd. WehaveS = 1,...,(n+1)/2 n+1,...,(3n+1)/2
{ }∪{ }
which is a winning coalition of size n+1 with 1 crucial, but there is no winning
coalition of size n + 1 with 2n + 1 crucial. On the other hand, from (P), clearly
there are less winning coalitions of size 2n with 1 crucial then those with 2n +1
crucial. Therefore, wehave1 and2n+1are notd-comparable. (cid:4)
Ourfirst mainresultis thefollowing
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Theorem 1. Legco of size 2n is of dimension 1 if n = 1 or 2, of dimension 2 if
n = 3 or 4,andof dimension3 ifn 5.
≥
Proof. Forn = 1or2,Legcoisofdimension1asonecancheckeasilythatLegco
ofsize2isrealizedby[2;1,1,0]andLegcoofsize4isrealizedby[4;1,1,1,1,1].
Soweshallletn 3andweshalluse x and x todenotethegreatestinteger
≥ ⌊ ⌋ ⌈ ⌉
lessthan orequal to x and theleast integergreaterthan orequal to x respectively.
Recall thatLegcoisofdimension1meansthatitisaweightedmajoritygame
(whichmustbeswaprobust). LetS = 1,..., n/2 , n/2 +1,n+1,...,n+ n/2 ,n+
{ ⌊ ⌋ ⌊ ⌋ ⌊ ⌋
n/2 +1 andS = 1,..., n/2 , n/2 +2,n+1,...,n+ n/2 ,n+ n/2 +2 . Then
′
⌊ ⌋ } { ⌊ ⌋ ⌊ ⌋ ⌊ ⌋ ⌊ ⌋ }
bothofthemarewinningcoalitionsofLegco. Nowifweswap n/2 +1inS with
⌊ ⌋
n+ n/2 +2 inS , then wegetthefollowingtwocoalitions
′
⌊ ⌋
1,..., n/2 ,n+1,...,n+ n/2 ,n+ n/2 +1, n/2 +2
{ ⌊ ⌋ ⌊ ⌋ ⌊ ⌋ ⌊ ⌋ }
and
1,..., n/2 , n/2 +1, n/2 +2,n+1,...,n+ n/2 .
{ ⌊ ⌋ ⌊ ⌋ ⌊ ⌋ ⌊ ⌋}
Sincebothofthemarelosingcoalitions,Legcoisnotswaprobust. Hence,for
n 3, Legco of size 2n cannot be of C-dimension 1 and of dimension 1 as it is
≥
notswap robust.
Forn = 3 or4, Legco is ofdimension2 as onecan check easily that Legco of
10;2,2,2,3,3,3,1
size6canberealized by andLegcoofsize8canberealized
15;2,2,2,2,3,3,3,3,140;3,3,3,2,2,2,1
by .
15;3,3,3,3,2,2,2,2,4
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